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Is realism the best theory that we have to explain what happens in international relations?...

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IR Essay 1 Question Two: Is realism the best theory that we have to explain what happens in international relations? Realism as a theory of international relations has a long history and has grown to become very broad indeed. In judging its effectiveness in explaining events in international relations, it is necessary to assess not only how capable realism, as opposed to other theories, is of explaining events, patterns and processes, but also how well it predicts what happens in international relations. This essay argues that the scope and diversity of realist theories, while enabling them to account for most of the actions and interactions of states in the international system, also mean that a monolithic theory of realism, that seeks to explain and encompass the entirety of international relations study, is destined to be incomplete in its explanations and at best imprecise in its predictions. Furthermore, international politics in the modern world appears to defy the basic assumptions of realism, meaning that the theory cannot operate as an overarching explanatory theory of international politics. Rather, realism can operate as a simplified model to examine certain dimensions of international politics, and act in concert with other theories to help us better understand international relations. As a political theory, realism has an enormous scope. It can be argued that realist thought began with Thomas Hobbes, who in “Leviathan” describes the consequences of life in an anarchic state of nature where men are motivated by animal impulses chief among which is the fear of death.[ CITATION Tho98 \l 18441 ] Morgenthau describes realism from a biological point of view, arguing that even if all of men’s needs are fulfilled, human nature still means that they will experience a drive to gain power, which will manifest itself in the anarchic realm of international politics as the pursuit of power through violent conflict. [ CITATION Han48 \l 18441 ] Conversely, structural realists such as Waltz argue that it is the structure of anarchy itself which predicts international conflict through the balance-of-power theory. [ CITATION Ken79 \l 18441 ] This diversity of theories means that an analysis of realism must focus on their commonalities. According to Donnelly, realism emphasizes the constraints on politics imposed by human nature and the absence of international government, where the motivation is power and interest. Thus defined, realism seems able to predict many things about the world. For example, some wars among global superpowers can be understood in the context that each acts in the interest of its own survival. For this reason, the rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union prior to the Second World War was put aside as each faced the threat posed by the Axis powers, after which the rivalry was immediately resumed – in a world with only two superpowers, it is predictable that the only threat to one’s survival is the other. [ CITATION Jac00 \l 18441 ] More broadly, it is possible to interpret almost all the foreign relations of states in a way where they act, in the anarchic international scene, in their own best interests. The variations in realism theory can be seen as offshoots and supplements to one another: Wohlforth argues that, for example, power transition theory is a supplement to hegemonic stability that seeks to explain how war may arise when hegemonic stability predicts cooperation and peace under a single world power. A benefit of this definition of realism is that it structures discussion within the reality of the anarchic international system and the patterns of human nature. In this way, realism is useful in that it can serve as a yardstick for other theories of international relations. While it may not completely preclude theories which do not acknowledge these realities, it is nonetheless useful to analyse other theories, such as institutionalism, in the context of a reaction to realism. Even if these theories disagree with the conclusions or the normative recommendations of different realist theories, they

must either be plausible with anarchy and human nature, or else must propose an adequate response to these constraints. For example, an institutionalist might argue, as Donnelly does, that instead of complete autonomy under anarchy, states in an international system might find themselves constrained by institutions such as international law, conventions and kinship. [ CITATION Jac00 \l 18441 ] Legro and Moravcsik point out that the actions of states must still be subject to the “international distribution of material resources”, such that the effect of institutions such as democracy, culture, international law and economic integration are necessarily limited. Another benefit of this definition of realism is that it allows realists to largely escape the constraining assumptions of human nature postulated by biological realists such as Morgenthau. One may accept that humans need not always experience a drive to gain power - an alternative mechanism is that those with this drive ultimately self-select, ending up in positions of far greater influence over foreign relations than the people who do not, even if the latter are the majority. However, it is impossible to fully ignore the consequences of motivations. Donnelly (2000) argues that in the absence of motivations, it is impossible to make any predictions whatsoever about international politics even given knowledge of the anarchic structure and the power distributions therein. While international relations is certainly subject to structural forces, it cannot be completely determined by them. The actions taken by states are, instead, a product of their motivations subject to these constraints. This poses a large theoretical problem. Self-interest, as a motivation, is broad enough that it entails a tautology: the only result that it predicts is that states will not take any action for the express purpose of self-harm. But when it comes to predicting the precise actions of states – whether or not they will go to war, how they conduct bargaining among themselves – self-interest is useless. Strikingly, offensive realism and defensive realism are competing schools of thought that arise from the same basic constraints of realism – in the state of anarchy, one predicts that states will prefer to go to war to increase their power and influence, while the other predicts that the inherent difficulty and risk in making war will compel states to remain at peace. Thus, the number of cases in which realism is able to make a coherent – to say nothing of accurate – prediction is limited to those cases where all its variants are in unanimous agreement. This necessarily limits the explanatory power of realism. Legro and Moravcsik point out the contrast between the assumptions of state preferences that are made by Morgenthau and Waltz – the former arguing that power is the ultimate goal of states, the latter arguing that power is but a means to the ultimate goal of survival[ CITATION Leg94 \l 18441 ]. They argue that the exact motivations of states are less necessary than the binding assumption that these preferences must be consistent. But in the context of making predictions and explaining phenomena, this is hardly sufficient, especially when different motivations can yield such different results. It is argued by Mearsheimer [ CITATION Joh13 \l 18441 ] that Waltz’s structural realism permits alternative motivations to that of survival – such as nationalism or power – as long as such motivations do not lead the state to take actions that deliberately come into conflict with the survival motive. But it seems that many states, in practice, act in ways which risk their survival for these motives: the initiation of war by Nazi Germany, for example. Across the different conceptualisations of realism, it is impossible to elevate a single motive to primacy in all cases. A deeper understanding of why states have the preferences they do is required. In many cases, such motivations may not be material ones. If such motivations are nonmaterial, realism experiences problems in explaining their existence. Legro and Moravcsik (1994) claim that many realist theories shift their focus from explaining variations in power to variations in perceptions of power – but when such perceptions fail to

correlate with material power, then other factors must be introduced to explain this. This means that realism cannot be theoretically distinctive from other theories which provide other sources of motivations – imposing another limitation on realism’s explanatory as well as predictive power. It is liberalism that provides an explanation for state behaviour that goes beyond purely material considerations, and indeed focuses on international cooperation instead of international conflict. Realism, which predicts international conflict in the anarchic structure in order to secure power, is largely unable to account for cooperation – a prisoner’s dilemma conception of realism, for example, predicts instead that states should renege on such agreements out of fear of their own security. But in fact, international cooperation can and does happen, whether over climate change, or mutually advantageous economic pacts. While bandwagoning is a phenomenon that is predicted by Waltz(1979), it appears that many of the international agreements that take place are fundamentally different from bandwagons: for example, the ASEAN free trade area takes place between Southeast Asian nations, none of which is a regional – not to mention global – power. Liberalism, on the other hand, argues that state interests are directed by the interests of individuals and groups. The further assumption that states are interdependent means that cooperation is not only possible but expected. Ultimately, though, it is fallacious to argue that because liberalism is able to provide an explanation and a prediction for those motives that realism cannot, liberalism becomes the superior theory. Indeed, it seems unwise to argue that the two theories must be in conflict at all. Rather, a more productive approach would be to recognise that while realism is primarily concerned with material objectives in an anarchic structure, liberalism recognises the impact of societal actors and how their demands define state preferences, which are the underlying cause of state behaviour, in a way that is unique to the state. [ CITATION Mor08 \l 18441 ] Empirically, being able to recognise which states are likely primarily coercive and which have preferences that are socially determined will be very useful in making predictions. Furthermore, realism remains useful in studying conflicts where they actually happen, and in analysing dynamics where power is the main dynamic. In today’s world, the frequency of armed conflict and the shifting power dynamics between China, Russia and the USA mean that it remains relevant as a theory of international relations.

References Donnelly, Jack. 2000. Realism and International Relations . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hobbes, Thomas, and J.C.A Gaskin. 1998. Leviathan. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Legro, Jeffrey, Andrew Moravcsik. 1994. "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" International Security 5-55. Mearsheimer, John. 2013. "Neoclassical realism." In International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, by Tim, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith Dunne, 77-93. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Moravcsik, Andrew. 2008. "The New Liberalism ." In The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, by Christian and Duncan Snidal Reus-Smit. Oxford: OUP. Morgenthau, Hans. 1948. Politics Among Nations. New York: Knopf . Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: Random ....