PS2030 - Lecture notes 9 PDF

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Lecture 9: Decision Making and Communication in Groups Lecture Outline: Group polarisation o Evidence o Theories o Applications ‘Groupthink’ o Janis’ model and examples o Evaluating the model Groups Polarization (GP) For Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969) proposed an idea by which something happens to o...

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Lecture 9: Decision Making and Communication in Groups Lecture Outline: - Group polarisation o Evidence o Theories o Applications - ‘Groupthink’ o Janis’ model and examples o Evaluating the model Groups Polarization (GP) For Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969) proposed an idea by which something happens to our attitudes and views when going through a process of group discussion. In particular this event causes attitudes to become more extreme. So group polarization is the phenomenon whereby group discussion typically strengthens the average inclination of group members. When a group’s average attitude is already towards an extreme, the group discussion will push that attitude to the outermost extreme. GP Experiments - A lot of research often focuses on attitude statements o You measure someone’s attitude before going into group discussion and then introduce them in a group discussion on the topic previously measured o You then measure the individual attitudes again and you tend to find this pushing of the attitudes further out towards the extremes § Examples: • Moscovici & Zavalloni (1969) – attitudes to French President and towards Americans o Results showed that polarization works on both positive and negative attitudes • Isozaki (1984) – Japanese students judging guilt of someone accused of a road traffic offence o Results showed that participants in groups who already leant towards thinking that the defendant was guilty would hold those attitudes more strongly after group discussion • Whyte (1993) – groups exacerbate the “too much invested to quit” phenomenon o Results showed that there is a phenomenon where often businessmen and women will feel that they have to stay committed to a decision, even when it does not benefit them financially o He also showed that group discussion amongst board members would strengthen this phenomenon

Everyday group polarisation - We often tend to unconsciously gravitating towards like-minded individuals. o For example, an individual highly interested in politics would most likely have a close circle of friends who were also very much into politics. However, it would be unusual for these friends to hold opposing political views.

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Example Studies: • Maccoby (2002) – Gender differences in children • Internet intensifies polarisation effects (Postmes & Haslam, 2005). The ‘echo chamber’ effect (Barbera et al., 2015) o The idea of the internet echo chamber is similar to the echo in a big empty space: some of our internet behavior essentially leads to us hearing back our own attitudes back. o This is because unconsciously we tend to seek out people online who share the same sorts of attitudes and values as we do. • Wright (2003): The Internet “makes it much easier for small groups to rally like-minded people, crystallize diffused hatred and mobilize lethal force.” o This is one of the consequences of the echo effect. In fact, this is the worrying real-world correlates of everyday group polarization.

Real-worl d examples: in communities o During community conflicts, like-minded people associate together more frequently § Gangs are a great example of community polarization (e.g. Cartwright, 1975): if they are young males and are within the ages of late teens early 20s, this is sometimes via gangs § Researchers have argued that gangs show a pattern in behavior. In fact, you see people do things that they may have never had the courage to do on an individual basis. But in a group yes. • Lykken (1997) o He writes that a gang is much more dangerous than the sum of its individual parts, because together they feel the empowerment that alone they wouldn’t feel. • Veysey & Messner, 1999 o They report that the existence of gangs in neighborhoods is a strong statistical predictor for crime statistics. • Dishion et al., 1999 o This has shown that if you group young adolescent delinquents together, you tend to greatly increase the rate of youth crime in a particular area § Terrorists similarly are a good example – McCauley & Segal (1987; McCauley, 2002) • They raise the question of whether whenever discussing terrorists and their background we aren’t just asking the wrong questions when looking at the flaws within the individual • Maybe we have to look at the organization and the possibility of the individual being intrigued by extreme beliefs and groups. • This may have lead to group polarization

Explaining polarization: Persuasive arguments theory - Burnstein & Vinokur (1977) o An example of what Asch called informational influence § He argued that in order to make sense of the world around us, we look to other people to help understand whether the information we hold about the world is valid or not. o The idea is that group discussion elicits a pooling of ideas, most of which favour the dominant view. § When everyone shares these views, there will be some arguments that are unknown. So as you hear more arguments which support your initial attitude you most likely will consolidate that idea. o Evidence shows that even if people forward their argument without revealing their position on the issue, polarization still happens Social Comparison - This is an example of normative influence à this is a desire we have when we are in a group that we value - Essentially we have a desire to compare our view with the other group members and see how typical our view is: o Before group discussion, people seem to misperceive the group norm o But during group discussion people realise what the group norm is and this leads to want the individuals to re-evaluate and adjust their view so we feel part of the group Self-categorization theory (SCT) - Turner (1985); Turner et al (1987) Kaplan (1989) à he tried to make sense of these two competing explanations and argued that it may be persuasive arguments: o He states that theory is more important in factual domains, whereas social comparison theory comes in more when you have a value driven domain: • Whenever we join a group, we tend to identify within that group, so we tend to act in a different way than we would as an individual outside of the group context. • The key point is that if the group norm is already polarized to an extreme, then the ingroup norm becomes polarized and polarization occurs. • If the group norm is not polarised, then you get convergence to the mean group position o Rupert Brown (1988) – he argues that not all groups making a decision have an obvious outgroup to compare themselves to; thus questions whether SCT works. o SC theorists defend the theory by stating that there doesn’t have to be a concrete outgroup

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Criticisms of polarization research External validity o Rupert Brown (1988) – most experiments use ad-hoc lab groups • The groups are created for the experience and then they are dissolved at the end; not like in real life § Some studies have failed to find polarisation in real decision-making contexts and groups - e.g. Fraser (1974) § Semin & Glendon (1973) - real decision- making bodies § But some externally valid studies have found evidence - e.g. Clement & Sullivan (1970) § Roger Brown (1986) –juries

GROUPTHINK - Janis (1972) Preface: Hand-picked experts discussed plan to invade Cuba, under guidance of JFK. C.I.A. proposal that commandos could capture BOPs, launch raids and encourage civilian revolt. Unity, cohesiveness, respect - JFK leads. Norms re who can ask questions, order of questioning, are rarely broken. - Janis (1972) described the events as one of the "worst fiascoes ever perpetrated by a responsible government" (p.14). ‘A mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action’ (Janis, 1972) - It is difficult to assess the quality of decision-making in terms of outcomes all the time, but one can almost always evaluate the quality of the decision-making process. Janis wrote a book on this topic called Victims of Groupthink: - In this he interviews the people who have made bad decisions and tried to look for the causes and whatnot. - These are case studies of faulty decision-making in groups based on GT o A distorted style of thinking that renders members incapable of making a rational decision. - He argued that after studying a faulty group decision making you can identify a syndrome called groupthink: o This is a syndrome that creates a distorted styler of thinking that renders people incapable of making rational decisions. - As it is a syndrome it therefore has causes, symptoms and possible treatments GT Symptoms - Personal pressure - Self-censorship - ‘Mindguards’ o Apparent unanimity à due to the three ‘symptoms’ above it seems that there is unanimity, however this is not the case. - Illusions of invulnerability - Illusions of morality - Biased perceptions of the out-group - Defective decision-making strategies

Causes of GroupThink Cohesiveness o People refrain from speaking out because hey do not want to disrupt the cohesiveness of the group - Isolation o All the decisions are made behind closed doors, there is not interaction with the public domain thus there is a risk of isolating not only from the public but also from the public’s ideas which may be dangerous - Leadership o Whenever there is an autocratic leader, it creates pressure I the group to conform with the leader’s views - Decisional stress o Whenever decisions are taken under circumstances of time pressure or stress in general, there is the possibility of GT. -

Group think example: March 27, 1977: world’s worst aviation disaster - During a foggy day, a KLM 747 begins take off roll at Tenerife’s Los Rodeos airport while a Pan-Am 747 is still taxiing at other end of runway o The KLM 747 takes off before the control tower had given them clearance, thus while the Pan-Am 747 was still taxiing at the other end of the runway - A total of 583 people died Many of the groupthink symptoms and causes are present: - A cohesive group was present of the KLM 747 à the pilot, co-pilot and engineer - Additionally, this group had a very influential leader o The captain of that flight was one of the airline’s main captains, with many hours experience o He trained new pilots - This caused a norm of not questioning the leader, especially based on who the captain was in this case. - Decisional stress o The fog had created delays which had caused the maximum number of hours to fly to nearly finish. This would have increased the cost of transferring passengers. - Illusion of unanimity CRM o This is because the flight engineer and co-pilot only mildly protested at the captain’s decision to take off Preventing Groupthink: The Cuban Missile Crisis (Oct. 1962) - Regarded by many as the closest the world has approached to nuclear war: o Cubans were creating missile sites on Cuban grounds in partnership with the Russians o USA decided to place a naval blockade around Cuba, as the missiles had to come by sea from Russia. The naval blockade would have stopped them - Janis interviewed the individuals that took part of the missile crisis to see how they reacted differently: o Overall, there was a limiting of premature seeking of concurrence: § New ideas welcomed § JFK refused to state his opinion and discouraged deferen

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Split into 2 groups to work on options separately and then brig everyone back together to share their views § He overcame the isolation of the group by inviting outside expert opinions JFK gave Robert Kennedy the role of Devil's advocate: o He was the given the role of when people put forward an idea to always encourage that, the other side of the argument was discussed.

Case Study: The Challenger Disaster à Moorhead, Ference & Neck, 1991 - The Challengert was launched on Jan 28, 1986, with a temperature in mid- 20s F (considered a very low temperature) - 73 seconds after the launch the Challenger exploded, killing all 7 astronauts - The Presidential Commission concluded that the one of the primary contributing causes was a flawed decision-making process o Decision made night before by the Level 1 Flight Readiness Review meeting: § Meetings throughout day and night following an initial decision not to launch due to high crosswinds. § Discussions continued through to about midnight via teleconference and telefax systems connecting Kennedy Space Centre in Florida, Morton Thiokol (MTI) in Utah, Johnston Space Center in Houston and the Marshall Space Flight Center § Highest level of management personnel § At 08:45 on Jan 27, MTI engineers recommended not to launch if temperatures were below 53 degrees F (below any previous Shuttle launch) § So why was 51-L Challenger launched?! Groupthink - Antecedent conditions Cohesive group o People had worked together for many years; they were confident and respected each other; there was a team feeling - Leader preference o 2 top-level managers promoted their pro-launch view in face of opposition - Isolation (from experts) o MTI engineers made their recommendations early in the meeting; top-level decision-making group knew of their concerns but did not meet them directly Groupthink symptoms (1) - Perceived invulnerability o NASA new that the O-rings were a weakness in the shuttle’s design, yet there was a sense of invulnerability that NASA couldn’t lose astronauts because it had not lost an astronaut since 1967 -

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Rationalization o Once the decision to launch was given, rationalization look place and the decision was justified unreasonably o When the engineers raised concerns about the decision they were criticized, and their views were deemed speculative and inconclusive: § “…This was a meeting where the determination was to launch, and it was up to us to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that it was not safe to do so. This is in total reverse to what the position usually is in a preflight conversation or a flight readiness review. It is usually exactly opposite of

that...” – (Report of the Presidential Commissions on the Space Shuttle Accident, 1986, p.93) -

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Morality o There was a sense of morality that the space program was a good thing for the USA Stereotyped views of others o The engineers who were hesitant were ridiculed and stereotyped by the desk managers who were in NASA and were very pro launch Pressure on dissent o A lot of pressure on the individuals who were hesitant as the launch was very wanted Self-censorship o This caused people who were dissent to keep quiet and stop voicing their concerns Mindguarding o Some of the engineers were being taken aside by higher level managers and encouraged them not the share their concerns, thus mindguarding was very present

Evaluating the Groupthink research Reliance on historical record and eye-witness accounts o There is heavy reliance on historical records as well as memories which may be skewed or distorted Is leadership style more important than thought ? (Flowers, 1977). o Maybe leadership is more importance than what Janis argues. In fact, he places more emphasis on cohesiveness rather than leadership as the main issue Vinokur et al. (1985) looked at cohesiveness o Results from experimental groups have shown that cohesive groups make better decisions than groups that are not cohesive Herek et al. (1987) – correlational/archival support o Using archival analysis tried to correlate political decision with the outcome and argued that there is evidence of a correlation between unfavorable political decisions and the presence of group think symptoms o The more groupthink symptoms were present, the more likely the decision was to have a bad outcome Turner et al (1992) – SCT approach o He argues that part of the explanation is to deal with groups perceiving a threat from another group o You may get a groupthink happening more often in a cohesive group but where there is also outgroup threat Not all forms of cohesiveness are detrimental – it is mainly through friendship that problems arise (Bernthal & Insko, 1993) o They argued that cohesiveness isn’t always a problem for groups if it is formed more around mutual admiration based on expertise. The risk arises when the cohesiveness is due to friendship Mullen et al (1994) – meta-analysis of 7 studies (>1,000 participants) o Cohesive groups do make poorer decisions

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o But only when other groupthink symptoms are also present (e.g. decisional stress) o If these other groupthink symptoms are not present, then cohesive groups tended to make better decisions Some evidence that Janis’ distinction between symptoms and causes doesn’t always hold (e.g. Tetlock et al., 1992)

A contemporary study (Forsyth, 2020) Studied media reports of anti- quarantine groups in the U.S. Whenever there is a pandemic there is a history of to Government policy, for example: o During the 1918 flu pandemic there was the anti-mask league o In 1879 there was an Anti-Vaccination Society of America formed to fight against mandatory smallpox vaccination - Now, during the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, thousands of individuals protested in the US against the Covid-19 restrictions: o Blocked access to hospitals o Harassed medical staff o Ridiculed those compliant - For Forsyth this is an example of groupthink: o In fact, large groups can still fall prey to groupthink. o These groups are more based on social identity, shared goals (task cohesion) and ideological commitment than interpersonal ties yet still include groupthink factors - Groupthink factors are present: o Isolation – e.g. echo chamber effect of social media and internet searching (confirmation bias) o Stress – social isolation, illness anxiety, lost income, change to routines o Illusions of morality – talk of constitutional rights et -...