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Redota 1 Armen Christine P. Redota Judge Rene Dela Cruz Statutory Construction Chapter VI: Presumptions A fact assumed to be true under the law is called presumption.1 An interpretative presumption affords guidance arising out of the essential nature of legislation, as to the legislator’s prima facie intention regarding the legal meaning.2 In construing a stature, the court may properly rely on presumptions as to legislative intent in order to resolve doubts as to its correct interpretation. Presumptions are based on logic, experience and common sense, and in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, doubts are to the proper and correct construction which is in accord with the presumption on the matter. These presumptions include the presumptions in favor of constitutionality of a statute, of its completeness, of its completeness, of its prospective operation, of right and justice, of its effective, sensible, beneficial and reasonable operation as a whole, as well as those against inconsistency and implied repeal, unnecessary changes in law, impossibility, absurdity, injustice and hardship, inconvenience and ineffectiveness.3 But presumptions cannot prevail against clear and explicit terms of law. 4 In other words, if the language of the law is clear, courts should not resort to presumptions. Presumptions against Unconstitutionality Every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The reason lies in the very essence of how a law is enacted. It is but a decent respect due to the wisdom, integrity, and the patriotism of the Legislature by which the law is passes, and the Chief Executive by whom the law is approved, to

1 @UPCounsel, “Legal Definition of Presumption,” n.d., www.upcounsel.com/legal-def presumption. 2 Bennion, Francis. Understanding Common Law Legislation: Drafting and Interpretation. Oxford Scholarship Online, September 2009. 3 Ruben Agpalo, Statutory Construction 3rd ed. (Rex Book Store, 1995) 71. 4 Black, Construction and Interpretation of Laws, 103.

Redota 2 presume of its constitutionality. The presumption of constitutionality is rooted in the respect that the judiciary must accord to the legislature. In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan5: This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature. If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. The presumption of constitutionality may, of course, be challenged. Challenges, however, shall only be sustained upon a clear and unequivocal showing of the bases for invalidating a law. In Smart Communications vs. Municipality of Malvar6: To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because "to invalidate [a law] based on . . . baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the

5 Joseph Ejercito Estrada vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19 2001. 6 Smart Communications, Inc. vs Municipality of Malvar, Batangas, G.R. No. 204429, February 18, 2014.

Redota 3 executive which approved it." This presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down. All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of law. Presumptions Against Injustice The presumption is that the legislature, in enacting a law, did not intend to work a hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one person with a weapon to impose hardship on one another. Ea est accipienda interpretatio quae vitio. That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice. The principle is illustrated in the case of Zacaria Cometa vs Court of Appeal7s where the Court of First Instance awarded to Cometa the sum of P 57,396.85 of which the sheriff levied on 3 commercial lots of Cometa located in Makati. 2 of the lots were sold to Franco at public auction. Later, Herco Realty filed a civil case to annul the levy on execution and sale of the real properties alleging that the ownership of the lots had been transferred by Cometa to Herco before execution of the sale. It also assailed the legality of the levy contending that the personal properties of Cometa must be exhausted first. Meanwhile, the RTC issued an order directing the Register of Deeds to cancel the certificates of title of Cometa and to issue new ones in favor of Franco. The Court ruled that the right to redeem can still be availed of or not must be viewed in the light of the dictum that the policy of the law is to aid rather than defeat the right of redemption. In short, the statute, being remedial, is to be construed liberally to effectuate the 7 Zacaria Cometa and Herco Realty & Agricultural Corporation vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141855, 6 February 2001.

Redota 4 remedy and carry out its evident spirit and purpose. A law should not be interpreted so as to cause an injustice. There are laws which are generally valid but may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular sense because of its peculiar circumstances. We are not bound to apply them in servile subservience to their language. Presumptions Against Implied Repeals It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency or repugnancy and, accordingly, against implied repeal. For the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. Hence, all efforts must be exerted to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject. A construction which in effect will repeal a statute altogether should, if possible, be rejected. For this reason, in case of doubt as to whether a a later statute has impliedly repealed a prior law on the same subject, the doubt should be resolved against implied repeal.8 UHPAP vs. AISL9 illustrates the application that repeal by implication is not favored. The respondent argued that there exists an actual inconsistency between E.O. No. 1088 and PPA AO No. 03-85. E.O. No. 1088 should be construed as an implied repeal of PPA AO No. 03-85 provisions on nighttime and overtime pay. The Court ruled that Section 3 of E.O. No. 1088 is a general repealing clause, the effect of which falls under the category of an implied repeal as it does not identify the orders, rules or regulations it intends to abrogate. A repeal by implication is frowned upon in this jurisdiction. It is not favored, unless it is manifested that the legislative authority so intended or unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the subject laws or orders are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. 8 See Agpalo 322. 9 The United Harbor Pilot’s Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs Association of International Shipping Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 133763, November 13 2002.

Redota 5 This is because the legislative authority is presumed to know the existing law so that if repeal is intended, the proper step is to express it. There is nothing in E.O. No. 1088 that reveals any intention on the part of Former President Marcos to amend or supersede the provisions of PPA AO No. 03-85 on nighttime and overtime pay. While it provides a general repealing clause, the same is made dependent upon its actual inconsistency with other previous orders, rules, regulations or other issuances. The Court finds no inconsistency between E.O. No. 1088 and the provisions of PPA AO No. 03-85. The two orders dwell on entirely different subject matters. E.O. No. 1088 provides for uniform and modified rates for pilotage services rendered to foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports, public or private. The purpose is to rationalize and standardize the pilotage service charges nationwide. Upon the other hand, the subject matter of the controverted provisions of PPA AO No. 03-85 is the payment of the additional charges of nighttime and overtime pay. Plainly, E.O. No. 1088 involves the basic compensation for pilotage service while PPA AO No. 03-85 provides for the additional charges where pilotage service is rendered under certain circumstances. Just as the various wage orders do not repeal the provisions of the Labor Code on nighttime and overtime pay, the same principle holds true with respect to E.O. No. 1088 and PPA AO 03-85. Thus, the Court adheres to the rule that every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.19 E.O. No. 1088 and PPA AO No. 03-85 should thus be read together and harmonized to give effect to both.

Presumptions Against Ineffectiveness It is presumed that the legislature intends to impart to its enactments such a meaning as will render them operative and effective, and to prevent persons from eluding or defeating them.

Redota 6 Accordingly, in case of any doubts or obscurity, the construction will be such as to carry out those objects.10 The Court in DBP vs COA11 case explained that when a statute is susceptible of two interpretations, the Court must “adopt the one in consonance with the presumed intention of the legislature to give its enactments the most reasonable and beneficial construction, the one that will render them operative and effective.” The Court always presumes that Congress intended to enact sensible statutes. Applying the rationale why the Board cannot grant its members other than those expressly mentioned by law, Section 8 of the DBP Charter, which expressly states that Board members will receive per diems, would be rendered inoperative if the Board, with the approval of the President, would grant additional benefits not cited under the law. Further, limitations on the increase of the per diems would also be rendered futile because the Board could disregard the same in allowing additional and higher benefits. Presumptions Against Absurdity Statutes must receive a sensible construction such as will give effect to the legislative intention so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion.12 The principle is illustrated in the case of Chavez vs JBC13 that when allowing a Senator and a Congressman to sit alternately at any one time as representative in Judicial Bar Council cannot be a solution since each of them would actually be representing only his half of Congress when he takes part in JBC deliberations. Allowing both to sit in those deliberations at the same time with half a vote each is absurd since that would diminish their standing and make them

10 Judge Noli Diaz. Statutory Construction 5th ed., (2016) 164. 11 DBP vs Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 221706, March 13, 2018. 12 Diaz 166. 13 Francisco Chavez vs Judicialand Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013.

Redota 7 second class member of JBC, something that the Constitution clearly does not contemplate. It is presumed when drafting laws that the legislature does not intend to produce absurdity. Presumption Against Violation of International Law This presumption is in conformity with the Declaration of Principles and State Policies in our Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 2, 1987 Phil. Constitution). It states that the Philippines as a democratic and republican state adopts the generally accepted principle of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.14 In Bayan vs Exec. Sec. Zamora15, with the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the exchange of notes between the Philippines and the United States of America, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations. As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be bound by generally accepted rules for the conduct of its international relations. While the international obligation devolves upon the state and not upon any particular branch, institution, or individual member of its government, the Philippines is nonetheless responsible for violations committed by any branch or subdivision of its government or any official thereof. As an integral part of the community of nations, we are responsible to assure that our government, Constitution and laws will carry out our international obligation. Hence, we cannot readily plead the Constitution as a

14 See Diaz 171 15 Bayan, et.al., vs Exec. Sec. Ronaldo Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000.

Redota 8 convenient excuse for non-compliance with our obligations, duties and responsibilities under international law. Beyond this, Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the International Law Commission in 1949 provides: "Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty."

Chapter VII: Aids in the Construction and Interpretation Although some statutes appear as simple and straightforward at first glance, upon further examination, terms of the statute are ambiguous or do not directly address legal issue. There are

Redota 9 several tools that can help to determine the meaning of ambiguous statute or to choose between plausible interpretations of the same statute.16 These tools fall into two categories: (A) Intrinsic Aids; and (B) Extrinsic Aids. Intrinsic Aids Intrinsic comes from the Latin word intrinsecus which means “inwards.” Intrinsic aids therefore are those aids within the statute. In resorting to intrinsic aids, one must go back to the parts of the statute: the title, preamble, context or body of the statute, and punctuation. All these resorted to in order to determine the intention of the legislature, only if there is ambiguity in the statute.17 Title as Intrinsic Aid Title is the part of the statute that which expresses the subject matter of the law. In intervention, the Republic of the Philippines through Games and Amusement Board contends that Manila Ordinance 7065 which purported to grant Associate Development Corporation (ADC) a franchise to conduct jai-alai operations is void on the ground that since Republic Act No. 954 requires a legislative franchise, not a municipal franchise for the operation of jai-alai. The title of R.A. 954 will immediately reveal that the law was enacted to achieve a special purpose. It states “An Act to Prohibit Certain Activities in Connection with Horse Races and Basque Pelota Games and To Prescribe Penalties for Its Violation.” The title of R.A. 954 does not show that it seeks to limit the operation of jai-alai only to entities with franchise given by

16 The Writing Center, GULC. “A Guide to Reading, Interpreting and Applying Statutes,” 2017, www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/A-Guide-to-ReadingInterpreting-and-Applying-Statutes-1.pdf. 17 Diaz 173.

Redota 10 Congress. What the title trumpets as the sole subject of the law is the criminalization of certain practices relating to jai-alai games.18 The title of the law is a valuable intrinsic aid in determining legislative intent. Preamble as Intrinsic Aid The main objective and purpose of the Act are found in the preamble of the statute. It is a preparatory statement and contains the recitals showing the reason for the enactment of the Act. 19 It is usually expressed in the form of “Whereas” clauses. The intent of the law as culled from its preamble and from its situation, circumstances and conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced.20 The Court in People vs Echegaray21 discussed the meaning of the term “heinous.” The Court first pointed to Republic Act No. 7659. The preamble to that Act characterizes crimes that are heinous for being grievous, odious, and hateful offenses and which by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity, and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. The foregoing definition or description is a sufficient criterion of what is to be considered as heinous crime. The preamble in general terms, the Court would feel that it was the sense of Congress that this preamble would be applicable to each and every offense described and punishable in the measure. However, preamble is not an essential part of the statute. Hence, where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operations 18 Lim vs Pacquing and Associate Corporation, G.R. No.115044, January 27, 1995. 19 Team @LawTimesJournal."Aids to Interpretation of Statutes." 2019 lawtimesjournal.in/aids-to-interpretation-of-statutes/ 20 Diaz 176. 21 People vs Echegaray, G.R. No. 117472, February 7, 1997.

Redota 11 much less prevail over its text. Nor can a preamble be used as basis for giving a statute a meaning not apparent on its face.22 The case of Risos-Vidal vs Comelec and Estrada23 is a good illustration of the aforementioned rule. Initially facing reclusion perpetua for plunder, Estrada was granted pardon by then-president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in 2007 the same year when he was convicted and detained, on the condition that he will not seek any public position as stated in the one of the paragraphs of the preamble of the executive clemency granted to the former that read: WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office. IN VIEW THEREOF, and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution, I hereby grant executive clemency to Joseph Ejercito Estrada, convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is hereby restored to his civil and political right. Sgd. Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo According to the petitioners, it is clear that the restoration of the civil and political rights of Estrada did not include the right to seek elected position or office. The intent of the conditional pardon was to prohibit the convicted felon from running for public office. The Supreme Court ruled in the contrary. They ruled that jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word “whereas.” Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the

22 See Agpalo 59. 23 Atty. Alicia Rosis-Vidal vs COMELEC and Joseph Ejercito Estrada, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015.

Redota 12 statute. In the present case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditi...