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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION RULES Ratio Legis: Spirit of the law/Legislative Intent as the Primary Object

1. As expressed in the literal reading of the text General rule: if statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. a. Verba legis (literal or plain meaning rule) × Index animi sermo – speech is the index of intention. × Words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will × Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure × Thus, what is not clearly provided in the law cannot be extended to those matters outside its scope × Judicial legislation – an encroachment upon legislative prerogative to define the wisdom of the law. Courts must administer the law as they find it without regard to consequences CASES: Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018 Bustamante v. NLRC, 265 SCRA 61 IBAA Employees Union v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663 Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople, 138 SCRA 273

(1) Dura lex sed lex  Dura lex sed lex – the law may be harsh but it is still the law  Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent – when the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required  When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if it may be harsh or onerous  Hoc quidem perquam durum est, sed ital ex scripta est – it is exceedingly hard but so the law is written  A decent regard to the legislative will should inhibit the court from engaging in judicial legislation to change what it thinks are unrealistic statutes that do not conform with ordinary experience or practice o If there is a need to change the law, amend or repeal it, remedy may be done through a legislative process, not by judicial decree  Where the law is clear, appeals to justice and equity as justification to construe it differently are unavailing – Philippines is governed by CIVIL LAW or POSITIVE LAW, not common law o EXCEPTION: Equity is available only in the absence of law and not its replacement o Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis – equity never acts in contravention of the law CASES: Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA 561

a) Exception: Inapplicability in criminal cases CASE: People v. Santayana, 74 SCRA 25 in relation to People v. Mapa, 20 SCRA 1164

2. As determined through Construction a. General Rule: Statute must be capable of construction, otherwise inoperative  If no judicial certainty can be had as to its meaning, the court is not at liberty to supply nor to make one CASE: Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 In this case, the Court adopted a literal meaning thus, concluded that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the power of the people to amend the Constitution (initiative on amendments) for the following reasons: 1) Does not suggest an initiative on amendments on to the Constitution because it is silent as to amendments on the Constitution and the word “Constitution” is neither germane nor relevant to said section 2) Does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution Does not provide for subtitles for initiative on the Constitution 3) RA is incomplete and does not provide a sufficient standard

b. Specific Rules (1) Mens Legislatoris: Ascertain spirit/intent/purpose of the law      

Don’t literally construe the law if it will render it meaningless, lead to ambiguity, injustice or contradiction The spirit of the law controls its letter Ratio legis – interpretation according to the spirit or reason of the law Spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter A law should accordingly be so construed as to be in accordance with, and not repugnant to, the spirit of the law Presumption: undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure

 Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire – words ought to be more subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words  Guide in ascertaining intent – conscience and equity  It is possible that a statute may be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.  Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed  As between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail CASES: Matabuena v. Cervantes, 38 SCRA 284 King v. Hernandez, 114 SCRA 730 1) Issue: whether or not a Chinese (parang si RA and Serge) may be employed in a noncontrol position in a retail establishment, a wholly nationalized business under RA 1180 Retail Trade Law (this law has been repealed by the Retail Trade Liberalization Act) 2) Held: No, the law has to be construed with the Anti-Dummy Law – prohibiting an alien from intervening in the management, operation, administration or control thereof 3) When the law says you cannot employ such alien, you cannot employ an alien. The unscrupulous alien may resort to flout the law or defeat its purpose. 4) It is imperative that the law be interpreted in a manner that would stave off any attempt at circumvention of the legislative purpose Bustamante v. NLRC, supra 1) Issue: how to compute for backwages to which an illegally dismissed employee would be entitled until his actual reinstatement 2) 3 ways: o 1st – before Labor Code – to be deducted from the amount of backwages is the earnings elsewhere during the period of illegal dismissal o 2nd – Labor Code Art. 279 – the amount of backwages is fixed without deductions or qualifications but limited to not more than 3 years o 3rd – amended Art. 279 – full backwages or without deductions from the time the laborer’s compensation was withheld until his actualreinstatement 3) The clear legislative intent of the amendment in RA 6715 Labor Code) is to give more benefits to workers than was previously given them under the Mercury Drug rule or the 1 st way US v. Toribio, 15 Phil 85 The prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work/ draft purposes was a “reasonable necessary limitation” on private ownership 2) Purpose or object of the law – to protect large cattle against theft and to make easy recovery and return of such cattle to their owners, when lost, strayed or stolen 3) Issue: whether the slaughter of large cattle outside the municipal slaughterhouse without a permit by the municipal treasurer is prohibited? 4) Held: YES! Outside or inside without permit is prohibited Bocobo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520 1) Issue: whether the CFI and a municipal court in the capital of a province have concurrent jurisdiction over the crime of libel 2) RPC – grants jurisdiction with CFI 3) Judiciary Act grants jurisdiction with the municipal court in the capital of a province in offenses where the penalty is not more than prission correctional or fine not exceeding 6,000Php (penalty for libel) Planters Association of Negros, Inc. v. Ponferrada, G.R. No. 114087, October 26, 1999 1) 2 apparently conflicting provisions should be construed as to realize the purpose of the law 2) The purpose of the law is to INCREASE the worker’s benefits 3) Benefits under RA 6982 shall be IN ADDITION to the benefits under RA 809 and PD 621 4) “Substituted” cannot be given literal interpretation 1)

a) Instance when the literal import must yield to spirit/intent: in electionrelated cases

CASE: Villanueva v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-54718, December 4, 1985 (Read the dissent of Justice Aquino for the caveat on this rule) Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. CTA, 100 Phil 850

b) When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases × The reason which induced the legislature to enact a law is the heart of the law × Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex – when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases × Ratio legis est anima – reason of the law is its soul CASES:

Comendador v. De Villa, GR No. 93177, August 2, 1991 1) Issue: whether PD 39, which withdrew the right to peremptorily challenge members of a military tribunal, had been rendered inoperative by PD 2045 proclaiming the termination of a state of martial law 2) Held: YES! The termination of the martial law and the dissolution of military tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the existence of PD 39 ceased automatically and the decree itself ceased People v. Almuete, supra. 1) Agricultural Tenancy Act is repealed by the Agricultural Land Reform Code 2) Agricultural Tenancy Act – punishes prereaping or pre-threshing of palay on a date other than that previously set without the mutual consent of the landlord and tenant = Share tenancy relationship 3) Agricultural Land Reform Code – abolished share tenancy relationship, thus does not punish pre-reaping or pre-threshing of palay on a date other than that previously set without the mutual consent of the landlord and tenant anymore = Leasehold system b.) When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases

CASES: Comendador v. De Villa, GR No. 93177, August 2, 1991 People v. Almuete, supra (2) ut magis valeat quam pereat: construe statute as a whole CASE: Sajonas v. CA, G. R. No. 102377, July 5, 1996 Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes, supra Planters Association v. Ponferrada, supra Aisporna v. CA, supra a) Harmonize and give effects to all provisions whenever possible; reconcile apparently conflicting provisions CASES: Planters Association of Negros, Inc. v. Ponferrada, supra National Tobacco Admin v. COA, 311 SCRA 755 (1999) Republic v. CA, 263 SCRA 758 (1996) Dreamwork Contruction v. Janiola, supra (3) Redendo singula singulis CASE: King v. Hernandez, supra (4) Construe Statute in Relation to the Constitution and Other Statutes a) Supremacy of the Constitution b) When statutes admit of two constructions, one constitutional and the other unconstitutional, construction in favor of constitutionality should be favoured CASE: De la Cruz v. Paras, GR No. 42571-72, July 25, 1983 c) Statutes in Pari Materia CASES: Vda. de Urbano v. GSIS, GR No. 137904, Oct 19, 2001 Cabada v. Alunan, 260 SCRA 828 (1996) Declarador v. Gubaton, G.R. No. 159208 August 18, 2006 Naga City v. Agna, GR No. 36049, May 31, 1976 King v. Hernandez, supra (5) Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail CASE: Planters Association of Negros, Inc. v. Ponferrada, supra (6) Construe statute in relation to the object for which it was enacted CASE: US v. Toribio, supra (7) When the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish CASES: Ty-Delgado v. HRET, G.R. No. 219603, January 26, 2016 Republic v. Manalo, supra Ramirez v. CA, 248 SCRA 590 (1995)

Garvida v. Sales, 271 SCRA 767 (1997) (8) Meaning of Words and Phrases a) Statutory definition CASE: Victorias Milling v. Social Security Commission, 114 SCRA 555 (1962) b) Ordinary sense of the words vs. technical or legal meaning CASES: Matuguina Integrated Wood v. CA, 263 SCRA 490 (1996) Mustang Lumber v. CA, 257 SCRA 430 (1996) Grego v. COMELEC, 274 SCRA 481 (1997) c) Specific words 1. “May” vs. “Shall” May: o The word “may” denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having mandatory effect. Shall: General rule: o The word “shall” ordinarily connotes an imperative and indicates the mandatory character of a statute. Exception: o Not an absolute rule in statutory construction. o The import of the word ultimately depends upon a consideration of entire provisions, its nature, object and consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other. o Where the statute provides for the doing of some act which is required by justice or public duty, or where it invest a public body, municipality or officer with power and authority to take some action which concerns the public interest or rights of individuals, the permissive language will be construed as mandatory and the execution of the power may be insisted upon as a duty. CASES: Director of Lands v. CA, 276 SCRA 276 (1997) Capati v. Ocampo, 113 SCRA 799 (1982) Held: It is a well settled that the word ‘may is merely permissive and confers discretion upon a party Under ordinary circumstances, the term ‘may’ connotes possibility. It does not connote certainty. ‘May’ is an auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission, or possibility. Here, the court held that the stipulation as to venue in the contract in question is simply permissive. By the said stipulation, the parties did not agree to file solely and exclusively w/ the CFI of Naga. They merely agreed to submit their disputes to the said court w/o waiving their right to seek recourse in the court specially indicated in Sec. 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. PCFI v. NTC and PLDT, 131 SCRA 200 (1984) (But see dissent of Abad Santos, J.) • • • • •

Issue: Is the promulgation of rules and regulations a mandatory prerequisite under sec 2. Of P.D 217? Held: • 1983 decision interprets the rule-making authority under sec. 2 of P.D. 217 as mandatory. • In statutory construction, the word used in the law must be given its ordinary meaning, unless a contrary inter is manifest from the law itself. • Hence, the phrase ‘may be promulgated ‘should not be construed to mean ‘shall’ or ‘must’. • Here, It shall be interpreted in its ordinary sense as permissive or discretionary on the part of the delegate – Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication’s Board of Communications then, now NTC – WON to promulgate pertinent rules and regulations. • There is nothing in P.D. 217 which commands that the phrase “may be promulgated” should be construed as “shall be promulgated.” • Both words ‘shall’ and ‘may’ are employed in the lone sentence of sec 2 of P.D. 217. This demonstrates that the law preserves the distinction between their ordinary, usual or normal sense. Abad Santos dissent: • The first decision relied on the canons INDEX ANIMI SERMO EST (speech is the indication of intent) and A VERBIS LEGIS NON EST RECEDENDUM( from the words of the statute there be no departure)

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Canons of stat construction march in pairs of opposite. Thus as opposed to the abovementioned we have : verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire( words ought to be more subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words) Here, compelling reasons dictate that the provisions of the P.D. 217 should be construed as mandatory rather than merely directory. Berces v. Guingona, 241 SCRA 539 (1995) Sajonas v. Court of Appeals, supra

2. “Or” vs. “And” CASES: Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010 GMCR v. Bell Telecom, 271 SCRA 790 (1997) Issue: Is the NTC a collegial body? Held: • •

Sec 16 of E.O No. 546 states that “the Commission is composed of a Commissioner AND two (2) depute commissioners”, not the commissioner alone. The word ‘and’ whether it is used to connect words, phrases or full sentences, must be accepted as binding together and as relating to one another  Hence, the NTC is a collegial body.

Hda. Luisita Inc. v. PARC, G.R. No. 171101, Resolution, November 22, 2011 Gonzales v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967 Romulo, Mabanta, et al. v. HDMF, G.R. No. 131082. June 19, 2000 Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, 236 SCRA 197 3. “Principally”/” Primarily” vs. “Exclusively”  Principally/Primarily means “ mainly, principally, mostly, generally.”  CASES: Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014 Alfon v. Republic, 97 SCRA 859 (1980) Facts: Petitioner, as per civil register, was named Maria Estrella Alfon Duterte. She, however, grew up wit her maternal uncle and aunt and since birth has been using her mother’s surname, Alfon. She filed a petition for a change of name in the civil registry from Duterte to Alfon The trial court denied the petition, citing Article 364 of the Civil Code which provides: Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.” The denial of the petition was appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: Does Article 364 preclude the use of the mother’s surname? Held: • •

The lower court should have granted the petition. The only reason why the lower denied the petition was because of article 364. The word ‘principally’ as used in said article is not equivalent to ‘exclusively so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled.

Floresca v. Philex Mining, supra Facts: sec. 46 Jurisdiction shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the Supreme Cout, x x x.” Issue: Does CFI have jurisdiction over the complaint? Held:

There were several opinions from amicus curiae as to the nature of the remedies provided for under the WCA, namely: 1.CUMULATIVE 2.) EXLCUSIVE Senator Angara believes that recovery under the WCA isexclusive and there precludes an action of damages under the Civil Code. 3.) SELECTIVE- which the heirs had the option of choosing between availing ofthe compensation under the WCA or filing an action for damages arising out of negligence under the provisions of the Civil Code. (The court agreed with this position)

Chavez v. NHA, G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007 Issue: WON, NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to reclaim lands of public domain (Chavez claims that the power to reclaim lands of public domain is vested exclusively with PEA) Held: •

Although PEA was designated under E.O 525 as the agency primarily responsibile for integratingm directing and coordinating all reclamation projects, its charter does not mention that it has the exlusive and sole power and authority to reclaim lands of public domain. • Principally/Primarily means “mainly, principally, mostly, generally.” Thus not all reclamation projects fall under PEA’s authority of supervision, integration, and coordination. Vda. de Urbano v. GSIS, supra 4. “Term” vs. “Tenure” • Term- the period that an officer may hold office and upon the expiration of such term, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must cease. • Tenure CASE: Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 231 (1984) R.A. No. 1160 created NARRA. Sad law empowered its Board of Directors to appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager subject to the approval of the President. On January 15, 1960, the Board approved Resolution No. 13 appointing Bruno Appari as Gen. Manager of NARRA. On march 14,1962, the Board passed Reso. No . 24, fixing the term of the incumbent Gen Manager up to March 31, 1982 Apparri filed with the CFI of Manila an action to annul Reso. No. 24 The CFI dismissed the action. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the dismissal of the case on the ground that Aparri’s cessation from office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term of office and the term of office could be fixed by the board. He appealed to Sc. Issue: WON Resolution No. 24 constitutes removal of Aparri without cause. Held: •

His term of office expired on march 31,1982

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R.A. No. 1160 expressly gives the Board the power to appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager.

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The word ‘term’ describes the period that an officer may hold office and upon the expiration of such term, his rights, duties and authority as apublic officer must cease. It is necessary to interpret the word ‘term’ within the purview of the statute as to effectuate the statutory scheme pertaining to the office under examination. In this case, the term of office is not fixed by law, but by the board.

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Resolution No. 24 speaks of no removal but an expiration of the term of office of Aparri.

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The statute is clear If the words and phrases are not obscure or ambiguous its meaning and intention must be determined from the language employed. There is no room for construction. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words. The legisl...