Glannon Civil Procedure Outline 4 PDF

Preview

Summary

Civil Procedure Glannon Outline...

Description

Glannon Guide Outline I.

Diversity Jurisdiction: The Basic Rules A. State citizenship in diversity cases: The domicile test 1. Practice Question with Answer 1. Marla is domiciled in Colorado, because she resides there with the intent to remain indefinitely. Domiciled is determined when a person resides in the state and has the intent to remain there indefinitely. Here, Marla was domiciled in Colorado because she currently resides in the state and because she intends to remain there indefinitely when she states “she figured she’s stay if she liked it, and get a job as stylist afterwards, in Denver or elsewhere.” Or she would “leave the program if she didn’t like it and look for work, in Denver.” She intends to remain in Colorado at the time—establishing her domicile in Colorado. It is irrelevant if she changes her mind later. B. The difference between intent and evidence: proof of domicile 2. Practice Question 1. The court will probably conclude that Rossi is domiciled in Pennsylvania, since she intends to return to Pennsylvania when she finishes her degree. The test is whether she resides in the state and whether she intends to remain there indefinitely. Here, Rossi had previously been domiciled in Pennsylvania, so she meets that prong of the test for residence. Second, she intends to remain in Pennsylvania, not in Idaho, because she wants to return to be with her spouse after finishing her degree. She never had the intention to remain in Idaho—she states that she was there to finish her degree and then return to Pennsylvania.

C. Chief Justice Marshall’s Strawbridge Rule: The requirement of complete diversity 3. Practice Questions 1. If Madison, from Virginia, sues Adams Corporation, incorporated in Delaware with its principle place of business in Virginia, there would be no diversity jurisdiction. Under 1332(c)(1) the corporation is “domiciled” in the state of incorporation and the state where it has its principle place of business. The corporation’s principle place of business is in Virginia and Madison is domiciled in Virginia. They are not diverse parties to the cause of the action; thus, the federal lacks diversity jurisdiction to hear this case. 2. There is jurisdiction over the case. Under 1332(c)(1) a corporation is “domiciled” in the state of incorporation and in the state where it has its principle place of business. Here, Brainard is incorporated in California, and has its principle place of business in Idaho, and the corporation’s co-defendant is from Idaho. The plaintiff, O, is domiciled in Oregon because he resides there and does not intend to leave. It is irrelevant whether he works in Idaho, since that is not the test. It is also irrelevant whether the corporation has a large sale’s 1

office in Oregon because that office is neither the corporation’s principle place of business nor the state of incorporation. It is also irrelevant where the president of the corporation is from because 1332 does not make it a part of the analysis. Since there is no same P on the other side of the “v” the federal court has diversity jurisdiction. D. Determining a corporation’s principle place of business 4. Practice Question 1. The court will find that there is diversity jurisdiction because under 1332(c)(1) a corporation is domiciled in its state of incorporation and in the state where its principle place of business is. Under Hertz, the principle place of business is where the “nerve center” of the corporation is a.k.a the headquarters where the corporate officers directs corporate operations. Here, Angus and Philips (Ps) are domiciled in Texas and the corporation is incorporated in Delaware and has its principle place of business in Oklahoma because that is where its corporate headquarters is. E. Diversity in cases involving foreign citizens 5. Practice Questions 1. There is no jurisdiction if Gompers remains in the case, but the action could proceed between the Ps Crandall and Rizzouti and Ds Touissaint and Janssen. Under 1332(a)(1), the federal courts have diversity jurisdiction over suits between citizens of different states, which are Crandall, from Missouri, and Rizzouti, from Iowa, versus Janssen, from Vermont. There would be jurisdiction over Touissaint because under 1332(a)(3) the federal district courts has jurisdiction over cases between citizen of different states and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties. Touissaint is a foreign national. However, including Gompers in the litigation destroys complete diversity because Gompers is domiciled in the U.K., despite him being a U.S. citizen. 1332 requires both citizenship in the U.S. and that the citizen be domiciled in the states. F. The relation between statutory diversity jurisdiction and the constitutional grant 6. Practice Question 1. Smith’s bill would be constitutional, because the scope of diversity jurisdiction in Art. III includes minimal diversity cases. Congress has the authority to broaden or to shrink diversity jurisdiction so long as it does not go beyond the scope of power proscribed by Art. III. Congress has the power to create the federal courts and to determine the cases it can hear—it does not directly bestow this power to the federal district courts. That power belongs to Congress. G. The amount-in-controversy requirement 7. Practice Questions

2

1. A diversity case cannot be heard in federal court unless the amount in controversy is at least 75,000.01, exclusive of interest and costs because that is what 1332(a) says. 2. To determine whether the amount in controversy requirement is met, the court will have to determine whether a reasonable jury could award more than 75k for the injuries Wanda alleges. The standard does not ask the court to evaluate the seriousness of the injury—but to weigh in what the fact finder would find if the injury alleged to have been committed by the D would supersede the 75k. H. Aggregation of damages in Diversity Cases 8. Practice Questions 1. Maurice does not meet the amount in controversy against Parker, but does against O’Connell. The amount in controversy cannot be aggregated as to claims brought forth against multiple defendants, but can be aggregated for multiple claims against 1 defendant. Here, Maurice’s 65k claim against Parker does not meet the amount in controversy because it does not exceed 75k and it cannot be aggregated with Maurice’s other two claims against O’Connell. Maurice has one claim against O’Connell for 25k and another for 65k; which can be aggregated. 2. Larry (NY) sues Curly and Moe (Iowa) for injuries he suffered when Curly and Moe’s car collided. He claims that one or the other, or both, were negligent and seeks 100k in damages for his injuries. Under 1332, there are not parties of the same state on both sides of the “v” and the amount the P seeks from one, or both, of the defendants in 100k. II.

Federal Claims and Federal Cases I. The Toughest Nut: The Mottley Rule 1. Practice Questions 1. This motion should be granted, because the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. Under Mottley, the Ps claim must “arise under” the constitution or federal law. Here, CC’s claim is not a wellpleaded complaint because the occurrence for which the company is suing Garce is based on state tort law. The only source invoking federal law is Garce’s counterclaim alleging a 1st amendment violation and a congressional statute. Here, CC did not rely on federal law as the source for a right to relief because the cause of action is a state tort claim, and it was the commission of the tort itself by Garce that resulted in litigation. The fact that Garce can counterclaim with claims for relief based on federal law is irrelevant since it is the P’s complaint that has to rely on federal law as the source for a right to relief. 1. The court considers not what the P claimed, but what the P needed to plead to state a claim for relief—what has to be the in complaint to get their relief. 3

J. What is a Well-pleaded complaint? 2. Practice Question 2. The D’s motion will be granted, since O’s case does not “arise under” federal law, as that phrase is interpreted in 28 U.S.C 1331. The well-pleaded complaint rule requires that the Ps claim have more than an incidental relationship with federal law, but be what the P relies on for their cause of action and to look solely at the Ps complaint. Here, the P claims that the D violated state law for improperly allowing toxic waste to leak into the water and cause the O cancer. The claim relies solely on the state claim since O is suing for the damages caused by the D’s alleged nuisance; not because the D failed to abide by the Federal Toxics Transportation Act. The claim for violating FTC Act did not have to be alleged for O to state his cause of action. K. The relation between constitutional and statutory limits on “arising under” jurisdiction 3. Practice Questions 1. This case “arises under” federal law as that phrase is construed in Art. §1331. Under Mottley, the courts interpret §1331 to mean that for a claim to “arise under” federal law, the Ps complaint must rely on the constitution or acts of congress for a right to relief. Here, the P is suing for breach of k, a state claim, that does not rely on federal law to provide the P with his right to relief. However, under Art. III, §2 the claim only “form an ingredient” of the case in order to be heard, even if provided by the D. The D’s counterclaim alleging that federal law was the reason D could not perform under the K would be sufficient to satisfy the rule. L. Law and facts 4. Practice Questions 1. The federal district court has jurisdiction over the entire action. Under 1331, as interpreted by Mottley, the claim “arises under” federal law because the P’s claim relies on federal law for a right to relief in the action. The P is claiming that D violated the federal statute when it drove with that chemical without proper safety precautions, and for violating the statute for not abiding by the safety requirements of the statute, the P is asking for damages for the pollution caused by the D’s violation of the statute. M. Mongrel Jurisdiction 5. Practice Questions 1. The federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over the first two claims, but not the third claim. Under 1367(a) federal courts have supplemental jurisdiction over a claim so long as the federal court has original jurisdiction over at least one claim, and the claims that arise under state law, arise from the same nucleus of operative facts (under the same underlying facts as the anchor claim). Here, the first claim is proper because it “arises under” § 1331. The second claim is proper under 1367(a) because there arises from the same set of underlying 4

facts as the ADEA claim—the improper discharge of P. The court does not have supplemental jurisdiction over the third claim because it does not arise under the same set of underlying facts as anchor claim—it arose from a separate transaction that had nothing to do with the P’s discharge. III.

Removal Jurisdiction: The Defendant Chooses the Forum N. The basic standard for removal jurisdiction 1. Practice Question 1. The action is not properly removed, because the case does not “arise under” federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §1331. Under 1331, as interpreted by Mottley, the P’s claim must assert a right relying on federal law. Here, the P’s claim does not satisfy the wellpleaded complaint rule because the P did not have to allege a federal patent law claim in order to sue the D for a breach of contract claim. Because the case could not have been originally filed in federal court, it cannot be removed under §1441. O. A logic Limit on removal of diversity cases 2. Practice Question 1. The federal court lacks jurisdiction over the case, under §1441(b)(2). Under 1441(b)(2) in diversity jurisdiction cases, if the plaintiff chooses to sue the defendants in one of the defendant’s home state court, the case cannot be removed. Although it could have been filed originally in federal court, the fact that the P chose to sue the D in his state court for battery while he was trying to arrest the Ds, places the facts under the purview of §1441(b)(2). P. Removal later in litigation 3. Practice Question 1. The motion to remand should be granted, because E did not remove the action within thirty-days after the action was filed. Under §1441(b) (3) a D can remove a case that was not previously removable because the court did not have jurisdiction over the matter at the time of filing. Here, the D had ample opportunity to remove because the parties were diverse at the time of filing. The fact that the P amended the complaint to add a federal claim that brought it under 1331 is irrelevant because at the onset of litigation, 1332 was satisfied because 1) the P was not from the same state as the D, and 2) the amount-in-controversy requirement was met. Q. Making something out of nothing: Removal of exclusive federal jurisdiction cases 4. Practice Questions 1. The federal court should take jurisdiction over the entire case. Under 1441(f) if the state court did not have jurisdiction over the case in the first place, it does not preclude the case from being removed to federal court. Moreover, the federal court has jurisdiction over the entire case 5

because the P’s claim “arises under” a federal law for a right to relief satisfying 1331. Because the federal courts have original jurisdiction under 1331 of one claim, the court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction of other state law claims under 1367 as long as they stem from the same nucleus of operative fact. Here, the contract breach claim satisfies 1367 because it stems from the D’s publication of the P’s book. R. Reverse Removal R. Which federal court? 5. Practice Questions 1. Removal is improper, because it has been removed to the wrong district. Under 1441(a) the case is removed to the same district as the court for which the case was originally pending. 1391 does not apply to the case because that pertains to cases that are originally filed in federal court, not to cases that are removed from state court. T. The effect of removal on objections to personal jurisdiction 6. Practice Questions 1. Boyle’s objection to personal jurisdiction is not waived by removal. The court should dismiss if there is no personal jurisdiction over Boyle in Oregon, even though the case was properly removed. The analysis called for under personal jurisdiction is completely different for that of subject matter jurisdiction—you can have subject matter jurisdiction without being able to meet the Shoe analysis to have personal jurisdiction. 2. Boyle’s motion is invalid, because Boyle responded to the merits in state court, thereby waiving her objection to personal jurisdiction. Removal cannot revive raising the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction since the state court employed a special appearance rule, and state law controls until removal occurs. U. Procedural requirements and motions to remand 7. Practice Questions 1. The motion should be denied because the court has original jurisdiction over the case and I’s objection has been waived. Under 1446(a) a D can remove the case to federal court if the case could have originally been filed in federal court and done so within 30 days. Under 1446(b)(2)(a) the Ds must either consent or join onto the removal. Here, not all Ds consent to the removal. The first D filed the notice of removal on time. However, the second D that filed a notice to remand the case to state court failed to meet the deadline proscribed under 1447(c) stating that the D must do so in 30 days or waive it for situations other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Here, the D did not file the notice until more than 30 days after the deadline. V. The closer: Permutations 6

8. Practice Questions 1. The action is properly removed, because Rasmussen’s case became removable after the motion to amend to add the federal claim was granted. Under 1441(a) for diversity actions, a D may not remove if the P has chosen to bring the suit in the D’s home state. Here, the P, from Ohio, sued the D, incorporated in New York, in the corporation’s principle place of business, Pennsylvania. Thus, the case could not have been removed at the onset of the case. When the P’s motion for leave to amend was granted and a federal claim was alleged, this satisfied 1331, as interpreted by Mottley, because the right to relief sought relies on federal law, not a state claim. Under 1367(a) the contract claim is properly brought into federal court because the contract breach arises from the nucleus of operative fact as the FEDEA claim: the firing was what led to the breach and violation of federal law. IV.

Personal Jurisdiction: Myth and Minimum Contact W. The jurisdictional premise of Pennoyer v. Neff W. In-State contacts as an alternative basis for exercising jurisdiction 1. Practice Questions 1. Under international shoe, Neff’s contacts in Oregon suffice to support personal jurisdiction over Neff in the Oregon action for Mitchell’s fees claim, even if he is not served in Oregon. Shoe broadens where a defendant may be brought into court beyond Pennoyer. Neff had minimum contacts with Oregon because he voluntarily hired the services of an attorney in Oregon and his contacts with Oregon were what led to the cause of action. He purposefully availed himself to the benefits of Oregon by utilizing the services of an Oregon attorney. Y. The nexus requirement: The Myth of miscellaneous contacts 2. Practice Questions 1. Cartwright is not subject to personal jurisdiction in New York, because the claim does not arise out of Cartwright’s New York contacts. The New York court does not have specific, personal jurisdiction because the D’s lawsuit does not arise from his specific contacts from New York, but from an accident he had in Massachusetts with a P from New York. This is not enough to satisfy the minimum contacts test because it needs to arise from the specific contact with the state—purposefully avail to the benefits of the state so as to reasonably foresee being haled into court in that state. Z. The difference between foreseeability and purposeful availment 3. Practice Questions 1. Ace is probably not subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois, because its contacts with Illinois are insufficient to support jurisdiction over it under the minimum contacts test. The D must purposefully avail itself to the benefits of the the forum state so as to reasonably anticipate 7

being haled into court. Here, the D did not have direct contact with Illinois—the D only sold its products to another company that just so happened to do business Illinois. The D intended to sell its products in Minnesota, but there is no evidence that the D intended to sell to anywhere else in the mid-west. Only the third-party company that the D sold the replacement tanks to is the only connection, and that is insufficient to show the Illinois court has personal jurisdiction. 2. The motion will likely be denied, because Boyarin’s contacts will suffice to support jurisdiction over her for this claim. In order for a D to have minimum contacts with the forum state, the D must have purposefully availed itself to the benefits of the state or directed conduct towards the forum state so as the D could have reasonably anticipated being haled into court there. Here, the D purposefully availed itself to Virginia by directly calling the hospital in Virginia to dissuade the hospital from finalizing the contract that affects a Virginia contract and Virginia commerce. The D could have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Virginia because of her actions directed at Virginia. AA. The role of reasonableness in minimum contacts analysis 4. Practice Questions 1. The Wisconsin court will probably not have personal jurisdiction over Lonergan. The court must first establish that the D has minimum contacts with the forum state by finding if the D purposefully availed himself to the benefits or directed his activity toward the forum state, and in doing so, could have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in the forum state. Here, the D did not have any minimum contacts with the forum state because 1) the P...