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HTS 3015, chapters 1-4 Vietnam: An American Ordeal (6th ed.)

1 | ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA THE JAPANESE OCCUPY INDOCHINA A. Interests pre-1940’s a. Philippines + Guam after victory in Spanish-American War b. Trade w/ colonies of Brit., French, Netherlands i. Malaya – rubber, tin ii. Dutch East Indies – rubber, oil iii. Vietnam – rubber c. Vietnam’s significance to US i. Foodstuffs, raw material ii. Near major shipping lanes cnxn w/ India, China, Jpn., SE Asia B. Diplomatic issues a. Fall of France (Jun 1940) – established Nazi gov’t @ Vichy i. FDR granted Vichy recognition, tries holding off German occupation of North African Fr. Colonies, failed at preventing Japan from Indochina occupation b. French officials offered little resistance to Jpn demands c. Jpn gained leverage in SE Asia for continuing war w/ China d. Indochina as base of op’s for Jpn success in conquering SE Asian terr (Philippines, ’41-42) C. Japan over Indochina, summer 1941 a. American response: cut off of oil supply i. Negotiations, summer-fall: US wants Jpn out of China/Indochina b. Japanese response: Pearl Harbor, Dec 7th; brought US into WWII i. Occupied E. Indies + extracted oil; used Vietnam as staging area, ports as resource depots D. 1st American military intervention into Vietnam, early 1942 a. “Flying Tigers” – group of US volunteers to rid Jpn of lifeline + Vietnam air bases for Chin attacks, under control of Chin Nat’list Army b. Conflict about Euro imperialism in Asia i. De Gaulle + Churchill team up v. FDR to retain holds in Asia; efforts blocked by US ii. Chin nat’list leader Jiang Jieshi refused rule over Indochina iii. FDR pushed for int’l trusteeship to align US foreign policy w/ Asian nat’lism THE VIETMINH REVOLUTION, AUG. 1945 A. What have the Vietminh being doing all this time? a. Espionage missions, raids on Jpn forces in north Vietnam b. Dec. 1944: Ho Chi Minh ordered creation of Vietnamese Liberation Army i. Winter ’44-45: guerrillas reclaim 3 provinces, combat w/ Jpn forces c. Spring 1945: received support from OSS contingent from US-Chin mission @ Kunming d. US + Brit. Took back Jpn wartime conquests in SE Asia; after resistance, Indochina cut off from Jpn theaters i. Fr flipped onto nat’list side of war, rule of Indochina ended by Jpn (Mar 9) ii. Jpn installed Vietnam gov’t headed by Bao Dai (orig. under Fr control) based on lies, army officers in charge of affairs

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HTS 3015, chapters 1-4 Vietnam: An American Ordeal (6th ed.) e.

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Vietminh (w/ most of Tonkin in jurisdiction) spread influence thruout country; w/i reclaimed provinces: i. Installed revolutionary regimes ii. Recruited guerrillas iii. Redistributed land from Fr landlords to peasants iv. Abolished taxes v. Reduced land rents vi. Helped in ’43-44 famine, confiscating rice and giving to peasants Jpn forces surrender, mid-Aug. 1945 i. 18th-28th: revolutionaries claimed back almost all Vietnam 1. 19th: Vietminh seized Hanoi; 23rd: seized Hue th ii. 29 : provisional gov’t of Democratic Republic of Vietnam formed, capital Hanoi iii. Sep. 2: HCM declared independence for Vietnam in Ba Dinh square iv. No nation (even US) officially recognized DRV; Bao Dai as “supreme adviser”

AMERICA SUPPORTS THE FRENCH RETURN TO VIETNAM A. FDR inconsistent w/ Vietnam, unbelief in Atlantic Charter extending to Asia, vague ideas for sol’n by death B. Truman came into office w/o much knowledge about Vietnam issues a. Met w/ other Allied leaders @ Potsdam, determined Vietnam would be temporarily divided along 16th parallel at end of WWII i. North – Chin nat’list troops deal w/ Jpn surrender, release of POWs + Allied internees ii. South – held by Brit troops handling same issues above

2 | THE FRENCH INDOCHINA WAR, 1946-54 THE FRENCH RETURN TO INDOCHINA A. Reason for conquest: political cohesion of Fr overseas empire; decolonization viewed similar to US domino theory B. Sep. 13, 1945: Gen. Gracey led 2K Brit + Indian troops into Saigon; ordered disarming of Vietnamese forces; released + equipped 5K Fr troops from Jpn internment C. Sep. 23: France overthrew Vietminh gov’t in Saigon D. Brit + Indian + Jpn + Fr forces pushed back resistance from Tran Van Giau/Vietnamese, fall 1945 (1st Indochina War) a. US proconsul in Jpn Douglas MacArthur denounced Allied intervention E. Early 1946 a. Jan. 6: 1st nat’l elections in Vietnam i. Over 90% eligible voters participated; Vietminh candidates won 206 of 254 seats ii. HCM allowed 70 guaranteed seats to nat’list delegates for broad support for Vietminh iii. Put brakes on constitution and permanent gov’t b. China pressure to reclaim Vietnam for Fr; refused Fr troops entry into north until concessions extracted

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HTS 3015, chapters 1-4 Vietnam: An American Ordeal (6th ed.) FRANCE-VIETNAM NON- NEGOTIATIONS A. Fr-Chin negotiations, Feb-Mar 1946 a. Fr agreed release of prewar trading rights/concessions in Chin for support in reeintry into north Vietnam b. Return required Vietminh permission; HCM willing to compromise w/ Fr to rid of Chin support B. Mar. 6: Franco-Vietnam negotiations (HCM-Sainteny) a. HCM gov’t declared free state w/i Fr Union w/ own gov’t and army b. Fr to hold nat’l referendum to determine whether Cochin China rejoins Annam + Tonkin in reunited Vietnam or remains separate Fr territory c. 25K Fr troops replace Chin forces north of 16th parallel til 1951, Chin forces withdraw by Jun 16 d. Vietminh delegation to go to Paris to work out vague terms e. Fr failed to hold referendum, hid “free state w/i Fr Union” under domination of Vietnam; 15K troops reentered Tonkin w/ Chin and US acceptance C. Soviet Union ignored Vietnam…until 1950’s a. Stalin favored Fr Communist officials over HCM; after party lost Fr 1946 elections, claimed cabinet positions + deputy premier → supported Indochinese colonization D. All by himself – HCM facing French a. Headed regime w/ no money or equipment; further attempts at negotiations i. Dalat (bust) ii. Fontainebleau (bust) – Fr reestablished control of Laos + Cambodia iii. US embassy in Paris (bust) iv. Fr PM Bidault (bust) → modus vivendi Oct 1946 THE FRENCH IND OCHINA WAR BEGINS A. Nov. 20: Fr + Vietminh customs collectors fought over who collects duties @ Haiphong port, exchanged fire btwn soldiers B. Nov. 23: Fr attacked guerrilla hideouts in Chin quarter of Haiphong; 6K dead, 25K wounded a. 28th: Gen Morliere ultimatum that Vietminh yield Fr control of city, suburbs, main hwy btwn Haiphong + Hanoi b. Dec 18: Fr moved troops into Hanoi, occupied gov’t buildings c. 19th: Giap ordered to disarm forces, refused command i. Guerrillas destroyed Hanoi power plant, attacked Fr officials’ homes, installations ii. HCM set up temporary gov’t @ Ha Dong, 6 miles S of Hanoi C. Early stages of Franco-Vietminh war (Dec. 1946 – 1947) a. 3 stages of war i. Vietminh guerrillas avoid urban areas, major battles w/ Fr forces; building up main force units, continuing political organization in villages ii. Revolutionaries strengthen, imperialist forces decline iii. General offensive by revolutionaries to drive imperialist forces from Vietnam b. 50 miles from Chin border, HCM headquarters in Bac Can c. Fall 1947 i. Fr launched major offensive to destroy Vietminh main forces + capture leaders (missed them by less than 1 hr), killed 9.5K, forced rebels to abandon large areas

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HTS 3015, chapters 1-4 Vietnam: An American Ordeal (6th ed.)

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ii. Fr move to undercut Vietminh thru alliances w/ Vietnamese groups cooperating w/ them against revolutionaries, persuade Bao Dai to head non-Comm Vietnamese state 1. Failed strategy b/c Fr not granting Vietnam sovereignty + non-Comm nat’list factions not getting along to form stable coalition 2. Could not destroy Vietminh army or create viable alternative to HCM nat’lism Winning streak, 1948-51 i. Maoist regime victory, transition from 1st to 2nd stage of war 1. Vietminh military, political apparatus doubled in size; regained terr from prev yr; expanded Cochin China under their control 2. Southern forces upped activity in/around Saigon, infiltrated new gov’t’s police force + civil service bureaucracies 3. Series of assaults on provincial capitals in Mekong R. Delta, Fr guerrillas to seek refuge in Plain of Reeds ii. Chinese-Vietnamese relations 1. Jieshi fled mainland, Chin Communists on Vietnam border Nov 1949 → end of 1st stage 2. Vietminh access to cross-border sanctuaries for mobilization of troops 3. Jan 1950: new Chin gov’t extended recognition to HCM gov’t; Moscow followed after 4. Gov’t became openly Comm; Indochina Comm Party (dissolved 1945) reappeared as Vietnamese Workers Party in 1950 5. VWP cadres began land reform in rural areas iii. Counteroffensive, 3rd stage of war 1. Apr. 1950: HCM to Beijing for lend-lease agreement a. By fall, Giap had 60K regulars into 5 infantry divisions 2. Sagging Fr efforts due to cost; refused drafting, reduced Fr troops by 10K 3. Giap to clear out string of Fr garrisons reaching into northern countryside along Chin border a. Principal garrison – Dong Khe, fell to Vietminh Sept 16 4. Fr lost over 6K men, abandoned important supplies, driven out of northern Tonkin; Giap to invade Red R. delta w/ unrestricted access to Chin, resources; prospective aid from USSR and Eastern bloc countries

A DEVELOPING FRANCO-AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP A. Sec of State Dean Acheson + Pres Truman sought to stop Comm revolution in Indochina, advancing interests of USSR + China a. Mar 1947: Truman Doctrine committed US to containment policy in Europe B. Fr provided political + econ. support in late 1940s ($160mil, part of Marshall Plan on Indochina military op’s) C. After Mao victory, Truman admin asked for more assistance; complied so Fr will cooperate w/ US strategic designs for Europe + free up resources for NATO AMERICA EXTENDS CONTAINMENT TO SE ASIA A. Response: helping rebuild Jpn economy, econ assistance to friendly nations

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HTS 3015, chapters 1-4 Vietnam: An American Ordeal (6th ed.) B.

1949 Bao Dai puppet regime: Fr claims to fight to save non-Comm Vietnamese nation from int’l communism C. Apr 1950: NSC-64 i. Promoting nat’l leaders who could rally non-Comm Vietnamese nat’lists, nullify Vietminh appeal ii. Revealing doubt Fr forces will beat Vietminh iii. By Feb, US formally sided w/ Fr, recognized Bao Dai’s “associated states of Vietnam” D. Korean war broke out Jun 1950, assumed N. Korea + Beijing led by communism i. Military Assistance + Advisory Group, late summer → Fr + Vietnamese instructed in US weapons/tactics; installed econ + technical assistance for Bao Dai gov’t, military programs; built Vietnamese nat’l army; coordinated US military aid w/ Fr military op’s ii. By end of Truman era, US aid in Fr war effort cost ≤$1bn (1951-52) → conjoined w/ war iii. Special Mission for Technical + Econ Aid built up Bao Dai Regime E. Further US presidents’ promises i. Eisenhower: intervention in southern Vietnam to replace Fr + support Diem’s efforts for non-Comm state ii. Kennedy: escalated US effort, inaugurated secret US war in S. Vietnam iii. LBJ: series of decisions in 1965 to fight major war in Vietnam

THE ROAD TO DIEN BIEN PHU A. Fr under new confidence to dominate Red R. delta from Gen. de Lattre de Tassigny a. Giap premature offensive Jan 1951 in western end, lost 15K troops (killed/wounded) B. 1951-53: Vietminh attacks in northern Vietnam a. Nov 14, 1951: Hoa Binh campaign (3 mos), Fr forced withdrawal mid Feb 1952 b. Little/no support from cities and coastal enclaves; land reform for peasants c. Navarre assumed charge of Fr forces April: regained delta terr from Vietminh (1 st phase of regaining Fr support of war) d. Giap sent regiments to Laos from DIen Bien Phu, spring BATTLE OF DIEN BIEN PHU, 1954 A. Strategies a. France (Navarre) a. Nov 1953: sent paratroopers to block Vietminh invasion into Laos + cut off supply route from China, tie down Giap’s forces from Red R. delta b. Force Vietminh to fight set-pc battle for defeat c. Second phase of war: Operation Atlante, series of op’s in northern Annam to clear northcentral Vietnam b. DRV (Giap) a. Delayed response to Fr thrust in delta, postponed large assaults until after Fr defense/morale weakened, encircled fortress + trapped Fr forces in their own trap b. Placed local guerrillas to block Fr efforts to pacify key coastal provinces in Operation Atlante B. More tries to compromise a. Feb 1954: Geneva peace conference – reunification of Korea, Vietminh war on agenda C. Final touches before the battle 5

HTS 3015, chapters 1-4 Vietnam: An American Ordeal (6th ed.) a. b.

Planned siege of positions, destruction of airstrips, artillery + mortars in hills overlooking fortress Deployed ≥50K main force troops, 50K support forces, 200K supply workers; 20-30K Chin workers, techs, mechanics, truck drivers, advisers + artillerymen joined a. Chinese supplied ammo, weapons, gasoline, foodstuffs, advice on tactics; Soviets furnished trucks, artillery + Eastern bloc aid pool b. 12K Fr troops under Col. Christian de Castries w/ defended area mainly around larger airstrip, 4 other small areas D. Battle of Dien Bien Phu started Mar 13, 1954 – Vietminh artillery opened fire on Fr positions below, infantry assaulted strong point a. Artillery + mortars shut down both airstrips in 48 hrs, Fr had to use parachute drop to reinforce and supply defenders b. Guns in camouflaged tunnels dug deep into mtns, constantly moved around; 4:1 advantage in firepower; functioning supply system c. Early April: series of infantry assaults to overrun outer defenses → Fr matched Vietnamese w/ heavy losses; Giap goes to tunneling d. Sappers (VietCong commandos) tunnel toward Fr positions w/ little resistance e. Navarre asked Americans to save Fr forces but were refused f. May 7: Vietminh 308th broke thru into center of Fr defenses; Dien Bien Phu fell the next day E. Aftermath a. Indochina phase of Geneva Peace Conference began b. Fr position in Red R. delta collapsed w/ 80K Vietminh guerrillas + 4 regiments roaming around; Fr withdrew to area around Hanoi + Haiphong c. Fr civilians evacuated north Vietnam; soldiers fled Vietnamese nat’l army d. 80% of country under Vietminh control AMERICA SEES FAILURE AND OPPORTUNITY A. Pres Eisenhower + Sec of State John Foster Dulles originally wanted military solution to hold the line, but w/ more aid to France, Fr position decline; Vietminh kept military initiative and add terr and support in Vietnam + Laos; Premier Laniel approved from Foreign Ministers’ Council for Indochina War on Geneva conference agenda; France w/ non-committed efforts to EDC B. Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Arthur Radford proposed series of US air strikes to save Dien Bien Phu (Operation VULTURE), possibly nuclear weapons used → failed C. April 1954 a. 3rd: Dulles + Radford met w/ Congress leadership for resolution in Vietnam intervention b. 7th : publicized press conference rallying support for possible intervention, arguing Indochina as raw material jackpot + starting domino that could knock SE Asia into communism → Brit. Foreign Sec Anthony Eden turned down c. Late April last-minute plea from Georges Bidault goes bad; diplomats from 9 nations inside old League of Nations building to discuss Indochina d. Fr to meet demands unacceptable before receiving aid (e.g. Vietnam independence, continuing to fight, greater role in training indigenous forces) e. Eisenhower viewed only US could stop Comm victory in Vietnam D. The Geneva conference a. Soviet + Chinese pressure to moderate Vietnamese demands for Fr b. Before final agreement, Laniel gov’t fell, replaced by Pierre Mendes-France

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HTS 3015, chapters 1-4 Vietnam: An American Ordeal (6th ed.) c.

Eisenhower + Dulles directly involved in replacing Fr in Vietnam, defending southern 1/2 + Laos + Cambodia; elections to unify Vietnam to be held before July 20, 1956

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HTS 3015, chapters 1-4 Vietnam: An American Ordeal (6th ed.)

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i. Consultations btwn 2 zones begin July 20, 1955 ii. Cambodia + Laos to be independent under current gov’ts, ceasefires, self-defense, no military alliances or foreign bases unless security threatened July 21, 1954 result: ceasefire, Vietnam divided along 17th parallel (HCM wanted 13th parallel) Ambiguous US policy toward Geneva Accords – recognized agreement but will continue to seek free elections for unity i. Undercut thru US creating int’l military alliance to send personnel into southern Vietnam + sabotage 1956 elections

LESSONS FROM A WAR A. Political maneuver over military firepower + tactics over technology B. Stable gov’ts + tempering cadres to keep support of rural populations + strong South Vietnam forces prove to be similar downfalls to US + Fr in years to come

3 | AMERICA’S DIEM EXPERIMENT FORMATION OF SEATO, 1954 A. NSC report: call to action → negotiation of new int’l agreements for security in south Vietnam + protect nearby SE Asian countries from Comm attacks B. Sept. 8, 1954: Pact of Manila, creation of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) a. Members: US, Brit., Fr., Australia, NZ, Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan b. Neutral: Burma, India, Indonesia c. Non-members: Laos, Cambodia, State of Vietnam (south) → umbrella of protection protocol C. US determines if military intervention is needed to suppress rebellion or stop aggression; legal vindication for intervention into Vietnam to stop N Vietnam aggression against S Vietnam THE ADVENT OF NGO DINH DIEM A. Background/early political career a. Attended, graduated from Quoc Hoc lycée (same as HCM); valedictorian @ School for Law + Admin in Hanoi b. Provincial chief of district made up of 300 villages c. Bao Dai appointed him minister of the interior 1932 i. List of reforms to modernize ministry; refused by Bao Dai & Fr masters d. Southern half of Vietnam premier Jun 1954 B. Reception a. Enemies i. French – domination of Vietnam ii. Communists – enemies of Vietnamese nat’lism iii. American media, gov’t officials iv. Vietnamese Buddhists 1. Cao Dai, Buddhist sect over northern Mekong delta (Pham Cong Tac) 2. Hao Hao, region SW of Saigon

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HTS 3015, chapters 1-4 Vietnam: An American Ordeal (6th ed.) b.

Supporters i. Liberal academics (“third force” theorists – if US wants to keep influence in developing countries, it should support non-Comm non-colonialist leaders) ii. Montagnards (Degar) in central highlands iii. Catholic connections 1. Cardinal Francis Spellman 2. JFK (senator at the time) 3. Sen. Mike Mansfield 4. Supr. Court Assoc Justice William O. Douglas 5. Sen. Joseph McCarthy (may/may not have met)

DIEM STRUGGLES TO SURVIVE A. Jun 25, 1954: arrival in Saigon proves that country is in turmoil (corrupt bureaucracy, poor + unfaithful army, political tension in city and vicinity, HCM and Lao Dong favored to win 1956 elections B. US aid money directly to Diem; Fr to build cnxns w/ Hanoi regime to protect investments in S as Diem was transferred full powers of governance Dec 1954 C. Saigon controlled by Binh Xuyen, criminal syndicate under Bay Vien (Grande Monde casino, Hall of Mirrors brothels, opium factory); Bao Dai received payoffs, appointed Vien as general in Vietnamese Nat’l Party + head of nat’l police D. Fr backed coup against Diem by Chief of Staff Gen. Nguyen Van Hinh, fall 1954: foiled by US forces a. 9 cabinet members resigned during coup plot; pressure on Diem to step down E. Gen. J. Lawton Collins sent to help Diem strengthen authority in S; recommended Pres Eisenhower + SoS Dulles to deprive him his office after Diem not taking his suggestions and seeing the bigger picture; support continued flowing to Diem from US a. Dollar replaced franc as State of Vietnam unit of currency, financial control of nat’l army b. After Feb 1955 visit from Dulles, Diem initiated events leading to Battle for Saigon i. March: refused to renew Binh Xuyen gambling license ii. Ended subsidies Fr paid Cao Dai + Hoa Hoa sects to purchase loyalty to Bao Dai state iii. Bay Vien and sect leaders formed United Front nat’l forces 1. March 21 ultimatum that Diem reorganize his gov’t + install new cabinet of ministers approved by Unite...