Pr 19 1004 russian military thought concepts elements PDF

Preview

Summary

Pr 19 1004 russian military thought concepts elements for modern warfare for 21 first century which used in today securuty envionment which is very volatile....

Description

UNCLASSIFIED MP190451V1 MITRE PRODUCT

Russian Military Thought: Concepts and Elements Sponsor: US European Command ECJ39 Dept. No.: P663 Contract No.: W56KGU-18-D-0004-S120 Project No.: 0719S120-J3 The views expressed in this document are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of MITRE, the Department of Defense, or the US government. This document is approved for public release, distribution unlimited. Case numbers 191004 Russia’s military thought; 19-0592 military art; 19-1069 reflexive control; 190047 asymmetric operations; 19-18-4231 A2AD; 18-1941 cyber concepts; 19-0314 information environment; 19-1451 definition of war; 18-4369 future war; 19-0807 Gerasimov; and 19-1546 Conclusions (and Foreword and Introduction) were used to compose this document.

Timothy L. Thomas August 2019

©2019 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.

McLean, VA

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Approved By

8/8/2019 Jo US European Command Project Leader

Date

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Foreword Technology has dramatically increased the speed at which decisions must be made, expanded the spectrum of military thought (from the strategic to the planetary), and focused more attention on innovative thinking and risk-taking. This report, Russian Military Thought: Concepts and Elements, considers technology’s impact on military thought while also considering the latter’s historical legacy passed from the Soviet to the Russian period. Two issues are thus at play in the report, traditional ones and those associated with information-age advances. Initially, the report examines several concepts from the Soviet era still in vogue today, such as the forms and methods of warfare, forecasting, and the initial period of war, among others. The past remains important for the present and continues to affect the way Russia analyzes its situational context. Next, how these basic concepts are applied to information-age advances are examined. For example, there are Russian-authored articles on the forms and methods (traditional thought) of network-centric conditions, aerospace defense, and cyber issues (information-age thought), among others. Forecasting must assess the impact on the nature of war from weapons based on new physical principles. The speed of cyber operations indicates that forces must be prepared now for the initial period of war (IPW). Planning tomorrow for a surprise attack is more than a day late, as the cyber IPW may result in the conflict’s end before it starts. The report is divided into twelve chapters. Chapter One provides an overall introduction to the topic of military thought. Chapter Two offers some historical and current contextual information regarding Russian military thought, to include what is expected from military officers today. Chapter Three looks at the importance of military art’s influence on thought processes. Chapter Four updates Russian use of its reflexive control concept, which is a way of manipulating or deceiving adversary thought processes. Chapter Five updates Russian use of asymmetrical and indirect operations. Chapter Six discusses Russia’s concept of disorganization and its impact on command and control issues. Chapter Seven offers nine Russian cyber and information issues for consideration. Chapter Eight explores the invisible aspect of the information environment (underwater cables, satellites, electrons, etc.). Chapter Nine examines a 2017 discussion on the concept of “war” in Russia. Chapter Ten looks at Russian forecasts of future war. Chapter Eleven offers a summary of the thoughts of General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov. Chapter Twelve offers several conclusions about Russian military thought. The report is of interest for its focus on purely Russian military thought. It attempts to avoid mirrorimaging Western concepts (hybrid, grey zone, etc.) onto Russian military thinking. It represents the first focused study on the topic of military thought since the edited 1981 book Soviet Military Thinking. The report in no way replaces that volume but rather supplements it. Timothy Thomas EUCOM Information Operations Domain Specialist MITRE Corporation, 2019

iii

UNCLASSIFIED

Acknowledgments The author is solely responsible for the selection and analysis of the material in this work. While there are many people who assisted in the preparation of this work, the author would like to acknowledge the support of several individuals. First, Dr. Harold Orenstein of Leavenworth, Kansas, deserves special recognition. He translated numerous key documents from Russian into English, as the footnotes continuously note. Without his support, this report would lack many key details. Second, the author would like to express his thanks to Colonel Michael Jackson, the European Command’s former J39, who supported and encouraged this work along with two important staff members, Chris Kirschman and Alan Bal. Finally, the MITRE staff, who helped with the editing and clearing of the chapters, were instrumental in pushing the product along. Joe Angyal, Matt Eager, and Marion Michaud were key players who spent numerous hours working through the report’s chapters. David Cleary helped with formatting the final product. My sincere thanks to all of you for your help.

iv

UNCLASSIFIED

Table of Contents Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1-1 Russian Military Thought: Building on the Past to Win Future Hi-Tech Conflicts ............. 2-1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 2-1 The Soviet Past Influences the Present .................................................................................... 2-2 Two Important Books on Military Thought............................................................................. 2-4 Modern Times .......................................................................................................................... 2-8 Military Leaders and Educational Institutes on Officer Training .......................................... 2-10 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................ 2-14 Russian Military Art and the Creative Employment of Knowledge .................................... 3-1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 3-1 Definitions of Military Art ....................................................................................................... 3-2 Weapons and Military Art: 2016-2019 .................................................................................... 3-3 Conclusions .............................................................................................................................. 3-8 Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory: Manipulating an Opponent to One’s Advantage ........ 4-1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 4-1 Definitions and Use of RC: 2002-2013 ................................................................................... 4-1 Definitions and Use Since 2013 and Ukraine…Some Recent Examples to Consider ............ 4-6 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................ 4-11 Russia’s Asymmetric Concept: Based on Military Art, Geopolitics, and Risk.................... 5-1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 5-1 Definitions of Asymmetry, Military Art, and Risk .................................................................. 5-2 Where Do Asymmetric Operations Fit in Russian Military Thought? .................................... 5-3 Sources of Asymmetry............................................................................................................. 5-3 Russian Military Asymmetric Thought in Action: The Past Decade ...................................... 5-6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 5-11 Connecting GPS Interference with Russia’s A2AD Concept .............................................. 6-1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 6-1 Background .............................................................................................................................. 6-1 Part One: Disorganizing Control: From Syria to Future War .................................................. 6-2 Part Two: REB and Disorganization........................................................................................ 6-6 Conclusions .............................................................................................................................. 6-7 Russia’s Context for Cyber and Information Issues: Nine Thoughts for Consideration...... 7-1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 7-1 v

UNCLASSIFIED Consideration One: Have Media Tactics Changed over Time?............................................... 7-1 Consideration Two: Russian Templates for Influence............................................................. 7-2 Consideration Three: Military Directorates for Cyber............................................................. 7-4 Consideration Four: Cyber and the Initial Period of War ........................................................ 7-5 Consideration Five: Warning of Presidential Election Meddling ............................................ 7-6 Consideration Six: The Worries of Russian Cyber Planners ................................................... 7-6 Consideration Seven: Reflexive Control and Cyber ................................................................ 7-7 Consideration Eight: Is There a “Cyber Dead Hand?” ............................................................ 7-8 Consideration Nine: Battlefield Influence Operations ............................................................. 7-8 Conclusions .............................................................................................................................. 7-9 Electrons, Underwater Cables, Satellites, and Creative Thought: The Russian Military’s Invisible Information Environment ...................................................................................... 8-1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 8-1 Overview .................................................................................................................................. 8-1 Newer Developments ............................................................................................................... 8-2 Information Strategies .......................................................................................................... 8-2 Information’s Role in the Initial Period of War (IPW) ........................................................ 8-5 Strategic Operations to Destroy Critically Important Targets (SODCIT) ........................... 8-6 Forms and Methods of Information’s Use ........................................................................... 8-8 Information and Digital Deterrence ..................................................................................... 8-9 Information Troops ................................................................................................................ 8-13 Information-Technical and Information-Psychological Capabilities................................. 8-14 Older Concepts Still in Vogue ............................................................................................... 8-26 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................ 8-30 Russia’s Military Discusses the Definition of War .............................................................. 9-1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 9-1 The 2018 and 2019 Discussions .............................................................................................. 9-1 Waging War ......................................................................................................................... 9-3 Wage War ............................................................................................................................ 9-3 The 2017 Debate on War ......................................................................................................... 9-4 Articles in the Journal of the Academy of Military Science (AMS) ....................................... 9-5 Articles in the Journal Military Thought................................................................................ 9-15 Two Articles on the Classification of War ............................................................................ 9-18 Armeysky Sbornik (Army Journal) ..................................................................................... 9-18 Journal of the Academy of Military Science ..................................................................... 9-21 vi

UNCLASSIFIED Conclusions ............................................................................................................................ 9-22 Russian Forecasts of Future War ........................................................................................ 10-1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 10-1 Some Views of Russian Forecasters ...................................................................................... 10-2 Contemplating Future War .................................................................................................... 10-4 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................ 10-9 Russian General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov: Shaping Russia’s Armed Forces and Military Thought ................................................................................................................ 11-1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 11-1 Part One: Background ............................................................................................................ 11-1 Part Two: Gerasimov’s Issues with the West ........................................................................ 11-2 Part Three: Gerasimov’s Non-AMS Interviews and Presentations ....................................... 11-3 Part Four: Presentations at the AMS ...................................................................................... 11-7 2013 Speech at the AMS—Forms and Methods of Warfare ............................................. 11-8 2014 Presentation at the AMS—Role of the General Staff and Changing Nature of War 11-9 2015 Speech at the AMS—Great Patriotic War Lessons for Today ............................... 11-11 2016 Presentation at AMS—U.S. Hybrid Issues and Counters to Them ........................ 11-12 2017 AMS Presentation—Contemporary War, Elements of Thought ............................ 11-13 2018 AMS Presentation—Future Wars ........................................................................... 11-14 2019 AMS Presentation—New Thoughts on Military Strategy ...................................... 11-15 Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 11-17 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................ 12-1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 12-1 Overcoming Western Stereotypes.......................................................................................... 12-1 Are Civilian and Military Thought Patterns Similar in Russia? ............................................ 12-4 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................ 12-7 Appendix A Russian Asymmetric Thought and Disorganization ........................................... A-1 A.1 Attachment One: A Short History of the Use of the Term “Asymmetry” ................... A-1 A.2

Attachment Two: An Expanded Definitions of Asymmetry ....................................... A-3

A.3

Attachment Three: An Extended Definition of Disorganization ................................. A-5

Appendix B

Russia’s Classification of Contemporary Military Conflicts .............................. B-1

Appendix C

Acronyms ............................................................................................................ C-1

vii

UNCLASSIFIED

This page intentionally left blank.

viii

Introduction There are many issues that have motivated the development of this report. However, two primary ones are a need to inform Western analysts of Russia’s military thought process, which differs from that in the West; and the need to demonstrate that Western mirror-imaging of its concepts onto Russian thinking doesn’t always work, whether it be hybrid warfare concepts, anti-access area denial (A2AD) thinking, or grey zone concepts. Russia doesn’t utilize many of the concepts that the West does, and those that it does use may be interpreted in different ways or have other issues attached to them. There are also many assumptions about Russian military thought that are based on false premises. Initially, the report examines several specific thought processes of the Russian military, to include some that are seldom if ever discussed in the West. These concepts include disorganizing an opposing force, reflexively controlling them, examining numerous forms and methods of applying force by branch of service, and finding innovative ways to employ military art, among other issues. There are other concepts, such as indirect and asymmetric operations, that numerous countries examine but implement them in various ways according to national values and traditions. Russia is no exception to this process, as several authors have written on indirect and asymmetric operations. Even the definition and concept of “war” is being reconsidered by Russia. In 2017, there was a long discussion among military specialists in Russia about the topic of war. These articles examined whether nonmilitary issues, to include the civilian use of cyber capabilities, had changed war’s character. Once it became apparent that cyber weaponry potentially could take out a nation’s power or state control mechanisms with special operations to destroy critical infrastructure targets (SODCIT), the definition of war apparently warranted reconsideration. Over the course of the past two decades, Russian military thought also has benefited from the conduct of serious “lessons learned” analyses from their forces’ combat operations in Chechnya, Ukraine, and now Syria. Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, underscored the need to learn not only from the conflicts that involved Russian operations but also those that the West undertook, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, and they have done so. Recent developme...