Summary Vietnam: An American Ordeal - Chapters 9-12 summaries PDF

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HTS 3015-A Vietnam: An American Ordeal (6th ed.), ch. 9-13

9 AFTERMATH OF THE TET OFFENSIVE, APR.-DEC. 1968 9.1 VIETNAM: THE FIRST TELEVISED WAR I.

Many Americans blamed TV news coverage of war; up to Tet-68 offensive, coverage was favorable to America winning a. Gen. Westmoreland could not gather US military resources for effort w/i 1-2 yrs b. Journalist Robert Elegant: “skewed reporting” that was “superficial and biased” c. Peter Braestrup study found the media writing inaccurate stories about VC winning; coverage worsened Washington political crisis, changing public opinion on war due to political leadership d. David Schmitz shown Tet coverage was non-factor in US officials’ decisions weeks after offensive e. Antiwar sentiment among soldiers serving, disillusionment of ppl in Vietnam: over 15K men died overseas, declining trust in LBJ

9.2 1968: THE BLOODIEST YEAR I.

II.

OF THE WAR 14K+ men killed, 150K wounded; saving lives more possible thanks to medevac system a. 7.5-11K US women served in war as volunteers; 80% served as Army, USAF + Navy nurses i. Half of 1.3K women in nonmedical work were enlisted, serving as clerks, air traffic controllers, photographers + cartographers ii. 21-year-old limit to be assigned to combat zone Westmoreland mounted largest search-and-destroy operation after Tet: 42 US + 37 ARVN battalions hunted rural areas around Saigon to eliminate VC/NVA units a. Set stage for action taking place in latter half of 1968, including actions against companies + platoons i. # of air strikes against guerrilla sanctuaries + supply lines increased as USAF + Navy bombers from raids of N military + industrial sites joined air war in S ii. Carpet bombing raids on enemy positions by cells of B-52s iii. US planes increasing in bombing HCM Trail b. US assaults into border areas near S cities that VC/PAVN attacked during Tet i. Forces struck NVA staging area in A Shau Valley (Communist stronghold near Laos border) – Americans withdrew August + N returned 1. MACV mounted operation DELAWARE to destroy PAVN bases in valley – failed effort in attacking NVA forces, but seized food and stores 2. “Screaming Eagles” (101st Airborne) failed catching willing to fight NVA troops ii. Along N border near demilitarized zone 1. Marines to seal border against enemy infiltration; units patrolled Rte. 9

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HTS 3015-A Vietnam: An American Ordeal (6th ed.), ch. 9-13 2. Con Thien (Oct 25) – armored co. completely destroyed N bunker complex, heavy losses to NVA

9.3 MASSACRE I.

AT MY LAI My Lai + My Khe, Mar 16, 1968: extensive fighting in south I Corps, US soldiers under 1st + 2nd Platoons of Charlie Co. (1st Battalion, 11th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division) massacred 400500 civilians a. Soldiers were poorly trained + under poor leadership b. Covered up from American ppl until Nov 1969 by media → Army board investigation found 14 soldiers helped keeping it under wraps, 13 soldiers charged w/ war crimes + crimes against humanity i. Charges later dropped or soldiers were acquitted, except for Lt. William Calley (convicted of mass murder) c. May have been more cases throughout S where US soldiers committed massacres against Vietnamese civilians d. Wave of attacks against Saigon + other S cities six weeks after My Lai/My Khe, ARVN/US forces crushed all resistance by early June i. Another weaker round of VC urban assaults in Aug, Allied intel predicted it and easily crushed them ii. VC now fought in smaller units, avoided direct attacks on US installations, forced to use younger + greener officers; more NVA troopers to be fed into VC main units; reverted to defensive tactic

9.4 PACIFICATION I.

AND THE BEGINNING OF VIETNAMIZATION Gen. Creighton W. Abrams abandoned attrition strategy for pacification + Vietnamization a. US combat forces formed security shields to stop VC from entering populous areas b. Allied officials turned to areas VC was most hit c. CORDS, S officials reinforced Chieu Hoi, program granting amnesty to VC defectors + implemented PHOENIX intel program to expose + neutralize VC infrastructure d. Authorized S force levels increased, provision of modern weaponry leading to improved performance of ARVN by year’s end; draft evasion + desertion widespread e. Plan changed little to S political balance i. VC infrastructure remained intact ii. NVA/VC main force units remained intact iii. VC controlled fewer villages + smaller S pop. than before Tet f. Saigon gov’t improved, kind of i. Ppl had to turn to Thieu gov’t out of anger @ Communists for attacking cities, realized security came from ARVN ii. Thieu involved citizens in repairing damage in S during Tet iii. New programs to combat corruption + curb over-the-place inflation: targeted corruption of Ky supporters, ignored corruption of Thieu loyalists iv. “The little dictator”: Thieu replaced cabinet members w/ military men loyal to him, gained upper hand over Ky w/ US support 2

HTS 3015-A Vietnam: An American Ordeal (6th ed.), ch. 9-13 v. Ongoing issues 1. Addition of 1mil new refugees to those already in slums; needs not taken care of 2. Stalled land reform: Thieu favored large landowners 3. Buddhists, sects, other non-Comm political groups refused to support RVN 4. US talks w/ Hanoi worsened tensions btwn US and Saigon officials

9.5 THE ELECTION I.

II.

OF 1968 Backdrop heading into election a. Increasing racial tensions i. Southern Christian Leadership Council (under MLK, Jr) led Poor People’s campaign – draining funds from civil rights + antipoverty programs 1. Apr 4, 1968 – assassination of MLK, Jr 2. 75K fed troops + Nat’l Guardsmen joined local police + sheriffs to suppress uprisings in 130 cities a. Mayor Richard Daley (Chicago) ordered police to shoot to kill arsonists + looters b. Barbed wire + machine gun emplacements to protect Washington gov’t bldgs. from rioting attacks b. Change in campus consensus for war – students protested ROTC, harassed recruiters from military services, CIA + co’s with Pentagon contracts i. April, Columbia Univ.: black militants joined w/ antiwar radicals that attacked school’s stance + construction of a new gym that would relocate black students in apartments near building site 1. NYC police forcibly removed students from occupying bldgs. 2. Strike forced univ to cut short 1968 semester ii. Other countries: worker-student revolt nearly brought down French gov’t Political standing – none of 3 major candidates had firm stance on Vietnam, but wanted settlement to end fighting + pro-W gov’t in S a. Democratic presidential nominees i. RFK 1. Beat McCarthy in most primaries b/c of ability to appear to voters transcending class + cultural boundaries (blacks, Hispanics, disadvantaged, working-class minorities, activist liberal intellectuals) 2. Won narrow victory in CA primary; after victory speech, was assassinated June 5 by Arab nat’list Sirhan ii. Eugene McCarthy 1. Appealed most to well-educated, middle-class liberals 2. Beat Kennedy at OR primary (May 25) 3. Came second to Humphrey at convention, Aug 28 4. Supported Humphrey in bombing halt during his campaign iii. Third candidate: VP Hubert Humphrey (promoted by LBJ) 1. Nominated as candidate Wed, Aug 28 3

HTS 3015-A Vietnam: An American Ordeal (6th ed.), ch. 9-13

III.

IV.

2. Sluggish campaign → called for total bombing halt; antiwar Dems came to support him; Oct polls show closing gap btwn him + Nixon b. More political violence i. Chicago, Democratic Convention, last week in Aug 1. Nat’l Mobilization to End the War (MOBE) + Youth Int’l Party (“Yippies”) planned series of demonstrations timed to overlap w/ convention 2. Mayor Daley mobilized whole 12K-man police force, IL governor 5649 Guardsmen to round-the-clock duty + LBJ 5K federal troops – succeeded at keeping activists from candidates (HQs/hotels) 3. Humphrey supporters defeated antiwar efforts to adopt peace plank for party platform; convention adopted plank endorsing LBJ Vietnam policy 4. Walpurgis Night of horrors televised; Sen. Ribicoff condemned Daley’s tactics 5. 1K+ ppl injured (including 192 policemen), 662 arrested 6. Weakened radical movement, strengthened conservatives coming back from ’64 Goldwater debacle c. Republican side: Richard Nixon nominated as party candidate in Miami convention i. Highlights of his acceptance speech 1. Need for nat’l unity, the demand for law + order, peace in Vietnam 2. Applauded “forgotten Americans” that are not in radical movement as good + decent 3. At beginning of campaign (Sept), polls gave him 15% lead over Humphrey ii. Veep running mate, MD governor Spiro T. Agnew iii. Stalled in Oct polls; hinted at plan to ending Vietnam War but could not disclose further or risk it not working d. Third-party candidate George Wallace (AL governor, American Independent Party) i. Hawkish settlements ii. Playing to white antipathy towards civil rights + antipoverty programs (working class, lower middle class men) iii. Commanded considerable support in Sept polls iv. Popular support in north declined → union leaders turned to Humphrey Keeping up with the Paris talks → both sides weren’t budging since May 13 start a. LBJ spoke to American ppl Oct 31 to announce complete bombing halt of N starting at midnight; negotiations resuming Nov 6 (day after election) b. Communists to accept Saigon gov’t’s presence at talks, Americans accepted NLF presence; LBJ promised Gen. Abrams the aircraft in N bombing would shift to air war vs HCM Trail in Laos c. With 43-40% lead by Humphrey nearing election time, Anna Chennault (leader of Flying Tigers) told S ambassador Bui Diem to advise Thieu not to negotiate until after elections – Nixon encouragement d. After Nixon elected, Thieu sent delegation to Paris to negotiate Results of election: Nixon won back lead (43.4%) to Humphrey (42.7%), 73mil votes casted

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HTS 3015-A Vietnam: An American Ordeal (6th ed.), ch. 9-13

10 NIXON’S VIETNAM WAR, 1969-71 10.1NIXON TAKES CONTROL I.

II.

III. IV.

1st inaugural address criticized LBJ gradualist use of forces in Vietnam, wanted to keep noncomm Saigon gov’t thru political-military victory over RVN Comm forces + diplomatic victory over DRV in Paris Henry A. Kissinger, nat’l security adviser a. Realist theories of int’l relations favored by foreign policy establishment (those who tended to be against Nixon) b. Similarities w/ Nixon’s views i. Phasing out of American Vietnam war in honorable fashion ii. Major powers (including Comm) maintaining stable world order 1. To improve improve relations w/ USSR, to move toward normal relations w/ China iii. LBJ decision-making by consensus a slow, onerous process 1. Plan for concentration of power to handle US foreign policy including bypassing NSC, bureaucracies in defense dep’t, State + CIA c. Early 1969: he + Nixon assured select groups that a plan for quickly ending war to be under way, really series of improvisations i. 6-month timeline, Nixon told Harrison Salisbury (asst. managing editor, NY Times) ii. Failure due to limits in maneuvering 1. Powerful domestic constraints 2. Stalemated war 3. Hanoi protracted war strategy + refusal to change objectives 4. Soviet lack of will to pressure Hanoi to end war 5. Thieu’s fears any settlement America would make will jeopardize S chances at survival Public opinion + Congress (Dem-majority) wanted quick end to war w/o being defeated US + Hanoi unwilling to accept each other’s terms as Nixon/Kissinger worked on new policy

10.2VIETNAMIZATION: SHIFTING I.

II.

THE BURDEN OF FIGHTING Delaying end of war a. Nixon: how to withdraw US from Vietnam – measured or swift? b. N leadership replaced S gov’t w/ one under Provisional Revolutionary Gov’t (PRG) c. What ends up happening: slow, bitter retreat from Indochina (“peace w/ honor”) Nixon’s letter of peace to N leadership a. Mutual withdrawal of US + NVA forces from S b. Restoration of DMZ as boundary btwn N + S c. Paris negotiations to follow 2-tiered approach: troop withdrawals from Washington + Hanoi, Saigon representatives + NLF worked on political settlement of civil war d. Same time letter sent to Hanoi, Kissinger sent to tell Anatoly Dobrynin (USSR ambassador) that Vietnam war must end b4 détente could occur 5

HTS 3015-A Vietnam: An American Ordeal (6th ed.), ch. 9-13

III. IV.

V. VI.

VII.

VIII.

i. Bombing of VC/NVA sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia bordering southern Vietnam Comm offensive in S, Feb. 22, 1969 JCS request to strike VC/NVA bases in Cambodia beyond Allied reach came true w/ MENU (Mar. 18) – B-52s bombing in several locales a. BREAKFAST, LUNCH, SNACK, DINNER, DESSERT, SUPPER b. Nixon ordered sporadic raids thru Aug 1969, sometimes followed by lightning crossborder raids Bombing continued on regular until May 26, 1970 → Cambodian air strikes openly supporting Allied ground ops vs. N bases Admin to keep this hidden from ppl a. USAF officials built systems of sortie records flown against authorized S targets accounting for fuel + weapons used on secret raids, dual bookkeeping b. William Beecher wrote May 9, 1969 account on secret bombing i. Nixon ordered FBI director J. Edgar Hoover to wiretap 11 NSC staff members’ phones + 4 news media ppl suspected of leak c. Nixon ordered bombing of N targets May 1970; press leak led to NY Times story → more wiretapping of suspected officials + journalists Pentagon Papers (NY Times publication, July 1971) – secret Defense Dep’t internal history of US involvement in Vietnam; given to press by ex-Defense officials Daniel Ellsberg + Anthony Russo a. WH officials formed “Plumbers” security unit to stop further leaks + discredit Ellsberg Stalemate on all levels – no change in Vietnam military balance a. Nixon televised May 14, 1969 speech called for ceasefire throughout Indochina, withdrawal of US/N troops from S in a year; proposed 8-pt peace plan and resurfacing of two-tier approach b. June 8: trip to Midway Island to meet w/ Thieu i. Announced recall of 25K troops from Vietnam same day, part of “Nixon doctrine” of limited involvement in 3rd world revolutionary wars ii. Followed by speeches denouncing antiwar critics and affirming maintenance of overseas commitments c. “Go for broke” strategy – all-out effort to end war either diplomatically or thru military force; Nixon urged HCM on for settlement or, after Nov 1, “else” d. Select NSC study group developed attack plans (DUCK HOOK) by end of Sept 1969 i. Mining Haiphong harbor ii. Naval blockade of N coast iii. Saturation bombing of military targets + major cities iv. Invasion of N (?) v. Bombing Red River dikes (?) vi. Closing down of rail supply lines to China (?) vii. Possible use of tactical nuclear devices e. Aug 4, 1969 talks btwn Kissinger + Xuan Thuy – first meeting a standstill i. Window of opportunity for parallel meetings w/ Le Duc Tho (chief negotiator) f. Formal response from HCM to Nixon’s letter Aug. 15 – denied US terms 6

HTS 3015-A Vietnam: An American Ordeal (6th ed.), ch. 9-13 i. Nixon by fall had to choose btwn military escalation or beating diplomatic retreat 1. Wanted air power to strike N + blockade ports; disapproval from Sec of State William Rogers + Sec of Defense Melvin Laird 2. Kissinger’s group of planners won’t get concessions from Hanoi or cripple ability to support war in S g. Back-up plan: fall back on Vietnamization

10.3MOBILIZING AGAINST I.

II.

III.

THE VIETNAM WAR, OCT. – NOV. 1969 Liberal antiwar activists organized the Moratorium + the New Mobilization a. Many organizers previously worked for either Eugene McCarthy or RFK in 1968 campaign b. Wanted to reach cities, towns + workplaces c. Support from most of peace movement (except most militant groups), intellectuals, major dissidents, 24 Dem senators + Averill Harriman M-Day, Sat., Oct. 15, 1969 – btwn 500K and 1mil ppl participated a. 100K citizens gathered at Boston Common to hear speeches + listen to music b. Manhattan: in large parade, Wall St. financiers walked w/ housewives, civil rights leaders, hippies + disillusioned Vietnam vets c. Philly series of antiwar events d. Widely observed in Midwest, ignored in South e. Denver: 3K marchers on state capitol, braving wintry conditions f. California: 20K citizens gathered on UCLA for day of antiwar events g. Vietnam: groups of US soldiers wore black armbands for support Nixon’s response a. Spent afternoon watching TV football game, canceled draft calls for Nov/Dec, replaced Gen. Hershey w/ Curtis Tarr i. Tarr’s swift actions to defuse protest against Selective Service 1. Lottery draft system lasting 3 yrs: upon turning 19, men drew #s from 1 to 365 based on birthdates – removed some class inequalities, reduced ranks of men likely to engage in antiwar events b. Counteroffensive, Nov 13-15 i. VP Agnew attacked “liberal establishment press” ii. Nixon’s Nov 3 televised speech, “silent majority” – timing halfway btwn moratorium + new mobilization 1. Declaration of war on antiwar movement, obtaining support from American ppl of his Vietnam policy 2. Called possibility of S bloodbath (esp. 1.5mil Catholics) if US pulled out forces 3. Broadened support: pro-Nixon rallies in cities, polls showed 77% of population supported Vietnamization + many agree antiwar demos harm peace plans for Vietnam iii. Factions w/i antiwar organizers (radical/liberal) iv. March Against Death: participants carrying light candle + placard started near Arlington Nat’l Cemetery, marching across Memorial Bridge to WH (each person 7

HTS 3015-A Vietnam: An American Ordeal (6th ed.), ch. 9-13

v. vi. vii.

viii.

paused to shout name of dead warrior) down Pennsylvania Ave to Capitol (each person placed placard in waiting coffin + blew out candle) Rev. William Sloane Coffin led ecumenical prayer service @ Nat’l Cathedral, Washington 150K ppl in parade for peace in San Fran 350K ppl gathered at Mall near Lincoln Memorial Sat., Nov 15, then flowed down Pennsylvania Ave past WH (barricaded by circle of buses) onto grounds of Washington Monument – mostly white, young demonstrators 1. Fitful attention to speakers; cast of Hair + Peter, Paul and Mary captivated crowd (“All we are saying is give peace a chance”, Bob Dylan) Moratorium/New Mobilization events little impact on public opinion, none on Nixon war policy 1. Little to no media coverage 2. ¾ of Americans didn’t like protests, 3/5 thought protesters aided enemy

10.4THE BATTLE I.

II.

OF HAMBURGER HILL March: MACV intel officers noticed NVA forces rebuilding logistics systems in A Shau Valley for offensive ops in I Corps a. “Screaming Eagles” (101st Airborne) ordered into area to destroy them April – early May: soldiers lifted into valley found new supply caches + new evidence of logistical buildup a. May 10: combined force of Marines + 187th Infantry air assaulted into area of jungled mtns along western valley side near Laos border b. May 11: soldiers found that NVA forces fortified ridges in thick jungle (Hill 937 or Dong Ap Bia), began to go up slopes but met w/ machine-gun fire from enemy bunkers dug into crests, forced to withdraw + artillery/air strikes called in to pound NVA positions c. 10-day battle follows i. May 13: 1st Battalion companies tried taking hill but driven back by rocket + machine-gun fire from 29th regiment battalions in bunkers 1. Men reinforced to try again, but failed again ii. Pause in fighting while enemy bunkers subjected to intensive artillery fire + air strikes for 36 hrs iii. May 18: two battalions attacked hill again w/ hillside stripped of foliage + w/ rain turning it into mud – problematic, slipped + slid down slopes iv. May 20: 4 battalion force reached crest of Ap Bia to find NVA abandoned positions d. Criticism – pointless sacrifice of men, irresponsible e. Significance – last campaign of attrition strategy, last battle in which victory was determined by body count, new strategy involves small unit warfare for destroying enemy logistics systems mixed w/ pacification + nation-building efforts

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