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A. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS ONG CHIA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 127240, March 27, 2000 FACTS: Petitioner was born in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has sta...

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A. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS ONG CHIA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 127240, March 27, 2000 FACTS: Petitioner was born in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law. The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. On appeal, CA reversed the trial court and denied petitioner’s application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance of naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal. Petitioner’s principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant’s brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court’s decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence during the trial, they are mere "scraps of paper” devoid of any evidentiary value ISSUE: Whether or not the rules on evidence applies to a petition for naturalization. HELD: The answer is in the negative. Rule 1, Sec. 4 provides that: “These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.” Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.

CECILIA ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996 FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta, wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin, entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent’s secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin’s passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband. Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. After trial, RTC rendered judgment for private respondent. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner. Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.

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ISSUE: whether or not documents and/or correspondence taken by one spouse without the consent of the owner spouse may be used by former against the latter as evidence in an action for disqualification to practice a profession. HELD: The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT G.R. NO. 150224, May 19, 2004 FACTS: Appellant Yatar was charged and convicted of Rape with Homicide by the trial court. The basis of the conviction rest on circumstantial evidence gathered from the testimony of various witnesses, to: (1) the presence of the accused at the crime scene within the timeframe of the approximate time of death of the victim; (2) at one point prior to the commission accused was seen wearing a white shirt with collar; (3) latter on he was seen wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (4) when the body of the victim was found, a dirty white shirt was seen beside her; (5) the dirty white shirt with collar found at the crime scene was stained by blood; (6) when the blood stain and accused’s blood was subjected to DNA testing, it was found that it contained the same DNA; (7) that when semen found inside the victim’s body was subjected to DNA testing, it was found to be identical to that of accused’s DNA. In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against selfincrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not, taking of accused’s blood sample and subjecting the same to DNA testing is inadmissible in evidence as it amounts to violation of his right against self-incrimination. HELD: Accused’s contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence. It was held in People v. Rondero that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress. Hence, a person may be compelled to submit

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to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde, where immediately after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused. It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.

NENA LAZALITA* TATING vs. FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA, et al.
 G.R. NO. 155208, March 27, 2007 FACTS: On 1969, Daniela sold her property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating. As a consequence, title thereto was transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972 to 1988. Daniela died on July 29, 1988. On 1989, Daniela’s heirs herein respondents found a sworn statement executed by Danila stating that she had actually no intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property. On September 6, 1989, Respondents filed a complaint with the RTC praying for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in her favor, cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Nena, and issuance of a new title and tax declaration in favor of the heirs of Daniela. RTC rendered its judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. CA Affirmed its decision. Petitioner asserts that the sole evidence which persuaded both the RTC and the CA in holding that the subject deed was simulated was the Sworn Statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. However, petitioner argues that said Sworn Statement should have been rejected outright by the lower courts considering that Daniela has long been dead when the document was offered in evidence, thereby denying petitioner the right to cross-examine her. ISSUE: Whether or not a sworn statement/affidavit of a deceased may be given probative value for purposes of deciding a complaint. HELD: In the present case, the main evidence presented by private respondents in proving their allegation that the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the parties thereto is the sworn statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. The trial court admitted the said sworn statement as part of private respondents’ evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also accorded great probative weight to this document. There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on Daniela’s sworn statement for purposes of proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship was created between them. Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their allegation that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she executed the subject deed of sale in favor of

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petitioner. As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defendant. Aside from Daniela’s sworn statement, private respondents failed to present any other documentary evidence to prove their claim. Even the testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that Daniela had a different intention when she entered into a contract of sale with petitioner. In Suntay v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the most protuberant index of simulation is the complete absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in any manner to assert his rights of ownership over the disputed property. In the present case, however, the evidence clearly shows that petitioner declared the property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her name.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODRIGO SALAFRANCA Y BELLO
 G.R. No. 173476, February 22, 2012 FACTS: The established facts show that past midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estao in order to seek help; that his uncle rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told Estao that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention; and that the stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years, who was in the complex at the time. Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged and convicted of murder for the fatal stabbing of Johnny Bolanon. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the CA. The basis of the conviction is the testimony of the victim’s uncle Rodolfo B. Estaño that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told him that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him. ISSUE: Whether or not a statement made to another person by a victim of murder before he died is admissible as evidence. HELD: Yes. An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets the conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death - There is ample authority for the view that the declarant’s belief in the imminence of his death can be shown by the declarant’s own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim. All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to Estaño, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest. Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim. Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

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The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estaño, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.

SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
 G.R. No. 128538, February 28, 2001 FACTS: SCC Chemicals Corporation obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc. (SIHI). Upon failure of SCC to pay, SIHI filed an action for a sum of money. During Pre-Trial, SCC admitted the existence of the loan executed through its officers. SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness was postponed several times due to one reason or another at the instance of either party. The case was calendared several times for hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was finally declared by the trial court to have waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the case was deemed submitted for decision. Trial court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI. The appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment. SCC elevated the case before the SC with the following contentions: (1) that SIHI introduced documentary evidence through the testimony of a witness whose competence was not established and whose personal knowledge of the truthfulness of the facts testified to was not demonstrated in violation of Sections 36, Rule 130; and (2) that due execution and authenticity of private documents evidencing the loan was not proved during trial. ISSUE: (1)  Whether or not a defendant who failed to conduct cross-examination due to its own fault may questioned the admissibility of the evidence for violation of hearsay rule. 
 (2)  Whether or not the due execution of loan documents is necessary when the existence of the loan had already been admitted during pre-trial. 
 HELD: (1)
 Petitioner’s reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value. However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible. The rationale for this exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross- examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay. However, the right to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right. Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other party’s witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus committed by the respondent court when it sustained the trial court’s finding that petitioner had waived its right to cross- examine the opposing party’s witness. It is now too late for petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsa...