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International Relations Essay (MT) By Daniel Waldron, Student Number 15324801 In this essay I will address why states, due their egotistic nature of self-preservation, feel inclined to comply with their commitments to avoid any retaliatory action from other governments. This paper aims to examine the various motives behind a state’s compliance with international regimes in the light of the three main theoretical approaches to international relations; Realism, Institutionalism and the State-Society Approach. Each of these theories presents its own unique reasoning as to why states behave the way they do in an international context. This essay will dissect each theory and its role in international politics, helping to ascertain various viewpoints giving us an insight into the actions and reactions that states take. Overall it will primarily focus on why states may succumb to the influence of external pressures when it comes to decision making and how a state’s involvement in international regimes can result in choices being made that are not in line with its own myopic self-interests. As the hegemonic leadership of the world’s superpowers began to wane, non-hegemonic cooperation was facilitated and maintained through International Regimes. Policy coordination within these regimes allows for conformity and cooperation between members, who were not previously in harmony, due to a negotiation process (Keohane, 1984). States are not bound to their commitments within these regimes because its laws and principles are not legally enforceable, instead these regimes more closely resemble conventions in which states conform, not necessarily out of obligation or myopic self-interest but because other states conform as well (Keohane, 1984). This crucial aspect of international regimes allows us to explore state behavior and interactions in a context where states, though not obliged by law to fulfill commitments made, are still under immense pressure and compulsion to do so. Successful regimes create productive linkages between issues through the establishment of rules and principles. These linkages increase the cost of deception and in violating the rules, the consequences can extend beyond just the issue at hand (Keohane 1984). This, as will be examined through the three core theories of international relations, explains why states behave the way they do and why egotistic states may comply with their agreements even if their actions don’t coincide with their own self interests. Realism is the oldest of the three core theories and asserts that the behaviour of states and non-state actors in anarchy is driven by the struggle for power between states. The state has been defined as having “a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 1968) and in the context of international relations, realism states that the top priority of a state is to maintain its sovereignty and security within its own borders and to increase or maintain its power, relative to other states (Grieco, 2001). Realism asserts that states are not concerned with conventional morality and, due to human nature, are constantly competing for power. As Hans Morgenthau once said “States possess a limitless lust for power”. Within a state the organized monopoly of force allows for an environment to be created in which obligations can be fulfilled successfully. In international politics, however, such a monopoly of power does not exist and no such environment is established. International Regimes such as the UN are thus established in the wake of wars establish linkages and encourage peaceful dialogue and interaction. The international regimes are not legally binding but establish rules and principles by which member states are collectively expected to abide by. Realists say that a state’s international behavior has little to do with its internal affairs, it is instead the external balance of power and retaliatory capability of other states that takes precedence. It is therefore understandable that in the eyes of a realist, egotistic governments may be coerced into abiding by their commitments within international regimes as a precaution, in so as avoiding retaliation from other actors. This precaution is not unfounded as international institutions such as WTO contain provisions for retaliation should its rules be violated. A core assumption of realism is that states are never certain about the intentions of other states (Dunne, et al, 2013) and this could offer an explanation as to why states may forego absolute economic gains to cooperate with other states (Grieco, 2001).

In this sense, a state’s involvement in international regimes resembles that of an open-ended Prisoner’s Dilemma where a state’s decision to cooperate may be the rational choice (Keohane, 1984). An ally today may become an enemy tomorrow as states can never be certain whether other states are satisfied with the status quo of positional power (Dunne, et al, 2013). Within this open-ended Prisoner’s Dilemma, the realist approach suggests that a “Tit-for-Tat” retaliatory strategy is more effective in inducing cooperation rather than a strategy of submissiveness. Axelrod emphasizes this point when talking about trench warfare during World War One. He wrote how both the British and German battalions along the front line preferred restraint to engagement but occasional “Tit-for-Tat” shows of strength showed that the restraint shown was not due to the weakness of either actor (Axelrod, 2006). With this realist approach, it is interesting to note the extent to which the retaliatory tendencies and capabilities of other states affects the behavior of the state in question, so much so that even the most rational, self-interested state may find that to comply with its commitments may be more beneficial than acting selfishly in line with its own preferences. Institutionalism offers a theory that places emphasis on different priorities than those of realism. Institutionalism suggests that states may indeed knowingly surrender a degree of sovereignty in the hope of fostering cooperation (Keohane, 1984). The institutionalist theory concedes that there are a lot of issues where states can’t achieve what they want unilaterally, it therefore fosters the idea that states must make bilateral arrangements with one another. Institutionalism suggests that states are more occupied with objectives such as economic growth and reduction in unemployment rather than their national prestige (Grieco, 2001). Through institutions such as the WTO, states are engaged in trade rounds in which all participants are engaged in comprehensive agreements involving trade issues. In these negotiations, states decide upon trade barriers such as the US negotiating terms and barriers involving the placement of tariffs on US steel importing (Deveraux, 2001). However, in accordance to WTO rules, states cannot be selective about which barriers apply to which states. A multi-lateralization of conditions must take. Consequently, if the US raises its trade barriers to protect its domestic steel industry from cheaper Asian steel, it must also raise barriers to the importing South American Steel (Deveraux, 2001). As is evident in this case, it may not be beneficial for the US to act in line with its own self-interests as the cost of the expected retaliation, in line with the trade rules and principles, would outweigh the benefits gained from pursuing its own myopic self-interests. Institutionalism is also concerned with a state’s reputation in an international sphere and, by extension, its ability to enter in to future agreements. With the existence of linkages among various issues in different international regimes, should a state choose to not comply with their commitments, the expected retaliation may not be limited to one instance but have a negative knock-on effect across many different issues. This has led to the concept of Rational Egoism in which governments make and keep agreements, even when they turn out badly (Keohane, 1984). It is interesting to note how this approach shows that individual governments, content on entering in to international institutions, may seek to avoid breaking established rules and principles for their own benefit as the “collective bad” outweighs the individual gain (Keohane, 1984). The State-Society Approach to international politics, unlike the previous two theories, is primarily focused on the dominant non-state factions within the country that affect its decision making. This theory asserts that powerful lobbying groups within states have a consequential effect on the decision making of that state, an assertion that doesn’t get a proper reflection in the theory of realism. In the context of international politics Gourevitch (1977) noted that the interests of economic groups determine tariff levels and that they are capable of “translating calculations of economic benefit into public policy”. This much was evident in the US with the agreement of NAFTA, one interest group beating the other in terms of votes to establish the trade deal. The nature of state institutions, alongside societal interests is a core factor in how states act internationally and both these factors are influenced hugely by small interest groups (Moravcsik, 1997). Such a theory raises questions over the sovereignty of nations and just how much influence these powerful groups have over a state’s decision making. With this approach in mind, it would be at the mercy of the core lobbying groups as to whether the state abides by its commitments. If the subsequent retaliation of other states had an immediate negative effect on these factions, they may push for the state to abide by its commitments. In conclusion, we have seen through the distinctive viewpoints of each individual theory on international politics, how states may opt to abide by its commitments within regimes and forego acting on self-interests as an opportunity cost. By doing so, states are still proving to be rational entities as their actions are helping to avoid retaliation by other players which could have proven extremely costly. To reiterate states, as selfpreserving rationalists, will act in such a way that the benefits of taking an action will outweigh the costs of taking an alternative action.

Bibliography

Axelrod, Robert M. The evolution of cooperation. Basic books, 2006

Devereaux, C. (2001) “Standing up for Steel: The US Government Response to Steel Industry and Union Efforts to Win Protection from Imports (1998-2001)”. Case Studies in US Trade Negotiation: Vol. 2: Resolving Disputes

Dunne, T., Kurki, M., Smith, S. (2013) eds., International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 71-88

Gourevitch, P.A. (1997) “International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873-1896” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 8, No. 2. (Autumn, 1977), pp. 281-313 http://www.jstor.org/stable/202790 Grieco, J.M. (2001) “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation” in International Organization 42:3, pp. 485-507 Keohane, Robert O. After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton University Press, (2005). Moravcsik, A. (1997) "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics", in International Organization, vol. 51, no. 4. (1997), pp. 513-533, 541-547 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2703498

Weber, Max. "Politics as a Vocation." (1968). ....