Notes on J.L. Mackie - Christina Busse PDF

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Notes on J. L. Mackie’s “Evil and Omnipotence” Notes are broken down by paragraph. My clarifications are in blue text.

Introduction In this section, Mackie states the problem he’s going to raise for theists (believers in God) who believe premises 1-3 stated below under paragraph (3). (1) The traditional arguments for God’s existence (e.g. the ontological, cosmological and teleological arguments) have been successfully criticized to the point where theists have accepted that God cannot be proven to exist. However, these theists still believe that they can be rational in their theism. In this paper, Mackie challenges this claim and aims to show that (three) traditional theistic beliefs cannot be rationally maintained. (2) The problem of evil arises for those who are committed to the following claims: • God is omnipotent. • God is wholly good. Mackie characterize this problem as being logical in nature. It is neither an empirical or practical problem because it is a problem that arises from the meanings (definitions) of “omnipotent” and “wholly good”. Since there is a current tension in the definitions of these terms, we’re dealing with a deductive problem. Thus, the problem cannot be resolved by additional future evidence so one might as well address it now. (3) Statement of the problem. The following three beliefs cannot all be true at the same time: 1. God is omnipotent. 2. God is wholly good. 3. Evil exists. (4) However, further clarification is necessary for us to grasp their paradoxical nature. We need to add premises and “quasi-logical rules” so that the relationships between the meanings of “good,” “evil,” and “omnipotent” are made clear. So, here’s the additional content: 4. Good is opposed to evil. (In other words, good always attempts to eliminate evil as much as possible.) 5. There are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do. Premises 4 and 5 lead us to the following conclusion: 6. A good, omnipotent being completely eliminates evil. But conclusion 6 and premise 3 are contradictory because God should have completely eliminated evil (or never permitted it).

A. Adequate Solutions This section describes one of two approaches theists tend to take toward the problem of evil as Mackie has stated it. Adequate solutions are sufficient to solve the logical paradox, but Mackie argues that no one really believes in these solutions. (1) To solve the paradox, one can deny one of the three beliefs. (2) How one might go about doing this (different strategies) : • Claim that 1 is false: God is NOT omnipotent. (Just throw 1 out.) • Change what “omnipotent” in 1 means. (Replace 1’s original meaning with a similar, but distinct meaning.) • Claim that 3 is false because “evil is an illusion”. (Replace claim “evil exists” with “evil is an illusion”.) • Change what “good” means by claiming that evil is a privation of good. Then good is no longer opposed to evil. (Replace 2’s original meaning with a similar, but distinct meaning.) • Change what “good” means by claiming that partial evil is good. (Alter the meaning of both 2 and 3.) (3) However, do those who take up these solutions really believe them? • One might think that the illusion in “evil is an illusion” is evil. But then evil (in its original meaning) exists. • One might think that privation is an evil in “evil is a privation of good.” But then, again, evil (in its original meaning) exists. Compare these lines of thought to the naturalistic fallacy: 7. Good is what contributes to evolutionary progress. 8. Evolutionary progress is itself good. 7 and 8 are fallacious because “Good” means different things in 7 and 8. There’s an attempt to give “good” a new definition in 7, but one reverts to its original meaning in 8. Something similar is happening for the two alternate definitions on offer for “evil”. Something similar also happens for Pope’s alternate definition of “evil” where partial evil is considered to be good. But then, either partial evil isn’t really evil, or partial evil is just a little evil. We can’t get away from the original meaning of evil. The point is that it’s hard to take up redefined terms. We have a tendency to slide back into our ordinary understandings of them. (4) In sum, we must reject “half-hearted solutions,” where we claim to change our beliefs but really don’t.

B. Fallacious Solutions In this section Mackie describes the second of two approaches that theists tend to take toward solving the problem of evil. These are solutions that people tend to believe, but at their core

involve incorrect reasoning because they tend to employ more than one meaning for terms like “good”, “evil”, “omnipotent” and “freedom.” (1) Comparison of adequate to fallacious approach: former explicitly rejects but implicitly accepts a certain claim. The latter explicitly asserts but implicitly rejects a certain claim. (2) It can be difficult to find the fallacy in any so-called “Fallacious solution.” Generally, the fallacy lies in what the terms “good” and “evil” are taken to mean. Mackie intends to examine these fallacies, and will also consider whether a genuine solution to the problem of evil is possible.

B1. “GOOD CANNOT EXIST WITHOUT EVIL” OR “EVIL IS NECESSARY AS A COUNTERPART TO GOOD” (1) Question: Why should there be evil? Answer: The existence of good is dependent on the existence of evil. (This answer requires that we change the meaning of at least one of the three premises.) (2) FIRST PROPOSAL: Set limits on God’s power: he cannot create good without also creating evil. (Thus, we must either deny premise 1 or alter what “omnipotent” means, thereby giving a modified version of premise 1.) THEISTIC REPLY TO FIRST PROPOSAL: We don’t need to reject or alter premise 1 because the following claims are also true: 9. God cannot violate the laws of logic. 10. Good is logically dependent on evil. If 9 and 10 are true, then omnipotence must already take into account the “limit” of God not being “able” to create good without also creating evil. Therefore, we don’t need to change our current beliefs. MACKIE’S FIRST OBJECTION TO THE THEISTIC REPLY: but then God didn’t create the rules of logic, and this claim is unacceptable to some theists. (This objection doesn’t defeat the theistic reply for all theists; just those who wish to maintain that God created logic.) (3) MACKIE’S SECOND OBJECTION TO THE THEISTIC REPLY (first interpretation of “logical dependence”): this reply denies that evil is opposed to good. That is, as logically necessary counterparts, good won’t eliminate evil as far as it can because good’s existence is somehow dependent on evil’s existence. The view therefore implies that good and evil are not intrinsic qualities of things. (An intrinsic quality or property is instantiated by an individual without reference to any other quality or feature. So, something cannot just be “good” or “evil” but only relative to something else.) Instead, perhaps good and evil are properties like great and small. Great and small only exist relative to each other. They are thus extrinsically defined. You cannot eliminate smallness in favor of greatness because they are relative qualities. Do we really want to claim that good and evil have the same behavior as properties like great and small? (If Mackie has correctly identified what theists mean by “logical dependence” here, then this objection defeats those theists who wish to maintain that good eliminates evil as far as it can.)

(4) POSSIBLE THEISTIC REPLY TO MACKIE’S SECOND OBJECTION (first interpretation of “logical dependence”): But perhaps “great” and “small” do have absolute meanings independent of each other, as do “good” and “evil”. (Deny the first interpretation of “logical dependence.”) MACKIE’S REBUTTAL: But if this is the case, the logical dependency is lost. And then we can no longer claim that good requires evil to exist. (By denying logical dependence of good on evil, then it seems that good no longer requires evil to exist.) (5) SUMMING UP: we have a dilemma. Either we reject the logical dependence of good on evil, but then must reject that good eliminates evil OR we claim that good is logically independent of evil, but then must explain why evil exists after all. Either way, we don’t have a solution. (6) SECOND PROPOSAL (another attempt to resolve the problem of evil that theists might make): good and evil are necessary counterparts, in the same manner as any quality (property) and its logical opposite. So evil must be a privation of good. MACKIES’S FIRST OBJECTION: Suppose we accept this solution. This solution requires that we accept the following metaphysical (ontological) principle: “…a quality must have a REAL opposite.” But this principle is false. Why? Mackie gives a counterexample to prove this: it is possible to have a world in which everything is red in color. So, in that world there is no REAL opposite to red. Mackie goes on to explain that in language, we tend to use words to discriminate different kinds of properties. So, if everything were red, we’d have no term for it. The fact that every term we use has an opposite (negated form) is a feature of language, but not of reality. God could have made everything good, and although we’d have no terms for “good” and “evil,” that wouldn’t mean that good didn’t exist. So again, it follows that good is not logically dependent on evil because good could exist in a world where there is no evil. (7) MACKIE’S SECOND OBJECTION: Furthermore, even if we accept that evil must exist as a counterpart to good, one would only need a tiny amount of evil to meet the claim’s truth conditions. But there is more than a tiny amount of evil in the world. So, we still have a problem because we need to explain why there is more evil in the world than is strictly necessary.

B2. “EVIL IS NECESSARY AS A MEANS TO GOOD” (1) MACKIE’S FIRST OBJECTION: This claim implies a severe restriction of God’s power. • The statement “evil is necessary as a means to good” must be a causal law because you cannot have the effect of good without evil being somehow involved in the cause. • However, such a causal law conflicts with God’s omnipotence because he has to conform that causal law, thereby limiting his power. MACKIE’S SECOND OBJECTION: this claim undermines the belief held by many theists that God made all causal laws.

POSSIBLE REPLY TO SECOND OBJECTION: One might resolve this conflict if God is capable of binding himself. This solution needs further investigation. (This will be dealt with later on in the paper. So, note that Mackie has not yet completely refuted the proposed solution at this point.) • But, regardless of whether one accepts this solution or not, one must either deny premise 1 or change the meaning of “omnipotent.”

B3. “THE UNIVERSE IS BETTER WITH SOME EVIL IN IT THAN IT COULD BE IF THERE WERE NO EVIL” Paragraphs 1-4 describe the account in some detail: (1) Seems similar to solution B2. Two ways to develop B3: • Aesthetic approach: A little evil makes everything better by heightening contrasts or adding aesthetic appeal. World is more beautiful because of evil. • Progressive approach: The gradual progression of good overcoming evil is better than having a static universe. (2) The meaning of “evil” for B3 solution is typically limited to physical (natural) evil. Hume’s presentation of this problem in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion primarily employed this notion. Many theists have pointed out that diseases and natural disasters have progressively been overcome. But further, there are spiritual goods that one gets out of struggling against evil. (3) Here Mackie begins to introduce some distinctions. • Call pain and misery, “first order evil” or “evil(1)”. • Call pleasure and happiness, “first order good” or “good(1)”. • Now consider how “second order good” or “good(2)” comes about: o It is an effect that emerges as a result of some cause that has evil(1) as a required component. o The sense of “required” being used indicates a logical requirement. • The details on the nature of good(2) are left vague so that both the aesthetic and progressive approach can be accommodated. • Assume that value of good(2) outweighs that of good(1) and evil(1). (4) So, we defend God’s goodness on the grounds that this is the best of all logically possible worlds. • Good(1) and evil(1) are not logically opposed. • But good(2) and evil(1) are opposed. God’s goodness is to maximize good(2). Call God’s goodness “good(3)”. This account seems like a genuine improvement over the other proposals. (5) MACKIE’S FIRST OBJECTION: Benevolence (= good(2)) and the attempt to maximize it (=good(3)) has a merely derivative value. They are merely a means of promoting good(1). So why bother with goods (2) and (3) and not just maximize good(1) to begin with?

However, there is an easy response for the theist (not given). Won’t press this objection. (6) MACKIE’S SECOND OBJECTION: This solution indicates that God’s purpose is not to minimize evil but to maximize good(2). Some theists would find this conclusion disturbing. (7) MACKIE’S THIRD OBJECTION: the current analysis suggest the existence of evil(2), where good(1) is minimized and evil(1) is increased. And wouldn’t God want to minimize evil(2)? Yet evil(2) exists, so we have a second-order problem of evil. (8) We need to explain the occurrence of evil(2) with some fresh notions. If we stick only with our current notions, then we risk an infinite regress. (An infinite regress is a situation in which a proposed explanation or solution to a problem itself requires a proposed explanation or solution, and the proposed explanations or solutions themselves require further proposed explanations or solutions and so forth ad infinitum.) (Again, Mackie has not yet fully refuted the proposed solution. The solution requires further development, which occurs in the following section.)

B4. “EVIL IS DUE TO HUMAN FREE WILL” We can consider this proposal an extension of the proposal given in B3. In addition, Mackie now deals with the binding solution mentioned in B2, where God is able to limit his omnipotence by binding himself so that he must conform to the causal laws he put in place. (1) B4 is the most important solution of all those that have been offered. Instead of ascribing evil to God, it’s ascribed to humans on account of their freewill. o So evil(1) (for which God is responsible) can be justified for the sake of good(2). o Evil(2) (for which God is NOT responsible, rather, human beings are) is NOT justified because it doesn’t promote any kind of good. Therefore, the MACKIE’S THIRD OBJECTION from B3 can be dealt with. (God doesn’t seek to minimize evil(2) because he’s given human beings the ability to act in accordance with their own freewill.) (2) For this solution to go through you need to argue that it’s better for humans to act freely. Freedom is treated as a third-order good. It’s more valuable than second-order goods alone when those goods would have been obtained deterministically (i.e. without freedom). Secondorder evils are logically necessary for freedom to occur, just as evil(1) is logically necessary for evil(2) to occur. (3) Mackie thinks the freedom solution is unsatisfactory because the notion of freewill is incoherent. But he cannot show that here. However, the subsequent arguments he offers suggest what he has in mind. (4) MACKIE’S FIRST OBJECTION: Question: Is evil(2) necessary for freewill to occur? Why didn’t God create human beings so that they would freely choose the good? This must be possible because sometimes humans do

choose good, and if they did it freely, why can’t they choose good freely every time they make a choice? God’s failure to create humans like that is inconsistent with his omnipotence and his being wholly good. (5) MACKIE’S SECOND OBJECTION: Mackie’s first objection leads us to the question: “What is freedom?” The current suggestion seems to imply that humans make their choices at random rather than as a result of their character. For if humans made choices as a result of their character, God must be held responsible for their evil(2) because he gave them their character. BUT if freedom is in fact random, how is it an expression of one’s will? What value would freedom have? How could it be the most important good? (First notion of freedom articulated; must be the notion meant; that version of freedom is valueless.) (6) So, it seems we have conflated two notions of freedom in our discussion: • Freedom as good(3). • Freedom as randomness. (7) This is a decisive objection against the proposed solution. (Mackie doesn’t stop here because he needs to do further work showing that he has in fact captured a correct understanding of freewill in the discussion. And as he previously mentioned, that requires a separate discussion.) MACKIE’S THIRD OBJECTION: But further, if humans are really free then even God can’t control them. So, we have yet another limit on omnipotence. THEISTIC RESPONSE TO THIRD OBJECTION: perhaps God just refrains from controlling human wills. MACKIE’S REBUTTAL: but why doesn’t God intervene when humans do evil? If God could do this, but doesn’t and if God is wholly good, then the only way to explain this is that every evil action is not genuinely evil. The freedom of the evil act outweighs its evil. But this contradicts what theists say elsewhere. THEISTIC RESPONSE TO MACKIE’S REBUTTAL: The only solution then is to claim that God made us so free that he cannot control our wills. (8) But this proposal gives rise to the paradox of omnipotence: can an omnipotent being make things which he can’t control? Or “…can an omnipotent being make rules which then bind himself?” (9) Answer yes: once bound, there are things God can’t do. Not omnipotent. Answer no: there are things he can’t do (he can’t bind himself), so again, he’s not omnipotent. (10) You can’t dismiss this question by claiming it’s improper. If a mechanic can make a machine he can’t control, it’s possible that God can create beings he can’t control. There is a problem somewhere in the definition of omnipotence.

(11) It turns out that the paradox applies to the determinist (one who denies freewill) as well. To illustrate, consider that machines don’t have freewill yet their activity can go beyond their maker’s control. That is, a mechanic might determine, yet not force, a machine’s activity. However, unlike a mechanic, God is omniscient so he can anticipate everything his creation will do. (But it doesn’t follow that he controls his creation while they carry out his expectations.) “The question is not whether God originally determined the future action of his creatures, but whether he can subsequently control their actions, or whether he was able in his creation to put things beyond his subsequent control.” Either yes or no to this question leads to paradox. (This is because if God bound himself so that he can’t control his creation’s subsequent actions, then his power is limited; and if God can’t bind himself then his power is limited (he can’t not control their actions).) (12) Discussion of the parallel paradox of sovereignty. Can a government with absolute authority pass legislation that restricts its ability to legislate in the future? For example, can the British Parliament pass a law that eliminates in sovereignty in the future? Answer yes: the parliament is no longer sovereign (it has lost its absolute authority because there’s a time in the future where it will have not authority). Answer no: but again, parliament is no longer sovereign (its powers are limited). To resolve the paradox, you need to distinguish between two kinds of laws: laws over the people and laws over the legislature. Then you can have two kinds of sovereignty: Sovereignty(1): unlimited authority to make first-order laws (laws over the people). Sovereignty(2): unlimited authority to make second-order laws (laws over the government). Parliament can have both kinds of sovereignty, but not at all times because it could use (2) to take away (1). (13) The paradox of omnipotence can be solved in a similar way. Distinguish between omnipotence(1) and omnipotence(2). If God always has (1) then no beings have power to act independently of God. (So, then you don’t have the freewill solution to t...