R v Jones; R v Smith - Lecture notes 3 PDF

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R v Jones R v Smith Title/Citation: R v Jones; R v Smith [1976] 1 W.L.R. 672 Parties: Defendants John Jones and Christopher Smith Procedural History: S and J entered a bungalow belonging to S's father and removed two television sets. The father reported to the police that his bungalow had been broken into and the sets stolen. The defendants were arrested after being seen by a police constable driving a car containing the television sets. The trial judge indicted them on a charge of burglary, contrary to section (1) (b) of the Theft Act 1968. The defendants appealed on the question whether a person with a general permission to enter premises can be a trespasser for the purposes of section. Material Facts: John Jones and Christopher Smith, entered a bungalow took away two television sets. Defendant Smith was the son of the owner of the house, Alfred William Smith. Neither of the defendants lived at the house. Smith's father reported to the police that his bungalow had been broken into and two television sets stolen. The defendants were convicted, and each was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment. Question(s) of Law/Issues: Could a person who had a general permission to enter premises of another person be a trespasser under the meaning of section 9 (1) (b) of the Theft Act 1968. Appellants’ and Respondents’ Arguments: Appellants: Defence argues that a person who had a general permission to enter premises of another person cannot be a trespasser. A son to whom a father has given permission generally to enter the father's house cannot be a trespasser if he enters it (even though he had decided in his mind before making the entry to commit a criminal offence of theft against the father once he had got into the house and had entered that house solely for the purpose of committing that theft.) Byrne v. Kinematograph Renters Society Ltd. [1958] F 1 W.L:R. 762. In this case persons had entered a cinema by producing tickets not for the purpose of seeing the show, but for an ulterior purpose. It was held in the action, which sought to show that they entered as trespassers pursuant to a conspiracy to trespass, that in fact they were not trespassers. The important words in the judgment are at p. 776: " They did nothing they

were not invited to do, . . ." That provides a distinction between that case and what we consider the position to be in this case. Reg. V. Boyle [1954] 2 Q.B. 292 In this case and particular the passage at p. 295. He accepts that the trickery cases can be distinguished from such a case as the present because in the trickery cases it can be said that that which would otherwise have been consent to enter was negative by the fact that consent was obtained by a trick. Decision of the Court: Appeal dismissed. Rule(s) of Law: Theft Act 1968, section 9 (1) (b) which is this : " (1) A person is guilty of burglary if— ...(b) having entered any building or part of a building as a trespasser he steals or attempts to steal anything in the building or that part of it or inflicts or attempts C to inflict on any person therein any grievous bodily harm."

Supporting Argument: We do not gain any help in the particular case (Reg. V. Boyle [1954] 2 Q.B. 292 ) from that decision. We were also referred to Reg. v. Collins [1973] Q.B. 100 and in particular to the long passage considering what is involved by the words " the entry must be ' as a trespasser.' " In Hillen and Pettigrew v. LCI. (Alkali) Ltd. [1936] A.C. 65, 69, where Lord Atkin said: “My Lords…this duty to an invitee only extends so long as and so far as the invitee is making what can reasonably be contemplated as an ordinary and reasonable use of the premises by the invitee for the purposes for which he has been invited. He is not invited to use any part of the premises for purposes which he knows are wrongfully dangerous and constitute an improper use. As Scrutton L.J. has pointedly said: ' When you invite a person into your house to use the staircase you do not invite him to slide down the banisters.'”

the mental element of mens rea is essential to the criminal offence.

a person is a trespasser for the purpose of section 9 (1) (b) of the Theft Act 1968 if he enters premises of another knowing that he is entering in excess of the permission that has been given to him, or being reckless as to whether he is entering in excess of the permission that has been given to him to enter. Provided the facts are known to the accused which enable him to realise that he is acting in excess of the permission given or that he is acting recklessly as to whether he exceeds that permission, then that is sufficient for the jury to decide that he is in fact a trespasser. In this particular case, it was a matter for the jury to consider whether it was shown by the prosecution that the defendants entered with the knowledge that entry was against the consent or in excess of the consent that had been given by Mr. Smith to his son....