AC Tricks - a LD AC Card example PDF

Preview

Summary

a LD AC Card example...

Description

FS Forloco 1AC Part 1- Burden Truth testing 1

Merriam Webster, First Definition is defined as to say something is true, and we should default to truth as A) otherwise we wouldn’t be able to begin to consider anything because our thought process would itself be suspect. B) o v e r t hi nki n ga b o utt h ev a l i di t yo fa l la c t i o nswo ul dp a r a l y z eu sf r om a c t i n ga swewoul dh a v et o c on t i n ua l l yq ue s t i onwh e t h e ro u rr e a s on sf o ra c t i n gwe r es u ffic i e n t .

1. Affirm

2. Most reciprocal we only prove truth and falsity 3. Key to resolvability, comparative worlds and other interps A. aren’t provided in tournament invitation, we only get the topic, unpredictable limits are bad B. there’s no bright line for what constitutes comparative worlds Next, The aff burden is to prove any right to free speech exists and the neg burden is to prove there is no right to free speech 1. Topic lit – free speech is in the words of the topic. (pretend theres a card here) A. Portability Outweighs your claims – particulars aren’t useful to debate outside of the round so generics ensure the applicability B. topic taking two months allows us to explore specific philosophical principles which outweighs any policy education C. if you wanted policy go to policy, LD’s constitutive obligation outweighs. 2. Reciprocity – aff and neg only have one way to win under my ballot and everything can be weighed – even if layering occurs, both aff and neg create more layers which outweighs 3. Inclusion – anyone can extempt philosophical arguments, policy debate is exclusionary because it prevents underfunded schools from participating in the truth construction process which ensures a dogmatic thought structure

Part 2- FW Freedom must be apriori- Revisionist quantum mechanics goes aff // extend kaku - free will is a priori and real, its the only thing completely consitutive of humanity so its ineescpable, now the only that can account for agents conflicting freedoms is a principle of universality A. freedom can only be restrictted by itself to remain free which requires the categorical imperative as an internal coherence test B. outweighs its a matter of logical consistency which is necessary for debate - this means the contentions universlaizbilty offense comes first KAKU 11 Kaku, Michio. "Why Physics Ends the Free Will Debate." Big Think. N.p., 13 Apr. 2011. Web. 31 July 2016. .

Determinism says that the universe is a clock, a gigantic clock that’s wound up in the beginning of time and has been ticking ever since according to Newton’s laws of motion. So what you’re going to eat 10 years mean that a murderer, this horrible mass murderer isn’t really guilty of his works because he was already preordained billions of years ago? Einstein said well yeah, in some sense that’s true that even mass murderers were predetermined, but he said, they should still be placed in jail. Heisenberg then comes along and proposes the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and says: ”Nonsense. Newtonian

from now on January 1st has already been fixed. It’s already known using Newton’s laws of motion. Einstein believed in that. Einstein was a determinist. Does that

1 Merriam Webster, First Definition

You don’t know where the electron is. It could be here, here or many places simultaneously.” This of course Einstein hated because he said God doesn’t play dice with the universe. Well hey, get used to it. Einstein was wrong. God does play dice. Every time we look at an electron it moves. There is uncertainty with regards to the position of the electron. So what does that mean for free will? It means in some sense we do have some kind of free will. No one can determine your future events given your past history. There is always the

There is uncertainty.

wildcard . There is always the possibility of uncertainty in whatever we do.

A. Resolvability – otherwise its impossible for the judge to make a decision because they can’t be free to vote for the better debater Wi l l i n gt h a twes ho ul da bi d eb yt h e i re t hi c a lt h e o r yp r e s up po s e st h a tweo wn o ur s e l v e si nt h efir s tp l a c e . Th us , de n y i n gs e l f o wne r s hi pi nt her ou nda ut o ma t i c a l l yi mp l i e st h et r u t ho ft he f r a me wo r k .Os t r o ws kionHo ppe J a me s ,,AS YMPOSI UM ONDRUGDECRI MI NALI ZATI ON:THEMORALANDPRACTI CALCASEFORDRUG LEGALI ZATI ON.SPRI NG,1 99 01 8Ho f s t r aL.Re v .6 07 "[A]rgumentation is a conflict-free way of interacting ... a mutual recognition of each person's exclusive control over his own body must be presupposed as long as there is argumentation." 112 Hoppe

Wh e ne v e rap e r s o nc l a i mst h a ts o mes t a t e me n tc a nb ej u s t i fie d ,[ s ] h eat least i mp l i c i t l ya s s u me s No b o d yh a st her i gh tt ouninvitedly aggress against the body of any other person and thus delimit or r e s t r i c ta n y o n e ' sc on t r o lo v e r [ h e r ]his own bo d y . "Th i srule i si mp l i e di nt h ec on c e p to fj u s t i fic a t i o na sa r gu me n t a t i v ej u s t i fic a t i o n .J u s t i f y i n gme a n sj us t i f y i n g wi t h o u tha v i n gt or e l yo nc o e r c i o n.In fact, if one formulates t h eo p p o s i t eo ft h i sr ul e , i.e., "e v e r y b od yha st h er i g h tt ou n i n v i t e dl y a g gr e s sa g a i ns to t h e rp e o p l e " . . . then it is easy to see that this rule is not, and n e v e rc o ul db e ,d e f e n d e di na r g ume n t a t i o n.Tod os owo u l di n f a c th a v et op r e s u pp o s et hev a l i d i t yo fprecisely its opposite, i.e., t h eaforementioned p r i n c i p l eo fn o n a g gr e s s i o n . summarizes the complete argument as follows: the following norm to be justified: "

B. consequential approaches fail, we can’t predict consequences if theyre contingent on the empirical which is constantly changing and is subject to infinite change because of the free will. Our culpability regresses across the events that create us and our responsibility so non deont theories ensure zero resposnisbillty which paralyzes action To say something is permitted is not to say that there is no possibility of a prohibition; rather it just matters that it is permitted under one locus of duty. A) This is true of obligations because the existence of an obligation doesn’t mean that there can’t be another obligation to do something else, as an obligation is just a locus of duty. B) Proving the resolution true under a specific index is sufficient to affirm regardless of any other type of index that negates. Rödl 2: the normative order of the question what to believe, on an occasion of its being asked, is a set of propositions Σ. In order to indicate this, we give the imperative an index specifying that set; we write, not “It is right to believe p because Σ[of an index]” but “It is right [given an index]Σ to believe p”. Now, nothing we said about Σ[an index] excludes that it may be right Σ [given an index] to believe p and right Σ [given an index] to believe non p. Thinking it is right Σ to believe p peacefully coexists with thinking it is right Σ to believe non p. This shows that, thinking it is right [given an index]Σ to believe p, I have not determined what to believe. For, thinking this is not having affixed myself to p in a manner that excludes affixing myself in the same way to non p. But thinking it right to believe p—thinking is true—is so affixing myself to p. This view is untenable for reasons [this is] analogous to those we mounted against the corresponding account of instrumental reasoning. Suppose

Self-consciousness requires us to will universal independence – realist goods are determined causally and rationality brings them into question KORSGAARD 96 Christine Korsgaard. “The Sources of Normativity.” Lecture 3. The Tanner Lectures on Human Values. 1996. Gender modified. http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/k/korsgaard94.pdf

Kant defines a

free will as

a rational

causality without alien cause including desires because the will is a causality, it must act according to law that is effective

being determined by any

. Anything outside of the will counts as an alien cause,

inclinations of the person. The free will must be entirely selfdetermining. Yet,

some

the

and

or other. Kant says, “Since the concept of a

causality entails that of laws . . . it follows that freedom is by no means lawless . . .” 2 Alternatively, we may say that since the will is practical reason, it cannot be conceived as acting and choosing for no reason. Since reasons are derived from principles, the free will must have a principle. But because the will is free, no law or principle can be imposed on it from outside. Kant concludes that the will must be autonomous: that is, it must have its own law or principle. And here again we arrive at the problem. For where is this law to come from? If it is imposed on the will from outside then the will is not free. So the will must adopt the law for itself. But

until the will has a law there is nothing from which it can derive a reason Categorical imperative is the law of a free will the will must have a law, but because the will is free,

adopting one law rather than another ? Well, here is Kant’s answer. The

or principle,

. So how can it have any reason for

tells us to act only on a maxim that we could will to be a law. And this, according to Kant,

why, we need only compare the problem faced by the free will with the content of the Categorical imperative. The problem faced by the free will is this:

2 Sebastian Rödl, Self-Consciousness, Harvard University Press, 2007.

. To see

it must be its own law tells us to a law choose

. And nothing determines what that law must be. All that it has to be is a law. Now consider the content of the Categorical imperative.

. Its only constraint on our choice

is that it have the form of a law

The Categorical imperative simply

. And nothing determines what that law must be. All that it has to be is a law. Therefore the categorical imperative is the law of a

free will. It does not impose any external constraint on the free will’s activities, but simply arises from the nature of the will. It describes what a free will must do in order to be what it is. It must choose a maxim it can regard as a law.3 Now I’m going to make a distinction that Kant doesn’t make. I am going to call the law of acting only on maxims you can will to be laws “the Categorical imperative.” And I am going to distinguish it from what I will call “the moral law.” The moral law, in the Kantian system, is the law of what Kant calls the Kingdom of Ends, the republic of all rational beings. The moral law tells us to act only on maxims that all rational beings could agree to act on together in a workable cooperative system. Now the Kantian argument that I have just described establishes that the categorical imperative is the law of a free will. But it does not establish that the moral law is the law of a free will. Any law is universal, but the argument doesn’t settle the question of the domain over which the law of the free will must range. And there are various possibilities here.

then the agent will

treat each desire as it arises as a reason, and her conduct will

be

that of

a wanton

If law is the

the law of

acting on the desire of the moment,

. 4 If the law ranges over the interests of an agent’s whole life, then the agent will be some sort of egoist. It is only if the law ranges over every

rational being that the resulting law will be the moral law, the law of the Kingdom of Ends. Because of this, it has sometimes been claimed that the categorical imperative is an empty formalism. And this in turn has been conflated with another claim, that the moral law is an empty formalism. Now that second claim is false.5 But it is true that the argument that shows that we are bound by the categorical imperative does not show that we are bound by the moral law. For that we need another step. The agent must think of herself as a Citizen of the Kingdom of Ends. Those who think that the human mind

The choose which desire

is internally luminous and transparent to itself think that the term “self - consciousness” is appropriate because what we get in human consciousness is a direct encounter with the self. Those who think that the human mind has a reflective structure use the term too, but for a different rea - son.

reflective structure of the mind[‘s]

is a source of “

to act on

you determine your act

. This means that

with such

the principle

a principle or law

or law by which

is to be

, in St. Paul’s famous phrase,

self-consciousness

a law to yourself

” because it

ions is one that

forces us to

have a conception æ that is you, and that

you regard as

being

s

expressive of you To identify rself.

. An agent might think of herself as a Citizen in the Kingdom of Ends. Or she might think of herself as a member of a family or an ethnic group or a nation. She

might think of herself as the steward of her own interests, and then she will be an egoist. Or she might think of herself as the slave of her passions, and then she will be a wanton. And how she thinks of herself will determine whether it is the law of the Kingdom of Ends, or the law of some smaller group, or

a description practical identity

the law of the egoist, or the law of the wanton that is the law that she is to herself. The conception of one’s identity in question here is not a theo - retical one, a view about what as a matter of inescapable scientific fact you are. It is better understood as

under which you value yourself

is

, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking. So I will call th a conception of your . Practical identity is a complex matter and for the average person there will be a jumble of such conceptions. You are a human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, someone’s friend, and so on. And all of these identities give rise to reasons and obligations. Your

reasons express

it

your ident

y, your nature ; your obligations spring from what that iden - tity forbids. Our ordinary ways of talking about obligation reflect this con - nection to identity. A century ago a European could admonish another to civilized behavior by telling him to act

like a Christian. It is still true in many quarters that courage is urged on males by the injunction “Be a man!” Duties more obviously connected with social roles are of course enforced in this way. “A psychiatrist doesn’t violate the confidence of her patients.” No “ought” is needed here because the normativity is built right into the role. But it isn’t only in the case of social roles that the idea of obliga - tion invokes the conception of practical identity.

are two selves

Consider

something one. To be a thing, one thing, a unity, an entity; to be anything at all: in the metaphysical sense, that is what it means to have integrity. But we use the term for

that is because we think that living up to them is what

obligations

I couldn’t live with myself

the astonishing but familiar “

if I did that.” Clearly

there

here, me and the one I must live with and so must not fail. Or consider the protest against obligation ignored : “Just who do you think you are ?” The connection is also present in the concept of integrity. Etymologically, integrity is oneness, integration is what makes

makes him one, and

someone who lives up to his own standards give[s] rise to unconditional

. And

so what makes him a person at all. It is the conceptions of ourselves that are most important to us that

. For to violate them is to lose your integrity and so your identity, and no longer to be who you are. That is, it is no longer to be able to think of yourself under the description under which you value yourself and find your life worth living and your actions worth undertaking.

That is to be for all practical purposes dead or worse than dead. When an action cannot be performed without loss of some fundamental part of one’s identity, and an agent would rather be dead, then the obligation not to do it is unconditional and complete. If reasons arise from reflective endorsement, then obligation arises from re - flective rejection.

(a) Morality is a question of what to do which can apply to those who are free so the NC controls ilink to all ethicsresponsibility pinpoints to events – any regressive view of culpability fails (b) Unconditional obligation. We can always question why our external obligations matter, but asking whether we have a reason to act for reasons would be self-defeating because the question itself concedes the authority of reasons – constitutive aims are intrinsic (c) Unity of action. Only the unification of the aim within the activity creates an unconditional intention to unify all the parts of action, contingencies fail to justify each step. The motivation is self evident, the largest practical identity is agency to identify with. And Actor specificity (a) Self consciousness requires a conception of the self which creates the agent and any obligation this is maintained by relation of the non self- only by willing limitations to preserve equal freedom can they realize themselves (b) Unilateral agreement represents coercion, you can’t agree to give up freedom because in order to fulfill or even receive the obligation of obedience you need to be an agent

Part 3- Contention //Take out to theory- can't universalize ar restriction on free speech thats the contention, theory restricts what we can and can't say

First, restricting free speech violates reciprocal constraint because people are excluded from the omnilateral will which makes it unilateral force Second, debatability, without a right to free speech we can’t be free to debate and determine the truth of the resolution Third, censorship is an a priori contradiction in the will because if everyone censored there’d be no information to censor Fourth, Any restriction on speech is a restriction on all speech because there’s no difference between types of speech from an a priori standpoint – denying speech denies the ability to use ones right to oneself Fifth – you can ignore words – empty air can’t coerce because you can reject their influence on you Sixth, without objectivity truths are constructed free speech is necessary to form delibartive truths

Part 4- Underview UV Theory 1. Aff gets RVI’s, to clarify the neg may not read false theory or T, false defined as winning a counter interp: A. Norms. RVI’s are logical meta theory shells which say you should drop the debater to deter bad theory interps which outweighs on scope because future norms ensure infinite fairness and education and deter bad theory that kills substance B. NIB - Theory is a NIB without RVI’s that moot the 1AC creating 13:7 rebuttal skew unique to theory which means no impact to any theory if we don’t get RVIs because the aff didn’t have the ability to defend the counterinterp since we had to extend substance but the 2N knows what theyre collapsing to

2. Pr...