Lecture 2-Theological Voluntarism & Euthyphro Dilemma PDF

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Lecture notes on the topics 'theological voluntarism' and 'Euthyphro Dilemma'. Also notes on Baggett and Walls....

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Religious Ethics Week 3 Lecture 2-Theological Voluntarism & Euthyphro Dilemma Baggett & Walls, ‘Good God’, Chapter 2-The Euthyphro Dilemma    

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The Euthyphro Dilemma: ‘Consider this: Is the pious being loved by the Gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the Gods?’ Plato. (p. 31) Louise Antony’s version: ‘Are morally good actions morally good simply in virtue of Gods favouring them? Or does God favour them because they are-independently of his favouring them-morally good?’ (p. 32) First horn=voluntarism/ ‘pure will’ theory/ DCT Second horn=nonvoluntarist/ ‘guided will’ theory Born horns cause problems for a theist. Objections to Voluntarism (6): Baggett and Walls note that they will be discussed and answered in further chapters. 1-Normativity objection. Why is Gods command morally authoritative? The voluntarist provides a better more plausible answer to this than the naturalist. B & W will attempt to answer this in Chapter 6 on DCT. 2-No reasons objection. No reason to say that abhorrent commands are wrong if God has commanded them. Links with the problem of arbitrariness-based on random choice. We can’t anticipate what Gods commands will be if he can command anything. We won’t be able to have any prior independent knowledge of morality- this doesn’t seem plausible and the atheist could put up a good argument in favour of this. 3-Abhorrent Command objection. Inspiring disgust and loathing. God could command atrocities. 4-Vacuity objection. We attribute God with ‘good’ thinking that this means something but it becomes vacuous when we are attributing it to a good who could be abhorrent. Connects with objections (2) and (3). 5-Epistemic objection. Who gets primacy-command or conscience? Believed voluntarism has no good valid answers as to why we should put divine commands first. B & W dedicate chapter 9 to epistemology to attempt to answer this and give good answers so the moral argument works. 6-Autonomy objection. Dan Brown (Teabing)- ‘the Piscean ideal believes that man must be told what to do by higher powers because man is incapable of thinking for himself’. (p. 31) Patrick Nowell-Smith thinks this in ‘infantile’. B & W offer a solution in chapters 9 and 10. Voices of Voluntarism: Attractiveness of voluntarism can be the idea of God as the first and uncaused causer (Cosmological argument).

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Biblical depictions of God see him as having the power and authority to issue such binding commandments. It is hard to imagine that God is irrelevant to Ethics and morality and its foundations as many theists believe he is the cause of everything which exists (cosmological argument). Anselmian God-if God is omnipotent then voluntarism is the only plausible solution as any other explanations of morality would undermine Gods power. Robert Adams- we should see morality as not just a non-natural matter, but a supernatural one. Ockham: Anything God commands will be deemed morally appropriate and even obligatory. He felt God could abhorrently command, but that he never would. ‘Radical voluntarism’=Ockhamism. Ludwig Wittgenstein also seems to endorse this kind of voluntarism. Guided Will Theory: Goodness is independent and comes before God commanding it. Michael Levin= ‘Guided Will theory’ It avoids major criticisms of voluntarism. God commands based on what is good so they’re not without reasons and therefore not arbitrary (based on random choice). God is now largely irrelevant to morality. Objections to Guided Will: Still subject to autonomy and epistemic objections. God is still commanding and so infringing our autonomy. This doesn’t sit well with theists as they can’t fathom God being irrelevant to morality. Pure Will theory does come with its implications but this alternative is one which denies that God is metaphysically relevant to morality at all, no theist can accept this. Defenders of Guided Will Theory: Mouw: It can be moral because it is moral and also because it is commanded by God. God can still be perfect/ultimate and not be the cause of morality. He is the perfect moral teacher who we trust to give us the right answers. Book of Ecclesiastes- ‘Fear God and keep his commandments’ (p. 41). Baggett & Walls version of voluntarism: Want to reject the kind of voluntarism that Antony depicts (Ockhamism). Will use the book to provide a more defensible version of voluntarism that will answer the Euthyphro dilemma. God will remain in some extent behind everything external to him. Murray Macbeath: Believes that the E dilemma doesn’t exhaust all possibilities of morality, there is a third possibility. God’s reasons for commanding might not just be because they’re moral but also because he wants to maximise our happiness B & W’s approach will resemble this. Moral goodness is an axiological matter (regards value). Moral rightness is a deontic matter (regards duty/obligation).

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Actions may be morally good without being your moral obligation-is an ethical challenge to decide what is your moral obligation. Gods commands will determine what is morally obligatory rather than what is morally good. Nonvoluntarist account of the good and voluntarist account of the right. B & W attempt to prove this by pointing out 7 distinctions that they will spend the rest of the book analysing in further detail. 1-Analysis/definition distinction. 2-Good/right distinction. 3-Epistemology/ontology distinction. Ontology is what the truth of the matter is whereas epistemology is how we get to know this truth. Foundations of morality might be at a greater epistemic distance from us than the truths of morality are. 4-Difficult vs impossible distinction. 5-Equivocation vs univocation distinction. 6-Dependence vs control distinction. Even though there are some moral truths that not even God can change, they still depend on him in a very important sense. 7-Conceivability vs possibility distinction. Just because God can be abhorrent doesn’t mean he will be. At least if he is morally perfect....