Stalin\'s RISE TO Power Paper 2 - DONE PDF

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Stalin's RISE TO Power Paper 2 - DONE...

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STALIN’S RISE TO POWER (1924-1928) Introduction:  A  fter  Lenin’s  death  in 1924, the Communist Party faced the question of electing its  new  leader,  creating  a  power  struggle  between  some  of  the  Party’s  most  prominent  members,  namely Joseph  Stalin  and  Leon  Trotsky.  In  the  years  leading up to 1928, Stalin took advantage of  sociopolitical  opportunities  as  they  presented  themselves  in  order  to  gain  power  and  secure his  position as the leader of the Soviet state.  Personality/Background: Stalin quickly gained popular support, as  members of the working class  could  relate  to Stalin’s  background,  and  members  of  the  Communist  Party  valued  Stalin’s  active  contributions to the Revolution.  Evidence ● Early Life ○ Stalin’s  background  as  the  son  of  a  peasant  aligned  him  with  members  of  the  Bolshevik Revolution and appealed to the working class ● Role in the Revolution ○ Stalin  had  a more direct role in the Revolution than Trotsky, organizing strikes and  planning armed robberies for party funds  Historiography ● Stephen Kotkin portrays Stalin as “a people person” with “surpassing organizational abilities;  a mammoth  appetite for work; a strategic mind and an unscrupulousness that recalled his  master  teacher,  Lenin.” According  to Kotkin, Stalin's background and personality gave him  an  advantage  over  Trotsky.  Trotsky,  a  latecomer  to  Bolshevism, appeared factionalist and  egotistic  compared  to  Stalin,  who  portrayed  himself as  the  faithful  defender  of  Lenin’s  legacy. ● Mcauley believes that Stalin “was a very skillful politician who had a superb grasp of tactics,  could predict behavior extremely well and had an unerring eye for personal weaknesses”  Counterclaim ● Lenin  saw  fault  in  Stalin’s  personality,  saying  that  Stalin’s  practical  and  organizational  abilities  were  offset  by  his  excessive  roughness,  impatience,  and  lack  of  caution  and  consideration of his colleagues. In fact, in his testament, Lenin suggested to remove Stalin  as General Secretary. However,  Kamenev  and  Zinoviev m  ade the mistakeof suppressing  Lenin’s Testament, which would have taken Stalin out of power. Had Stalin’s rivals not made  the mistakes that they had, Stalin’s personality would have been his downfall.  Ideology: Stalin embodied ideologies that were not only more appealing to the masses, but were  also more practical for the welfare of the state, garnering him widespread support.  Evidence ● Stalin vs. Trotsky

Socialism In One Country promised stability, whereas Permanent Revolution would  have led to continuous revolutionary turmoil ○ Permanent  Revolution  would  have threatened the  relationship  between workers  and peasants, and would have caused war with capitalist states New Economic Policy (NEP) ○ Stalin first supported the NEP, as aligned  with Lenin’s views. The Scissors Crisis of  1923  led Trotsky and  otherleftists, including Kamenev and Zinoviev to question the  NEP. Kamenev and  Zinoviev began to oppose Stalin,  eventually forming the United  Opposition  with Trotsky in 1926. Stalin accused them of dissenting from Lenin, and  eventually  expelled Trotsky,  Kamenev, and  Trotsky  from theParty in 1927. However,  after the Grain Crisis in 1927, Stalin went back to a more leftist approach, which then  alienated and eventually removed Bukharin and his supporters from the Politburo. ○

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 Historiography ● Ideologists  emphasize  that  Stalin  was  willing  to keep  the  NEP  as  long  as  it  worked, but  moved  to  change  his  policies  to  collectivization  when  NEP  threatened to harm the state.  Thus,  according to  ideologists, Stalin’s ideologies were from a m  ore practical perspective,  and appealed to the majority. ● Evaluation:  However, this school of thought putsStalinin a goodlight,andfailstoconsider the major role that his personality played in exploiting his contemporaries.  Counterclaim ● Leading  Bolsheviks  had  already  accepted Trotsky’s  position  of  internationalism;  however, Stalin advocated for the idea that Russia did not need foreign aid to become Socialist. Even  though  Stalin’s  views  of independent socialism  differed  from  those  of  the  majority  and  Lenin, he was able to manipulate his contemporaries to support his ideas.  Communist Party Structure: T he bureaucratic nature of the Communist Party allowed Stalin gain  control over most, if not all, aspects of the state and thus secure his rise to power.  Evidence ● The Communist Party was a bureaucracy known foritscomplexity.This made it difficult for  things  to  get  done  due  to  all  the  paperwork  and  communication  involved  in  decision-making. Stalin was known for his great  organizational  and leadershipabilities that  allowed him to flourish in this bureaucratic government. ● Stalin began the Lenin Enrolment, which encouraged people to join as a sign of respect to  Lenin.  This  policy  changed  the  nature  of  the  party  that  had  began  as  a  small  group  of  leaders who would guide the masses. Instead, the Lenin Enrolment encouraged the masses  to join and swell its ranks. ● Stalin belonged to all three leading organizations of the Party: the Politburo, which decided  on matters of policy; the Orgburo, which dealt with personnel matters; and the Secretariat,  which  controlled  the  flow  of  paper.  Trotsky only  belonged to one of them, the Politburo,  which meant that Stalin was widely unrivalled.

  Historiography ● Chris  Ward  argues  that  “circumstances  ensured  that  inside  the  mutating  power  of  the  party-state he (Stalin) would succeed and his rivals fail” ● Richard Pipes also emphasizes the role that the bureaucracy of the Communist Party played  in Stalin’s rise to power. Control over the state was centralized in such a way that all social  institutions, cultural  associations, the clergy, andeventhesmallest entities were controlled  by the Party. When Stalin was appointed by Lenin as General Secretary in 1922, he began to  make allies and gain loyalty from all units of the Party. ● Some R  evisionists claim that Stalin’s rise to power was due to social and cultural changes  in party membership; the importance of Stalin as an individual is downplayed, while more  emphasis is placed on the rank and file of the party in enabling Stalin to assume power.  Counterclaim ● Liberalists argue that Stalin  demonstrated the necessary  grit, determination, manipulative  skills,  and  ruthlessness  to  attain  power  through  his  own  means,  and  highlight  the  weaknesses of Stalin’s opponents. Thus, according to Liberalists, the party structure did not  contribute significantly to Stalin’s rise to power: it was Stalin’s personality that allowed him  to take advantage of the party structure.  Errors by Rivals: T he errors of Stalin’s rivals, namely Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev, allowed him  to eliminate opposition within the Communist Party and secure his rise to power. In particular, he  was  able  to  capitalize on  Trotsky’s weakness of leadership,  Kamenev’s  lack  of  vision,  Zinoviev’s  organizational weakness,  and  Bukharin’s  inability  to  convert  his  plausible  economic theory into a  credible programme.  Evidence ● Trotsky ○ Trotsky referred  to  Stalin  as  the  “party's  most  eminent  mediocrity”  though  this  proved to be a gross underestimation of Stalin’s character ○ neither  Zinoviev  nor Kamenev supported Trotsky  in  1924, viewing him as arrogant  and overbearing. Furthermore, the fact that he was highly intellectual and tended to  demote  the  significance  of  Slavic  culture  and  philosophy.  Rather  than  garnering  respect, his disposition brought on suspicion. ○ lacked the will for a political fight and questioned whether, as a Jew, he could gain  enough support required to lead the Soviet Union ○ did not join the  Bolshevik party  until  1917, whereas Stalin  was a member since 1905,  and had previously been sympathetic to the Marxist views of the Menshevik Party ○ did not attend Lenin’s funeral in 1926, claiming he had been misinformed by Stalin ○ Trotsky’s book  “Lessons  of October” underminedtheroles Kamenev and Zinoviev in  the October Revolution,  which members of  the  Communist  party  reacted to with  much disdain

unwilling to accept positions given to him by Lenin, such as the position of Lenin’s  deputy, which was to be shared with the rest of the Triumvirate ○ support of a “Permanent Revolution”, which was unpopular in the period  following  the Russian Civil War (1917-1920) ○ condemned  the  New  Economic  Policy  (NEP), which led to  criticism  from  the  right-wing  members  of  the  Party,  and  to  the  supporters  of  Lenin,  as  Lenin  had  supported NEP ○ eventually expelled from the party in 1927, as he was accused of factionalism Kamenev and Zinoviev ○ formed  the  Triumvirate  with  Stalin  and  recognized  Trotsky  as  a  threat  to  the  Bolshevik Revolution ○ refused  the  publication  of  Lenin’s  Testament,  which  saved  Stalin  from  Lenin’s  criticism that could have hindered his rise to power ○ allied with Trotsky in the United Opposition in 1926 against Stalin’s “Socialism in One  Country”, which allied Stalin with the working class ○ removed from the Politburo in October 1926 Bukharin ○ argued that the NEP  worked  effectively  to  sustain  the economy  of  the USSR and  should be continued, which Stalin eventually opposed ○

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 Historiography ● Intentionalists believe that Stalin intentionally calculated his decisions based on the errors  of his rivals, exploiting their weaknesses and manipulating their mistakes to his advantage.  Counterclaim ● Historians taking an ideological  approach argue that Stalin’s decisions were not based on  the actions or positions of his rivals, but rather on practicality, citing the example of Stalin  opposing  Trotsky’s  Permanent  Revolution  because the Soviet Union  was ill-equipped  for war. ...