A Compilation of Case Digests for Law on Persons and Family Relations PDF

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Persons and Family Relations II. EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS 1 Pesigan v, Angeles, 129 SCRA 174, April 30, 1984 TITLE Pesigan v, Angeles GR NUMBER G.R. No. L-64279 DATE April 30, 1984 PONENTE AQUINO, J NATURE/KEYWO RDS FACTS Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelino L. Pesigan are carabao dealers from Sip...

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Persons and Family Relations II. EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS 1 Pesigan v, Angeles, 129 SCRA 174, April 30, 1984 TITLE

Pesigan v, Angeles

GR NUMBER

G.R. No. L-64279

DATE PONENTE

April 30, 1984 AQUINO, J

NATURE/KEYWO RDS FACTS

Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelino L. Pesigan are carabao dealers from Sipocot, Camarines Sur who are transporting 26 carabaos and a calf to Padre Garcia, Batangas on the evening of April 2, 1982. ● They have in their possession the following: (1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Sur, issued under the Revised Administrative Code and Presidential Decree No. 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974; (2) a permit to transport large cattle issued under the authority of the provincial commander; and (3) three certificates of inspection, one from the Constabulary command attesting that the carabaos were not included in the list of lost, stolen and questionable animals; one from the livestock inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and one from the mayor of Sipocot. ● In spite of the permit to transport and other papers, the carabaos were confiscated in Basud, Camarines Norte while they are passing. ● The said confiscation was facilitated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town’s police station commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, the provincial veterinarian. ● The said confiscation was based on on the aforementioned Executive Order No. 626-A which provides “that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or

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purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed x xx to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos” Doctor Miranda then proceed to distribute the carabaos among twenty-five farmers of Basud, and to a farmer from the Vinzons municipal nursery. The petitioners have filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for replevin for the recovery of the carabaos allegedly valued at P70,000 and damages of P92,000. The action was then dismissed on April 25, 1983, Judge Domingo Medina Angeles for lack of cause of action. The Pesigans appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 25 of the Interim Rules and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440, a 1968 law which superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

+ ISSUE(S)

Whether or not the Executive Order No. 626-A was already effective at the time when the confiscation of the carabaos of the Pensigans on the evening of April 2, 1982?

RULING(S)

Executive Order No. 626-A is not yet effective at that time. The court holds that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982, because it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code. WHEREFORE, the trial court’s order of dismissal and the confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos are reversed and set aside. Respondents Miranda and Zenarosa are ordered to restore the carabaos, with the requisite documents, to the petitioners, who as owners are entitled to possess the same, with the right to dispose of them in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No costs.

2.People v. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523, October 12, 1984

TITLE

GR NUMBER DATE

People of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Regino Veridiano II., as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Branch I, and Benito Go Bio Jr. L-62243 1984-10-12

PONENTE

Relova

NATURE/KEYWO RDS

Petition for certiorari, Art. 2 of NCC, When Laws Take Effect

FACTS

- On or about and during the 2nd week of May 1979, private respondent Benito Go Bio issued a BPI check amounting to P200,000 to Filipinas Tan, which was dishonored for the reason of insufficient funds. He was charged with violation of Batasang Pambansa 22, also known as Bouncing Checks Law at the CFI Zambales presided by the respondent judge. - Private respondent filed a Motion to Quash, pointing out that at the time of issuing the check, BP 22 has not yet taken effect. - The prosecution opposed, contending that the date of the dishonor of the check, which is on September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the offense. BP 22 took effect on June 29, 1979. - Go Bio submits that what BP 22 penalizes is not the dishonor of the check, but its issuance without sufficient funds. - Respondent judge resolved the motion, saying that BP 22 cannot be given retroactive effect, that Go Bio cannot be held liable for bouncing checks prior to its effectivity. - Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, with the petitioner contending that BP 22 was published in the April 9, 1979 issue of the Official Gazette, which 15 days therefrom would be April 24, 1979, days before Go Bio issued the check. - Respondent Go Bio argues that while it was published on April 9, it was only released on June 14, 1979.

ISSUE(S)

W/N BP 22 is in effect at the time of issuing a check by the defendant.

RULING(S)

NO. Even though BP 22 was printed on the April 9, 1979 issue of the Official Gazette, it was only officially released for circulation on June 14, 1979. BP 22’s effectivity clause states that, “This Act shall take effect 15 days after the publication in

the Official Gazette.” Hence, it took effect on June 29, 1979. The order of the respondent judge is affirmed.

3.Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 , April 24, 1985 TITLE GR NUMBER DATE PONENTE

Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 L-63915 April 24, 1985 ESCOLIN

NATURE/KEYWO RDS

PETITION to review the decision of the Executive Assistant to the President.

FACTS

Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged nonpublication of the presidential issuances in question said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being “aggrieved parties”. Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court’s construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date— for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication—but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. ISSUE(S)

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectiveness of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.

RULING(S)

Publication in the Official Gazette is a sine qua non (a description of a requisite or condition that is indispensable) requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity date. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court’s declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank to wit: “The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is “an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration x x x that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.” In Pesigan vs. Angeles, the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that “publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.” The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that “the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.” WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. 4.MRCA v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 344 , December 19, 1989 _ ANTONA TITLE

GR NUMBER

MRCA, INC., petitioner, vs. HO N. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Judge, Regional Trial court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 168, Pasig, M.M., SPOUSES DOMINGO SEBASTIAN, JR. & LILIA TIOSECO SEBASTIAN, and EXPECTACION P. TIOSECO, respondents. G.R. No. 86675

DIVISION

FIRST DIVISION

DATE

December 19, 1989

PONENTE

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

NATURE/KEYWO RDS

Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS

The petitioner prays to set aside the CA decision dismissing the complaint for non-payment of the proper filing fees for failure to specify the amounts of moral & exemplary, attorney's fees and litigation expenses sought to be recovered, and left them "to the discretion of the Court" or "to be proven during the trial." Invoking the case of Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court in dismissing the complaint, hence, this petition. Petitioner argues that since the decision in Manchester had not yet been published in the Official Gazette when its complaint was filed, the ruling therein was ineffective; may not be given retroactive effect because it imposes a new penalty for its non-observance; the dismissal of the complaint for want of jurisdiction; and, that it should not apply to the present case because the petitioner herein had no fraudulent intent to deprive the government of the proper docketing fee, unlike the Manchester case where enormous amounts were claimed in the body of the complaint, but the amounts were not mentioned in the prayer thereof, to mislead the clerk of court in computing the filing fees. Important Dates: Manchester case’ promulgation - May 7,1987, Complaint in this case – March 24, 1988 Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., vs. Asuncion - February 13, 1989, a case that was already pending before Manchester was promulgated.

ISSUE(S)

W/N the publication in the Official Gazette is a prerequisite for the effectivity of a court ruling laying down a new rule of procedure?

RULING(S)

No. Publication in the Official Gazette is not a prerequisite for the effectivity of a court ruling even if it lays down a new rule of procedure, for "it is a doctrine well established that the procedure of the court may be changed at any time and become effective at once, so long as it does not affect or change vested rights." (Aguillon vs. Director of Lands). Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. As the resolution of October 1,

1945, relates to the mode of procedure, it is applicable to cases pending in courts at the time of its adoption; but it can not be invoked in and applied to cases in which the decision had become final before said resolution became effective. Manchester should apply except for the fact that it was modified in the Sun Insurance case, where the court may allow payment of the proper filing fee "within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the prescriptive or reglementary period." We quote: It is not simply the filing of the complaint, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. The petitioner might not have computed its damages yet, or probably did not have the evidence to prove them at the time it filed its complaint. In accordance with our ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., the petitioner may amend its complaint for the purpose of specifying how much it claims as damages, and to pay the requisite filing fees therefor, provided its right of action has not yet prescribed. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted.

5.Yaokasin v. Commissioner, 180 SCRA 591 , December 22, 1989 TITLE

GR NUMBER

JIMMY O. YAOKASIN, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, SALVADOR M. MISON and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF TACLOBAN, VICENTE D. YUTANGCO, respondents. G.R No. 84111

DATE

December 22, 1989

PONENTE

Grino-Aquino, J

NATURE/KEYWO RDS

Publication of law; general application principle

FACTS

ISSUE(S)

RULING(S)

Facts: On May 27, 1988 the Philippine Coast Guard confiscated 9000 bags/sacks of refined sugar from petitioner and turned it over to to the Bureau of Customs. Petitioner contend that the sugar was purchased in the Philippines, having sales invoice from Jordan Tradin of Iloilo as proof. The District Collector of Customs ordered the release of the sugar on June 7, 1988 but on June 14, 1988 following the transmission of the case to the Commissioner of Customs, the former ordered to seal the warehouse where the sugar was stored. Petitioner then secured a writ of replevin from the RTC of Leyte. Subsequently the respondents filed a petition to annul the grant of replevin. On July 15, 1988 the Collector of Customs rendered a decision finding that the 9000 bags/sacks of sugar in question are of foreign origin hence it was declare forfeited in favor of the government. Petitioner claim that the release of sugar in the decision issued on June 7, 1988 must be upheld. Defendants of the other hand averred that pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 20-87 dated May 1987, cases involving seizures and protest should go directly to the Commission of Customs for Automatic Review. Petitioner contends that Section 12 of PLAN and CMO No. 20-37 had not been published hence it is not demandable and enforceable at the time the confiscation happened. Whether or not the publication of CMO-20-37 being an administrative order is required to be published in the Official Gazette before it can take effect NO. As a general rule, administrative orders and proclamations need not be published in the Official Gazette except in cases where it has general applicability. The assailed CMO is an issuance addressed to only the Customs Collectors.

6.Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds, G.R. No. 179579, February 1, 2012 TITLE

GR NUMBER DATE

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF SUBIC, Petitioners, - versus - HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION, Respondent. 179579 February 1, 2012

PONENTE

SERENO

NATURE/KEYWO RDS

Retroactivity, equal protection clause

FACTS

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On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO (Customs Memorandum Order) 27-2003. Under the Memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat was classified according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. Either as food grade or feed grade. A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on 19 December 2003, respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the RTC of Las Piñas City. Respondent contended that CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of the Philippines Law Center. Respondent alleged that the regulation adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier without the benefit of prior assessment and examination; thus, despite having imported food grade wheat, it would be subjected to the 7% tariff, forcing them to pay 133% more Respondent claimed that the equal protection clause was violated when the regulation treated non-flour millers differently from flour millers for no reason at all and asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation was confiscatory in nature.

ISSUE(S)

Whether or not the CMO 27-2003 of the petitioner met the requirements for the Revised Administrative Code? Whether or not the content of the CMO 27-2003 met the requirement of the equal protection clause of the constitution?

RULING(S)

No. The petitioners violated respondents’ right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when they failed to observe the requirements under the Administrative Code which are: Sec 3. Filing (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Sec 9. Public Participation (1) An agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior t...