Chapter 2 - Constancy and Flux PDF

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Constancy and Flux Oppositions: -

Sameness Constancy (stability) Persistence (endurance)

Difference Change (flux) Creation and destruction

Saw these pairs of notion as opposites of one another. Theseus’ Ship: -

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Theseus leaves port on day 1, takes cargo hold full of lumber to a different destination. Each day he has to repair his ship with the same amount of wood from the cargo. Is the ship in which Theseus arrives at his destination the same ship that departed in? Ex. Does the ship on Day (1) = the ship on day (n)? No more cargo and the ship are made out of entirely new wood. Same ship? No: he does not arrive on the same ship he departed in. o Rationale 1: a ship is a material object consisting of nothing but the matter from which it is made; so, if none of the matter is the same then the ship is not the same. o Rationale 2: nothing can change in any way without becoming different than it was; but same and different are opposites; so, nothing can become different and still be the same. Yes: Theseus arrives on the same ship he departed in. o Rationale (1): some changes an object undergoes are so insignificant that they not prevent it from being the same object after it changes: make the daily changes that small or insignificant. o 2; then the ship on day 1 = ship on day 2 The ship on day (n-1) = the ship on day(n) o Identity is transitive, ex. If a=b and b=c, then a=c

Two Views of Change and Sameness -

Compatibility Thesis: they can be reconciled: some changes in an object can be so insignificant that they do not prevent it from being the same object after it has undergone such changes. Incompatibility Thesis: they can’t be reconciled: if an object changes, then it doesn’t remain the same; and if it doesn’t remain the same, then it is a different object.

Subscribing to the Incompatibility Thesis -

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Early materialists: the flux o Thales – p. 27 o Heraclitus – p. 27-30 o Only matter (earth, air, fire and water) and what is composed of matter, exists. Early idealists: constancy o Pythagoras

o o o

Parmenides Zeno Reality is an ideal version of what we encounter in our experience

Materialism: the four elements -

Thales (first ever recorded philosopher and scientist) thought water was the most fundamental element, as the other crucial elements depended on water, i.e fire, earth and air all need water. Heraclitus thought fire was the most fundamental element, as the other crucial elements revolved around fire. P. 28

Philosophers of Nature -

There is a single, unified explanation of everything The explanation does not rely on the supernatural The explanation can be grasped by the human intellect

Creation and Destruction: (How “new” is the sun every day?) -

Heraclitus: “Fire lives in the depth of earth and air lives in the depth of fire, water lives in the death of air, earth that of water” Destruction: something ceases to exist Creation: something comes into existence So, he says there is a different sun every day All “change” is really destruction and creation – nothing persists through change Change (Common sense): when something undergoes a change, it exists before the change and it (the same thing) also exists after the change – that is, things persist through change.

The Idealists: Constancy -

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Pythagoras o Numbers and geometric figures are the only things that are real o But number, figures and the relationships between them are permanent and unchanging o So, what is real is permanent and unchanging, ex. 2+2 will always be 4 Parmenides o If we speak or think about ‘what is not’, then we are speaking (or thinking) about nothing. P. 31-32 o If we are speaking or thinking about nothing, then we are not speaking or thinking. o So, we cannot speak or think about what is not. o Compare: “I desire nothing” means “I have no desire” o “I am thinking about nothing” means “I am not thinking” o It is and always has been, or it has never been

An Argument from a Follower of Parmenides The impossibility of change: -

Change requires that something become what it is not

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But nothing can be what it is not So, nothing can change. Zeno: the impossibility of motion p. 33-34 o Argument for this is that you can measure motion now.

Two Metaphysical traditions Materialism

Idealism

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- sameness is real, change is illusory - nothing can be destroyed or created - reality is known by reason

Change is real; sameness is illusory Change is creation and destruction Reality is known by experience

Both agreed: nothing can change in any way and still remain the same. I-T from before. Reconciliations Subscribing to the compatibility thesis -

New materialists: Democritus New idealists: Plato Aristotle – recovers some of the aspects of our common-sense view of change.

New Materialists: The atomists -

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Democritus o Atomism: all matter consists of simple, indivisible parts which themselves have no parts. o All change consists of rearrangements and re-combinations of the indivisible parts. o Non-being (the void) is real Change and sameness are reconciled: both are real.

Plato -

The one and many – p. 36

The Many -

The many particular things of the same kind ‘Sensible things’ In flux Imperfect images of realities

The one -one “Form” for each kind of thing - ‘intelligible things’ - constant, unchanging - the highest grade of reality

Plato’s theory - Synthesis of: -

Criticisms of the views of his predecessors (Heraclitus, Parmenides, etc.) Accepting some of their views and Taking seriously Socrates’ requirements for proper definitions

Plato: The Errors of Earlier Philosophers

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Objection to Heraclitus: If nothing is the same from moment to moment, we cannot attach names to things and speak about them (not even long enough to say “it is not the same”). We need some degree of stability to have good language and thought at all. Objection to Parmenides: If we cannot speak or think about ‘What is Not’, we cannot say false things or have false thoughts. We need some sense of reality and Being.

Socrates’ Questions: -

What is the nature (essence)of X? Any adequate answer must tell us: o What is the one thing the many (particular) Xs have in common, o That makes them all Xs, and o That can serve as a standard by which to judge in particular cases.

*Review Aristotle and Plato’s positions on sameness and change* Socrates > Plato > Aristotle...