Title | Session 3 Case Study ALDI in Australia |
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Course | Strategic Management |
Institution | University of Melbourne |
Pages | 20 |
File Size | 1005.8 KB |
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ALDIINAUSTRALIA(2018) 1
TOMOSEGOWITSCH,UNIVERSITYOFMELBOURNE JULY2018
I NTRODUCTION OnalateeveninginearlyJanuary2018,TomDauntnestledbackintohisofficechair.TheCEO ofALDIAustraliahadjustfinishedhis first conferencecallfor theyearwithcorporatehead‐ quartersinGermany.Involuntarilyhereplayedtheconversationinhismind. Afteran exchangeof well‐wishes for the New Year,Daunt hadreceivedplentyof praise from this superiors for the past year. Only weeks earlier, he had attended the opening of the group’s500thstore. ALDIAustralia’sexpansionbeyondtheeasternseaboard wasalsogoing to plan. In 2016 the company had commenced a 120‐store rollout in South Australia and WesternAustralia,thusextendingitscoveragetoall Australianmainland states. The opening ofthefirstset ofstoresinSouthAustraliahadbeenattendedbythestatepremier,whohad toastedALDI’sarrivalandthetimelyboosttoAdelaide’sstrugglingnorthernsuburbs(Interna‐ tional Supermarket News 2016). The Western Australian rollout had commenced a few monthslater.ALDIwaswellontrack to create in excess of 2,000permanent new jobsacross thetwostatesanditssuccesshadattractedplentyofpositivepresscoverage. Lookingback,ALDI’sexpansionintoAustraliawasan unquestionablesuccessstory.Sincear‐ rivingin2001,thecompanyhadgrownintoasignificantplayerintheAustraliansupermarket industry. Towards the end of 2017 the company employed some 11,000 Australians. Reve‐ nues had achieved double‐digit growth in 2017 and exceeded $8b (Chung 2017). Over the yearsALDIhadreceived plenty of praise and goodwill from politiciansand consumer groups forinjectingmuchneededcompetitionintoAustralia’ssupermarketlandscape.Importantly,it hadalsoachieved profitabilitywellwithinthe10‐yeartimewindowinitially setbycorporate headquarters(Anonymous2009). Inrecenttimes,however,anumberofdarkclouds hadappeared onthehorizon.Australia’s dominantgroceryretailers,ColesandWoolworths,hadinitiallybeenslowtoreacttoALDIbut were now fighting back vigorously. Price competition had undoubtedly intensified and the tworetailgiantswere imitatingsomeofALDI’s practices. Addingto Daunt’s worries was the recent arrival of retail powerhouses Amazon and Kaufland, as well as the possible entry of discount competitor Lidl, the group’s closest rival in Europe. Tom Daunt knew he was navi‐ gatingachangingcompetitivelandscapeandhisinstinctstoldhimtosteelhimselffordifficult timesahead.
ALDI G ROUP H ISTORY ALDI Australia is part of the privately‐owned ALDI group. The corporate founders, brothers KarlandTheoAlbrecht,werebornin1920and1922,respectively,andgrewupinmodestcir‐ 1
Thiscasewasdevelopedsolelyfor thepurposeofclassroomdiscussion.Theauthoroverwhelminglyprepared the casefrompublic sources.AlldollarvaluesareinA$unlessotherwiseindicated. ©2018UniversityofMelbourne.Allrightsreserved.
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cumstances in the town of Essen in Germany’s Ruhr Valley. After the mandatory schooling both served retail apprenticeships before being called up for military service during WWII. UponreturninghomefromanAlliedPOWcamp,thebrothers tookovertheirmother’s small grocerystore.Aselsewhereinthewar‐ravagedcountry,theresidentsofEssenwereclamour‐ ing for staple foods and other basic necessities. Karl and Theo focussed on selling a strictly limitedassortmentofgoodsatlowpricesandwithminimalservice.(Brandes2005) Thebusinessenjoyedconsiderablesuccessandsoonexpanded.By1948thebrotherswereal‐ readymanaging13storesintheRuhrregionand incorporated theirbusinessasAlbrechtDis‐ count(or“ALDI”forshort).By1960thecompanyoperated 300storesthroughoutGermany. (ALDIwebsite2011) Followingadisagreementoverthe direction ofthebusinessin1961,thebrothers dividedit intoanorthernandsouthernhalf,ALDINordandALDISüd,withTheoinchargeofthenorth‐ ern division and Karl heading the southern division. Despite the formal split, the two parts maintainedasinglecorporateidentity. Thetwodivisionsagreedto sharethebrand,to team upfornegotiationswithsuppliersandtofreelyexchangeretailmethodsandresults.(Brandes 2005) Followingitssuccessinthedomestic market, ALDImadeitsfirsttentativestepintotheinter‐ nationalarenabyexpandingintoneighbouringAustriain1967.Thisinitialforaywasfollowed byentriesintotheUS,variousEuropeancountriesandAustralia. Internationalmarketswere dividedbetweenthetwodivisionsandtothisdayGermanyandtheUSaretheonlycountries wherebotharepresent(seeExhibit1).2 E XHIBIT 1: ALDI’ S G LOBAL F OOTPRINT 2017 (S OURCE : ALDI‐N ORD 2017; ALDI‐S ÜD 2017)
Country
YearofEntry Numberofstores
Germany 1961 4,190 Austria 1968 490 Netherlands 1973 490 Belgium 1976 430 USA 1976 1,740 USA(Brand:TraderJoe’s) 1979 474 Denmark 1977 220 France 1988 850 UK 1990 760 Luxembourg 1998 10 Ireland 1999 130 Australia 2001 500 Spain 2002 250 Switzerland 2005 190 Portugal 2006 40 Slovenia 2005 80 Poland 2008 100 Greece 2008 0* Hungary 2008 130 China 2017 0** Italy 2018 0*** TOTAL 11,074 *ExitinDecember2010 **Onlinestoreonly ***StoreopeningsscheduledforJanuary2018
ALDINorth/South North&South South North North South North North North South North South South North South North South North South South South South
2 IntheUS,onlyALDISouthoperatedanetwork of ALDI‐brandedstores. ALDINorthopted foradifferentretailformatunderthe TraderJoe’sbrand.
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Over theyears, ALDIhadgrownintoa globalretailingpowerhouse.By theendof2017the groupwaspresentin18countriesandhadcommencedonlinesalesinChina (Reuters2017). It employed roughly 200,000 employees worldwide and total turnover was estimated at US$85b, making it the 8th largest retailer in the world (Deloitte 2018). The privately‐owned groupdidnotdisclosecorporate profitsbutwhenKarlAlbrecht diedin2014hisnetwealth wasestimatedatUS$26b(Forbes2014). Despite the group’s substantial size it was shrouded in mystery. The dearth of information was attributed to ALDI’s founders’ almost pathological disdain for publicity. According to a closeconfidanteoftheAlbrechtfamily,itwas the owners’firmbeliefthatthecompanyhad prosperedbecauseitwasnotdistractedbyengagementwiththebusinesspressandthepub‐ licatlarge.(Amann&Tietz2010) According toinsiders,thecompanyregardedopen communicationasamistakeoratleast as awasteoftime.ALDI’sstandardresponsetorequests forinformationwasthatitsfounders andexecutiveshadnothingtosaybecause theywereconcentratingonrunningthebusiness. Insiders providing information on the family or the company were regarded as traitors and typicallydidsoonconditionofanonymity.(Amann&Tietz2010) Thedeath ofTheoin2010,fouryears beforehisbrotherKarl,ledtoa numberof tentative changes.ThecompanyengagedPRconsultantsforthefirsttimeinits60‐yearhistoryandbe‐ camemoreactiveinengagingwiththebusinesspress. The company’s Australian offshoot underwent a similar evolution. Daunt’s predecessor, Mi‐ chaelKloeters, hadregularlyturneddown requestsforinterviews andinvitationsto industry events.Inoneofhisrareinterviews,Kloetershadexplainedthatthecompany’slackofame‐ diaprofilewasnottoavoidscrutinybutsimplyamatterofcostcontrol. Tosavecosts,wedon’thaveapublicrelationsdepartment.You can’tbehalfpregnant;ifyou doadecentPRthenitisgoingtocostyoualotofmoney‐oryoudon’tdoitatall.It’sverydif‐ ficulttodoitsomewhereinbetween.(Walker2003) AftertakingoverasCEOin2011,TomDauntgraduallyopenedupthecompanytothepublic. Whilestillmindfulofthetimespent onmediaengagements,heliftedthecompany’sprofile andrevealedsomeofthethinkingbehindthecompany’sstrategy.
ALDI IN A USTRALIA ALDISüdforgeditsplanstoenterAustraliain thelate1990s.Thetask oflaunchingthe com‐ panydownunderfelltoMichaelKloeters.Acompanyveteran, hehad heldseveralexecutive positions within ALDI and had developed a personal relationship with the Albrecht family. (Lindhe2008) When tapped to head the company’s Australian venture he agreed on condition that he wouldbeallowedtoinvestigatetheAustralianmarketplacefirst hand.Kloeterstravelledto Australia in the late 1990s to study the country’s supermarkets and shopping habits (Webb 2008). He accepted the job once he had convinced himself that ALDI could succeed. Com‐ paredtoGermany,Kloetersfoundthatsupermarket operators“hadsomuchfathereinAus‐ tralia.Itwasunbelievable”(Walker2003). AtthetimeofALDI’sentry,theAustraliansupermarketindustrywasalreadydominatedbyre‐ tail giants Woolworths and Coles, who controlled nearly three quarters of the market be‐ tween them. Over decades the two companies had consolidated the industry to the point whereitwasoneofthemostconcentratedintheworld.Thetwoheavyweightshadshrewdly adoptedretailingtechniquespioneered in other countries andtheirconsiderable economies
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of scale helped to cement their position. They had seen off many rivals over the years and their size and status deterred new entrants. Their respective parents, Wesfarmers Ltd and WoolworthsLtd,alsohelddominantsharesinotherpartsofthe retailsector,suchas liquor, hardware,householdelectricalsanddepartmentstores. OnJanuary26,2001,thefirstAustralianALDIstoreswere opened in the Sydney suburbs of MarrickvilleandBankstown.Encouragedbytheresponsefromlocalshoppers,thecompany opened28storesinNewSouthWalesbeforeexpandingintootherstates. At the end of 2017, ALDI Australia operated some 500 outlets, spread across all mainland states (Exhibit 2). Thecompany hadcaptured nearly9% of the$101bnational supermarket market (IBISWorld 2017); innewly addedSouthAustralia and WesternAustralia it held just over4%and3%,respectively(ALDI2017). E XHIBIT 2: N UMB EROF ALDI STO RESIN A USTRALIA , E NDOF Y EAR (S OURCES : CASE AUTHORS’ ESTIMATES ; E UROMONITOR , VARIOUSEDIT IONS ; ALDI PRESSSTATEMENTS , VARIOUS )
600 500 400 300 Stores 200 100
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
0 Afterearlierbeingcriticisedforits secretivenature,in2015ALDI Australiadisclosedfinancial detailsforthefirsttime.ThecompanyprovidedasubmissiontoanationalSenateInquiryinto corporatetaxation.WhiletheAustralian offshootrepresentedaverysmallproportionofthe globalALDIgroupitwasdeemedoneofitsmostsuccessfuloperations,aidedbythecompara‐ tivelackofcompetitioninthelocaldiscountsegment.Revenuehadgrown steadilyoverthe years,ashadprofits.Thecompanyalsodiscloseditstaxpayments, inresponse tocompeti‐ tors’accusationsthatitwasusing‘exoticstructures’tominimisetaxationliabilitiesinAustral‐ ia (Heffernan 2014). For the years disclosed (Exhibit 13), the rate paid by ALDI in Australia closelytrackedthestatutory30%companytaxrateandwassignificantlyhigherthan theav‐ eragecorporatetaxratepaidbyAustraliancompanies. E XHIBIT 3: ALDI A USTRALIAFINANCIALINFORMATION (ALDI 2015, 2017 AND 2018, C HUNG 2017)
Yearended31Dec
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
NetRevenue
$3,1b
$3,5b
$4,2b
$5.0b
$5.8b
$6.6b
$7.5b
ProfitBeforeTax
$121m $140m $232m $261m $231m $269m $205m
IncomeTaxExpense
$35m
$47m
$67m
$83m
$72m
$87m
$65m
29%
34%
29%
32%
29%
30%
32%
EffectiveTaxRate(ETR)
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T HE ALDI W AY ALDIwasaself‐described‘harddiscounter’.Itsbasicapproach –bornout ofnecessityduring thepost‐waryears– wastooffera strictlylimited number of quality products at lowprices. Retailexpertscommonlydefinedharddiscountersasthosethathadthefeweststock‐keeping units(SKUs),providedfewnon‐fooditemsandutilisedrelativelysmallstoresandlowstaffing levels. Despiteitshistoricalsecrecy,somedetailsofthe‘ALDIWay’(Brandes2005)ofcompetinghad emergedovertheyears.Firstandforemost,ALDI’sstrategywasanexpressionofitsfounders’ firmlyheldprinciples.Aboveallelse,KarlandTheoprizedthriftandsimplicity. Fromtheoutset,thebrothersfocusedonwhattheyconsideredtobe theessentials.Anyin‐ creaseinthenumberofSKUswasseenascompromisingthesimplicityofoperationsandthus resisted(Corsten&Kumar2006).Forthesamereasonthecompanyrefusedfordecadesto carryanythingbut drygoodsasperishables and frozen foodsrequired refrigerationand spe‐ cialhandling. KarlandTheowere alsopenny‐pinchersof mythicalproportion and numerous anecdotes at‐ testedtothebrothers’frugalnature(Amann&Tietz2010).Thefounders’corevaluesofthrift andsimplicitypermeatedthegroupandgaverisetotheALDIWay,aregimentedapproachto running the business that was replicated, with only minor adaptations, in every market the companyentered.
TheALDIWayinAustralia:‘SmarterShopping’ InAustralia,theALDIWayusedtobecapturedby theslogan ‘smartershopping’,thus“ena‐ blingAustralianshopperstolivericherlives, forless”.Thefundamentals of smartershopping consisted of “keeping the operation simple, keeping costs down and offering everyday low prices. We achieve this by avoiding the costly overheads that force other retailers to raise theirprices”.(ALDIwebsite2011) As elsewhere in the world,ALDI’s range ofmerchandise in Australia was strictly limited. An ALDIstoreofferedaround1,250SKUs(ALDI2014),comparedto 20,000to30,000 SKUsata typicalColesorWoolworthsoutlet.Onaverage,ALDIstoreswere1,200squaremetresinsize, compared to the average Coles store of 5,000 square metres (IBISWorld 2017).ALDI’s busi‐ ness model drastically restricted the variety and packing size of products in store. In the wordsofTomDaunt,“wedon’tcarryeightdifferentflysprays–wemighthaveone ortwo” (Speedy2012). The limited range of merchandise translated into large volumes for the chosen suppliers which,inturn,yieldedbulkdiscountsforALDI.Thelimitedassortmentalsocuthandlingand distributioncostsandallowedthecompanytogetbywithsmallstores. Inadditiontoitsregularrange,ALDIalsoofferedanumberofweekly‘SpecialBuys’.Thesein‐ cluded merchandise such as electrical goods, household appliances, apparel, sports equip‐ mentandtoys.Theproductschanged ona weekly basis. Theywere announced on the com‐ panywebsiteandwereavailableaslongasstockslasted.Someretailanalystsmaintainedthat the items added an element of excitement to the ALDI shopping experience. One shopper, representativeofmanyALDIcustomers,articulatedtheprevailingsentiment. “It’sexciting,becauseyoudon’tknowwhatyou’regoingto getevery week.[…]They have greatspecials.LikeMerinowooltops.Whenthey comeup,it’scrazy.There are lines outside the store and people push each other out of the way to get the good stuff.”(Huntley2014)
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On occasion, ALDI’s Special Buys created national news and went viral, such as when the companyofferedskiingequipment(TomDaunt,personal communication,October 2015), or children’s clothing created by well‐known fashion designer Collette Dinnigan (see video: http://www.smh.com.au/business/retail/aldi‐trials‐new‐store‐format‐in‐test‐for‐australian‐ market‐20151019‐gkcxzp.html)or18‐yearoldsinglemaltscotchat$70(Lacey2016). Liketheircounterpartsinothercountries,AustralianALDIstoreshadasimplelayoutwithonly afewaisles.Thestoreswerebrightbuthadanaustereatmosphereastheycontainedfewfix‐ turesandfeaturednobackground music.A lot of stockwas displayedeither on pallets or in specially designed cardboard boxes from which shoppers took individual items. To restock, staffreplenishedcardboard boxes orwheeledinanew pallet on an electric jack. Items such asmeatorbreadwerepre‐packed,aswasmuchofthefreshproduce. ALDIoutletsdidnot featurein‐shopdelisorbakeries. Anotherkeydifferenceincomparisonwiththecompetitionwasthepredominanceof‘private label’brands.InthecontextofALDItheywerealsooftenreferredtoas‘phantombrands’,to highlightthefact that theymadenoreferencetoALDI,insteadcarryingawiderangeof ‘ex‐ clusive’brandnameslikeLacuraSkincareorBelmontBiscuits.Inaddition,thepackagingtypi‐ callymimickedthatoftheestablishedmanufacturers’brands(Mortimer2016).(seeExhibit4) E XHIBIT 4: ALDI’ S ‘ PHANTOMBRANDS ’ COMPARE D TO MANUFACTURERS ’ BRANDS (S OURCE : M ORTIMER 2016, ALDI WEBSITE , MANUFACTURERS ’ WEBSITE S )
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ALDIAustraliadidstockasmallnumberoficonicmanufacturers’brands,suchasVegemiteor Milo,but95%ofitsrange consistedof privatelabels(Cowie2011). Thesuppliers ofprivate labelswerenotidentifiedonthepackagingbutitwaswidelyknownthatmanyALDIproducts originated with manufacturers that had their own popular brands.3Significant cost savings couldberealisedfromprivatelabelsastheydidnotrequirethemarketingbudgetsassociated withregularbrands.Grossmarginsonprivatelabelproducts were5to10percentagepoints abovethoseonmanufacturers’brands(Speedy2010). ALDIcustomerswentoutoftheirwayinsearch ofabargain.Marketresearch on shoppers’ attitudesrevealedthatgrocerybuyerswhousuallyshoppedatALDIweredramaticallymore likelytoagreethatgoodvalueandlowpriceswere“veryimportant”.Conversely,peoplewho usuallyshoppedatColes,WoolworthsandIGAweremoreconcernedwithfactorssuchassu‐ permarketlocationandconvenience(RoyMorgan2015). Likeev...