Challenger Case Study - Grade: A PDF

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Challenger Case Study: The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster

EM 691-851 11/19/17

1. Summary of the case study The space shuttle Challenger, with 6 astronauts and 1 school teacher aboard, exploded in flames on live televisions on January 28, 1986. This case study is about the horrific loss of NASA’s Challenger space shuttle and its crew in mission 51-L. This case study examines and explains the events that led up to the incident as well as discusses the findings and reasons for it. The case study also explains the commission’s recommendations based on their findings. The space shuttle concept was originated sometime in the 1960 around the Apollo lunar landing project. NASA’s idea and goal was to have a reusable space launch system that could frequently and economically travel to space. Due to trimmed funding and budget cuts, NASA focused on a reusable space shuttle system. There were many types of designs and concepts for the reusable space shuttle but the key was to lower the budget cost of the whole project. So, after examining many designs NASA finally selected the three-element space shuttle system composed of the orbiter, an expendable external fuel tank with liquid propellant for the orbiter’s engine, and two recoverable solid rocket boosters. It is worth to mention here that the recoverable solid rocket boosters won over the liquid rocket booster due to potentially lower operation costs, this was a new system that was not previously used. In August 1972, Rockwell International Corporation was awarded a contract for the design and development of the space shuttle orbiter. Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace was assigned the design and development of the external tank. Morton Thiokol Corporation was awarded the contract for the solid rocket boosters system. The control and project management was divided as follows: “NASA divided managerial responsibility for the program among three of its field centers. Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas, was assigned management of the orbiter. Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama, was made responsible for the orbiter’s main engines, the external tank, and the solid rocket boosters. Kennedy Space Center, Merritt Island, Florida, was given the job of assembling the space shuttle components, checking them out, and conducting launches. Because these three centers will be mentioned repeatedly in this report, they will hereafter be identified simply as Johnson, Marshall, and Kennedy.” (Francis M. Webster)

Due to budget management difficulties and the major engineering problems the planned five orbiter fleet was reduced to four in the 1970s. As you can imagen NASA was building first of its kinds reusable space shuttle system therefore the cost of engineering and delay of the schedule were normal as NASA was working and struggling with the unknown. The initial orbital test flights were delayed by more than two years. The Enterprise was the first space shuttle to be tested for flight control and aerodynamics. The Enterprise was carried by a specially designed aircraft to a specific altitude and then released so it could glide back down to earth. Many more testes and flights were performed from 1977 to 1980 with successful results. 1|Page

By 1981 the reusable space shuttle system was ready for the first orbital flight. Four orbital test flights using the Columbia space shuttle were successfully performed with 95 percent of the objectives accomplished. In the mid 1982 NASA declared the space shuttle “operational” and begun the “operational phase” of the space shuttle program. Including all the initial orbital test flights, the space shuttle flew twenty-four times each time carrying out a successful mission over a 57-month period. The Columbia shuttle made seven trips, Discovery made six, Atlantis two and the Challenger flew the most with nine prior to the disaster. The orbiter resembles a mid-size airline aircraft with 3 main parts. The forward fuselage is where the pressurized crew compartment is. The mid fuselage is where the payload bay is located. The payload bay is designed to carry 24 tons and the bay is 15 feet wide by 60 feet long. The aft fuselage is where the three main engines are located along with the vertical tail. The three engines fire for about the first 8 and a half minutes after liftoff and the fuel for the engines is carried inside the external tank. On re-entry back to earth the orbiter needs to withstand temperatures of 600 to 2750 degrees Fahrenheit. This protection is done using silicon carbide and ceramic tiles. The external tank holds the fuel (liquid hydrogen) and the oxidizer (liquid oxygen) for the orbiter’s main engines. The tank can hold 383 thousand gallons of liquid hydrogen at -423 degree Fahrenheit and 143 thousand gallons of liquid oxygen at -297 degree Fahrenheit. Together the total weight of the propellants is around 790 tons. The tank in made from welded aluminum cylinders. It is 154 feet long and 27.5 feet in diameter. This external tank is the only main component of the space shuttle that is not recovered and reused. The two solid rocket boosters provide about 80 percent of the total thrust at liftoff and the rest comes from the orbiter’s three main engines. The solid rockets are made from 11 sections about 12 feet in diameter and total length is 116 feet long. They attach on each side of the external tank. About two minutes into the flight and 24 miles above sea level the solid rocket’s fuel is used up. The two solid rockets separate from the external tank by controlled explosives and the boosters fly down back to earth by the means of a parachute and are reused on future flights. A typical shuttle mission lasts about seven days in orbit. Once in orbit the mission objectives are carried out. They can include experiments, satellite deployment or retrieval and others. The shuttle makes one revolution around Earth about every ninety minutes. When it comes out of orbit to begin the descent back to Earth the shuttle is traveling around 17 thousand miles per hour. Upon re-entry the orbiter can reach temperatures up to 2750 degrees Fahrenheit. The shuttle finally lands on the runway very similar to an aircraft. The preparations for the Challenger flight (51-L) that ended in disaster were not unusual, although the schedule was delayed but that was expected due to the complexity of the project. The Challenger flight was originally scheduled for July 1985 but then finally rescheduled for late January 1986. The Challenger schedule was continuously under stress as NASA had already 2|Page

plans and schedule in place for the next shuttle flight (61-C). The Challenger schedule was tight but all the necessary preflight processes were completed and nothing was omitted. The Challenger flight was postponed 3 times, two of which had to do with the schedule conflicts of the next mission and one delay was due to the cold weather and high winds. Finally, the flight was set for January 28, 1986. The weather that day was clear but very cold with temperatures in the low twenties. The engineers assessed the possible effect of the cold temperature on the launch but no critical issues were identified. Due to the cold, there was some ice buildup on the launch pad, the ice team completed three total ice inspections and added extra time for the ice to melt before the launch. The final flight of Challenger began at 11:38:00:010 AM Easter Standard Time on January 28, 1986. Some 73 seconds into the flight the devastating incident had happened, there was no indication or any problems until the actual catastrophic disaster. The President of the United Stated of America at that time Ronald Regan established a commission of distinguished Americans to investigate the accident of the Space Shuttle Challenger. After a long and detailed process that I will touch on in the rest of this paper the consensus of the commission was that a loss of the space shuttle was caused by a failure in the joint between two lower segments of the right solid rocket motor. The commission reviewed all available data, reports, records, experiments and other supporting documents to come to that conclusion. The specific breakdown was the destruction of the o-ring that are intended to prevent hot gases from leaking through the joints during liftoff. The commission indicated that no other element of the space shuttle was the cause the disaster. It is wort to mention that the commission also showed that organizational communication, structure, culture, management and ethics were to blame for using the faulty designed joint o-ring that led to the disaster.

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2. Contribution (C). What is the value/contribution of the paper – Contribution? The contributions of this case study are very important to project management, estimating management, organizational communication and ethics. Due to the intense public interest in the Challenger disaster, this case study has been fully publicized and examined. While the direct cause of the Challenger explosion was due to a technical fail of the joint between two lower segments of the right solid rocket motor, a faulty o-ring. The commission also showed that organizational communication, structure, culture, management and ethics were to blame. Below are listed the commission’s findings regarding the cause of the space shuttle accident. 1. The commission concluded that there was a serious flaw in the decisionmaking process leading up to the launch of flight 51-L. A well-structured and managed system emphasizing safety would have flagged the rising doubts about the solid rocket booster joint seal. Had these matters been clearly stated and emphasized in the flight readiness process in terms reflecting the views of most of the Thiokol engineers and at least some of the Marshall engineers, it seems likely that the launch of 51-L might not have occurred when it did. 2. The waiving of launch constraints appears to have been at the expense of flight safety. There was no system which made it imperative that launch constraints and waivers of launch constraints be considered by all levels of management. 3. The commission is troubled by what appears to be a propensity of management at Marshall to contain potentially serious problems and to attempt to resolve them internally rather than communicate them forward. This tendency is altogether at odds with the need for Marshall to function as part of a system working toward successful flight missions, interfacing and communicating with the other parts of the system that work to the same end. 4. The commission concluded that the Thiokol management reversed its position and recommended the launch of 51-L at the urging of Marshall and contrary to the views of its engineers in order to accommodate a major customer

This accident received world attention and refocused the worlds view on organizational communication, structure, culture, management and ethics. The commission’s findings and recommendations were not only reviewed and accepted by NASA but by other important companies and organizations. This unfortunate disaster has helped to reshape our view on safety, pride, human life and project management. The recommendation of the commission after the extensive and thorough investigation help to shape the NASA of today. The recommendations can be treated as a guide for organizational communication, structure, culture, safety, management and ethics. Below listed are the recommendations of the commission in bullet point format. 4|Page

I. Design II. Shuttle Management Structure III. Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis IV. Safety Organization V. Improved Communications VI. Landing Safety VII. Launch Abort and Crew Escape VIII. Flight Rate IX. Maintenance Safeguards

It is unfortunate that such a terrible disaster and the loss of 7 lives had to occur for great contributions to happen regarding safety and management organization in NASA. The Challenger case study has been examined and studied many times over. A lot of great improvements have happened in the aerospace industry due to the examination of the Challenger space shuttle disaster, it is just unfortunate that is had to come at the cost of human life.

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3. Course integration (CI) concepts: Integrate and discuss course concepts relative to the article (Very Important). This case study integrates many key concepts of our course. As stated previously the commission showed that organizational communication, structure, culture, management and ethics were to blame for using the faulty designed joint o-ring that led to the disaster. Let’s focus on few of the key concepts. Cost estimating was used throughout the whole space shuttle design and the cost saving process that played part of the cause of the disaster was the choice of selecting the solid booster system as compared to the liquid booster system. Cost saving is very important and necessary but it must not come at the expense of the project or human life. One of the commission’s recommendations was to redesign the o-ring on the booster system. They also stated that no design option should be omitted because of cost. Schedule estimating is another key concept that relates to our course. Scheduling for the space shuttle is massive and complex. Schedule planning was also part of the cause of the space shuttle disaster. At one point NASA had proposed 714 flights between 1978 and the 1990. The schedule for the Challenger flight was delayed many months but at the same time is was pressured forward by the next space shuttle lunch. There was also a lot of pressure from the outside, as NASA was the face of America with the can-do attitude. One of the commission’s recommendations was to establish a safe flight rate that is consistent with its resources. Value Engineering a key concept of our course was also part of the case study and the space shuttle disaster. NASA has used value engineering in the design of the reusable space shuttle system. As mentioned in my summary above, 2 of the 3 main space shuttle systems were reusable, this is a good example of value engineering and cost saving. The commission’s recommendations that relate to value engineering were to improve the landing safety and overall design. Contracts, organizational communication, structure and management between the contractors and NASA were part to blame for the space shuttle accident. As stated in the case study if the concerns of the o-ring by the Thiokol engineers and some of the Marshall engineers were escalated to their proper levels the space shuttle disaster could have maybe been avoided. Part of this lack of communication is blamed by the way the contractors were organized and structured, a better written contact with direct structure and management procedures would have escalated the o-ring issue to its proper level. The commission recommended that all crucial and hazardous components to be analyzed/reviewed and improved. Product life cycle a part of our course, had some impact on the space shuttle accident. The product life cycle of the space shuttle and the o-ring were not considered when making decision on launching the space shuttle. The space shuttle’s product life cycle as stated in the case study was too short and the shuttle flew too many times and too often. As for the o-ring’s product life

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cycle the item was used too many time as a Critical 1 issue. The commission recommended that NASA should review all Critically 1, 1R, 2 and 2R items. Productivity of the space shuttle project was very important and it is also part of our key course concept. Productivity is straightened by strong organizational communication and a good management structure. This did not happen leading to the Challenger disaster, the case study points out limited safety staff, loss of checks and balances and an overworked workforce. All of this leads to lower productivity that had some impact on the accident. One recommendation of the commission was to improve the shuttle management structure therefore improving the productivity of the whole project. Project selection and budget allocation yet another key course concept was a major factor in the space shuttle accident. As mentioned in the case study NASA was too ambitious with the project selection and focused on quantity over quality. The budget allocation was based on the number of flights. Not enough of money, time and resources were placed on the safety of the crew and the space shuttle. The commission recommended that the safety organization be reviewed and redesigned. Project control communication another key course concept was also to blame for the space shuttle accident. The lack of communication between the Thiokol engineers and the Marshall management led to the oversight of the o-ring problem do to the cold weather. If the organizational communication, structure, culture, management and ethics were in place then the project control would be greater therefore key communication elements would not be lost. The commission recommended to improve communication and therefore improve project control.

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4. Critique (CA): critique analysis I have enjoyed this assignment very much, I am a huge fan of NASA. Reading this case study was not only educational but also entertaining. I wish that the Challenger disaster never happened as we should never loose lives for the gain of knowledge. Ever since I was a kid I was fascinated with space travel and being an astronaut. This case study, brought back the kid in me. I think the reason for the Challenger space shuttle disaster was 3-fold; lack of safety concerns, communication/management issues and NASA’s can-do attitude. The lack of safety for the personal and the space shuttle was very evident from reading the case study. The casual use of Criticality 1 category parts on a space shuttle by issuing wavers is something that I feel is unacceptable. The failure of Criticality 1 parts means that loss of life or vehicle will occur. NASA should have used the least possible number of the Criticality 1 category parts and continually try to improve or redesign the parts. The schedule for the Challenger space shuttle was too condensed and there were too many other space flights scheduled too often. I feel that the NASA staff and all the contractors were overworked and bypassed some steps in order to fulfill the busy schedule. I also feel that NASA became too confident with the space flights, as their confidence grew they moved from a quality system to a quantity system. The communication and management issue was apparent from reading the case study. Due to NASA’s success, long work relationship with contractors and the lack of staff the communication and management process suffered tremendously. Issues and incidents that were very important to the safety of the flight were missed or omitted by the system. If the proper management system was in place and all issues and concerns were acted upon as they should have, the Challenger disaster would have been avoided. First off, the flight should have never taken place due to the cold temperatures and the ice formation on the launch pad. Second, the flight should have never taken place if the management personal would have escalated the engineering issues of the o-ring to its proper level. The NASA personal were asked to take off their engineering hats and put on their management hats in regards to the o-ring issue. The NASA ca-do attitude and the outside pressure (world perspective) of the space shuttle system moved the program from a development process to an operational one. From my understanding of the case study it seems that the NASA program became too standard. Everything was going well so NASA continued to output more while inputting less therefore omitting safety. Space travel is complicated and dangerous, but I think that it became normal as success grew and this was the beginning of loosing of the strict requirements. NASA’s attitude was sure we can do it, we did it before. I think that the can-do approach overshadowed the safety protocol and that was part of the downfall.

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5. Lessons Learned (LL): There are many lessons learned that we can take away from this cas...