Locke: the Certainty of Reality and the Corpuscular Hypothesis PDF

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Text used: First Philosophy (2nd edition) by Bailey
An essay on how Locke proves what we can be certain of in reality. An insight on empiricism....

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1 Sherry Ning 20061003 Professor Lehoux / TA Arjun Sawhney PHIL 111 24 November 2017 Locke: The Certainty of Reality and The Corpuscular Hypothesis Philosophical debates regarding epistemology have always been a burning conflict between two distinctly polar school of thoughts. On one end of the spectrum, the rationalistic doctrine believes knowledge about truth and reality can and should only be acquired through reasoning and logic. On the other end, the dogma of empiricism holds the theory that all true knowledge is derived from the experience of sensation and the proceeding perception. Unarguably, one of the greatest contributors of the latter school of thought is 17th-century English philosopher John Locke. An ardent proponent of British empiricism, Locke roots his philosophy on the central belief that all “human beings are born like a blank, white sheet of paper — a tabula rasa — withouts any innate knowledge” (Bailey and Martin 60). Although humans are born without intrinsic knowledge of the truths of reality, Locke agrees that we are intuitively programmed to acquire information of the external universe through consciousness and sensual experience. In his renowned legacy An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (60), Locke promises the configuration of corpuscles, the underlying substance of reality, as the only unit of truth. From my analysis, Locke concludes this statement from a series of observable effects and it preceding causes: first, we are certain of our consciousness; we acquire facts through the bodily sensation of external stimuli and the accumulation of these experiences shape our inventory of knowledge to form concepts known as ideas. Consequently, one must agree that

2 these empirically experienced sensations are sourced from a cause; Locke answers this with the notion that ideas are formed via secondary qualities, which in turn is produced by primary qualities — both of which are naturally possessed by objects in the universe. Conclusively, Locke claims the final cause of all qualities and subsequent perceptions as the product of the definite existence of corpuscles. Lastly, I will be discussing why Locke’s bottom-up approach to the phenomenon of perception is highly persuasive.

First and foremost, Locke most certainly confirms the existence of ideas. Ideas are guaranteed to exist because they are the immediate objects of perception and understanding; in other words, the mere nature of an experiencer having an experience proves the existence of that experience. Locke further reinforces the certainty of ideas: they are simultaneously, spontaneously, and continuously intertwined with physical sensations of the body. He claims that “when the idea of [pain] is revived in our minds, gives us no disturbance; which, when felt, was very troublesome, and is again, when actually repeated” (73). That is to say, the mere recalling of pain does not manifest physical symptoms on the body, but the actual experiencing of the pain is imminent. In fact, the pain is even experienced repeatedly whenever the stimulus acts on the body. This can be exemplified by the burning sensation caused by fire:

He that sees a fire may, if he doubt whether it be anything more than a bare fancy, feel it too; and be convinced, by putting his hand in it: which certainly could never be put into such exquisite by a mere idea or phantom, unless that the pain be a fancy too; which yet he cannot… (74)

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Physical sensations allow perception to form ideas of the truth of sensible things exterior of the body; in a reciprocal manner, the realness of these sensible sources are undoubtedly true in nature due to their immediate and unavoidable effects on the body and their ability to produce ideas for the experiencer (“He”, in this case, perceives the concept of pain because “he” can not deny the pain of the burning when “he” places his hand in the fire). Hence, Locke concludes that one must admit the truth of ideas because they are caused by real bodily sensations that are inescapable. From this, Locke further deduces that ideas must have a cause that sources from the external reality, and thus introduces the concept of qualities.

Transitioning from the principle of ideas, Locke explains that such ideas are caused by the qualities that naturally exist as part of the characteristics of the universe. The most immediate link between perception and the external reality is the existence of secondary qualities: “it is therefore the actual receiving of ideas from without, that gives us notice of the existence of other things” (72). In other words, the method of perception lies in secondary qualities and its power to create ideas in one’s mind; perception implies that secondary qualities exist. Also, “if then external objects be not united to our minds…and yet we perceive these original qualities…it is evident that some motion must be thence continued by our nerves” (67). Otherwise, ideas would be irrelevant to whatever is perceived. Is it pertinent to note that secondary qualities (such as colour, texture, and taste) are subjective since they “are in truth nothing in the objects themselves”, which means that they do not resemble the physical substance of the object they are projected from (67). In contrast, primary qualities are objective: they are described directly by

4 the physical particles of the object they are projected from, regardless of whether or not they are perceived (69). However, the secondary qualities’ ability to produce such various ideas when perceived “depend on those primary qualities” (67). Naturally, this contingency of secondary qualities on primary qualities shows that if secondary qualities exist, then primary qualities must too. Locke exemplifies this chain of contingency with the idea of a violet: “the impulse of such insensible particles of matter of peculiar figures and bulks…causes the ideas of the blue colour and the sweet scent of that flower to be produced in our minds” (67). That is to say, ideaproducing secondary qualities such as scent and colour are caused by distinct primary qualities such as shape and dimension, and they both share a common original element; Locke concludes that the origin of this chain of causation must depend on the definite existence of a universal underlying substance.

Locke arrives at the final stage of this chain of reduction: the cause of both types of qualities stems from the existence of corpuscles — the irreducible particles of reality. He claims that because ideas can not sprout into existence by themselves, “we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist…which therefore we call substance” (70). Although we can never have any idea of pure substance, we must admit that perception implies the definite certainty of an underlying configuration of matter particles. Therefore, corpuscles must exist.

Locke’s hypothesis is highly persuasive because it is impossible to obtain any ideas of truth without the empirical experiencing of sensations caused by the preliminary existence of

5 corpuscles. Locke states, “it is plain those perceptions are produced in us by exterior causes affecting our senses…this is too evident to be doubted” (73). Furthermore, one can not deny that such perceptions are tied to the qualities that produced it. For instance, one can not extract an idea of something without its qualities: for example, I can not imagine a bird without its shape, colour, and dimensions — the concept or idea of a bird is bundled with its properties. This proves that knowledge and ideas are linked to the objective qualities of the external world. Likewise, one can not perceive secondary qualities independent from primary qualities: I can not perceive a bird that has a set shape but no texture. This proves that the two qualities are intertwined. Lastly, primary qualities must have a cause; matter resides in the existence of corpuscular units. All in all, Locke states that the only certainty we can have of the exterior world is that when we perceive, we must simultaneously assume that there is an objective power causing our perception, and that that objective power must be caused by an irreducible particle of physical matter.

All in all, Locke’s epistemology stems from the empirical concept that all truth and knowledge are acquired through physical experiences of the body. Such certainty can be proven by the unavoidable sensations experienced by the body, which form ideas; such ideas are then caused by secondary qualities, which are produced from primary qualities, which are ultimately reduced to the characteristic compounds of matter itself. Hence, the sole truth of reality — all matter of the universe — lies in the irreducibly definite existence of corpuscles. Therefore, the existence of physical particles that compose the objective realm is the only assurance one can have about the reality of the universe external to one’s perception.!

Work Cited Martin, Robert M., and Andrew Bailey. First philosophy: fundamental problems and readings in philosophy: knowing and being. Broadview Press, 2013....