R v Miller Summary PDF

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A summary of the case R v Miller...

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Presentation: R v Miller [1983] 2 AC 16

• a statement of the relevant facts; A vagrant, the defendant, went to live in an unoccupied house. → One night, he lit a cigarette and lay down on a mattress in the room he was using. → He fell asleep before he had finished the cigarette. → After he fell asleep, the cigarette dropped onto the mattress, setting it alight. → He woke up later when the mattress was smouldering. → He did nothing to extinguish it, and moved to another room. → The house caught fire and damage to the value of £800 was caused.

• the name of the judge at first instance; 1st conviction at Leicester Criminal Court before the recorder Keith Matthewman Q.C.

• the decision at first instance; Charged with arson contrary to s. 1(1) and (3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, for which he was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. “the duty theory” applied - The accused having by his own act started a fire in the mattress which, when he became aware of its existence, presented an obvious risk of damaging the house, became under a duty to take some action to put it out. (but the CoA preferred the continuing act theory subject to a gloss which placed the emphasis upon adoption by the appellant of his previous act.) • the ground of appeal; (grounds of appeal from the first instance)

From his conviction he appealed to the Court of Appeal upon the ground that

the undisputed facts did not disclose any offence under section (1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 . 1.— Destroying or damaging property. (1) A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property belonging to another intending to destroy or damage any such property or being reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged shall be guilty of an offence. (2) A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property, whether belonging to himself or another— (a) intending to destroy or damage any property or being reckless as to whether any property would be destroyed or damaged; and (b) intending by the destruction or damage to endanger the life of another or being reckless as to whether the life of another would be thereby endangered; shall be guilty of an offence. (3) An offence committed under this section by destroying or damaging property by fire shall be charged as arson.

(grounds of appeal from the CoA) 1. The actus reus of the offence now charged as arson consists in destroying or damaging property belonging to another by fire 2. The appellant’s act in lying down on a mattress with a lighted cigarette and the fact of the mattress catching fire do not together or separately amount to the actus reus of arson to the mattress: that fire was innocent 3. After the mattress was on fire the appellant did nothing to destroy or damage the premises by fire 4. There is no liability in criminal law for an omission to act unless there is a legal duty to act imposed either by common law or by statue 5. No statutory provision imposes a duty neglect of which involves criminal liability in the circumstances of this case → 1~5 accepted 6. No common law duty to extinguish an accidental fire or fire innocently started has previously been declared in English law 7. At common law criminal liability for the neglect of a duty has arisen only in cases

of homicide: (where the deliberate or grossly negligent neglect of the life or the health of someone whose care has been undertaken by the defendant results in death.) 8. Accordingly the appellant’s omission to prevent damage to the premises was not a breach of any legal duty and was innocent 9. The continuing act theory is fundamental invasion of the principle “actus non facit reum, nisi mens fit rea” and is not good law 10. The continuing act theory together with the adoption gloss accepted by the Court of Appeal is inappropriate in this case because (a) it involves the fiction that the appellant did an act when in fact he did nothing; (b) it confuses the consequences of an innocent event with a continuing act and penalises the event in the light only of the consequences; (c) it supposes that the appellant adopted the fire on his discovery of it which is an issue of fact never canvassed at trial and is a supposition inconsistent with the proved facts. 11. If, contrary to the appellant’s submission, the principles declared by the Court of appeal are correct in law, the conviction ought nevertheless to be set aside (a) as being unsafe or unsatisfactory in all the circumstances of the case; (b) as based on the wrong decision of the material point of law

• The names of the appellate judges; Ackner and May L.JJ.and Stocker J. (Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)) • the appellate court’s decision on that appeal; Dismissing the appeal, that where a defendant was initially unaware that he had done an act that in fact set in train events which, by the time he became aware of them, would make it obvious to anyone who troubled to give his mind to them that they presented a risk that property belonging to another would be damaged, the defendant was guilty of the offence under section 1 (1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 if, when he did become aware that the events in question had happened as a result of his own act, he did not try to prevent or reduce the risk by his own efforts or if necessary by summoning the fire brigade and the reason why he did not was either because he had not given any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or because having recognised that there was some risk involved he had decided not to try to prevent or reduce it; that accordingly, in the circumstances, the defendant had been rightly convicted (post, pp. 179C-E, F - 180A). • where the case reaches the House of Lords, the names of the judges, the question(s) of general public importance which were certified and the decisions

thereon. Names of the judges: Lord Diplock, Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Bridge of Harwich, Lord Brandon of Oakbrook, Lord Brightman Upon appeal to the House of Lords, Lord Diplock stated I see no rational ground for excluding from conduct capable of giving rise to criminal liability, conduct which consists of failing to take measures that lie within one's power to counteract a danger that one has oneself created, if at the time of such conduct one's state of mind is such as constitutes a necessary ingredient of the offence.

=> actus reus was in fact the set of events, starting with the time the fire was set, and ending with the reckless refusal to extinguish it, establishing the requisite mens rea and actus reus requirements. => Therefore, an omission to act may constitute actus reus. Actions can create a duty, and failure to act on such a duty can therefore be branded blameworthy. Secondly, an act and subsequent omission constitute a collective actus reus. This has been described as the principle of 'supervening fault'....