POLS 5090 Paper 1 - Grade: B+ PDF

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Paper analysis on the basis of Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend. ...

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1 Eisenman Alyssa Eisenman POLS 5090 Dr. Bowman 8 March 2018 Analysis of Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend The question that is asked when it comes to scientific discovery is not how scientific discovery comes about, but in what ways does scientific discovery come about through the different definitions of science . There are many views as to what science is to be but in relation to Karl Popper , Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend the definition of scientific discovery varies on how exactly you view science ; do you view science as a construct of ever changing paradigm shifts , or do you view science on a philosophical level to show that science is a normal phenomenon that is it lateral . Although there is the spectrum of being a relativist and a positivist, there is a more convincing argument to be a positivist when studying the four philosopher’s positions and theories of science. Overall the theory that comes off of Karl Popper is one that makes the most sense due to other philosophers assessing their arguments off of his , but only having two of the three sticks to adding onto his argument in a positivist standpoint. To begin the argument, I will first examine Karl Popper’s theory of science and how it is defined as the process in which it takes to come up with a new way to come up with an evolving theory, due to his heavy positivist outlook. To begin, Popper had made the argument stating that “the problem of distinguishing science from non-science , is

2 Eisenman the problem of demarcation” (Godfrey-Smith, 58). Popper stated that in order to test what is science and not science there would be a need for a way to falsify a theory . In order to do so, Popper argues that to have a solution to demarcation , we would need falsifiable, which “claims that a hypothesis is only scientific if and only if it has the potential to be refuted by some possible observation ” (Godfrey-Smith, 58). Popper uses the falsifiability claim to be able to show that the scientific process has two steps : conjecture and the state of refutation . This process is one that describes the making of a hypothesis by a scientist and using critical testing to falsify the hypothesis ; if we are able to see that an apple is not an apple then it is not an apple . Through this view we are able to see that Popper uses seeing a distinct method of sense to determine that the hypothesis is not correct and deeming it false . Popper had established a positivist view as to how science works, through falsifying a hypothesis, but Thomas Kuhn views his demarcation theory as one closely similar to Popper , but as a further explanation to science historically. Thomas Kuhn, is a theorist that believes he was siding with Popper but is one that came off in his theory of scientific discovery as a relativist due to his way of thinking. Kuhn had started in his theory that there is a relative definition to what ‘normal science’ is before going on to continue with his theory : “normal science means research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements , achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practices” (Kuhn, 10). The definition of normal science leads into Kuhn ’s argument for scientific methods of describing what a paradigm is within his theory ; he

3 Eisenman describes a paradigm as a challenge to the original paradigm that has come about in scientific discovery. In simpler terms the original paradigm is the hypothesis that is challenged and instead of being falsified , like in Popper’s theory, Kuhn states that the paradigm is shifting to allow for the original paradigm to be expanded . The next aspect to Kuhn’s argument is that a paradigm is one that can be expanded upon to grow the original paradigm without falsifying it, but it can only be done laterally. In other words, a paradigm can be determined without rationalization due to it being a tool within scientific discovery (Kuhn , 44). Kuhn continues to further his argument for paradigm shift through anomalies , which he describes as a complete shift in the paradigm that is to change it completely . An anomaly is the questioning of a paradigm to the extent to see where the shift would come about; thus, this would allow for new paradigm to emerge (Kuhn , 68). Thomas Kuhn had taken the theory of paradigm shifting to allow for new paradigms to grow off of the original paradigm , but he had looked at it from a historical aspect that had allowed for Popper to not view his argument as a positivist one, but as a relativist argument that doesn ’t align with his own. Popper, after reading Kuhn’s scientific revolution theory , does not believe that it aligns with his argument for demarcation , rather it paints it in the wrong light. Popper believes that Kuhn views his theory by picking and choosing what parts of his argument align with his own, not fully looking into the context of theories being falsified ; instead Kuhn, in Popper’s terms, “has been taught in a dogmatic spirit: he is a victim of indoctrination. He has learned a technique which can be applied without asking for the reason why” (Popper, Normal Science is Dangerous, 53). Unlike Kuhn, Popper would

4 Eisenman want to test the hypothesis that has come about, making science happen through trial and error; Popper sees this as Kuhn not wanting to learn about new scientific discoveries, but rather he is wanting to see his ‘paradigms’ shift than be found to be wrong. Popper views Kuhn’s historical sociological/psychological theory as one that doesn’t account for the true scientific process of seeing theories fail through testing and making new conjectures out of the failures . Although Popper was critical of Thomas Kuhn ’s theory of scientific revolutions , Peter Godfrey-Smith is also critical of how Popper ’s theory actually works. If we are to test for falsifiability, for example, how are we able to truly see an object if it may not actually be visible to help with the theory of falsifiability? Godfrey-Smith states that in order to just test the theory of falsifiability , we cannot just test one aspect to deem the hypothesis as false, but we would need differentiate the questions that are being asked about the hypothesis to deem it false or not. Godfrey-Smith also points out that the other issue with Popper’s theory is that it does not distinguish the differences between science and pseudo-science to a certain extent (66) . Popper’s theory of demarcation is a black and white theory that doesn ’t allow for anything other than what is directly spelled out in the testing of the theories . Although Popper’s ideas were refuted by Godfrey-Smith, Imre Lakatos is sympathetic to the theory of demarcation but has a similar structure of a theory like Kuhn with his research design. Lakatos’ research design is structured to show a complete theory that refutes the damage that Kuhn had made through the misinterpretation of what happened in the past; there are two characteristics of scientific

5 Eisenman change in Lakatos’ research design: “(1) change within individual research programs, and (2) change at the level of the collection of research programs within a scientific field (Godfrey-Smith, 104). In order for there to be scientific changes the starting point in Lakatos argument is to determine the research program . With the determination there would have to be the hard core and the protective belt to be able to determine the testable aspects of the research program . Although Lakatos was against the theory that Kuhn had come up with, he had the same deduction that research programs would face anomalies that would all for unsolved empirical problems (Godfrey-Smith , 105). Imre Lakatos uses scientific programs to determine , just as Popper did, that theories should not be cast aside when they are too considered to be troubled , as they can be worked on to be pulled out of that stage . Lakatos sympathy to Popper’s demarcation theory is what lead to determining just how to refute Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolution. Lakatos believes that “blind commitment to a theory is not an intellectual virtue ; it is an intellectual crime” (Lakatos, Science and Pseudoscience, 514). He argues that in Popper’s terms, a scientist isn’t just going to give up on their hypothesis just because they decided that it is falsified , but they will take the anomaly and make a hypothesis around it or ignore it; he also states that Kuhn is wrong that there are no boundaries in scientific progress , and that it is to be considered as scientific degeneration . Lakatos states that Popper was right in the virtue of empirical research due to refutations being an aspect of science that will always be there, and that failure will always be there, but the hypothesis will always be remade to work (Lakatos, 517). The issue that Lakatos brings up on Kuhn ’s argument is that he

6 Eisenman didn’t keep the theory of demarcation in mind ; he completely skipped over the idea not thinking that there is a way to falsify a paradigm . Although Lakatos disagrees with Kuhn , he agrees with Popper’s demarcation theory showing that there is a shift in scientific thinking . He states that through research programs if we are able to determine that one program is to suffer defeat, the experiment is still to be considered crucial to having provided information on the program, even if it wasn’t the outcome that was intended for (Lakatos , Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes , 78). Lakatos uses Popper’s theory of demarcation as a standard for helping his research program determine what is a ‘mature science’ and what is a ‘immature science.’ He uses the demarcation theory to determine that ‘mature sciences’ are what are to be used for research programs ; stating that they are novel facts that has a structure of the protective belt to generate science (Lakatos, 79). The theory of demarcation is the movement Lakatos uses to show that science is a process intended to disprove hypothesis and make a new scientific discover, but Paul Feyerabend takes a stance from Kuhn ’s scientific revolutions to describe his theory. Feyerabend describes his theory as epistemological anarchism , which is the rejection of all rules and constraints that are in the process of science (Godfrey-Smith , 111). Feyerabend describes his position as one that moves the logic of science to grow due to it being incommensurable; through scientific discovery we are able to move through creating our own scientific discovery as long as we are testing hypothesis , they shift a hypothesis, much like Kuhn, to make a larger discovery as to what science truly

7 Eisenman is. Thomas Kuhn was his main influence for the theory of epistemological anarchism , as he viewed Kuhn’s work as “a glorifying…mind-numbing routine of normal science” (Godfrey-Smith, 112). Feyerabend’s work was a direct connection to Kuhn ’s thinking due to Feyerabend beginning his argument in Against Methods, chapter 14, with the idea of science in the novel Copernicus. Feyerabend explains the methods in with Copernicus wants to change the way that astrology was studied but does so in a way to show that hypothesis is tested and can be tested and refuted in ways that don ’t have constraints: “Neither new observations nor the inability of Ptolemy to take care of what was known to him are the reasons for Copernicus discomfort. The difficulty lies elsewhere” (Feyerabend, 140). Although the study of Galileo’s science is not the modern study of science today, it still shows that even throughout history scientist, no matter the form of science they are studying , are able to see the differences in ways to rejected structures to studying science. Feyerabend also makes the connection that discovery and criticism go hand in hand with empirical criticism, but criticism only comes after discovery is made : Discovery may be irrational and need not follow any recognized method . Justification, on the other hand—or to use the Holy Word of a different school—criticism , starts only after the discoveries have been made, and it proceeds in an orderly way” (Feyerabend, 147). Through this view scientific discovery does not need to hold onto the value of constraints, but once the discovery has been made there will be criticism to follow the discovery through its methods. He points out that it is easier to have a new theory grow off of the failure of the old theory to see what was wrong ; in other words, it is best to use

8 Eisenman an old theory to see what was wrong with it and create a new theory through the original criticisms (Feyerabend, 153). Although Feyerabend gives a convincing argument following Kuhn ’s theory, there are distinctions that make his relativist theory less plausible than what Popper had first given through his theory of demarcation . Feyerabend, like Kuhn had gone off of a historical over view on the study of science ; he believes that the science of the past is to be considered science, whereas the science of today is to be considered the enemy of scientific freedom (Godfery-Smith, 113). Godfrey-Smith also points out that Feyerabend believes that one’s inclinations are to be let go in the study of science at any time due to science being able to profit from it (Godfrey-Smith , 114). Feyerabend believes that science is a process that derives from natural inclination that should be ignored in order to test the hypothesis, ignoring all aspects of wrong or right. Through all of these authors we are able to see that Kuhn and Feyerabend had a far-fetched view of what scientific study was to be . Karl Popper’s theory of demarcation is the most convincing argument due to it being a logical argument that leads you to figuring out what a true science is . Although Imre Lakatos follows Popper’s logic, there is a point in which Lakatos’ argument grows off of Popper’s but still skews from the original theory of demarcation. Popper’s theory of demarcation doesn’t come off of shift in theories, like Thomas Kuhn, but it proves whether a theory is to be scientific or not; it also does not follow Feyerabend’s theory of throwing out all rational thinking’s when it comes to science, but it uses logical testing to come to a conclusion on whether a

9 Eisenman hypothesis is correct or not. Overall, Karl Popper’s theory of demarcation is the most logical of the four philosophers due to its true scientific structure....