Policepower case digests PDF

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Compiled case digests for police power sample cases...

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CASE NAME: Stone v. Mississippi 101 US 814 May 10, 1880 FACTS: In 1867, the provisional state legislature of Mississippi chartered the Mississippi agricultural, educational, and manufacturing aid society. The society was chartered to run a lottery for the next 25 years; however, in 1868, a new constitution ratified by the people outlawed lotteries in the state. John Stone and others associated with the society were arrested in 1874 for running a lottery. The society claimed they were protected by the provisions of their charter while the state declared that the subsequent enforcement legislation had repealed the grant. ISSUE: Did Mississippi violate the contract clause by repealing the society’s grant? HELD: A unanimous court found that the Mississippi classification of lotteries as outlawed acts was valid. The state legislature does not have the power to bind the decisions of the people and future legislatures. The court stated that no legislation had authority to bargain away the public health and morals. The contracts protected in the constitution are property rights, not governmental rights. Therefore, one can only obtain temporary suspension of governmental rights (in this case, the right to outlaw actions) in a charter which can be revoked by the will of the people. CASE NAME: Lao H. Ichong Vs Jaime Hernandez G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957 FACTS: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said the Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprived of their liberty and property without due process of law.

Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those privileges long ago recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men; that it is a gainful and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit and penalize. This arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect assumption and premise, i.e., that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by petitioner, it has been so engaged by him, by the alien in an honest creditable and unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the citizens and without ultimate danger to their economic peace, tranquility and welfare. But the Legislature has found, as we have also found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly abused by the alien, thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic control of the occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency. ISSUE: Whether or not the said Republic Act was unconstitutional by denying all alien residents their right to equal protection and due process? HELD: No, the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary. The petition is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. CASE NAME: White Light Corporation et. al. vs. City of Manila G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009 PONENTE: Tinga, J. FACTS: City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns,

Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila.” The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day. The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business. ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of Police Power of the State. RULING: NO. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as such, it is unconstitutional. The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. The desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution. HELD: The petition is granted. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is declared unconstitutional. No pronouncement as to costs.

CASE NAME: MMDA v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising G.R. No. 179554 December 16, 2009

FACTS: IN 1997, the government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications, entered into a build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT agreement) with Metro Rail Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957 (Build, Operate and Transfer Law), under which MRTC undertook to build MRT3 subject to the condition that MRTC would own MRT2 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which the ownership would transfer to the government. In 1998, respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & promotions, Inc. (Trackworks) entered into a contract for advertising services with MRTC. Trackworks thereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and other advertising media in the different parts of the MRT3. In 2001, however, MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle the billboards, signages and other advertising media pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, whereby MMDA prohibited the posting, installation and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees, parks and open space. After Trackworks refused the request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle the former’s billboards and similar forms of advertisement. ISSUE: Whether MMDA can exercise police power. HELD: No. MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the court had the occasion to rule that MMDA’s powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.

The court also agrees with the CA’s ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks’s billboards, signages and other advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and display of billboards, signages and other advertising media applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private property pursuant to the BLT agreement between the government and MRTC, was not one of the areas as to which the prohibition applied. CASE NAME: Acebedo Optical Company, Inc Vs Court Of Appeals G.R. No. 100152 March 31, 2000 FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the original petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed by the herein petitioner against the City Mayor and City Legal Officer of Iligan and the Samahang Optometrist sa Pilipinas — Iligan Chapter (SOPI, for brevity). On October 17, 1989, petitioner brought a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for restraining order/preliminary injunction against the respondents, City Mayor, City Legal Officer and Samahan ng Optometrists sa Pilipinas-Iligan City Chapter (SOPI), docketed as Civil Case No. 1497 before the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch I. Petitioner alleged that (1) it was denied due process because it was not given an opportunity to present its evidence during the investigation conducted by the City Legal Officer; (2) it was denied equal protection of the laws as the limitations imposed on its business permit were not imposed on similar businesses in Iligan City; (3) the City Mayor had no authority to impose the special conditions on its business permit; and (4) the City Legal Officer had no authority to conduct the investigation as the matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Professional Regulation Commission and the Board of Optometry. On October 3, 1990, instead of taking an appeal, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the questioned Order of Dismissal, branding the same as tainted with grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. On January 24, 1991, the Ninth Division 2 of the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner's motion reconsideration was also denied in the Resolution dated May 15, 1991. ISSUE:...