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USUFRUCT 1. NHA v. CA G.R. No. 148830 FACTS: By virtue of Proclamation No. 481 issued by then Pres. Marcos, a portion of land in Quezon City owned by National Housing Authority (NHA) was reserved for the site of National Government Center (NGC). Subsequently, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1670, which removed a sevenhectare portion from the coverage of the NGC. Proclamation No. 1670 gave Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc. (MSBF) usufructuary rights over this segregated portion. MSBF occupied the area granted by Proclamation No. 1670. However, over the years, MSBF’s occupancy exceeded the seven-hectare area subject to its usufructuary rights; it occupied approximately 16 hectares by 1987. By then the land occupied by MSBF was bounded by Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) to the west, Agham Road to the east, Quezon Avenue to the south and a creek to the north. On 18 August 1987, MSBF leased a portion of the area it occupied to Bulacan Garden Corporation (BGC) and other stallholders. BGC leased the portion facing EDSA, which occupies 4,590 sq. m. of the 16-hectare area. On 11 November 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 127 (MO 127). This revoked the reserved status of “the 50 hectares, more or less, remaining out of the 120 hectares of the NHA property reserved as site of the NGC.” MO 127 also authorized the NHA to commercialize the area and to sell it to the public. Acting on the power granted under MO 127, the NHA gave BGC 10 days to vacate its occupied area. Any structure left behind after the expiration of the 10-day period will be demolished by NHA. ISSUE: Whether or not the premises leased by BGC from MSBF is within the 7hectare area that Proclamation No. 1670 granted to MSBF by way of usufruct? HELD: The Court held that MSBF abused their usufruct rights. Clearly, in the present case, Proclamation No. 1670 is the title constituting the usufruct. Proclamation No. 1670 categorically states that the 7-hectare area shall be determined “by future survey under the administration of the Foundation subject to private rights if there be any.” MSBF, then, has the latitude to determine the location of its 7-hectare usufruct portion within the 16-hectare area.

Although MSBF has the discretion to determine its 7-hectare usufruct, MSBF abused its right when it exceeded the 7-hectare portion granted to it by Proclamation No. 1670. The Court said that “a usufruct is not simply about rights and privileges. A usufructuary has the duty to protect the owner’s interests. One such duty is found in Article 601 of the Civil Code. The Court further said that “at this point, the determination of the sevenhectare portion cannot be made to rely on a choice between the NHA’s and MSBF’s survey. There is a need for a new survey, one conducted jointly by the NHA and MSBF, to remove all doubts on the exact location of the seven-hectare area and thus avoid future controversies. This new survey should consider existing structures of MSBF. It should as much as possible include all of the facilities of MSBF within the seven-hectare portion without sacrificing contiguity.” It must be noted however that based on Art. 605, MSBF has only 22 years to exercise its usufruct since the Civil Code provides that the right can be exercised only within 50 years.

2. GABOYA V. CUI 38 SCRA 85 FACTS: Don Mariano sold his three lots prodiviso to his three children. One of his children, due to lack of funds, wasn’t able to purchase part of the land. This reverted back to the father. As part of the sale, the father reserved for himself the usufruct of the property. He co-owned the land with his children then. A building was then constructed in a portion of the land, wherein rentals was given to the father. Thereafter, the two children who were co-owners obtained a loan, secured by a mortgage, with authority of the father, to construct a commercial building. The father alleges that since he has usufruct over the land, he has usufruct or share in the rentals earned through the constructed building. ISSUE: Whether the usufruct reserved by Don Mariano in the deed of sale, over the property that were at the time vacant and unoccupied, gave the usufructuary the right to receive the rentals of the commercial building constructed by the two daughters with funds borrowed from the Rehabilitation and Finance Corporation, the loan being secured by a mortgage over the lots sold. – NO

HELD: The Supreme Court (the “SC”) held that the usufructuary rights of the late Don Mariano reserved in the deed of sale was over the land alone and did not entitle him to the rents of the building later constructed thereon by his two daughters. The SC also held that said usufructuary was entitled only to the reasonable rental value of the land occupied by the building aforementioned.

3. VDA. DE ALBAR V. CARANGDANG 106 PHIL 855 FACTS: Dona Rosario Fabie was the owner of a parcel of land with a building constructed thereon. Upon her death, she bequeathed the naked ownership to Rosario Grey while the usufruct to Josefa. Thereafter, a fire broke out and the building constructed on the land was destroyed. Then a Chinaman offered to lease the property and Josefa nows demand a share in the rentals given by the lessor. ISSUE: W/N the usufruct included the building and the land? W/N the usufructuary (FABIE) or naked owner (VDA DE ALBAR) should undertake the reconstruction? W/N the usufructuary should pay the real estate taxes? HELD: (1)A life usufruct constituted on the rentals of the building located on a certain place includes the rentals on both the building and on the land on which it is erected, because the building cannot exist without the land. Hence, the usufruct isn’t extinguished by the destruction of the building, for under the law, usufruct is extinguished only by the total loss of the thing subject of the encumbrance. (2)FABIE, the usufructuary has the discretion to reconstruct the building. Of course, this is addressed to the wisdom and discretion of the usufructuary who, to all intents and purposes is deemed as the administrator of the property. (3)The usufructuary should pay the taxes. We find, however, merit in the contention that the real estate taxes paid by respondent in her capacity as usufructuary for several years previous to the present litigation should be paid by her, as she did, instead of by petitioners not only because she bound herself to pay such taxes in a formal agreement approved by the court in Civil Case No. 1569 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Fabie vs. Gutierrez David, supra). In the case, which involved the same parties and the same properties subject to usufruct, the parties submitted an amicable agreement which was approved by the court wherein the usufructuary, herein respondent, bound herself to pay all the real estate taxes, special assessment and insurance premiums, and make all the necessary repairs on each of the properties covered by the usufruct and in accordance with said agreement, respondent paid all the taxes for the years 1945 to 1954.

4. BALURAN V. NAVARRO 79 SCRA 309 FACTS: Spouses Paraiso executed an agreement entitle “BARTER” whereby they agreed to “barter and exchange” with spouses Baluran their residential lot with the latter's unirrigated riceland. The documents allowed the parties to enjoy the material possession of their respective properties, reap the fruits of the unirrigated riceland for spouses Paraiso and build a house in the residential lot for spouses Baluran. Also, it was conditioned upon the event that if any of the children of Natividad Obencio, daughter of spouses Paraiso, shall choose to reside in this municipality and build a house in the residential lot, spouses Balura shall be obliged to return the lot with damages. Lastly, neither party shall encumber, alienate or dispose of in any manner their respective properties as bartered without the consent of the other. Antonio Obendencio, son of Natividad, filed a complaint to recover the residential lot. Avelino Baluran alleged that the barter agreement transferred to him the ownership of the residential lot in exchange for the unirrigated riceland. ISSUE: WON there was a transfer of ownership between the parties. – NO HELD: No barter agreement for purposes of transferring ownership can be inferred when it is clear that the parties merely intended to transfer material possession thereof. All that the parties acquired was the right of usufruct which in essence is the right to enjoy the Property of another. Under the document, spouses Paraiso would harvest the crop of the unirrigate riceland while Baluran could build a house on the residential lot. The mutual agreement was subject to a resolutory condition, that the children of Natividad, shall choose to reside in the municipality and build his house on the lot, which would terminate the right of possession and use. Usufruct may be constituted for any period of time and under such conditions as they may deem convenient and beneficial subject to the provision of the Civil Code. The manner of terminating or extinguishing the right of ususfruct is primarily determined by the stipulations of the parties which in this case is the happening of the event agreed upon.

5. MERCEDES MORALIDAD vs. SPS. DIOSDADO PERNES and ARLENE PERNES G.R. No. 152809 August 3, 2006 Facts: In her younger days, petitioner taught in Davao City, Quezon City and Manila. While teaching in Manila, she had the good fortune of furthering her studies at the University of Pennsylvania, U.S.A. While schooling, she was offered to teach at the Philadelphia Catholic Archdiocese, which she did for seven (7) years. Thereafter, she worked at the Mental Health Department of said University for the next seventeen (17) years. During those years, she would come home to the Philippines to spend her twomonth summer vacation in her hometown in Davao City. Being single, she would usually stay in Mandug, Davao City in the house of her niece, respondent Arlene Pernes, a daughter of her younger sister, Rosario. Back in the U.S.A. sometime in 1986, she received news from Arlene that Mandug at the outskirts of Davao City was infested by NPA rebels and many women and children were victims of crossfire between government troops and the insurgents. Shocked and saddened about this development, she immediately sent money to Araceli, Arlene's older sister, with instructions to look for a lot in Davao City where Arlene and her family could transfer and settle down. This was why she bought the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-123125. Petitioner acquired the lot property initially for the purpose of letting Arlene move from Mandug to Davao City proper but later she wanted the property to be also available to any of her kins wishing to live and settle in Davao City. Petitioner made known this intention in a document she executed on July 21, 1986. ISSUES: 1. W/N the agreement for the use of the land constituted the defendants as usufructs. 2. W/N the usufruct is terminated. 3. W/N the defendants, as usufructs, have the right of reimbursement. HELD: 1st Issue: YES, because of the written letter by the petitioner to the defendants, it created the usufruct between the parties. What was constituted between the parties herein is one of usufruct over a piece of land, with the petitioner being the owner of the property upon whom the naked title thereto remained and the respondents being two (2) among other unnamed usufructuaries who were simply referred to as petitioner’s kin.

It is undisputed that petitioner, in a document dated July 21, 1986, supra, made known her intention to give respondents and her other kins the right to use and to enjoy the fruits of her property. There can also be no quibbling about the respondents being given the right "to build their own house" on the property and to stay thereat "as long as they like." 2nd Issue: YES, the usufruct was terminated. The term or period of the usufruct originally specified provides only one of the bases for the right of a usufructuary to hold and retain possession of the thing given in usufruct. There are other modes or instances whereby the usufruct shall be considered terminated or extinguished. The document executed by the petitioner dated July 21, 1986 constitutes the title creating, and sets forth the conditions of, the usufruct. Paragraph #3 thereof states "[T]hat anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the use thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose thereof". What may be inimical to the purpose constituting the usufruct may be gleaned from the preceding paragraph wherein petitioner made it abundantly clear "that anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the aforementioned property should maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid bickering with one another." That the maintenance of a peaceful and harmonious relations between and among kin constitutes an indispensable condition for the continuance of the usufruct is clearly deduced from the succeeding Paragraph #4 where petitioner stated "[T]hat anyone of my kins who cannot conform with the wishes of the undersigned may exercise the freedom to look for his own." In fine, the occurrence of any of the following: the loss of the atmosphere of cooperation, the bickering or the cessation of harmonious relationship between/among kin constitutes a resolutory condition which, by express wish of the petitioner, extinguishes the usufruct. From the pleadings submitted by the parties, it is indubitable that there were indeed facts and circumstances whereby the subject usufruct may be deemed terminated or extinguished by the occurrence of the resolutory conditions provided for in the title creating the usufruct. Thus, the Court rules that the continuing animosity between the petitioner and the Pernes family and the violence and humiliation she was made to endure, despite her advanced age and frail condition, are enough factual bases to consider the usufruct as having been terminated. 3rd Issue: NO, they have no right to reimbursement. To reiterate, the relationship between the petitioner and respondents respecting the property in question is one of owner and usufructuary. Accordingly, respondents’ claim for reimbursement of the improvements they introduced on the property during the effectivity of the usufruct should be governed by applicable statutory provisions and principles on

usufruct. By express provision of law, respondents, as usufructuary, do not have the right to reimbursement for the improvements they may have introduced on the property. The respondents may, however, remove or destroy the improvements they may have introduced thereon without damaging the petitioner’s property. NUISANCE 1. SITCHON V. AQUINO 98 PHIL 720 FACTS: Petitioners constructed houses on a public road. They were made to pay concession fees and were issued receipts for the same. Thereafter, they were being ordered by the city engineer to vacate. Failure to obey, there was an order for demolition. Petitioners contend that by virtue of arts. 700 and 702, the power to remove public nuisances is vested in the District Health Officer, not in the City Engineer. ISSUES: 1. Is there a public nuisance? 2. Does the City Engineer have authority to cause the abatement of the nuisance? HELD: Houses constructed without government authority, on public streets and roads, obstruct at all times, the free use of the public of said places and accordingly, constitute nuisance per se aside from being public nuisances. This case falls on article 694(4), classifying as a nuisance the obstruction of free passage of any public highway or street. It is public because it affects a community or neighborhood. The constructions in fact constitute nuisances per se, obstructing at all times the streets. As such, the summary removal of these may be authorized by statute or ordinance. Aquino, as City Engineer, is vested with authority to effect the abatement of the nuisances through demolition. By virtue of the Revised Charter of Manila, such duty, among others, was placed upon him. Arts. 700 and 702 must yield to this provision not only because it is later law but also because of the principle that special provisions prevail over general ones. Moreover, an ordinance authorized the action sought to be taken by respondent.

2. VELASCO V. MANILA ELECTRIC 40 SCRA 342 FACTS: Velasco was the owner of 3 adjoining lots. He then sold two of these to Meralco who later constructed a substation and finished it the following November, without prior building permit or authority from the Public Service Commission. The facility reduces high voltage electricity to a current suitable for distribution to the company's consumers, numbering not less than 8,500 residential homes, over 300 commercial establishments and about 30 industries. The substation has a rated capacity of "2 transformers at 5000 kilovolt-ampere (KVA) each or a total of 10,000 Kva without fan cooling; or 6250 Kva each or a total of 12,500 Kva with fan cooling". It was constructed at a distance of 10 to 20 meters from the appellant's house. The company built a stone and cement wall at the sides along the streets but along the side adjoining the appellant's property it put up a sawale wall but later changed it to an interlink wire fence. It is undisputed that a sound unceasingly emanates from the substation. ISSUE: Whether the sound constitutes an actionable nuisance. – YES HELD: General rule is that everyone is bound to bear the habitual or customary inconveniences that result from the proximity of others, and so long as this level is not surpassed, he may not complain against them. But if the prejudice exceeds the inconveniences that such proximity habitually brings, the neighbor who causes such disturbance is held responsible for the resulting damage, being guilty of causing nuisance. The test is whether the rights of property, of health or of comfort are so injuriously affected by the noise in question that the sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes beyond the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of living, or of holding property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to uses which involve the emission of noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it within reasonable bounds.

3. ILOILO COLD STORAGE V. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL 24 PHIL 471 FACTS: According to the pleadings, the plaintiff, upon authority granted by the defendant, constructed an ice and cold storage plant in the city of Iloilo. Some timeafter the plant had been completed and was in operation, nearby residents made complaints to the defendant that the smoke from the plant was very injurious to their health and comfort. Thereupon the defendant appointed a committee to investigate and report upon the matters contained in said complaints. The committee reported that the complaints were well-founded.Upon receipt of this resolution and order, the plaintiff commenced this action in the Court of First Instance to enjoin the defendant from carrying into effect the said resolution. “That the defendants intend and threaten to require compliance with said resolution administratively and without the intervention of the court, and by force to compel the closing and suspension of operations of the plaintiff’s machinery and consequently of the entire plant, should the plaintiff not proceed with the elevation of the smokestacks to one hundred feet, which the plaintiff maintains it is not obliged to do and will not do.” ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution alone issued by the municipal council is sufficient to label and abate the supposed nuisance in this case? -- NO HELD: If no compelling necessity requires the summary abatement of a nuisance, the municipal authorities under their power to declare and abate nuisances, don’t have the right to compel the abatement of a particular thing or act as a nuisance without reasonable notice to the person alleged to be maintaining or doing the same of the time and place of hearing before a tribunal authority to decide whether the thing is a nuisance or not. In the present case it is certain that the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry, beneficial to the people ...