ICI Video - Pipa Alpha Disaster Notes PDF

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Summary of Pipa Alpha Video, frequently appears in exam....

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ICI Video - Pipa Alpha Disaster  Explosion – killed 167 men  Shortcomings safety Messages for managing safety Six basic requirements for safe operations      

Hazards recognised and understood Fit for purpose equipment Systems and procedures to maintain integrity Competent staf Plan for emergencies Monitor performance – effective auditing process

At Pipa Alpha, there were shortcomings were all of these requirements. What was Piper Alpha and what happened to it?  Very large North Sea oil rig  75 meter cube approximately: Consisted of drilling jerry – mixture of gas, oil  Processing plant separated mixture of gas oil to be exported to pipeline  Living accommodation present on ofshore platform.  Remember, people not working live on premises  Unit is surrounded by water – should there be a fire, only a part time fire fighting crew is present  If there is a major instrument failure and should people need to escape, contact with outside is required. What happened?  Explosion and subsequent fire – in 3 hours the structure was essentially gone Purpose of public inquiring and how it works  Objectives: find the cause of death and make recommendations to ensure that it does not happen again.  Everything evaluated – contractors, steel manufacturers, operators, managers, etc  Enquiry conducts the investigation as it happens (no prior assessment beforehand) Events of disaster and how they happened  Propane heavy air  Spare pump was recommissioned – was supposed to be maintained. Reconnected electrically – and pressure relief valve repair was not finished;  Faults in permit to work system  This was not an isolated problem – it turns out that permit to works were not crossed checked and were simply left on process supervisors desk. Process supervisor did not have any formal training in permit to work system.  Open opening pump, condensate leaked out from were pressure relief valve should have been fitted. Deficient permit to work system and training – 2 people died from initial exploure

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Explosion damaged equipment – specifically structure that contained most of the oil, and fire walls were damaged. However there were no

explosion walls. The fire was burning for longer than the structural integrity of the platform would allow.  Two platforms connected to Pipa Alpha continued to produce despite receiving warnings, and thus they continued to pump oil into Pipa, thus making the situation work.  Two managers has no training for fires eventually communication lines cut Deficient hazard analysis and emergency training    

Gas pipeline through Pipa Alpha operated at 200kPa – upon being heated and burned as a result of the fire, large amount of energy was released. Engineer was asked to perform study of whether standby firefighters should be necessary He found that in the event of a gas fire, nobody would be able to do anything – loss of life would occur AT MEETING WITH SENIOR TEAMS THIS STATEMENT WAS NOT CONSIDERED Deficient hazard management

Majority of workers died of carbon monoxide poisoning (in accommodation block)  Was designed to stand up against fire but not carbon monoxide  Waited and died  No command was given for a helicopter to land and pick up  Only way to escape was to jump into sea and hope to be picked up – no command was made, one person took initiative  Why was no command given – no major emergency training was provided to offshore rig manager Death in accommodation, deficient design, command, training 

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Need to fight fire with what is on hand Fire fighting – deficient emergency system Water to fight fire was seawater Pipework was replaced with non-corrosive material but replacement was not complete

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Somebody was present to perform daily monitoring, but no reports back on permit to work system, and audit 6 months prior did not make any recommendations

All links in the train were weak. Lessons for us in ICI We need to ensure that these events never repeat themselves. Analysis is important for us    

All of these things that went wrong were the responsibility of management – means every single manager. Safety manager must be visibly committed. Safety depends on systems: No systematic assessment of major hazards. No HAZOP. Quality of safety management: It was wrong to have divers in water for 12 hours a day. Safety manager did walk around to check entire platform at 7pm – when operations had stopped.

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High quality of safety auditing

The bottom line of safety Two survivors: one arrived six hours before explosion, first time ever on any platform, hadn’t worked yet – didn’t have any idea where he was Second survivor worked for drilling company...