Summaries of Course Readings and Lecture Notes PDF

Preview

Summary

Topic 1: Political Background – From Colony to SAR1POLILecture 2 28-1- From Colony to SAR (ppt included)Politics of HK in colonial era  Constitutional basis of colonial HK  Latters Patent (英皇制誥) – the legal basis for office of governor, Exco, Legco  Royal Instructions (皇室訓令) – Constitution for Ex...

Description

POLI3020 Final Review on Concepts Topic 1: Political Background – From Colony to SAR

POLI3020 Lecture 2 28-1-2016 From Colony to SAR (ppt included) Politics of HK in colonial era 

Constitutional basis of colonial HK  Latters Patent (英皇制誥) – the legal basis for office of governor, Exco, Legco  Royal Instructions (皇室訓令) – Constitution for Exco, Legco, procedures for legislating and enacting laws 

“Double principle of subordination” (Martin Wight)  Subordination of colonial executive to metropolitan executive; from colonial legislature to colonial executive 



Governors  Appointed by the Crown  Selection process within a committee within Colonial Office  

Recommendation is made to Secretary of State for the Colonies and PM Positions  



“single and supreme authority responsible to, and representative of, His/Her Majesty” Powers comparable to that of “those once possessed by a King of England before coming of democracy”

Governors were not intimidated by the constitutional powers held by their masters, and they regard London as an adversary (對手) rather than an ally 



Britain can legislate for HK through parliament or by prerogative (through Governor)

David Trench successfully fended off interventions from new UK Conservative gov. in 1970s by possibility of resignation

Administrative Officers (AO)  Elite-grade top civil servants (only a tiny group at 1950, but turn to 622 in 2011) 

“AO party” - during colonial era, AOs occupy most of the important political positions. People thought they were coherent.



Reserved for foreigners at first, gradual introduction of locals closer to 1997



Enjoyed a pretty good life (cut-off society with colonial privileges)  Public assessments of AO were generally good, but they ruled uneasily in fear of the public (they did not know that the public actually thought they were doing a good job)



Highly competitive entry



 Treated as a life-time career instead of a job (stable privilege)  Donald Tsang climbed from EO, AO to Chief Executive “Generalist” rather than “specialist” 1

Cheung Tin Lok Nyto

POLI3020 Final Review on Concepts Topic 1: Political Background – From Colony to SAR





 They were well-trained to follow procedures  Donald Tsang served in finance-related, trade-related and administrative positions The myth of “political neutrality” (they will always follow political neutrality) and “conscience” (they will work for the conscience of HK) 



The general public agree the labeling of “Hong Kong’s conscience”

 AOs were regarded as highly efficient, competitive Political structure   



AOs were expected to fit in any occupation at anytime

Executive Power lies in Governor + AOs “pure administrative state” / “bureaucratic polity” Hong Kong had no “politics” (no election, no political parties, etc)

Political culture – population of HK  Refugee society from WWII, Chinese Civil War and political unrest (e.g. Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution)  

Most families currently in HK came from different places in few generations ago “Touch base” policy in accepting immigrants  One guessed rationale: HK was in need of development of labour (those refugees under this policy had to be physically capable)





Residents did not have to plan to a long-term stay in HK  HK as a “lifeboat” (there is always a chance to go back in the future)  People did not seek to challenge the colonial government of demand social reforms “Depoliticization”  Not all residents are political neutral or didn’t demand social reforms 

Thus, “Administrative absorption of politics” District offices are the front lines to face dissatisfaction Actively co-opt opinion leaders and elites into policy-making process (colonial government knew the dissatisfaction from opinion leaders was potential threat to the government) Whenever social demands arise, the gov. would translate it into bureaucratic, non-political issues (e.g. respond housing problem in a bureaucratic way, i.e. the housing was just under construction and you need to wait for the housing) some activities taken out of political agenda / the gov disregarded it as political issue Heavily emphasize stability and prosperity Label social activists as troublemakers

 Colonial government ruled HK effectively with unique social background and their successful strategies  London, Governor and bureaucrats were the colonial masters up until the transition period, 1980s 2 Cheung Tin Lok Nyto

POLI3020 Final Review on Concepts Topic 1: Political Background – From Colony to SAR

Development during transition period and Beijing’s response 

Economic Success 



Hong Kong became an entrepot because almost all goods in and out China were transported via HK  Export-oriented manufacturing  When China opened up, HK turned into a financial center

 GDP per capita of HK skyrocketed and surpassed UK’s in 1991 Concerns for HK reverting to China 



Economic Factors  Capitalist vs Socialist, Open vs China  Developed vs Developing Political Factors  Even though HK people had no rights to choose the governor, HK people enjoys relatively reasonable London sovereign; China was a one-party sovereign 





Efficient bureaucracy based on meritocracy vs. Centralized party-state bureaucracy based on networks

Social Factors  HK people were ethically China, a significant share of population fled from China (war, political unrest) / Communist

Responses of Beijing 



OCTS  It was originally a device to attract Taiwan to be reunified  Deng Xiaoping knew HK would not accept socialism “Democratic Reunification”  An emerging class of social leaders thought it was natural to reunify with China, but they called for a democratic reunification 





President Zhao Ziyang said that democratic governance was “beyond doubt”

 After 1989, Tiananmen, the rherotic turned into “democracy against Communist” Confidence Crisis in 1980s-90s  Massive emigration after Sino-British talks 

HK currency lost 1/3 value  showed social instability in economic terms (directly led to current linked exchange rate system)

 

All of these intensified after 1989 Tiananmen crackdown An estimation warned that growth rate would decrease by 45% following the “brain drain” (=Loss of brain power and human capital)

Beijing’s response - “United Front”  Beijing sought new partners after (i) HK became reluctant and strongly opposed to reunification and (ii) Britain became hard-lined 3

Cheung Tin Lok Nyto

POLI3020 Final Review on Concepts Topic 1: Political Background – From Colony to SAR

 

Capitalists were the primary co-optation target Some see it as a remedy from unfair treatments

 

Some find long-term cooperation with mainland necessary after 1997 Some expect business potential in mainland e.g. Li Ka-shing after meeting Deng in 1990



A series of organizations were created to create memberships to co-opt as many business professionals as possible. (more than half of them were business professionals)



Preparatory Committee / Selection Committee SC responsible for selection of 1st CE and Provisional LegCo SC: 400 members from 4 sectors – (1) industry, commerce, finance; (2) finance; (3) labor, grassroots, religious; (4) political (1)+(2) for co-opting capitalists; (3)+(4) pro-Beijing forces total exclusion of democrats Appointment without any consultation, totally controlled by Beijing

Theory: Authoritarian Co-optation 

In the wider literature, authoritarian leaders stay in power through two ways: repression vs. cooptation (buying off opponents by resources/patronage)



Beijing’s co-optation to HK business sector  Repression unlikely as an option for Beijing given international attention on HK and demonstration of OCTS (contrast Beijing 1989) 

As a highly globalized economy, capital in HK could also “exit” easily; repression is extremely costly



Why businessmen chosen as co-optation target? 1. Directly retaining their investment and prevent capital outflow 2.



“Demonstration effect” - if respected business leaders voice their support for reunification and optimism, population would follow

Statistical evidence showing that Beijing selectively co-opted stakeholders from large firms on stock market (demonstration effect)

4 Cheung Tin Lok Nyto

POLI3020 Final Review on Concepts Topic 2: Political Background – One Country Two Systems and the Basic Law

POLI3020 Lecture 3 18 Feb 2016 One Country Two Systems and the Basic Law OCTS framework 

Constitutional framework  Sino-British Joint Declaration (1984) 

According to PRC Cons. Art.31, NPC has the power to set up SAR and its laws whenever necessary (distinct political entity considered as the same national group) 





It’s different to “national autonomous areas” in Art.30 (places for ethnic minorities)

 Basic Law (1990) Features  

High degree of autonomy (except foreign and defence affairs) Be vested with executive, legislature and independent judicial power; laws currently in force will remain unchanged



CE appointed by Central People’s Government on the basis of elections or consultations to be held locally

 

Have its current social and economic systems and life-style remain unchanged Basic policies stipulated in Basic Law will remain unchanged for 50 years

Critics (1) Ambiguity 

A lot of terms not clearly defined (e.g. elections or consultations, high degree of autonomy)

 

Checks on PRC’s power to interpret them (through drafting of BL and its interpretation) Enforcement and monitoring: A “Sino-British Joint Liaison Group” was established, but terminated on by 2000

(2) Lack of local participation 

UN list of non-self-governing territories: established 1946, a lot of territories gained independence, self-rule



A lot of UN colonies gained independence or self-governance



PRC gained UN membership in 1971, removed HK and Macau from list in 1972  HK was not recognized as a non-self-governing territory since then



HK people were not consulted in the design of OCTS  It was mainly proposed by Beijing and accepted by British government

Basic Law and its interpretations 

Drafting – Basic Law drafting committee  

39 out of 59 members are from mainland (others from HK) Only 2 were unambiguous “democrats” (Martin Lee, Szeto Wah)(and both of them resigned 1

Cheung Tin Lok Nyto

POLI3020 Final Review on Concepts Topic 2: Political Background – One Country Two Systems and the Basic Law

after Tiananmen crackdown); other HK members are mostly business leaders, pro-Beijing individuals and conservative figures 

Interpretation and amendment BL Art.158  

“the power of interpretation of this law shall be vested in the NPCSC” “the courts may also interpret other provisions of this law in adjudicating cases” 

“Courts should “seek an interpretation” from the NPCSC through the CFA if their judgment concerns affairs “which are the responsibility of the Central People's Government, or concerning the relationship between the Central Authorities and the Region”

 “However, judgments previously rendered shall not be affected.” BL Art.159 

“power of amendment of this law shall be vested in the NPC”



“power to propose bills for amendment to this law shall be vested in the NPCSC, the State Council, and the HKSAR.” 



Submitted by HK NPC delegates after obtaining consent from: 2/3 HK NPC delegates, 2/3 Legco, the CE



“No amendment shall contravene the established basic policies of the PRC regarding HK”



For both amendment and interpretation, the “Committee for BL” under NPCSC shall be consulted

Cases of interpretation (1) 1999: Right of Abode issue, proposed by HKSAR gov   

After a CFA judgment, CE with Exco requested for an interpretation of BL NPCSC overruled CFA judgment, reducing eligible immigrants to 0.27 m Controversies 1. Could executive branch request for an interpretation instead of (and bypassing) CFA? 2. Could judgment by CFA be overturned? (violate Art.158?) 3. Should CFA request for an interpretation prior to judgment?

(2) 2004: Universal suffrage timetable proposed by NPCSC (3) 2005: Term limit of CE, proposed by HKSAR gov  Chinese authority introduced the term “Framers’ intent” (立法原意) to interpret Art.46 (about CE’s term of office) by saying that acing CE Tsang will take office for remaining term after Tung resigned (4) 2011: Diplomatic immunity, proposed by CFA

2 Cheung Tin Lok Nyto

POLI3020 Final Review on Concepts Topic 2: Political Background – One Country Two Systems and the Basic Law

HK’s role to Beijing 

Economic role  



During Cold War, goods traded/smuggled in/out of China generate foreign exchange In late 70s, as much as 75% of China’s foreign exchange go through HK

 HK is a gateway to foreign investment (because of separation of systems and autonomy) Reflection of HK’s economic role in BL 

Art.5: practice previous capitalist system / Art.108: low-tax policy / Art.109: maintain status as financial centre / Art.112: foreign exchange control / Art.114: free trade policy



These policies are stated in a constitutional document which may constrain own government whenever crisis arise

Chinese interventions into HK 



Pre-2003  

Largely hands-off during first CE Tung (97-02) Policy change after 2003 amid economic downturn and 1st July protest with 0.5m people



Economic interventions: CEPA, individual traveller’s scheme

Post-2003 – political intervention Liaison Office 

It held negotiations with oppositions over local political reform, bypassing HK gov  Normally Chinese government shall not have a role in all HK affairs including political reform, however it did



Nowadays political protest targets the Liaison Office equally than the local gov.  It was seen as more effective to target at LO because SAR gov. was just seen as listening to instructions of Chinese gov.



In a publication (2009), Liaison Office even suggest establishing the “second important governing force directly under the CPG” in HKSAR (overturning the promise of high

degree of autonomy) White Paper published by State Council – “The practice of OCTS Policy in HKSAR” (2004) 

“The high degree of autonomy of HKSAR is subject to level of central leadership’s authorization. There is no such thing called residual power”



 It was not something that was previously agreed (in Sino-British negotiations) To warn of those who “act in collusion with outside forces” to undermine the OCTS (potential response of Occupy Central Movement)



Directly led to Umbrella Movement

Question to consider (potential exam Q) Why China refrained from intervening at first, then increasing level of intervention over time?

3 Cheung Tin Lok Nyto

POLI3020 Final Review on Concepts Topic 2: Political Background – One Country Two Systems and the Basic Law

Theory: Autonomy  

No dominating definition “the ability of a region or community to organize its affairs without interference from the central government or neighbouring regions or communities” (Ghai, 2013)



Can be defined positively as the maintenance and development of regional institutions; negatively as absence of political intervention by sovereign power (Scott, 1998)



HK’s high degree of autonomy in different perspectives (1) “Dead autonomy” or “thousand cuts” (an analogy)  

Pessimistic view No autonomy to start with or autonomy decaying



Reason is the difference in power and ultimate authority of Beijing (the BL interpretations and ability to rewrite) (2) “Partial independence”  

Neutral-optimistic Autonomy is largely intact due to China’s focus on economic growth (both China and HK) which depends on autonomy



Evidence: no obvious decline in governance quality

Theory: Institutions as ‘credible commitment’ 

Political leaders need investment, which depends on investors’ confidence on property rights, rule of law, etc.



The key is to create powerful and binding constraint on the regime





Democracies may have an advantage but it also depends on the credibility (e.g. unstable democracies vs stable dictatorships)



Authoritarian government will also design institutions to constrain their power because they want to demonstrate that they have limited exercise of power

Beijing’s dual commitment in HK 

Institutions are created for co-optation of businessmen (e.g. FC, United Front, EC)  FC is able to block changes on themselves, protecting vested interests



OCTS is not credible (it is just for promising HK citizens)  BL is flexible and vulnerable to interpretation by Beijing It shows that Beijing’s target is in business sector instead of political sector



4 Cheung Tin Lok Nyto

POLI3020 Final Review on Concepts Topic 3: Political Institutions – Executive-legislative Relationship

POLI3020 Lecture 4 24-3-2016 Executive-Legislative Relationship (ppt included) Executive branch 

Chief Executive  5 year term, maximum 2 terms  

Non-partisan: can’t belong to any political parties (CE Election Ordinance) Past CEs  Tung Chee-hwa (1997-2002, 2002-2005): businessman  



Donald Tsang (2005-2007, 2007-2012): bureaucrat, Fin/Chief Sec under Tung CY Leung (2012-now): surveyor, Executive Council member since Tung

Executive Council  Advisory cabinet appointed by CE to assist him/her  

Currently 16 official (3 senior sec + 13 bureau sec) and 14 non-official members Members drawn from political officials, legislators and ‘public figures (BL Art.55) - practically anyone CE likes



Political significance  Forming governing coalition – “Exco collective responsibility rule”  

2003, James Tien resigned from Exco before planning to vote against gov. Currently incorporate DAB, FTU, New People’s Party etc, formulizing Legco support

Election method of CE 

Selection  Done by Selection Committee for 1st CE, then Election Committee 

Expanded from 400 to 800 in 2000, then 1200 in 2011



2011 Election Committee (for 2012)  1200 EC members elected from ~250000 registered voters (individ...