Brief of World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson PDF

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Completed Case Brief for World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v. Woodson...

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Alaina White Business Law September 22, 2016 Brief of World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson I.

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Facts Harry and Kay Robinson purchased a new Audi automobile from Seaway Volkswagen, Inc. in New York State in 1976. The following year they left to move to Arizona. While they were driving through Oklahoma, another car struck their Audi in the rear, causing a fire which severely burned Kay Robinson and her two children. The Robinsons brought a products-liability suit in the District Court for Creek Country, Oklahoma, claiming that their injuries resulted from defective design and placement of the Audi’s gas tank and fuel system. The Robinsons joined as defendants the auto manufacturer, Audi, its importer, Volkswagen of America, Inc., its regional distributor, World Wide Volkswagen Corporation, and its retail dealer, Seaway. Issue Whether, consistently with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an Oklahoma court may exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident automobile retailer and its wholesale distributor in a products-liability action, when the defendants’ only connection with Oklahoma is the fact that an automobile sold in New York residents became involved in an accident in Oklahoma? Decision The Supreme Court reversed the Oklahoma court’s ruling. Foreseeability of being asked to defend a suit in a particular forum is not a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. Instead, it is the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum state that determines whether it is reasonable for a defendant to be haled into court. Because Seaway and World-Wide had no contacts, ties or relations with the state of Oklahoma, jurisdiction would violate the Due Process Clause. Reason The court found that World Wide is incorporated and has its business office in New York, where it distributes vehicles, under contract with Volkswagen, to retail dealers in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut. Seaway is a retail dealer whose place of business is also in New York. There was no evidence that either World-Wide or Seaway does any business in Oklahoma. There was also no showing that any automobile sold by WorldWide or Seaway has ever entered Oklahoma with the single exception of the vehicle involved in the present case. As long as it has been held, a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only so long as there exist “minimum contacts” between the defendant and the forum State. The court’s reasoning for not extending jurisdiction was the fact that World-Wide and Seaway and World-Wide do not have any business in Oklahoma. Thus, the Due Process Clause “does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.

Alaina White Business Law September 22, 2019 Case Brief of Parker v. Twentieth Century Fox I.

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Facts Shirley MacLaine Parker, a well-known actress, signed a contract with Twentieth Century-Fox Corp., to play the female lead in the defendant’s upcoming motion picture, and musical production called “Bloomer Girl”. The contract provided that the defendant would pay Parker a minimum “guaranteed compensation” of $750,000. Prior to the starting of production, the defendant decided not to produce the picture, and instead offered Parker the lead female role in another film entitled “Big Country, Big Man”, which was a dramatic “western type” to be filmed in Austalia. Parker did not accept the offer and then sought out action to recover the agreed guaranteed compensation. Issue Whether facts have been presented which give rise to a triable factual issue on a motion for summary judgement, and if the offer of alternate employment under those contracts infringes an employee’s rights. Decision The trial court correctly ruled in Parker’s favor and the judgment is affirmed. Reasons It is clear that the trial court correctly ruled that Parker’s failure to accept defendant’s tendered substitute employment could not be applied in mitigation of damages because the offer of the “Big Country” lead was of employment different and inferior to “Bloomer Girl”. “Bloomer Girl” was to be a musical review calling upon Parker’s talents as a dancer and actress and was to be produced in the City of Los Angeles. “Big Country” was a straight dramatic role taking place in an opal mine in Australia. Also, the substitute “Big Country” offer eliminated the screenplay and directing approvals to Parker under the original contract, thus constituted an offer of inferior employment. No expertise or judicial notice is required in order to hold that the deprivation of infringement of an employee’s rights held under an original employment contract converts the available “other employment” relied upon by the employee to mitigate damages, into inferior employment which the employee need not seek or accept....