Point 5353 and the After Effects of the Kargil War PDF

Title Point 5353 and the After Effects of the Kargil War
Course Indian Government And Politics - I
Institution Christ (Deemed To Be University)
Pages 4
File Size 78.9 KB
File Type PDF
Total Downloads 58
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Summary

Point 5353 and the After Effects of the Kargil War...


Description

UNDERSTANDING THE RELEVANCE OF POINT 5353: THE AFTEREFFECTS OF THE KARGIL WAR

INTRODUCTION

Last year, the country commemorated Vijay Divas, the 20th anniversary of India's victory over Pakistan in the Kargil War. Despite all of India's victories in retaking all of the points taken over by the Pakistani Army, it failed to retake Point 5353, one of the most important areas on the Line of Control (LOC). In 2019, a group of social media activists started questioning Gen. Ved Prakash Mallik (retd), the army chief at the time of the war, about the army's inability to capture the three heights along the Line of Control that are still under Pakistani control.

HISTORY OF THE WAR

Just after the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, both countries have signed the Shimla Agreement as a symbol of peace and harmony. Under this agreement, neither country may cross the Line of Control (LOC) in Jammu and Kashmir in order to prevent a war-like situation. However, on May 3, 1999, a Pakistani incursion was detected in Kargil, within about 10 days, the Pakistanis had infiltrated the Dras, Kaksar, and Mushkoh areas. The Indian Army was alerted, and an air attack was launched against those infiltrators. Over the course of two months, the Indian army was successful in recapturing Tiger Hill, Tololing, Dras, and Batalik. The Indian government has released documents demonstrating Pakistan's involvement in the conflict. The Kargil clashes were officially declared over on July 26th.One other significant observation is that most of the outposts taken over by the Pakistani Forces were bounded by the Line of Control (LOC), so they never managed to cross the LOC fluidly, consequently upholding the Shimla Agreement. In the

midst of it all, the Indian Army left a small blemish on history: Point 5353, a vital landmark that they attempted but failed to capture.

UNDERSTANDING THE UNKNOWN

Once the war was proclaimed, the Vajpayee state granted the army direct instructions that no matter what else happens, soldiers and airliners had to complete their missions without crossing the LOC. This situation made fighting more difficult and may have been the prime cause for the inability to reclaim Point 5353.. Point 5353 was located just east and behind Tiger Hill, connected by a tract known as Sando Gully to the Mushkosh village of Holiyal, where an empty primary school served as the battalion's forward operating base. The operation's commanding officer also stated that Point 5353 had been retaken in order to block the enemy's view of Highway 1D. When a troop was attacking Tiger Hill and Tololing, a few Pakistani soldiers opened fire from Point 5353, which was promptly reported to authorities. Satellite images proving that the enemy had captured the post were provided to back up this claim.

THE RELEVANCE OF POINT 5353 Point 5353 is the highest point in the Tiger Hill district, with a clear view of National Highway 1D. Although the point is clearly on the India side of the LOC, it is still occupied by the Pakistani army, which has fortified it with reinforced bunkers and built a small transportation route. The key reason why Point 5353 is so valuable to both sides is that it provides a perfect picture of the highway that links Kashmir and Kargil. The primary explanation for the Indian army's retaliation to the Pakistani incursion in 1999 was that any disruption in road traffic would cut off supply to Ladakh and the Siachen Glacier. The artillery observers stationed at the post can shoot on the 25-kilometer stretch without being bothered. Furthermore, the city's most commanding feature commands a commanding view of Tiger Hill and the surrounding areas.

Allowing the enemy to occupy the post would be tantamount to allowing them to blatantly spy on us, which would be beneficial to them if the two countries went to war.

GOVERNMENT’S REACTION

The Vajpayee government was persuaded that the Kargil war's objectives had been fulfilled and emphasised this. Mr. George Fernandes, the then-defense minister, repeatedly said that Point 5353 was on the Line of Control and that no country occupied it. Another contention was that the point is on Pakistani territory, and that in order to seize it, they would have to come from the north, which would necessitate crossing the LoC, which is illegal. The Indian forces then tried to exchange positions on the LoC, with the enemy occupying Point 5353 and the Indian forces occupying Point 5245. This, though, is simply a cover-up used by the government to hide their own mistakes. Point 5245 and Point 5353 are not the same. Prior to this, some attempts were made to drive Pakistani troops back with artillery fire, but it seemed impossible after the 2003 ceasefire, and the government has since given up hope on that post.

THE WAY AHEAD

To investigate the matter, the government should ideally form a new unbiased commission. The committee's recommendations must be carefully debated, and a recommendation on whether or not Point 5353 should be rescinded must be made. If this is the case, so the two countries will resolve it at their next bilateral meeting.In the event that Pakistan is unable to reconcile, India will pursue UN intervention. With the current Kashmir crisis between India and Pakistan, there is always the possibility of war erupting, and it would be important to take over such a significant

post before this occurs. Furthermore, so many soldiers have given their lives in the service of the republic, and this is the very least that can be done to truly honour their sacrifice....


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