Water Hacks Aff - Gonzaga 2021 PDF

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a water hacks affirmation case...

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Water Hacks Affirmative – Scholars GDI21 Contents Water Hacks Affirmative – Scholars GDI21..................................................................................................1 On-Case.......................................................................................................................................................2 1AC..........................................................................................................................................................3 Contention 1 – Risk Assessment..........................................................................................................4 Contention 2 – Scenarios.....................................................................................................................9 Plan....................................................................................................................................................10 Contention 3 – Solvency....................................................................................................................11 Background............................................................................................................................................16 Water Sector Actors...........................................................................................................................17 EPA Has Regulatory Authority............................................................................................................18 Inherency...............................................................................................................................................20 Fed Role Limited Now........................................................................................................................21 EPA Not Acting...................................................................................................................................22 Risk High................................................................................................................................................24 Water Infrastructure Vulnerable........................................................................................................25 Framing..............................................................................................................................................33 Cyber Threats High Risk.....................................................................................................................34 Russian Cyber Attacks High Risk.........................................................................................................36 Water Terrorism High Risk.................................................................................................................38 AT – Water Not Key/Alt Causes..........................................................................................................39 AT – Hype...........................................................................................................................................41 AT – Fear Turn....................................................................................................................................45 Generic Infrastructure Vulnerable.....................................................................................................46 Water Attacks Scenario..........................................................................................................................49 Scenario

– Water Attacks................................................................................................................50

Attacks Impact – Poisoning................................................................................................................53 Attacks Impact – System Integrity......................................................................................................55 Attacks Impact – Flooding, Shortages................................................................................................56 Attacks Impact – Disease...................................................................................................................57

Attacks Impact – Everyday Life...........................................................................................................59 Water Scarcity Brink...........................................................................................................................61 Water Scarcity Impacts – Disease, Food, Energy, Econ......................................................................63 Waterborne Diseases Impact – Antibiotic Resistance........................................................................65 Superbugs Impact – Extinction..........................................................................................................67 Economy Scenario.................................................................................................................................69 Scenario

– Economy......................................................................................................................70

Internal Link – Control Systems..........................................................................................................75 Economic Impact – Ripple Effect........................................................................................................76 Economic Impact – Company Collapse..............................................................................................77 Smart Cities Scenario.............................................................................................................................78 Scenario

– Smart Cities...................................................................................................................79

Water Key to Smart Cities..................................................................................................................84 Smart Cities - Climate Change............................................................................................................87 Impact---Climate Change...................................................................................................................96 Smart Cities Impact – Social Problems...............................................................................................98 Smart Cities Impact – Crime............................................................................................................100 AT: No Smart Cities...........................................................................................................................102 Infrastructure Scenario........................................................................................................................105 Scenario

– Infrastructure.............................................................................................................106

Internal Link---Health & Econ...........................................................................................................108 Infrastructure Impact – Irrigation, Flooding, Drinking Water...........................................................111 Black Sky Add-on.............................................................................................................................112 Terrorism & Cyber War Scenarios........................................................................................................114 Scenario

– Terrorism....................................................................................................................115

Scenario

– Cyber War with Russia................................................................................................120

Scenario

– Cyber War...................................................................................................................124

Internal Link – Panic.........................................................................................................................127 Internal Link – Vulnerability – Bio, Chemical, Cyber Attacks............................................................130 Internal Link – Espionage.................................................................................................................131 Internal Link – Ransomware............................................................................................................134 Cyber Impact Magnifiers/Laundry Lists...........................................................................................136 Cyber War Brink – Retaliation Brink.................................................................................................138

Cyber War Impact – Nuclear Retaliation..........................................................................................139 Cyber War Impact – Miscalculation.................................................................................................141 Cyber War Impact – Russia..............................................................................................................143 Cyber War Impact – China...............................................................................................................146 Terrorism Impact – Securitization....................................................................................................149 Terrorism Impact – Authoritarianism Impacts.................................................................................154 AT — Risk Overblown.......................................................................................................................157 Solvency...............................................................................................................................................158 Regulation and Resources................................................................................................................159 Requirements Key............................................................................................................................160 Regulatory Frameworks...................................................................................................................162 Fed Key............................................................................................................................................164 Multiple Barrier Approach...............................................................................................................165 Risk Assessment Solvency................................................................................................................166 Cybersecurity Countermeasures......................................................................................................168 Secure Network...............................................................................................................................170 Culture Solvency..............................................................................................................................176 AT – Regulations Now......................................................................................................................179 Federal Incentives Solvency.............................................................................................................181 Resources Key..................................................................................................................................183 Revolving Funds Solvency................................................................................................................185 AT – No Enforcement.......................................................................................................................186 Off-Case Answers.....................................................................................................................................187 Federalism Answers.............................................................................................................................188 Link Answer – Cyber Is Federal Authority........................................................................................189 Link Answer – EPA authority............................................................................................................190 AT – State/Local Reject Federal Action Link.....................................................................................191 Politics Answers...................................................................................................................................192 Link Uniqueness Answer – Federal Action Now...............................................................................193 Bipartisan Support...........................................................................................................................195 Counterplan Answers..........................................................................................................................197 States CP – Solvency Answers..........................................................................................................198 States CP – Permutation Solvency...................................................................................................200

Voluntary CP – Solvency Answers....................................................................................................202

On-Case

1AC

Contention 1 – Risk Assessment

The risk of cyber-attacks on water systems high – it’s not a question of if, it’s a question of when Sobczak, Energywire Deputy Editor, 19 [Blake, 3-28-19, Environment & Energy News, “Hackers force water utilities to sink or swim,” https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060131769, accessed: 6-27-21, AHP] Last month, hackers tied computers into knots at a small Colorado water utility. It wasn't the first time the Fort Collins-Loveland Water District and its wastewater counterpart had been hit by "ransomware," a type of malware that encrypts victims' computer files and demands online payment to unlock them. While operations weren't harmed, the infection prompted the water district to switch out its information technology service provider and call in the FBI. The case, first reported by the Coloradoan, remains under active investigation. FCLWD and the South Fort Collins Sanitation District treat and distribute water to 45,000 customers in northern Colorado. Colorado water officials aren't alone in their cybersecurity woes. The nation's nearly 70,000 water and wastewater utilities are struggling to keep their heads above a rising tide of online threats, based on interviews with security experts and water company operators. As one IT manager at a midsize water utility put it, "It's not a question of if, it's a question of when" hackers disrupt vital U.S. water systems. "Most small and midsize utilities are overstressed," said the manager, who requested anonymity. Some larger utilities are well-positioned to thwart an attack by hackers backed by a foreign government, said Michael Arceneaux, managing director for the Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center, the industry's clearinghouse for getting the word out about the latest hacking threats and vulnerabilities. But in a sector that encompasses tens of thousands of local water systems, securing America's vast and disparate drinking water supply remains a significant challenge. "Drinking water utilities run the gamut in terms of cybersecurity preparedness," Arceneaux said. "What we try to do to compensate for that is make sure people are aware of the threats, so they have some motivation to invest the resources that should be invested." He said the ISAC and its membership recently reached the level of maturity needed to start partnering with other sharing and analysis centers, including the multistate government ISAC and the electric power sector's E-ISAC. Water utilities and power distributors share similar industrial control systems, rely on many of the same equipment providers and can encounter similar cyberthreats.

While the water system is inherently not as interconnected as the U.S. electricity system, "it's very plausible that the water sector is less prepared than the power sector for dealing with cybersecurity threats," Arceneaux said. "We are so fractured, so the water sector as a whole is at a little bit of a disadvantage." What keeps you up at night? The decentralized nature of the U.S. water industry has left policymakers with a dilemma. Cybersecurity for water treatment and supply networks is only loosely monitored at the federal level and is often ignored by state utility commissions that may have limited cybersecurity expertise and tend to focus on water quality. "Water cybersecurity is not on everyone's — or certainly not every commissioner's — radar screen, although I've tried to make it that way," said Mary-Anna Holden, a commissioner on the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities. In many emergency planning exercises, it isn't the lack of electricity that triggers chaos and widespread casualties. It's the lack of clean water that forces people from their homes. "Nobody thinks about wastewater systems until they break," said Holden, who chairs the Committee on Water at the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners.

Water infrastructure protections are inadequate – the majority of water systems are vulnerable. Expanded federal protections are necessary to ensure the support and resources to prevent cyber attacks. Krebs, investigative reporter and former Washington Post Security Fix reporter, 21 [Brian, 06-21-2021, Krebs on Security, “How Cyber Safe is Your Drinking Water Supply?,” https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/06/how-cyber-safe-is-your-drinking-water-supply/, accessed 06-302021, HSP]

Amid multiple recent reports of hackers breaking into and tampering with drinking water treatment systems comes a new industry survey with some sobering findings: A majority of the 52,000 separate drinking water systems in the United States still haven’t inventoried some or any of their information technology systems — a basic first step in protecting networks from cyberattacks. The Water Sector Coordinating Council surveyed roughly 600 employees of water and wastewater treatment facilities nationwide, and found 37.9 percent of utilities have identified all IT-networked assets, with an additional 21.7 percent working toward that goal. The Council found when it comes to IT systems tied to “operational technology” (OT) — systems responsible for monitoring and controlling the industrial operation of these utilities and their safety features — just 30.5 percent had identified all OT-networked assets, with an additional 22.5 percent working to do so.

“Identifying IT and OT assets is a critical first step in improving cybersecurity,” the report concluded. “An organization cannot protect what it cannot see.” It’s also hard to see threats you’re not looking for: 67.9 percent of water systems reported no IT security incidents in the last 12 months, a somewhat unlikely scenario. Michael Arceneaux, managing director of the WaterISAC — an industry group that tries to facilitate information sharing and the adoption of best practices among utilities in the water sector — said the survey shows much room for improvement and a need for support and resources. “Threats are increasing, and the sector, EPA, CISA and USDA need to collaborate to help utilities prevent and recover from compromises,” Arceneaux said on Twitter. While documenting each device that needs protection is a necessary first step, a number of recent cyberattacks on water treatment systems have been blamed on a failure to properly secure water treatment employee accounts that can be used for remote access. In April, federal prosecutors unsealed an indictment against a 22-year-old from Kansas who’s accused of hacking into a public water system in 2019. The defendant in that case is a ...