R v Woollin - case summary PDF

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R v Woollin INTENTION Question of Law The Court of Appeal certified the following questions of general public importance: "1. In murder, where there is no direct evidence that the purpose of a defendant was to kill or to inflict serious injury on the victim, is it necessary to direct the jury that they may only infer an intent to do serious injury if they are satisfied (a) that serious bodily harm was a virtually certain consequence of the defendant's voluntary act and (b) that the defendant appreciated that fact? 2. If the answer to question 1 is 'Yes,' is such a direction necessary in all cases or is it only necessary in cases where the sole evidence of the defendant's A intention is to be found in his actions and their consequence to the victim?" Appellants’ argument Where there isno direct evidence that the purpose of a defendant is to kill or cause g grievous bodily harm, the judge should direct the jury that they must have regard to the defendant's foresight of the consequences of his action as evidence from which they may infer the necessary intent. He must make clear that foresight of consequences, if found to exist, can amount to no more than evidence from which they may infer that the defendant did havethe necessary intent. The question of intent is still a matter of inferencefor the jury, as to a subjective state of mind. If a consequence is virtually certain, the probability, and therefore also the likelihood, of its being foreseen is "little short of overwhelming." Before a jury can infer the necessary intent, they have to be sure that death or serious injury was a virtually certain consequence of the defendant's voluntary act, and that the defendant appreciated that that was the case. Respondent’s argument The foresight of the probability of the prohibited consequence in murder, namely, death or serious injury, does not itself amount to intention but is evidence from which intention may be inferred. It should be explained to them that the greater the probability of a consequence the more likely it is that it was foreseen and that if it was foreseen the greater the probability is that it was also intended. Court’s decision quashed the conviction of murder and substituted a conviction of manslaughter Judgement The appellant lost his temper and threw his three-month-old son on to a hard surface. His son sustained a fractured skull and died. The issue was whether the appellant nevertheless had the intention to cause serious harm. See Reg. v. Nedrick. The judge at trial said… “Jury should be directed that they are not entitled to infer the necessary intention, unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty.” But at the end of this speech, the judge said that if the jury were satisfied the appellant “must have realised and appreciated when he threw that child that there was a substantial risk that he would cause serious injury to it, then it would be open to you to find that he intended to cause injury to the child and you should convict him of murder." appellant's principal ground of appeal was that by directing the jury in terms of substantial risk the judge unacceptably enlarged the mental element of murder. The CoA judge said "although the use of the phrase 'a virtual certainty' may be desirable and may be necessary, it is only necessary where the evidence of intent is limited to the admitted actions of the accused and the consequences of those actions. It is not obligatory to use that phrase or one that means the same thing in cases such as the present where there is other evidence for the jury to consider." R v Nedrick (1) How probable was the consequence which resulted from the defendant's voluntary act? (2) Did he foresee that consequence? If he did not appreciate that death or serious harm was likely to result from his act, he cannot have intended to bring it about

A result foreseen as virtually certain is an intended result. Nedrick does not prevent a. jury from considering all the evidence: it merely stated what state of mind (in the absence of a purpose to kill or to cause serious harm) is sufficient for murder. I would therefore reject the Crown's first argument. I would therefore reject the argument that the guidance given in Nedrick was in conflict with the decision of the House in Hancock. the judge should not have departed from the Nedrick direction. By using the phrase "substantial risk" the judge blurred the line between intention and recklessness, and hence between murder and manslaughter. The conviction of murder must be quashed....