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Steven Castellano A Critical Review Essay Main Themes- According to Baldwin, many theorists define anarchy as the absence of government; but, this definition requires government to be defined. Many government activities have international counterparts, suggesting that such conceptions of anarchy are...

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Steven Castellano A Critical Review Essay Main ThemesAccording to Baldwin, many theorists define anarchy as the absence of government; but, this definition requires government to be defined. Many government activities have international counterparts, suggesting that such conceptions of anarchy are based on a governmental characteristic distinctively absent at the international level. (p. 14) The idea that power gains is a zero-sum game is common in international relations literature concerning capability gains, but is easy to refute. (p. 18) A concept of power that allows for variations in scope, weight, and/or domain makes it possible and plausible for an increase in power by both actors to be an increase in the ability of each to destroy each other. (p. 19) According to Mearsheimer, liberal institutionalism considers when both states cheat in joint ventures it creates the worst possible outcome. (p. 343) Institutions are a means to prevent cheating (p. 344) by allowing would be victims the information to detect cheating early and protect themselves. They also reduce transaction costs of individual agreements making cooperation more profitable. It is generally thought that liberal institutionalism is less useful in security issues because fear of cheating is greater when military issues are at stake. (p. 345) This theory also ignores concerns about relative gains being an obstacle to cooperation. (p. 346) Collective security does not explain how states will overcome their fears and learn to trust one another. It has a set of demanding requirements that are likely to thwart efforts to confront an aggressor. (p. 360) Such impediments include, among others, that aggression is not always wrong. (p. 361) Critical theory aims to radically shift the thinking and discourse about world politics away from realism to something more in line with collective security. The discourse will bring about a change from realism to their ideas concerning world politics. (p. 370) Critical

theory fails to answer what determines why some ideas become dominant and others do not. (p. 374) It also fails to guarantee that a discourse replacing realism will be the one they advocate rather than one more violent than realism. (p. 376) According to Keohane and Martin, institutionalist theory should be highly applicable to security issues because its argument is centered on the role of information. (p. 388) When distributional issues are significant, relative gains are important. (p. 389) If realist relative gains logic is correct, the information provided by institutions can include distribution of gains which could encourage increased cooperation. (p. 390) Realist theory maintains that states act rationally when constructing institutions but do not affect patterns of cooperation. They must mean that institutions have an effect other than that assumed by liberal institutionalists since, if they were correct, it does not account for states devoting resources to these structures. (p. 392-3) According to Caporaso, the concept of domestification of the international system is the process of diminishing anarchy within world politics. This concept suggests a continuum ranging from the most anarchic to a world government and world society. Historically, international systems have always had some degree of rule and common understanding. The concept brings up what it means to be a domestic polity rather than the international system where states are freer of centralized rule. Laws and legislation are the most formal of hierarchies of norms and is better developed within domestic polities than among them. (p. 579) Constitutionazition [a form of domestification] is the structural merger of constitutions of a group of states. This is found primarily in Western Europe. An international state will eventually emerge and will be limited in such areas as taxing and spending but will be a state in political and legal terms. (p. 580)

Critical EvaluationCaporaso brings up the concept of states being freer in world politics than in domestic polities. (p. 579) Baldwin discusses that many theorists define anarchy as the absence of government at the international level but he goes on to argue that many governmental functions have international counterparts. (p. 14) Baldwin’s argument further leads me to believe that international systems should not be defined as anarchic, an all or nothing view. It should be defined by levels of government, regulations, and constraints present within that system. It should be placed on a continuum from entirely anarchic to entirely hierarchic being able move from time to time. Some states in the world even have less domestic governance than international governance. This may be limited to failed states, but challenges the dichotomy of domestic societies being only hierarchical and international systems as entirely anarchic. Mearsheimer tries to expose some weaknesses in collective security by citing that aggression is not always wrong and may prevent states from defending against them. He points to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia against Pol Pot. (p. 360-1) I see the situation as becoming a strength for collective security if such agreements are designed to protect the peoples within states and not just the governments. In such a scenario, collective security would mean aiding Vietnam, and not Cambodia. Keohane and Martin claim that realists believe that institutions do not affect patterns of cooperation. However, since resources are devoted to these structures, realist must mean that they have an effect other than that argued by liberal institutionalists. (p. 392-3) This effect could be that stronger powers maintain or increase their power with institutions. This explanation would make the stronger powers rational and they would surely offer incentives to the lesser powers with institutions making the lesser powers rational too....