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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

DIGESTED CASES CONSTI II – Atty. Joan Largo U.S. vs GOMEZ Facts: In this case, defendant was found guilty by the trial court with the crime of practicing medicine without a license, in violation of Section 8, Act 30 of the Philippine Commission which provides: “The Board of Medical Examiners may refuse to issue any of the following certificates provided for therein to an individual convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving immoral or dishonorable conduct. In case of such refusal, the reason therefore shall be stated to the applicant in writing. The Board may also revoke any such certificate for like cause, or for unprofessional conduct, after due notice to the person holding the certificate, and a hearing, subject to an appeal to the Board of Health for the Philippine Islands, the decision of which shall be final.” Defendant contends that the court erred in declaring the aforementioned provision are no in conflict with the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in which he relies on paragraph 1, section 5 thereof which states: “That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws.” Held: Defendant’s contention is not meritorious because the Board of Medical Examiners where given such a responsibility through the exercise of the State’s police power. The state has general power to enact such laws, in relation to persons, and property within its borders, as may promote public health, public morals, public safety, and the general prosperity and welfare of its inhabitants. This power of the state is generally denominated in its police power. It has been held that the state cannot be deprived of its right to exercise this power. The police power and the right to exercise it constitute the very foundation, or at least one of the cornerstones of the state. For the state to deprive itself or permit it to be deprived of the right to enact laws to promote general prosperity and welfare of its inhabitants, and promote public health, public morals, and public safety, would be to destroy the very purpose and objects of the state. No legislature can bargain away the public health, public safety, or the public morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much less their servants. Governments are organized with a view to preservation of these things. They cannot deprive themselves of the power to provide for them. (Stone vs. Mississippi) In order to enforce the police power of the state, it may, under certain conditions become necessary to deprive its citizens of property and of a right providing for the continuance of property, when the property or the exercise of the right may tend to destroy the public health, the public morals, the public safety, and the

general welfare and prosperity of its inhabitants. (Slaughter House Cases) Upon police power of the state depends the security of social order, the life and health of the citizens, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property. It extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of all persons and the protection of all property within the state. Persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. BINAY vs DOMINGO Facts: The Burial Assistance Program (Resolution No. 60 – assisting those who only earn less than P2,000/month of burial assistance in the amount of P500.00) made by Makati Mayor Jejomar Binay, in the exercise of the police power granted to him by the municipal charter, was referred to the Commission on Audit after the municipal secretary certified the disbursement of four hundred thousand pesos for its implementation was disallowed by said commission of such disbursements because there cannot be seen any perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. of its inhabitants. Hence, this petition revolving around the pivotal issue on whether or not Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. Held: Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, “Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas” (use your property so as not to impair others) and “Salus populi est suprema lex” (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good. AGUSTIN vs EDU Facts: The letter of instruction providing for an early

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

warning device for motor vehicles is being assailed in the case at bar as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process. Petitioner contends that they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public;" 13 are "one‐sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so‐called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." 14 are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of EWD's." Held: Petitioner’s contention is erroneous because the Letter of Instruction was issued in the exercise of the police power which is “nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty.” In the leading case of Calalang v. Williams, Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order for the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.’ This doctrine was later reiterated again in Primicias v. Fugoso which referred police power as ‘the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.’ The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as ‘that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.’ Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What are critical or urgent changes with the time.’ The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.” ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ

Facts: This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a legislative enactment, fundamental and far‐ reaching in significance. The enactment poses questions of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence and national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation may be free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the enactment? Held: It has been said the police power is so far ‐ reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co ‐ extensive with self ‐protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all ‐embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause. Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. THE UNITED STATES vs LUIS TORIBIO Facts: Appellant in the case at bar was charged for the violation of sections 30 & 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle. Evidence sustained in the trial court found that appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality where it was slaughtered. Appellant contends that he applied for a permit to slaughter the animal but was not given one because the carabao was not found to be “unfit for agricultural work” which resulted to appellant to slaughter said carabao in a place other than the municipal slaughterhouse. Appellant then assails the validity of a provision under Act No. 1147 which states that only carabaos unfit for agricultural work can be slaughtered. Held: The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful subject of discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is universally conceded to include everything essential to the public safely, health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. Under this power it has been held that the State may order the destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise endangering the lives of passers‐by; the demolition of such as are in the path of a conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities; the regulation of railways and other means of public conveyance, and of interments in burial

grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to certain localities; the compulsary vaccination of children; the confinement of the insane or those afficted with contagious deceases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards; the suppression of obscene publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling houses and places where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this, however, the State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.) To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the court. From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected. Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt., 140), said (p. 149) that by this "general police power of the State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right in the legislature to do which no question ever was, or, upon acknowledge and general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned." CHURCHILL vs. RAFFERTY Facts: The case arises from the fact that defendant,

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 – 2ND SEMESTER 2010-2011 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

Collector of Internal Revenue, would like to destroy or remove any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be offensive to the sight. The plaintiffs allege otherwise. Was there valid exercise of police power in this case? Held: Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts. "The power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same." "The police power of the State, so far, has not received a full and complete definition. It may be said, however, to be the right of the State, or state functionary, to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which do not ... violate any of the provisions of the organic law." "It [the police power] has for its object the improvement of social and economic conditioned affecting the community at large and collectively with a view to bring about "he greatest good of the greatest number."Courts have consistently and wisely declined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of this power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying social conditions demand correction." "It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare." "It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this police power than to mark its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its exercise." MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village Facts: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government Agency 　tasked with the delivery of basic services

in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village 　Association (BAVA), 　respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be ...