Kirksey v Kirksey PDF

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Professor Klass Contracts Case Brief...

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Isaac Kirksey v. Angelico Kirksey Supreme Court of Alabama, 1845

Summary: A widow (our plaintiff, Antillica) and her children were leasing and residing on an area of public land in Talladega county, Alabama. She received a letter from the brother of deceased husband saying, “Hey, I know you’re going through a hard time... ‘If you will come down and see me, I will let you have a place to raise your family.’” Within a month or so of receiving this letter, Antillica moved herself and her family to her brother-in-law’s residence, where he put them in a comfortable home. Two years later he moved them to an uncomfortable home in the woods. Procedural History: Question/Outcome/Rationale: Is there consideration to enforce Defendant’s promise? Held. No. Defendant’s promise was gratuitous, and as such cannot be enforced due to lack of consideration. Although the Justice writing the opinion would consider Plaintiff’s inconvenience valid consideration to enforce Defendant’s promise, the Court finds that the promise is merely gratuitous and lacks consideration. Key Takeaway/Discussion: 1. A gratuitous promise lacks consideration and is not enforceable under contract law 2. A benefit/detriment are not sufficient to find consideration. There must (also) be an exchange.

There are two theories of consideration, the benefit/detriment (quid pro quo) theory and the bargain theory. The benefit/detriment test states that there must be (1) some detriment to the plaintiff OR (2) some gain to the defendant in order to constitute consideration. Since the standard is OR, why is her detriment not enough (according to Ormund, there was a detriment incurred by her uprooting her family and moving)? Because there was not an exchange! This case truly stands for the bargain theory of consideration. Angelico/Antillica didn’t have to provide anything in return. It was conditional that she move, but not what was ultimately sought. The following example (pg. 82) highlights the court’s reasoning here. “The distinction between such a conditional gift and a contract is well illustrated in Williston on Contracts, Rev. Ed., Vol. 1, Section 112, where it is said: “If a benevolent man says to a tramp,--‘If you go around the corner to the clothing shop there, you may purchase an overcoat on my credit.’ No reasonable person would understand that short walk was requested as the consideration for the promise, but that in the event of the tramp going to the shop the promisor would make him a gift.” The walk is simply what must occur for the gratuitous promise to take place, it is not what is sought by the promisor. Applying this line of reasoning to Kirksey, the court argues that no reasonable person would think the conditional (you have to move) was part of the exchange....