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MFC 332 Professor Olga Posse First Month Case Brief...

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Title & Citation: Horton v Goose Creek Independent School District. 693 F.2d, 1982 Facts: The plaintiffs Heather Horton, Robby Horton and Sandra Sanchez brought this action by their next friend, Robert Horton seeking to represent all students enrolled in the Goose Consolidated Independent School District in a challenge under the 42nd U.S.C § 1983 to defendant school district’s canine drug detection program. Procedural History: The court had originally ruled in favor of the school district in the original suit. However, the case was appealed to the fifth circuit court of appeals. Both the courts ruled that canines were allowed to sniff the students’ lockers and cars without violating their fourth amendment rights. Issue: 1. Was it lawful of the school district to publicly have the students searched and sniffed by canines even with good intentions behind it? 2. Are the school authorities going overboard with their powers over the students for a “safer” school environment? Holding: 1. On a motion for class certification and cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court denied certification and held the sniffing, although it is a search is not unreasonable. 2. The school authorities were not going overboard with their power, the district court viewed reasonable cause is the standard for searches of students and their property by school officials acting in loco parentis and the dogs alerting the officials provide that reasonable cause for searches of lockers and cars as well as searches of the pockets, purses and outer garments of students. Therefore, the school officials were acting the limits of the law and no one’s rights were violated. Reasoning 1. The plaintiffs brought this action, alleging a violation of the fourth amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures and violation of the fourteenth amendment prohibition of deprivations of liberty and property without due process. A district court in this circuit and appellate courts for the seventh and tenth circuits have decided similar cases. In the most recent case, Zamora V. Pomeroy. 639 F.2d662 the tenth circuit upheld the use of dogs in exploratory sniffing of lockers. Even though the main focus of the opinion was the due process predicament presented by the school’s disciplinary action, the court did consider the fourth amendment issues. Stating that the school did give notice at the beginning of the school year that lockers were subject to being opened and that the school and the student possessed the locker jointly. Therefore, there was an established understanding between the school administration and the students on the use of the locker. The maintenance of a school atmosphere was the primary job of the school administration and would do anything to keep that even if it meant violating the fourth amendment right of the student with reasonable cause. The

fifth district court held that the program does not violate the due process, because it subjects the students to minimal intrusion, humiliation and fear. Dissent: the appeals courts recognized that school officials have to balance the need to maintain safe learning environments for its students with the need to recognize its student’s constitutional rights. Therefore, it ruled that drug-sniffing dogs could be used on students’ cars.

Title and citation: Tinker V Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S 503 Facts: The petitioner was a high school student who joined his parents in protesting against the Vietnam War. The form of protest was to wear a black armband for a period of weeks during the holiday season. When school was back in session, the petitioner returned to school with the arm band on his arm. He was told to remove the arm band or face suspension. He chose suspension and did not return to school until after the protest period had ended. History: a complaint was filed under the U.S District Court by petitioners under § 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code. The district court dismissed the case and held that the school’s district actions were reasonable to uphold school discipline. The U.S court of appeal do the eighth Circuit affirmed the discussion. Issue: Does the first amendment fully protect U.S citizens in symbolic speech? Holding: The students are persons under the U.S constitution, therefore they are worthy of constitutional protections both while in school and out of school. Dissent: the students are not wise enough to support or reject a cause. The best decision is to leave the order of education to the administrator’s judgment. Reasoning: students do not lose their constitutional rights in school or out of school. The duties of the school officials are to provide a safe learning environment that must be balanced against the student’s expression rights protected by the constitution. The wearing of the armband was singled out of all other symbolic speech used by the student body. There was no evidence that wearing armbands caused any disturbance or disruption of any class or school function.

Title and citation: Magabgab V Orleans Parish School Board 239 So.2d,1970 Facts: The plaintiffs, Joy Mogabgab and her husband, Dr. William J Mogabgab, filed this suit against the defendants, Orleans Parish School Board, Robert E. O'Neil, head coach at Benjamin Franklin Senior High School, Sam A. Mondello, assistant coach, Estelle Barkemeyer, principal of the school, Dr. Carl J. Dolce, superintendent of Orleans Parish School Board, Jack Pizzano, supervisor of Health, Safety and Physical Education Division of Instruction of Orleans Parish

School System, and Continental Casualty Company. Plaintiffs alleged that from the negligence of the defendants in failing to perform their duty of providing all necessary and reasonable safeguards to prevent accidents, injuries and sickness of the football players at Benjamin Franklin Senior High School, and, also, in failing to provide for prompt treatment when injuries or sickness occur, is what resulted the death of their son, Robert. History: Defendants failed to provide necessary and reasonable safeguards resulting in the death of Robert Mogabgab. It is plain that Robert E. O'Neil and Sam A. Mondello were negligent in denying the boy medical assistance and in plying an ill-chosen first aid. The trial court dismissed the action without written reasons. Issue: was the defendant negligent in protecting Robert against risk of heat illness? Holding: The Appellate Court held coaches Mondello and O’ Neil negligent for denying Robert immediate medical assistance. Roberts’s signs of his distress displayed for over two hours prior to getting a doctor. The court reasoned that the plaintiff did not have to prove that Robert would have lived if he was taken to a hospital sooner. Another physician, Dr. Busch, established that it was more likely that Robert would have lived had the defendants administered proper first aid and provided quicker medical assistance and because of that, they were negligent in their actions. Dissent: Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and rendered. The judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, insofar as it dismissed the plaintiffs' suit against Mrs. Estelle Barkemeyer, Dr. Carl J. Dolce and Mrs. Inez C. Pizzano, executrix of the Succession of Jack Pizzano.

Title and Citation: Scheelhasse v Woodbury Central School District, 488 F.2d 237, 1981 Facts: plaintiff was employed as a grade school teacher by the defendant Woodbury Central School district from 1960 to 1970 Both a private conference and public hearing were granted plaintiff pursuant to the statute. The teacher’s professional competence cannot be determined solely on the basis of her students’ achievement on the ITBS and ITED, especially where the students maintain normal educations growth. History: Norma Scheelhaase was terminated by the Board under the Iowa Code 279.13. Mr. Devine didn’t renew Norma Scheelhaase contract because of the showing of her students in test. Norma was damaged of a sum of $13, 644. The trial court found jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Issue: is one of Federal Jurisdiction with respect to the continued employment of a non tenured teacher under Iowa law? Holding: The trial court held that a teacher's professional competence could not be determined solely on the basis of her students' achievements on the ITBS (Iowa Test of Basic Skills) and ITED (Iowa Tests of Educational Development). She was ordered reinstated and granted damages.

Dissent: The trial court found jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The First Amendment claim has not been briefed to us and we were informed on oral argument that no claim thereunder is being asserted. The trial court based its determination on the Fourteenth Amendment.

Title and Citation: Lemon v Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602 Facts: Alton Lemon was a teacher in Pennsylvania. He was the plaintiff and the claimant in this case. David Kurtzman was the Superintendent of the Department of Public Instruction in the State of Pennsylvania. He was the defendant in this case. Lemon filed this case against Kurtzman. In 1968, the Non-Public Elementary and Secondary Education Act became law. Costs for school programs were rapidly increasing and the act was able to supply more funds. The act authorized the state Superintendent to purchase certain “secular educational services” from nonpublic schools, directly reimbursing those schools solely for teachers’ salaries, textbooks and instructional materials. The reimbursement was restricted to specific courses such as mathematics, foreign language, physical science and physical education, the textbooks and materials had to be approved by the Superintendent and no payment could be made for any courses containing “subject matter expressing religious teaching or the morals or forms of worship of any sect.” The act allowed the Superintendent to make contracts with schools that were affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. The complaint alleged that schools affiliated with the church are therefore controlled by the church and in turn have the purpose of promoting religious faith. Similarly, Rhode Island’s Salary Supplement Act provided a 15% salary supplement to teachers in nonpublic schools whose average expenditure was lower than the expenditure of public schools. Costs of the salaries needed to attract competent and dedicated teachers were rapidly increasing and the act was able to supply more funds. The act authorizes state officials to supplement the salaries of teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic schools by paying 15% of their current salary directly to them. The salary could not exceed the maximum paid to teachers in public schools and the recipient must be certified by the state Board of Education. The teachers that were eligible for the supplement had to teach courses that were taught in public schools, using materials used in public schools and had to agree not to teach courses in religion. The complaint alleged that due to the impressionable age of the children, the teachers under religious control posed a threat to the separation of church and state. History: In the original suit, the court decided in favor of the state. They dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim for relief. They found no violation of the Establishment or Free Exercise Clause. An appeal was brought before the court to challenge the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute and Rhode Island statute. Issue: Is it constitutional for the state to provide financial aid to religiously affiliated schools? Holding: The plaintiffs-appellants had standing to challenge the Acts. The complaint for failure to state a claim for relief was dismissed. The decision made in the lower courts regarding the Pennsylvania statute was reversed. The decision made in the lower courts regarding the Rhode Island statute was affirmed. The statutes were found to violate the Establishment and Free

Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the Acts were unconstitutional. Reasoning: The court found that the parochial school system was "an integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church," and held that the Acts led to "excessive entanglement" between government and religion, thus violating the Establishment Clause. The statutes provided continuing state financial aid directly to the church related schools. This on-going entanglement of church and state violates the Constitution. The financial aid benefits the religion and therefore gives the religion an unfair advantage. Dissent: Justice Brennan dissented. He believes that the statutes extension of eligibility to sectarian institutions is severable from the general broader program. Therefore, the acts are unconstitutional only if they authorize grants of federal monies to sectarian institutions. Sectarian institutions are those that have a purpose or function to propagate or advance a particular religion. He states, “I do not see any significant difference in the Federal Government's telling the sectarian university not to teach any non secular subjects in a certain building, and Rhode Island's telling the Catholic school teacher not to teach religion. The vice is the creation through subsidy of a relationship in which the government polices the teaching practices of a religious school or university.” This creates censorship and he believes that is more damaging than entanglement. Justice White dissented. He believes that the court was wrong in overturning the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes on the ground that they amount to an establishment of religion forbidden by the First Amendment. He states, “Our prior cases have recognized the dual role of parochial schools in American society: they perform both religious and secular functions.” He argues that legislation that has a secular purpose and extending governmental assistance to sectarian schools in the performance of their secular functions does not constitute “laws respecting an establishment of religion" forbidden by the First Amendment merely because a secular program may incidentally benefit a church in fulfilling its religious mission. He thinks that it is possible for the religion to indirectly benefit from the aid to the secular activities of churches and non public schools....