168047671 Statutory Construction Case Digest PDF

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Case No. 9 Radiola Toshiba Philippines vs Intermediate Appellate Court GR No. 75222, July 18, 1991

Case No. 10 | Midterms Case No. 1 Manuel T. De Guia vs Commission on Elections GR No. 104712, May 6, 1992

Statutory rule: In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part be given effect.

Statutory Rule: A construction that gives to the language in a statute meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted should be rejected.

Facts: The levy on attachment against the subject properties of spouses Carlos and Teresita Gatmaytan was issued on March 4, 1980 by the Court of First Instance of Pasig. However, an insolvency proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Angeles City was commenced four months after the issuance of the said attachment. Petitioner contends that its lien on the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby. Issue: W/N the levy on attachment dissolved the insolvency proceedings against the respondent spouses even though it commenced four months after said attachment. Held: No. Sec. 32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that there is a cut off period one month in attachment cases and thirty days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Also, there is no conflict between Sec. 32 and Sec. 79. Where a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction that will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other.

Facts: Petitioner Manuel De Guia is a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Paranaque. He contends that under par(d) of Sec. 3 of Ra 7166, members of the Sangguaniang Panglungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in the May 1992 elections. Issue: W/N par(d) Sec. 3 of RA 7166 should be interpreted to mean that elective officials of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and SB shall be elected at large. Held: No. Par (d) Sec. 3 of RA 7166 refers only to elective officials of the Sangguniang Panlungsod which are single district cities and Sangguniang Bayan for municipalities outside Metro Manila. The law specifically stated that provinces with only one legislative district should be divided into two and therefore should necessarily be elected by districts. Par (d) should be interpreted in line with the rest of the statute and to follow the interpretation of the petitioner would make the act of the statute in singling out the single district provinces as useless or meaningless. The key to open the door to what the legislature intended in the language of a state is its purpose or reason which induced it to enact the statute. Statutes should then be construed in light of the object to be achieved. A construction should be rejected that gives the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted.

Case No. 11 | Midterms Case No. 2 Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas vs CA GR No. 78687, January 31, 1989

Case No. 12 | Midterms Case No. 3 B/Gen Jose Commendador, et al. vs B/Gen Demetrio Camera, et al. GR No. 96948, August 2, 1991

Statutory Rule: Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.

Statutory rule: When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Facts:

Facts: The parents of Elena Salenillas, one of the petitioners, were grantees of free patent. The subject property was later sold to Elena Salenillas and her husband, petitioners in the instant case. On December 4, 1973, the property of petitioners was mortgaged to Philippine National bank as security for a loan of P2,500. For failure to pay their loan, the property was foreclose by PNB and was bought at a public auction by private respondent. Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the property under Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act. Respondent states that the sale of the property disqualified petitioner from being legal heirs vis-a-vis the said property. Issue: W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act. Held: Yes. Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act provides that "every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs within a period of five years from the date or conveyance." The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. The distinction made by respondent contravenes the very purpose of the act. Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.

Petitioners are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and were charged with violations of Articles of War in relation with their alleged participation in a failed coup d’etat. Their case was referred to General Court Martial No. 14. At a hearing, petitioners manifested their desire to exercise their right to raise peremptory challenges against the President and the members of the general court martial invoking Art. 18 of CA No. 408. GCM No. 14 ruled that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under PD 39. Issue: W/N the right to peremptory challenge provide by Art. 18 of CA No. 408 has been discontinued under PD 39. Held: No. Although PD 39 disallowed peremptory challenged allowed under CA No. 408, PD 39 however was issued to implement General Order No. 8 issued during martial law to create military tribunals. With the lifting of Martial Law, General Order No. 8 was revoked and military tribunals were dissolved. As such, the reason for the existence of PD 39 ceased automatically. When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.

Case No. 13| Midterms Case No. 4 Lydia O. Chua vs The Civil Service Commission, NIA GR No. 88979, February 7, 1992

Case No. 14 | Midterms Case No. 5 City of Manila and City Treasurer vs Judge Amador E. Gomez, Et Al. GR No. L-37251, August 31, 1981

Statutory rule: Doctrine of necessary implications. What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.

Statutory rule: Doctrine of necessary implications. What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.

Facts:

Facts:

RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Sec. 2 provides for who are qualified to avail of the benefits of RA 6683 which includes, "all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees." Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program filed and application with the respondent NIA which was denied due to the fact that she is a coterminus employee. Her appeal with respondent Commission was likewise denied.

The Revised Charter of Manila fixes the annual realty tax at 1.5%. On the other hand, the Special Education Fund Law imposed an “annual additional tax of 1% on the assessed value of real property in addition to the real property tax regularly levied thereon” but “the total real property tax shall not exceed 3%” Since the maximum limit imposed is 3%, the municipal board of Manila imposed an additional .5% to fix the total imposable tax on real property at 3% which is divided into the following: 1.5% as per charter of Manila, 1% as per Special Education Fund law and .5% as per order of the municipal board. Private respondent Esso Philippines paid the additional one-half percent realty tax under protest and later filed a complaint for recovery of the said amount. It contended that the additional one-half percent is void because it is not authorized by the city charter or any law.

Issue: W/N petitioner's status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the benefits of Ra 6683 (Early Retirement Law) Held: No. There is no substantial difference between a co-terminus employee and a contractual, casual or emergency employee for all are tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career and temporary. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause of the constitution if the SC were to sustain respondent's submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law. The doctrine of necessary implications should be applied in this case.

Issue: W/N the additional one-half percent imposed by the City of Manila is valid or legal. Held: Yes. The Real Property Tax Law imposes that a city council, by ordinance, may impose a realty tax of “not less than one-half perfect but not more than two percent of the assessed value of real property.” The additional one-half percent then is legal. Furthermore, the doctrine of implications sustains the contention of the City of Manila that the additional one-half percent is sanctioned by the Special Education Fund Law when the same states that “the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum.” The doctrine of necessary implications means that “that which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.”

Case No. 15 | Midterms Case No. 6 People of the Philippines vs Guillermo Manantan GR No. L-14129, July 31, 1962

Case No. 16 | Midterms Case No. 7 JM Tuason and Co., et al. vs Hon. Herminio Mariano, et al. GR No. L-33140, October 23, 1978

Statutory rule: The rule of “casus omissus pro omisso habendus est” can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established.

Statutory rule: Stare Decisis. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled. Matters already decided on the merits cannot be relitigated again and again.

Facts: Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of the Section 54 of the Revised Election Code which provides that “No justice, judge, fiscal…. shall aid any candidate in any manner in any election, except to vote.” Defendant contends that this provision excludes justice of the peace and as such, he is excluded from this prohibition. Because of this, the lower court dismissed the case against him. The Solicitor General appealed. Issue: W/N a justice of the peace is included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Held: Yes. Although petitioner argues that when Section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words “justice of peace” from the Revised Administrative Code provision from which it was taken and thus making the intention of the legislature clear in the omission, the word judge in the former provision was qualified or modified by the phrase “of first instance.” The term “judge” in Section 54 is not modified or qualified, making it broader and more generic to comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the Courts of First Instance, Courts of Agrarian Relations, Courts of Industrial Relations and justices of the peace. The rule of casus omissus has no applicability to the case at bar for the maxim only applies and operate if and when the omission has been clearly established.

Facts: Respondents Aquial claimed ownership of a parcel of land located in Quezon City having an area of 383 hectares. They alleged that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of Petitioners Tuason pursuant to a decree issued on July 6, 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. Issue: W/N OCT No. 735 is valid. Held: OCT No. 735 is valid. The validity of OCT No. 735 was already decided upon by the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin vs Tuason, Alcantara vs Tuason and Pili vs Tuason. The ruling in these cases was also applied in other cases involving the validity of OCT No. 735. Considerng the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled), the court ruled that respondents cannot maintain their action without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.

Case No. 17 | Midterms Case No. 8 Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. vs Intermediate Appellate Court GR No. L-72005, May 29, 1987 Statutory rule: When the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. The rule, founded on logic, is corollary of the principle that general words and phrases of a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. Facts: Private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires Inc. filed a complaint for a collection of money against Varian Industrial Corporation. During the pendency, private respondent attached some of the properties of Varian Industrial corporation upon the posting of a supersedes bond. The latter in turn posted a counter bond through Petitioner Philippine British Assurance so the attached properties were released. The trial court then rendered a decision favorable to the private respondent and Writ of execution was issued in favor of private respondent. The same was however returned unsatisfied as varian failed to deliver the attached personal properties upon demand. Sycwin thus prayed that petitioner corporation be ordered to pay the value of its bond which was granted. Issue: W/N the counter bond issued through petitioner corporation covers execution of a judgment pending appeal. Held: The counter bond was issued in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Neither the rules nor provisions of the counter bond limited its application to a final and executory judgment. It applies to the payment of any judgment that may be recovered by plaintiff. It is a recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Since the law did not make any distinction nor intended any exception, when it speaks of "any judgment" which may be charged against a counter bond, it should be interpreted to refer not only to a final and executory judgment but also a judgment pending appeal.

Case No. 18 | Midterms Case No. 9

Juanito Pilar vs Commission on Elections GR No. 115245, July 11, 1995 Statutory rule: The rule is well recognized that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Facts: On March 22, 1992, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. Three days later, he withdrew his certificate of candidacy. As a result, respondent Commission imposed a fine of P10,000.00 for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the law that the candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost. Issue: W/N petitioner can be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures since he was a "non-candidate", having withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three days after its filing. Held: Yes. Sec. 14 of Ra 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. As the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to who who withdrew his candidacy. Sec. 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their certificate of candidacy".

Case No. 19 | Midterms Case No. 10

People vs Judge Antonio Evangelista and Guildo Tugonon GR No. 110898, February 20, 1996

Cecilio De Villa vs Court of Appeals GR No. 87416, April 8, 1991

Statutory rule: If the law makes no distinction, neither should the court.

Statutory rule: When the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it.

Facts: Private respondent Guildo Tugonon was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide. He filed a petition for probation. However, the Chief Probation and Parole Officer recommended denial of private respondent's application for probation on the ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial, he had already waived his right to make his application for probation. The RTC set aside the Probation Officer's recommendation and granted private respondent's application on April 23, 1993.

Facts: Petitioner Cecilio De Villa was charged before the RTC of Makati for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, the Bouncing Checks Law. Petitioner contends that the check in question was drawn against his dollar account with a foreign bank and as such, it is not covered by the Bouncing Checks Law.. Issue: W/N a foreign check drawn against a foreign account is covered by BP 22.

Issue: W/N respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by granting private respondent's application for probation despite the appeal filed by the private respondent. Held: Yes. Private respondent filed his application for probation on December 28, 1992, after PD 1990 had taken effect. It is thus covered by the prohibition that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfect the appeal from the judgment of conviction" and that "the filing of the application shall deemed a waiver of the right to appeal." having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction, private respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation. Furthermore, the law makes no distinction between meritorious and unmeritorious appeals so neither should the court.

Case No. 20 | Midterms Case No. 11

Held: Yes. The law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case since what the law only specifies is that “checks drawn and issued in the Philippines, though payable outside thereof are within the coverage of the law.” It is a cardinal rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it.

Case No. 21 | Midterms Case No. 12

Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. vs Pedro Jimenez GR No. L-14787, January 28, 1961

RP vs Eutropio Migrinio and Troadio Tecson GR No. 89483, August 30, 1990

Statutory rule: General terms may be restricted by specific word, with the result that the general language will be limited by specific language which indicates the statute’s object and purpose. The rule is applicable only to cases wherein, except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class.

Statutory rule: Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those especially mentioned.

Facts:

Facts:

Petitioner corporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparations and household remedies. They import materials including “stabilizers and flavors” is among those petitioner imports. For every importation, petitioner pays 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges pursuant to RA 601, the Exchange Tax Law. However the same law also provides that “foreign exchanged used for xxx importation to the Philippines of xxx stabilizers and flavors xxx shall be refunded to any importer making application therefore.” Petitioner now s...