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Thabo-Meli v R [1954] 1 WLR 228 Privy Council The four appellants were convicted of murder. They had planned to kill a man and then make it look like an accident. They took him to a hut and beat him over the head. Believing that he was dead, they then took his body to a cliff and threw it off. Medical evidence showed that the deceased died from exposure of being left at the bottom of the cliff and not from the blow to the head. They appealed against their convictions on the grounds that the actus reus and mens rea of the crime did not coincide. That is to say when they formed the intention to kill, there was no actus reus as the man was still alive. When they threw him off the cliff, there was no mens rea as they can intend to kill someone they believed was already dead. Held: Convictions upheld. The act of beating him and throwing him off the cliff was one continuing act. Lord Reid: "It appears to their Lordships impossible to divide up what was really one transaction in this way. There is no doubt that the accused set out to do all these acts in order to achieve their plan and as parts of their plan; and it is much too refined a ground of judgment to say that, because they were under a misapprehension at one stage and thought that their guilty purpose and been achieved before in fact it was achieved, therefore they are to escape the penalties of the law."

R v Jordan (1956) 40 Cr App E 152 The defendant stabbed the victim. The victim was taken to hospital where he was given anti-biotics after showing an allergic reaction to them. He was also given excessive amounts of intravenous liquids. He died of pneumonia 8 days after admission to hospital. At the time of death his wounds were starting to heal. Held: The victim died of the medical treatment and not the stab wound. The defendant was not liable for his death.

R v Smith [1959] 2 QB 35 CAUSATION Facts The defendant was a soldier who stabbed one of his comrades during a fight in an army barracks. The victim was taken to receive medical attention, but whilst being carried to the hospital was dropped twice by those carrying him. Once at the hospital, he received negligent medical treatment; the medics failed to diagnose a puncture to his lung. The victim died of his injuries, and the defendant was charged with murder and convicted at first instance. The defendant appealed on the basis that the victim would have survived but for the negligence of those treating him. He also argued that his confession had been obtained under duress and was therefore inadmissible. Issue The issue was whether the negligence on the part of the doctors was capable of breaking the chain of causation between the defendant’s action in stabbing the victim, and his ultimate death. Held The court held that the stab wound was an operating cause of the victim’s death; it did not matter that it was not the sole cause. In order to break the chain of causation, an event must be:

“…unwarrantable, a new cause which disturbs the sequence of events [and] can be described as either unreasonable or extraneous or extrinsic” (p. 43). The chain of causation was not broken on the facts of this case. With respect to the issue of duress, the court held that as the threat was made some time before the relevant confession and was no longer active at the time of the defendant’s statement, it did not render the evidence inadmissible. The conviction for murder was therefore upheld.

R v Malcherek and Steel [1981] 2 ALL ER Two separate appeals were heard together. In Malcherek the defendant had stabbed his wife. In Steel the defendant was accused of sexually assaulting and beating a woman over the head with a stone. In both cases the victims had been taken to hospital and placed on life support machines. The doctors in the respective cases later switched off the life support machines as both victims were not showing any activity in their brain stem. The defendants sought to argue that the doctors' actions constituted a novus actus interveniens which broke the chain of causation. Held: Convictions upheld The test of death is where the brain stem has died. Thus at the time of switching off the machine, the victims were already dead. The doctors could not therefore be the cause of death.

s 99 (3) of the penal code states that a right in exercising private defence is available when the victim is unable to seek recourse from public authorities. In PP v Seow Khoon Kwee, the accused (“Seow”) was denied his right to private defence by s 99(3). The court assumed that Seow had felt threatened by the deceased on the first occasion during their scuffle, hence should have reported this fear to the prison authorities; and because he had failed to do so, his subsequent fight with the deceased disqualified him of private defence. This section submits two reasons justifying why Seow’s failure to seek the State’s protection should not deny him of private defence: i) Fear of possible repercussions—revenge by the deceased After the first skirmish, Seow suspected the deceased’s resentment towards him, but not every such suspicion would command him to rush to the authorities and it may be unrealistic to require prisoners to report to the guards at the slightest fear of retaliation. Prisoners would likely only do so as a last resort, and at heightened fear, since involving officers’ help would probaby bring more unwanted attention and the possibility of revenge unto oneself. While Seow could have been presented with the opportunity to physically seek recourse from the authorities, he likely assessed that such action would not substantively provide sustainable protection from the accused, who was bigger-sized and known to be violent to the inmates. ii) Timing and degree of reasonable apprehension of danger Two elements are required in seeking the State’s protection: 1) time to do so, and 2) reasonable apprehension of danger. In this case, Seow could not possibly predict when the deceased might attack him, if there was any intention so; hence Seow’s level of apprehension of danger dwindled as time elapsed. Resultantly, the justification to seek official recourse would have subsided and even ceased. It was only during the second quarrel that the apprehension of danger spiked, but at that time, the suddenness of the attack would have rendered s 99(3) inapplicable. The elements of apprehension of danger and time for recourse to the State did not coincide. Such misjudgment on Seow’s part may not form a sufficient reason to deny him of his right to private defence.

Chong Teng v PP 1960] MLJ 153FACT: the Accused alleged that the deceased had taken away his wife & children which took place two years ago. On the day of the incident, he heard that the deceased was in market in Seremban. He went there in search of the deceased. The Accused argued that his act was done due to provocation. HELD:There was no provocation as it was not grave & sudden since th e Accused sought the provocation & due to the fact that his allegation that the deceased took away his family had taken place two years ago which showed a cooling-off period between the provocation & the act of killing & there was MR on the part of the Accused to kill the deceased (the killing should have taken place a long time ago in order for it to be sudden)Mat Sawi bin Bahodin v PP [1958] MLJ 189

FACT: the Accused was charged for murder of the mother-in-law. The Accused & the wife stayed together with the mother-in-law. There were a series of provocation by the mother-in-law. It started when the Accused prohibited the wife to go out to work but the mother disagreed so he gave in. Later, the wife’s behaviour changed & he sensed that she was having an affair. One night, the Accused had a stomach-ache & as ked the w ife to apply s ome ointment on the abdomen but she gave a cold- shoulder treatment (she looked away while applying). When he turned to the mother-in-law for sympathy,she backfired & scolded him instead. She even called him abusive words such as, “babi”. The Accused later killed the mother-in-law....