Richard J Evans - Summary The Third Reich in Power, 1933 - 1939 PDF

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Richard J Evans: The Third Reich In Power: How the Nazis Won Over the Hearts and Minds of a Nation. Part of a trilogy. 2006, Penguin Books, London.

p. 7: ‘Hitler had assembled the ideologoy of Nazism from disparate elements of antisemitism, panGermanism, eugenics and so-called racial hygiene, geopolitical expansionism, hostility to democracy, and hostility to cultural modernism’ p. 8: Only won 2.8% of the votes in 1928, right before the Wall Street Crash p. 612: Hitler’s situation with his ministers depended on if they were in his favour at the time and also what position they actually held. Evans lists Agriculture Minister Walther Darre (upper infliction e) as attempting for two years in the later 1930’s to speak to Hitler but never succeeded. Goring, Goebbels and Himmler however often seen frequently. P. 614: Summarising an account by Speer, Evans sums up Hitler as being ‘erratic’, at least in his working habits. Speer said he was mull over issues for weeks before spending a day or two perfecting a solution. ‘In areas where he did take a real interest, he did not hesistate to give a direct lead, even on matters of detail’, Evans was referring more to social policy, such as art and culture, but goes on to say ‘undeniably’ that foreign policy was Hitler’s key interest. P. 615: ‘It was without question Hitler, personally, who drove Germany towards war from the moment he became Reich Chancellor, subordinating every other aspect of policy to this overriding aim and, as we have seen, creating a growing number of stresses and strains in the economy, society and the political system as a result’. – This would be good for the literature review and showing how foreign policy had an impact on social policy as well. Come to think of it, my own personal definition for social and foreign policy might be a good idea. August 1933: ‘he told two visiting American businessmen that he wanted to annex not only Austria, the Polish corridor and Alsace-Lorraine but also the Germany-speakign parts of Denmark, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania’ ‘This meant total German domination over Europe. In the long run, indeed, he intended Germany to dominate the world’. Hitler’s initial aim was ‘to keep Germany’s potential enemies at bay while the country rearmed’ in this period. Pg 617: Bernhard von Bulow as being one of many individuals who were ‘more aggressively inclined’ than those in the 1920’s. Put in power by Reich Chancellor Heinrich Bruning in 1930 (as State Secretary). Pg 618: Diplomats in the Foreign Ministers welcomed the January 1933 regime.

13 March 1933, Bulow submitted a memorandum to Neurath and Blomberg (who were?) detailing how ‘now that reparations had been wound up and the French, British and Americans had ended their military occupation of the Rhineland, should be to get back the territory lost to the Poles in 1918-19, and to incorporate Austria into the Reich. In the immediate future, however, he advised Germany should avoid any aggressive moves until rearmament had restored its strength’ Defence Minister Blomberg wished for conscription in the face of Ernst Rohm (umlaut)’s brownshirt army. Blomberg and the Foreign Ministry went behind Hitler’s back to encourage German representatives at the Geneva International Disarmament Conference (going on since 1932) to take a hard-line against the British and French who had been refusing armament parity to Germany since the start. Blomberg then persuaded Hitler to pull Germany out of the conference 14 October 1933 which Hitler did on the basis that it was his ‘view of the unreasonable, humiliating and degrading demands of the other Powers’ and also stressed his peaceful intentions, and that this on top of Versailles etc. could not be tolerated. 4 weeks later confirmed this was Germany’s belief with a plebiscite, although Evans notes that it was ‘thanks not least to massive intimidation and electoral manipulation’, but does admit on 619 that it would likely have been a vote to withdraw anyway.

Pg 619: Evans calls the withdrawal from the League of Nations ‘the first decisive step’ in Third Reich Foreign Policy. Calsl the Polish non-agg pact of 1934 ‘forced through by Hitler personally over serious reservations on the part of the Foreign Office’. ‘For Hitler, the pact’s advantage was that it covered Germany’s vulnerable eastern flank during the period of secret rearmament, improved trade relations, which were extrememly poor at the time, and provided some security for the free city of Danzig, which was now run by a Nazi local government under League of Nations suzerainty’ ‘The pact could be used to demonstrate to Britain and other powers that Germany was a peaceful nation’, and if it was one pushed through by Hitler in order to hide other goals..well Evans sums it up perfectly ‘The pact was, however, a purely temporary expedient on Hitler’s part: a piece of paper, serving its purpose for the moment, to be torn up without ceremony when it was no longer of any use’ and that ‘there were to be many more like it’. Ribbentrop: 629: Background in Britain, Canada and Switzerland post-education. Also part of the military team at the Peace Conference in 1919 – Diplomatic relations therefore an interest and a familiarty. 630: Hitler supposedly saw him as a ‘man of the world, experience in foreign travel, multi-lingual, socially adept’ which meant that upon his appointment as Chancellor, a position which Ribbentrop was involved in talks with, Ribbentrop was used ‘for special diplomatic missions, bypassing the conservative, routine-bound Foreign Ministry’ – Blomberg not that great then? 631: This perceived competition is evident by Goring and Goebbels dislike of him, for arriving on the scene so late (1932, ref needed). He needed to be in Berlin so as to not be marginalised. ‘he repeatedly told Hitler not to take the possibility of British intervention too seriously. Hitler listened to him’. 633: The decision to remilitarise to Rhienland decided in part by ‘encouraged at every juncture by Ribbentrop, he had made up his mind’ – decided as a result, despite ‘Blomberg and the leading generals were extremely nervous, realizing that the army was still no match for the French should they choose to act’.

645: Mid-1938 Neurath replaced by Ribbentrop ‘who could be trusted far more to do his bidding’...