4. Hypnosis - Lecture notes 4 PDF

Title 4. Hypnosis - Lecture notes 4
Author Isabelle Horn
Course Forensic Psychology
Institution University of Liverpool
Pages 18
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Legal definitions, theories, coercion, investigative hypnosis, critical evaluation...


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4. Hypnosis Hypnosis and the law: Forensic hypnosis •

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There is a long history of contact between hypnosis and the legal system (Laurence & Perry, 1988; Wagstaff, 1991). However, there have been three main areas of contact between Hypnosis and the law. These are – Hypnosis as a truth-telling device – Hypnosis as a coercive and injurious tool – Hypnosis as a police interview procedure to enhance memory. Given popular stereotypes of hypnosis, this is not surprising. Survey research from a variety of countries indicates that a popular stereotype of a hypnotic subject is that of a person induced into a special state, possessed of unusual powers, under the control of the hypnotist, and with little idea of what is going on (Daglish and Wright, 1991; Wagstaff, 1999; Molina, 2006). Essentially this stereotype assumes that hypnosis is a state of automatism, and it is this aspect which is considered first.

HYPNOSIS AND AUTOMATISM LEGAL DEFINITIONS OF AUTOMATISM : • ‘An automatism is an involuntary piece of behaviour over which an individual has no control ‘(Fenwick, 1990). • ‘An act which is done by the muscles without any control by the mind, such as a spasm, a reflex action, or a convulsion: or an act done by a person who is not conscious of what he is doing’ (Lord Denning, Bratty v. A-G for Northern Ireland, 1963). • ‘Automatism is a term used to describe unconscious, involuntary behaviour, the state of a person who, though capable of action, is not conscious of what he is doing’ (R. V. Rabbey, 1980; Canadian Courts) Implications for hypnosis and the law If hypnosis is a special state of automatism possibilities with legal implications include: • the hypnotized subject can be made to tell the truth i.e. hypnosis can be used as a ‘truth serum’ in police investigations. • a hypnotized person might be coerced into committing a crime or being a victim of crime without his/her knowledge or responsibility for his/her actions. • However, a major difficulty in examining this possibility defining what is meant by ‘hypnotic state’: • For example, one of the most long-standing and fundamental academic controversies in the study of hypnosis is the 'state-non-state' debate (Wagstaff, 1981, 1998; Pintar, 2010).

Theoretical background: The state position • The 'state' school argue that hypnosis involves profound alterations in the subject's state or condition (e.g. J. Barber, 1991; Woody and Bowers, 1994; Hilgard, 1991; Gruzelier, 2000). • Woody and Bowers’ (1994) dissociated control theory: based on models of working memory (Norman and Shallice, 1986). Argues that, when in the hypnotic state the frontal lobes are inhibited so behaviour becomes more automatic, less critical, and subject to situational control; i.e. control is reduced due to frontal lobe inhibition. See also, Gruzelier (1998, 2000). • More recently refined as Second-Order Dissociated Control whereby hypnosis weakens the feedback from executive monitoring which again is associate with frontal lobe functioning (Egner, Jamieson & Woody, 2005; Jamieson & Woody, 2007). In contrast… Theoretical background: the non-state (sociocognitive) position Supporters of the non-state suggest that the phenomena we associate with hypnosis are best explained in terms of ordinary psychological processes, without reference to a special state or process: e.g. imagination, relaxation, role-enactment, compliance, conformity, attention, attitudes and expectancies (Barber, 1969; Coe and Sarbin, 1991; Gorassini, 1996; Kirsch and Lynn, 1991; Spanos, 1991; Wagstaff, David, Kirsch & Lynn, 2010). • Hypnosis is seen primarily a strategic role enactment. But this is not the same as faking; subjects may become highly engaged in the role of behaving like a hypnotic subject, trying hard to experience what is suggested to them; they ‘think and imagine along with suggestions given by the hypnotist (Barber, Spanos and Chaves, 1974). The Concept of Generic Trance • More confusing as many clinicians and researchers in everyday practice use term hypnotic state to refer to more or less any condition of absorbed attention. • Gives the impression that any altered state to which we might apply the term ‘trance’ is, in fact, hypnosis. So, for example, a person in a profound state of relaxation, concentration or meditation, could be described as ‘in trance’, and, thereby, ‘hypnotized’. Relaxation sometimes described as ‘neutral hypnosis’ (Edmonston, 1977). • If the term hypnotic state is used in this way, then it is clearly not a state of automatism according to legal definition of automatism. • But main problem is determining whether this everyday concept of ‘generic trance’, by itself, plays any role in the production of the classic phenomena we associate with hypnosis (Wagstaff, 1981, 2010, 2014). • Main effect of hypnosis on behaviour is the increase suggestibility. It has long been argued that it is this increase in suggestibility that allegedly differentiates ‘hypnotic’ behaviour from normal ‘waking behaviour’. • (Bowers, 1983; Hilgard, 1986; Hilgard and Hilgard, 1983; Hilgard and Tart, 1966; Kirsch and Braffman, 1999; Lynn and Rhue,1991; Sheehan and Perry, 1976; Wagstaff, 1998). • However, no evidence that relaxation, meditation, absorption etc., of themselves raise suggestibility.





Suggestibility is only increased if the ‘trance inducing ‘procedure is explicitly labelled as ‘hypnosis’ (Gandhi and Oakely, 2005; Wagstaff et al., 2004; 2010). Also, in contexts explicitly defined as ‘hypnosis’, participants will still report themselves as hypnotized and show elevated responses to suggestions when instructions are given that counter these experiences of relaxation such as being awake and alert (Banyai & Hilgard, 1976; Barber, 1969; Kendrick et al., 2012; Barber, Spanos & Chaves, 1974; Wagstaff, 1981).

The label is everything? • Endorses the view that suggestions for eye fixation, relaxation etc. do not of themselves create hypnotic phenomena, but they can serve to reinforce the expectation that ‘hypnosis’ has occurred and may thereby increase the readiness to respond to suggestions, including therapeutic ones (Barber, Spanos & Chaves, 1974; Hilgard, 1986; Wagstaff, 2010; Mazzoni et al., 2012). Suggested State of Hypnotic Automatism? • Suppose, however, we accept that any increases in suggestibility that arise from the induction of hypnosis result, not from processes generated by the mechanics of the induction procedure per se, but from the expectancies that occur when the situation is labelled as one of ‘hypnosis’. • This might still be a powerful phenomenon which could have legal implications, in other words it might be worth asking whether a hypnotic condition of this kind is capable of getting people to act against their will (e.g. McKenna ats Gates, 1998). • If we posit an ‘expectancy generated’ or ‘suggested’ state attributed to ‘hypnosis’ is it capable of making people act against their will or knowledge? • For instance, can you hypnotize someone into telling the truth? Could be useful in police investigations. No evidence for the view that hypnosis prevents lying, though increased rapport with the hypnotist may discourage lying. If they trust the hypnotist they might be more inclined to tell the truth (APA report, 1986; Reiser, 1980). HYPNOSIS AND COERCION The issue of coercion Probably the most significant issue surrounding the concept of hypnotic automatism, however, is that of criminal coercion; i.e. o Can a hypnotized person be coerced into committing a crime or being a victim of crime without his/her knowledge or responsibility for his/her actions? Hypnotic coercion in real life • Most famous modern case was of Palle Hardrup (1952; reported by Reiter, 1958). o Shot dead two bank tellers in Copenhagen. o Claimed he was hypnotized by Bjorn Neilsen. o Court decided he was not responsible for his actions.

o In a review of the case, Barber (1969) argues: 1. Close relationship existed between Hardrup and the hypnotist, which involved close emotional ties as they had previously shared a prison cell together. 2. Neilsen persuasive (hypnotically suggested that he was Hardrup’s “guardian angel who gave him tasks. Persuaded him that the robbery was for worthwhile political ends – to aid the formation of a new Nazi party). 3. Not necessary to invoke hypnosis as an explanation for Hardrup’s behaviour. 4. Although Neilsen admitted guilt; Hardrup changed his story and was committed to an institution for the insane. In fact, it is generally difficult to isolate hypnotic factors from other influences. For example, famous UK cases include: • R v. Mohammed (Mottahedin, 1992): UK, Defence alleged Sarah Mohammed participated in attempted murder because she was ‘hypnotized’. (Sentence shortened because of hypnosis.) But was abused by hypnotiser so this might have influenced her behaviour. • R. v. Nelson (Gibson, 1992): Attempted to hypnotize several underage girls to perform sexual acts. (Hypnotist found guilty). Girls underage, hypnosis wasn’t relevant to his conviction. • R. v. Darwish, Hasan Darwish (2001): Accused of raping a woman who was ‘under hypnosis’. (Hypnotist found not guilty.) Woman claimed total amnesia. •

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Particularly interesting are cases of ‘robbery by hypnosis’ reported in Italy (Clerici et al., 2009). These are cases where people claimed that were hypnotized to hand over money’. Popular in media. Very Italian phenomenon; Clerici et al. Looked at 106 cases between 1988 and 2007. Concluded that in no case was it necessary to invoke hypnosis to explain what happened. In all cases, attempts were made to confuse and disorientate the victim (foreign accents, multiple requests). Concluded that coercion by hypnosis is an ‘urban myth’. They conclude: ‘“I was hypnotized” certainly seems to be a very convenient, functional, and even distinctly economical solution that enables victims to shift the responsibility for their behaviour onto another’s shoulders and emerge merely as victims.’ (p.427) But only an opinion. Is there any relevant scientific evidence?

Hypnotic coercion: The experimental approach In real-life impossible to isolate hypnotic effects from other causal factors; so researchers turned to experimental methods. • Orne and Evans (1965) based on studies by Rowland (1939) and Young (1952) found hypnotic subjects and non-hypnotic simulating subjects would perform dangerous acts e.g. pick up poisonous snake, plunge hand into a beaker of concentrated nitric acid. Set up such that despite appearances, the acts were actually safe. • Non-hypnotic subjects (simulators) will perform antisocial or repugnant acts including, mutilating the bible, cutting up the national flag, making a homosexual advance, and heroin dealing, make slanderous statements (Coe,



Kobayashi and Howard, 1973; Levitt, Aronoff, et al., 1975; O'Brien and Rabuck, 1976; Calverley and Barber, 1965). Wagstaff, Green and Somers (1997) found people with experience of hypnosis were more likely to find a defendant guilty when the defence claimed the crime was committed because of hypnosis (i.e. they didn’t believe that the hypnotized defendant could not control his actions). If someone has already been “hypnotized”, they wouldn’t belive another had.

Reviewers of studies in which hypnosis has allegedly coerced people into performing antisocial acts argued that they can be explained primarily in terms of subjects a) wanting to help the hypnotist/experimenter, b) thinking their actions were actually safe, and/or c) making assumptions that someone else would take responsibility for the consequences of the acts. • Barber, 1961, 1969; Coe, Kobayashi and Howard, 1972, 1973; Orne and Evans, 1965; Udolf, 1983). By mid 1990s consensus of experts was that hypnotic automatism does not occur: • Hence the definition of hypnosis provided by the American Psychological Association clearly rejects the notion of the hypnotic automaton; thus it states, Contrary to some depictions of hypnosis in books, movies or television, people who have been hypnotized do not lose control over their behaviour'(1994, p.143). • In a survey of 10 experts on forensic hypnosis conducted by Vingoe (1995), all rejected the view that 'during hypnosis the control a person normally has over him or herself is in the hands of the hypnotist' (p.180). • A similar view is expressed by the editors of Theories of Hypnosis (edited by Lynn and Rhue, 1991a). Thus Lynn and Rhue conclude: 'Since the 'golden age' of hypnotism (the 1880s and 1890s), the view of the hypnotized subject as a passive automaton under the sway of a powerful hypnotist has faded in popularity. In fact, this rather extreme position is not endorsed by any of the theorists whose ideas are represented in this book' (p.606). Perhaps most significantly, having reviewed the scientific evidence, the independent panel appointed by the Home Office in 1995 to investigate stage hypnosis recommended that the public should be made explicitly aware of the fact that: 'The hypnotised subject retains ultimate control over his/her actions.' (see Home Office consultation document, 1995, Annex D)

Hypnotic coercion: The revival of the hypnotic automaton? McKenna ats Gates However, an interesting development in the late 1990s was the case in the High Court of McKenna ats Gates (1998) •

In this case it was claimed that the Plaintiff (Christopher Gates) was placed in a deep trance state and to made to perform activities of which he was not fully



conscious, and of which would have resisted had he not been in this deep trance state. As a result of stress and other neurological and psychological effects associated with hypnosis, the Plaintiff developed schizophrenia. Prosecution referred to a large amount of neuro-scientific evidence to support these claims. Of particular significance was evidence related to changes in frontal lobe function during hypnosis.

FORENSIC HYPNOSIS: Coercion Does hypnosis involve frontal inhibition? The prosecution referred to the original version of dissociated control theory, it was argued that hypnotic inductions result in an altered state of consciousness in which ‘subsystems of control can be directly and automatically activated (by the hypnotist), instead of being governed by high level executive control’ (Bowers, 1992; Gruzelier, 2000). Effects are achieved primarily through inhibition of the frontal lobes such that hypnotized subjects are in a state of consciousness functionally similar to that of patients with frontal lobe disorders (including schizophrenics). THE FRONTAL INHIBITION HYPOTHESIS Typical deficits attributed to patients with damage to the prefrontal cortex of the brain include: A) deficits in control of action; B) deficits in goal-directed behaviour (Shallice and Burgess, l993). Hence this case, it was argued that because of hypnosis, the plaintiff ended up in essentially the same condition as someone with brain damage. So, some have argued that, in hypnosis, the frontal functions become inhibited; resulting in: ‘the suspension of reality testing, abdication of planning functions, and reduced attentional monitoring of external cues which characterise hypnosis’ (Gruzelier & Warren, 1993) i.e. symptoms of schizophrenia. Frontal inhibition Is there evidence that hypnosis impairs frontal /executive functioning? Consider phonemic fluency total words; i.e. a frontal/executive task whereby a participant had to generate as many words as possible from one letter (Wagstaff et al., 2006). Phonemic fluency does decrease with hypnosis, but high susceptibles are still better functioning when hypnotised than lows are when not hypnotised! In all levels of hypnotic depth people performed worse on phonemic fluency task after hypnosis. People judged to be highly hypnotisable are still better functioning in terms of phonemic fluency when they are hypnotised than low hypnotisable people are when they are not hypnotised, this doesn’t make sense if hypnosis involves a state of automatism. If high hypnotisables are in a state of automatism during hypnosis, low hypnotisables must be in an even more profound state of automatism even when they are not hypnotised. Why does phonemic fluency reduce with hypnosis?

One explanation is that the decrease in phonemic fluency is simply due to divided attention. e.g. Crawford (1996) points out that, during hypnotic suggestions, consistently there is increased involvement of regions within the frontal cortex during hypnotic suggestion’, particularly left frontal context. Thus, following hypnotic suggestion can be a frontal task (See also, Jamieson, Dwivedia and Gruzelier, 2005; Kallio et al., 2001; Rainville et al., 1999; Thornton, 2001). If concentrating during hypnosis involves frontal resources, then it is more difficult to simultaneously perform another frontal task (such as phonemic fluency). People might therefore perform worse on the phonemic fluency task simply because they are trying to perform two frontal tasks at the same time - not because hypnosis is somehow inhibiting their frontal lobes. •



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Suggests that brain activity changes according to nature of induction and use of suggestions. Changes in phonemic fluency may be due to ordinary cognitive processes such as divided attention, not a special state. But, main point is, overall, evidence indicates that when hypnotized, high susceptibles (high hypnotizables) have as good frontal/executive function as lows who are not hypnotized. So, no evidence at present that hypnosis induces automatism through inhibition of frontal lobes. Other phenomena have been associated with the idea of hypnotic coercion…

Freezing: A link with inability to respond during hypnosis? • Is it possible for a person to ‘freeze’ and be unable to move during hypnosis? • Some hypnosis victims claimed they haven’t ben able to move, are they making this up? • In situations of extreme anxiety and stress, such as in emergencies, it is not unusual for some individuals to appear to ‘freeze’ and remain motionless. • Leach (2004) has argued that the classic response to danger should be relabelled ‘fight, flight or freeze’. • Very possible that some victims of assault whilst ‘hypnotized’ may freeze, but because of stress/anxiety, not hypnotic state per se. Even from the perspective of what is generally considered the most influential modern ‘state’ theory of hypnosis, dissociated control theory, hypnotized subjects ultimately maintain control over their behaviour; hence Erik Woody, has commented, • ‘Common misconceptions are that hypnosis can be used to enable people to demonstrate abilities they would not otherwise possess, and make people engage in behaviour they would otherwise avoid because of ethical and moral constraints. Neither of these is true’ (1998, p.2). • Hence there seems to be a consensus amongst both state and sociocognitive theorists that, although hypnotized subjects may sometimes interpret their responses as involuntary, they are aware of what is happening and do not actually lose control of their behaviour. Hypnotic Coercion: Conclusion •

However, any hypnotic situation places strong social demands on people to enact the role of a 'hypnotized' person. Hypnosis can make you do things ‘you wouldn’t normally do’ – just like many other social situations.

This is especially so when the context is defined as therapeutic; in such situations, as in counseling and psychotherapy generally, clients can develop a strong emotional bond with their therapists. This can make them vulnerable to abuse. • Perhaps, in general 'experts' in this field should stress the elements of the hypnotic situation relevant to the legal concept of compulsion or duress rather than automatism. – Compulsion, or duress, occurs when, for instance, an action was performed under threat, obedience to orders, marital coercion, or to avert a greater evil. – Automatism, occurs when, for instance, an action was performed without awareness, or as the result of a spasm (Curzon, 1980). Case histories in the modern era show that prosecutors are more likely to achieve a ...


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