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Trust Case Summaries Week 1: Earl of oxford case 1615 1 ch rep 1: - Earl of Oxford’s case (1615) 21 ER 485 is a foundational case for the common law world, that held equity (equitable principle) takes precedence over the common law. - The Lord Chancellor held: "The Cause why there is Chancery is, for that Mens Actions are so divers[e] and infinite, that it is impossible to make any general Law which may aptly meet with every particular Act, and not fail in some Circumstances." - The judgement stresses that the legal position for chancery (equity) is tempered to dealing with voids (lacunae) in the common law, a principle regularly asserted in the courts of appeal i.e. "equity follows the law", one of the maxims of equity which taken together impose many limits on the eligibility of cases and applicants. - The King decreed on the advice of the Attorneys General that if there was a conflict between the common law and equity, equity would prevail. Equity’s primacy in England was later enshrined in the Judicature Acts in 1873 and 1875, which also served to fuse the courts of equity and the common law (although emphatically not the systems themselves) into one unified court system. Facts: - A statute, the Ecclesiastical Leases Act 1571 (13 Eliz c 10), provided that conveyances of estates by the masters, fellows, any college dean to anyone for anything other than a term of 21 years, or three lives, ‘shall be utterly void’. - Not mindful of this, Roger Kelke, Master and the Fellows of Magdalene College, Cambridge sold some of its land (at St Botolph's Aldgate in London) to Queen Elizabeth I. The queen then granted the land to Benedict Spinola, a Genoese merchant. It was generally thought among those preparing and signing these conveyancing deeds that the transfer to the Queen or transfer from the Queen would amount to an unwritten exception, allowing for new unimpeachable title (ownership). Spinola thought this, and so did Edward de Vere, the Earl of Oxford, who bought the land in 1580 and built 130 houses. John Warren leased a house through intermediaries. - Then, Barnabas Gooch, Master (1604-1624) considered that, in the light of the 1571 Act, he was able to lease the land to John Smith and allowed him into occupation as such. Warren brought an action of ejection against Smith, but his lease expired before it was heard by court. Warren asked the question to be decided anyway Judgment: - Jury: o The Jury held that Smith had taken possession unlawfully (ie through the later lease by Gooch on behalf of the College) and so the sale was good. This ultimately meant that Warren was entitled to eject Smith. - King’s Bench: o Chief Justice Coke held the initial land transfer was void, caught by the statute 13 Eliz c 10. The Queen was ‘the fountain of justice and common right’ and could not be exempted from a statute aimed to maintain the advancement of learning. Therefore, Gooch acting for the College had validly leased the property. Warren could not eject Smith. o In 1604 alleged owner Edward de Vere, 17th Earl of Oxford had died, thus succeeded by his son Henry (b. 1593) who was minor. He and another tenant, Thomas Wood, brought the case to the Court of Chancery. Gooch and Smith refused to answer the bill, saying it was void. They refused to appear. The Chancery Court committed them to Fleet Prison for contempt of court. - Chancery: o Lord Ellesmere LC, issued a common injunction out of the Court of Chancery prohibiting the enforcement of the common law order, and granting the Earl of Oxford and his tenants quiet enjoyment of the land, in other words meaning that the statute did not void the initial transaction of the land. It stayed all common law suits against the Earl. He began his judgment by referencing the Bible, Deuteronomy 28:30, saying he "that builds a House ought to dwell in it; and he that plants a Vineyard ought to gather the Grapes thereof." He remarked that common law judges themselves ‘play the Chancellors Parts’ in taking the equitable construction of statutes to be law properly speaking. The Chancery, however, was not like a Court of Appeal.[1] Instead, the Chancery had a unique position.

“The Office of the Chancellor is to correct Men’s consciences for Frauds, Breach of Trusts, Wrongs and oppressions, of what Nature soever they be, and to soften and mollify the Extremity of the Law, which is called summum jus. o And for the judgment, &c., law and equity are distinct, both in their courts, their judges, and the rules of justice; and yet they both aim at one and the same end, which is to do right; as Justice and Mercy differ in their effects and operations, yet both join in the manifestation of God's glory. o … when a Judgment is obtained by Oppression, Wrong and a hard Conscience, the Chancellor will frustrate and set it aside, not for any error or Defect in the Judgment, but for the hard Conscience of the Party. o [...] o In this Case there is no Opposition to the Judgment; neither will the Truth or justice of the Judgment be examined in this Court, not any Circumstance depending thereupon. o [...] o The Cause why there is Chancery is, for that Mens Actions are so divers and infinite, That it is impossible to make any general Law which may aptly meet with every particular Act, and not fail in some Circumstances.” Summary: - SUMMARY: In this report of the judgment in the Court of Chancery in Michaelmas term 1615, the court recites the circumstances under which the messuage and great garden of Christchurch were sold by the Master and Fellows of Magdalene College, Cambridge, to the Queen in 1574, by the Queen to Benedict Spinola in 1575, and by Spinola to Oxford in 1580. The court then finds that after being acquired by Spinola and Oxford, the property was considerably developed, to the point that £10,000 had been expended upon it and it had been ‘advanced by the Purchasers from a Thing of little Value to a great and considerable one’. The court then recites the circumstances by which the then Master of Magdalene College, Dr Barnaby Goche (d.1626), had attempted to regain the property for the College, ‘having by undue Means obtained the Possession of one of the 130 Houses’ on the property, thereby giving rise to legal proceedings. Lord Dudley and Ward v Lady Dudley (1705) Prec Ch 241: - Dudley v Dudley (1705) is a 1705 case of the Court of Chancery commonly cited in textbooks on law for its statement on the nature of equity. Lord Cowper, who gave the report, is sometimes misspelled as Lord Copper. Facts: - Edward Ward 7th Baron Dudley and 2nd Baron Ward leased for 99 years real property in trust for himself for his life, then in trust to pay out of the rents, issues, and profits annuities for his grandchildren (Edward Ward (the plaintiff’s father), son and heir of William Ward, eldest son of the 7th Baron Dudley; and William Ward, son of Ferdinando Dudley Ward second son of the seventh Baron Dudley); and to the grandchildren to 7th Baron Dudley's brother, William Ward, (Frances Porter and Catherine Porter). The remainder of the lease was in trust to the 7th Baron Dudley and heirs of his body male. The annuities arose on the death of the 7th Baron Dudley. - The seventh Baron Dudley died on 28 June 1701. Edward Ward a minor, (the plaintiff’s father) succeeded as the 8th Baron Dudley and 3rd Baron Ward, since his father predeceased the 7th Baron Dudley and received his annuity and the remainder of the lease in trust. The 8th Baron Dudley married Diana Howard, the defendant. The 8th Baron Dudley died on 20 March 1704 while his wife, Lady Diana was pregnant. On 16 June 1704 Lady Diana gave birth to Edward Ward, 9th Baron Dudley and fourth Baron Ward, the plaintive. Lady Diana brought a Writ of Dower at law that was granted but stayed enforcement because of the lease. This bill was filed by the Honourable Thomas Newport on behalf of the 9th Baron Dudley for administration the will of his father and great-grandfather. Lady Diana filed a cross bill demanding one third of the surplus of the lease after the payment of the annuities as her dower. At 244: - “Equity is no part of the law, but a moral virtue, which qualifies, moderates, and reforms the rigour, hardness, and the edge of the law, and is a universal truth; it does also assist the law where it is defective and weak.... and defends the law from crafty evasions, delusions, and new subtleties intended as contrived to evade and delude the common law, whereby such as have undoubted right are made remediless; and this is the office of equity, to support and protect the common law from shifts and crafty contrivances against the justice of law. Equity therefore does not destroy the law, nor create it, but assists it.” Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: 5.10 - We must next say something about decency and what is decent—about the way decency is related to justice and the way what is decent is related to what is just. For on investigation these appear to be neither unconditionally o

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the same nor different in genus. For sometimes we praise what is decent and a decent man, so that we even | 35| transfer the term “decent” to other things we are praising, in place of “good,” |1137b1| making it clear that what is more decent is better. But sometimes, on following out the argument, it appears strange that what is decent, if it is something apart from what is just, should be something praiseworthy. For either what is just is not something excellent or what is decent isn’t, if it is different from what is just; or if both are excellent, they are the same.400 |5| It is pretty much because of these considerations, then, that a puzzle arises about what is decent. Yet in a way they are all correct and none is contrary to any of the others. For what is decent, although better than what is in a certain way just, is still just and is not better than what is just by way of being a thing of a different genus. Hence what is just and what is decent are the same, and while both are excellent, |10| what is decent is more excellent. What produces the puzzle is that while what is decent is just, it is not what is just according to the law but, rather, a rectification of what is legally just. The cause of this is that all law is universal, but about some sorts of things it is not possible to pronounce correctly in universal terms. So in the sorts of cases where it is necessary to pronounce in universal terms but not possible to do so correctly, the law picks |15| what holds for the most part, not unaware of the error involved. And it is no less correct for doing so, since the error is not in the law or in the legislator but in the nature of the thing itself. For what is doable in action consists of this sort of subject matter right from the outset.401 So whenever the law makes a universal pronouncement and a particular case arises that is contrary to |20| the universal pronouncement, at that time it is correct (insofar as the legislator has omitted something and he has made an error in pronouncing unconditionally) to rectify the deficiency—to pronounce what the legislator himself would have pronounced had he been present and would have put into his law had he known about the case. That is why what is decent is just and better than what is in a certain way just. It is not better than what is unconditionally just, however, but only better than the sort that, because it pronounces universally, makes an error. |25| And this is the very nature of what is decent—a rectification of deficient because of its universality. For this is also the cause of not everything’s being regulated by law—namely, that there are some cases where it is impossible to establish a law, so that decrees are needed. For the standard of what is indeterminate is itself indeterminate, just like the lead standard used in Lesbian |30| building. For the standard is not fixed but adapts itself to the shape of the stone, and a decree adapts itself to the things themselves. What it is to be decent, then, and that it is both just—and better than what is in a certain way just—is clear. And it is also evident from this what a decent person is. For the person who deliberately chooses to do—and actually does—decent things |35| and is not a stickler for justice in the bad way but takes less than his due even if | 1138a1| he has the law on his side, is decent and his state is decency, which is a sort of justice and not some different state....