nyaya sidhhanta muktivala - nature of verbal language PDF

Title nyaya sidhhanta muktivala - nature of verbal language
Author Simran
Course Philosophy of Language
Institution University of Delhi
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Summary

The answer is from the prescribed reading of Delhi University on Nyaya Sidhhanta Muktivala, and mentions the nature of verbal language. Applicable for third year, sixth semester B.A. (Hons) Philosophy....


Description

Philosophy of Language Internal Assignment

BySimran Narula Roll no.-891 Third Year B.A. (Hons.) Philosophy

Ques.) What according to Nyaya Siddhanta Muktavali, is the nature of Verbal Knowledge?

Introduction Nyāya literally meaning "justice", "rules", "method" or "judgment" is one of the six orthodox (astika) schools of Indian Philosophy. Nyaya school's epistemology accepts four out of six Pramanas as reliable means of gaining knowledge – Pratyakṣ a (perception), Anumāṇ a (inference), Upamāṇa (comparison and analogy) and Śabda (word, testimony of past or present reliable experts). Nyāya school is closer to the Vaisheshika school of Hinduism than others. It holds that human suffering results from mistakes or defects produced by activity under wrong knowledge (notions and ignorance). According to the school, Moksha (liberation) is gained through right knowledge. knowledge of 16 categories The Nyāya School is highly concerned with ‘correct’ epistemology, that is the reliable means to gain correct knowledge and to remove wrong notions. The School is direct realism, stating that anything that really exists is in principle humanly knowable. Nyaya is related to several other concepts and words used in Indian philosophies: for instance, Anviksiki (science of inquiry, systematic philosophy), Pramana-śastra (epistemology, science of correct knowledge), Tattva-sastra (science of categories), Tarka-vidya (science of reasoning, innovation, synthesis),

Verbal Knowledge The following nature of Verbal Knowledge is taken from an interpretation of Nyaya Siddhanta Muktāvali, wherein the author also comments on Kārikāvalī, Dinakarī and Muktāvalī, and makes extensive use of the subcommentary- Rāmarudrī. It is already well known that the Nyaya system admits four means of valid knowledge: Perception, Inference, Comparison and Word.

Please note that the following abbreviations have been used in the answer below. K. - Kārikāvalī M. - Muktāvalī D. - Dinakarī R. - Rāmarudrī

General Description of Verbal Knowledge – Word (Śabda) According to Naiyāyikas one of the four means of valid knowledge is śabda (word). Śabda (verbal knowledge) means relying on word, testimony of past or present reliable experts One must rely on experts say for instance his parent, family, friends, teachers, ancestors and kindred members of society to rapidly acquire and share knowledge and thereby enrich each other's lives. This means of gaining proper knowledge is either spoken or written, but through Śabda (words). The reliability of the source is important, and legitimate knowledge can only come from the Sabda of reliable sources. Vyatsayana (commentator on Nyaya sutra explained ‘who is a reliable person ?’as ‘one who knows the truth as it is ‘(yathartha), his sentence contains cognition and thus cannot convey falsity .

Other schools were against it; Carvaka argued that only perception is the true source of knowledge and Sankara of Advaitha school had questioned that Nirgunabrahman doesn’t have any attributes or properties then how could language express Brahman. But navyanyayaikas have argued that language is not faulty when explaining truth, the falsity or error is with the speaker, they believe that language can capture the reality.

From Pracheen-nyaya to Navyanyaya Pracheen nyaya (old, concerned with concepts) had a recorded history of dialogues but which created ambiguity because the language used was neutral and falls for misunderstandings due to misinterpretations , Udanayacharya discovered this and emphasised the need of a non-ambiguous clear language, thus the period of navyanyaya, emphasised upon the methods and instruments of knowing. Any language of human being can be used to transit knowledge, Navyanyaya developed language for precise points from pracheen-nyaya to navyanyaya there was a shift from prameyapradan to pramanapradan.

The Instrumental cause The actual instrumental cause of verbal knowledge is not words which are actually being known, but knowledge itself of words. The difference between these two positions is that, in the first case, words are actually uttered and, in the second case, there is no need of actually uttered words; as for

example, when a person who keeps silence writes down words, we come to have the knowledge of words by seeing the script. The operation of this instrumental cause is the recollection of the meanings of words and this recollection itself has to be produced by the knowledge of words. It is stated that only ‘Pada-janya-padārth- jñānam’ and not ‘pada-janya-padārth-smara nam’ is the operation, then if someone hears the word jar, and then in the next moment he sees a jar, and so he has perceptual knowledge of the meaning of the word, then he would have verbal knowledge. But such a possibility is not accepted by anyone because when a person hears a sentence and recollects the meaning of words by the knowledge of certain things which are other than the words themselves but which are related to the words, he would have verbal knowledge; to avoid this, padārthasmaran am is qualified by pada-janya. Thus, ‘pada-janya-padārtha-smaranam’ and not ‘pada-janyapadārth-jñānam’ is said to be the operation of the instrumental cause namely, pada-jñānam. Further, if the recollection of the meanings of words is not produced by the knowledge of words with the help of the significatory function of words, then the following difficulty may arise- When one hears words like ‘jar’, etc. since these words essentially exist in ether, one can also have recollection of ether. This is because the knowledge of one relation produces the remembrance of another related term. Thus, giving a different verbal meaning altogether. This difficulty is avoided when it is stated that the recollection of the meanings of words which is produced by the knowledge of words is to be taken in the sense that the recollection of the meaning would be produced by the knowledge of words with the help of the significatory function of words.

Nature of Significatory Function Significatory function is either denotative function (śakti) or implication (laksanā). And these functions are in the form of relations that exist between words and their meanings. This makes it necessary to firstly describe the nature of denotative function.

Nature of Denotative Function (śakti) Denotative function is the relation of a word with its meaning. However, in explaining the nature of this relation, the ancient and modern schools of Naiyāyikas differ. According to the former, denotative function of words is in the form of the will of God that ‘from this word- this meaning is to be understood’. Thus, according to the old Naiyāyikas, terms like nadī, vrddhi, etc. coined by moderns only have no denotative function. The modern Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, accept denotative function in terms such as nadī, vrddhi,  etc. also since they assert that denotative function is in the form of will only and not necessarily the will of God. From this it follows that, according to both old and modern Naiyāyikas, in well-known words such as ‘jar’, ‘cloth’, etc. there is denotative function in the form of the will of God.

Nature of Verbal Knowledge An understanding of the nature of verbal knowledge availed from the translation of Kārikāvalī

The instrumental cause of verbal knowledge is cognition itself of words. Its operation is the knowledge i.e., recollection of the meanings of words. Verbal knowledge is the result and the knowledge of the denotative function is auxiliary (cause).

An understanding of the nature of verbal knowledge availed from the translation of Muktāvali The manner of the origin of verbal knowledge is described with the words beginning with cognition itself of words: It is not the case that a word which is actually being known (i.e., is being heard) is the instrumental cause, for even in the absence of words there is verbal knowledge as in the cause of a stanza etc. composed by a person who is keeping silence. The knowledge of the meaning of words (padāthdhīriti): The operation is the recollection of the meaning of a word which (recollection) is produced by the word. Otherwise, a person who has the knowledge of a word would have verbal knowledge, even when he has perceptual cognition of the object denoted by the word. Even the recollection of the meanings of words should be produced by words with the help of their significatory functions; otherwise, by means of words like ‘jar’, etc. One can have the recollection of ‘ether’ through inherence (Empedocles' idea that the qualities of matter come from the relative proportions of each of the four elements entering into a thing) and then there would come about the verbal knowledge of ether. Significatory function is only a relation which is either denotative function or implication. It is here alone that the knowledge of the denotative function is useful. If one does not have the knowledge of the denotative function earlier, even though he has the knowledge of words, there would not arise the recollection of meaning as related with the word. This is because the knowledge of word brings about the recollection of its meaning in the capacity of being the knowledge of the relatum. The opinion of the traditional school is as follows: Denotative function is the relation of the meaning of a word with that word, and that is in the form of the will of GOD, viz. from this word this meaning is to be understood. The modern (Naiyāyikas) hold that the will of God is not the denotative function but merely will and, thus, they say that terms (coined by moderns alone) indeed have denotative functions....


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