Property 452 Reviewer Digests p14 PDF

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Property 452 Reviewer Digests p14...

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1. SITCHON, ET AL. v. AQUINO

different areas in Velaso’s property was measured in terms of decibels. It was found that the sound exceeded the average intensity levels of residences.

The duties vested in the district health officer in case of nuisances may be placed upon other officers as may be designated by special provision of law.

ISSUE: Can there be a nuisance caused by noise or sound? HELD: Yes. Several American decisions are cited showing that noise is an actionable nuisance. In fact, Kentucky v. Anderson dealt with noise emanating from electrical machinery and appliances. The determining factor, however, is not just intensity or volume. It must be of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities. However, appellant’s testimony is too plainly biased. Nor are the witnesses’ testimonies revealing on account of different perceptions. Consequently, sound level meters were used. As stated above, the sound exceeds average residential decibels. Also, the testimonies of appellant’s physicians (which were more reliable since they actually treated him, unlike the appellee’s) point to the noise as having caused appellant loss of sleep, irritation and tension weakening his constitution. Notable lastly is the fact that in the Kentucky case, where the nuisance was ordered abated, the average reading was 44 decibels while in the instant, the readings include 52, 54, and 55. The decision goes on to discuss the proper award of damages. But Meralco was ordered either to transfer the facilities or reduce the produced sound to around

FACTS : This decision stems from six (6) different suits. All of the petitioners implead Aquino (the City Engineer of Manila) as respondent so that he may be enjoined from causing the demolition of their respective houses situated in different areas along public streets in Manila inasmuch as these constitute public nuisances. All of the petitioners occupied the subject parcels of land initially entirely without consent. However, all of them subsequently paid concession fees or damages for the use of the land with the agreement that such payment and consent shall be without prejudice to an order to vacate. The time came when the City Engineer demanded that petitioners vacate the occupied streets. Unheeded, he threatened to demolish the houses. Petitioners contend that by virtue of arts. 700 and 702, the power to remove public nuisances is vested in the District Health Officer, not in the City Engineer. ISSUES: Is there a public nuisance? Does the City Engineer have authority to cause the abatement of the nuisance? HELD: There is a public nuisance. This case falls on art. 694 ¶ 4, classifying as a nuisance the obstruction of free passage of any public highway or street. It is public because it affects a community or neighbourhood. The constructions in fact constitute nuisances per se, obstructing at all times the streets. As such, the summary removal of these may be authorized by statute or ordinance.

3. ILOILO COLD STORAGE CO. v MUNICIPAL COUNCIL City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance which has not theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged by judicial determination.

Aquino, as City Engineer, is vested with authority to effect the abatement of the nuisances through demolition. By virtue of the Revised Charter of Manila, such duty, among others, was placed upon him. Arts. 700 and 702 must yield to this provision not only because it is later law but also because of the principle that special provisions prevail over general ones. Moreover, an ordinance authorized the action sought to be taken by respondent.

FACTS: Plaintiff is the owner of an ice and cold storage plant. Nearby residents made complaints regarding the smoke that the plant emits saying that it was very injurious to their health and comfort. The defendant made investigations and later on passed a resolution which demands that the smokestacks of the said factory be elevated or else the factory operations will be closed or suspended. Plaintiff opposed by filing for injunction.

2. VELASCO v. MANILA ELECTRIC CO.

ISSUES: W/N the resolution alone issued by the municipal council is sufficient to label and abate the supposed nuisance in this case?

Noise may constitute a nuisance but it must be of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities.

RULING: NO. There are two kinds of nuisances: nuisances per se and per accidens. The former are recognized as nuisances under any and all circumstances. The latter are such only because of the special circumstances and conditions surrounding them. The former may be abated even by private individuals however the latter is different; it needs a determination of the facts which is a judicial function.

FACTS: Velasco bought three (3) adjoining lots. He sold two (2) of these to Meralco and maintained the last one as his residence. Meralco constructed on their lots a sub-station at a distance of 10-20 meters away from appellant’s house. The company also built a concrete wall at the sides along the streets but put up only an interlink wire fence (previously a sawali wall) on the boundary with appellant. An unceasing sound emanates from the substation, caused by transformers (probably decepticons). Such, appellent contends, constitute a nuisance which has worsened his health condition and has lowered the value of his property. Several witnesses came forth but their testimonies were vague and imprecise. Resort was made to a sound level meter. The audible sound from

The question of nuisance can conclusively be decided, for all legal uses, by the established courts of law or equity alone, and that the resolution of officers, or of boards organized by force of municipal charters, cannot, to any degree, control such decision. City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance which has 1

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not theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged by judicial determination.

refused to vacate the said land despite the efforts of the government since money is allocated for the construction of a municipal gymnasium within the public plaza and such construction could not continue because of the presence of the buildings constructed by the defendants.

In the present case it is certain that the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry, beneficial to the people and conducive to their health and comfort. The resolution is obviously not enough to abate the property of the plaintiff.

ISSUE: Whether or not the municipality has a cause of action for the abatement of public nuisance under Article 694 of the CC.

4. HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. v BALANDAN, et al. Attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial (e.g. water tanks) as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location.

Held: Yes based on the definition of a nuisance provided for in the CC which states that “Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property or anything else which: … hinders or impairs the use of the property.” Article 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be equal.”

FACTS: Guillermo Balandan and his wife is claiming damages in the sum of P2,000 for the death of their son, Mario. Petitioner was the owner of an Ice plant, who had in their premises 2 tanks filled of water, 9 feet deep. The factory was fenced but Ingress and egress was easily made because the gates were always open and there was no guard assigned in the said gate. Also the tanks didn’t have any barricade or fence. One day when Mario was playing with his friend, they saw the tank inside the factory and began playing and swimming inside it. While bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already as a cadaver, having died of ‘asphyxia secondary to drowning.’ The lower decided in the favor of the parents saying that the petitioner is liable for damages due to the doctrine of attractive nuisance.

Article 699 provides for the following remedies against public nuisance: 1. 2. 3.

A prosecution under the penal code or any local ordinance civil action abatement without judicial proceedings

In the present case, the municipality chose to file a civil action for the recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied by the PR. Under the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan has to first pass an ordinance before summarily abate a public nuisance.

ISSUE: W/N the doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable in this case?

Considering the facts in the complaint is true then the writ of possession and writ of demolition would have been justified. A writ of demolition would have been sufficient to eject the PR.

RULING: NO. The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that “One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. American Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. In the case bar, the tanks themselves cannot fall under such doctrine thus the petitioners cannot be held liable for Mario’s death.

6. SUBIDO VS. OZAETA FACTS: Petitioner was the editor of the Manila Post who sought the inspection of real estates sold to aliens and registered with the RD who was given the authority thru DOJ Circular to examine all the records in the respondent’s custody relative to the said transactions.

5. TAMIN VS. CA

ISSUE: What is the extent of the discretion of the RD to regulate the accessibility of records relating to registered lands in its office.

FACTS: Petitioner municipality represented by its mayor Real filed in the RTC a complaint for the ejectment of respondents. It is alleged that the municipality owns a parcel of residential land located in Zamboanga del Sur and the said parcel of land was reserved for public plaza under PD 365 and that during the mayor, the municipality leased the area to the defendants subject to the condition that they should vacate the place in case it is needed for public purposes and the defendants paid the rentals religiously until 1967. They

HELD: What the law expects and requires from the RD is the exercise of an unbiased and impartial judgment by which all persons resorting to the office, under the legal authority and conducting themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of the person seeking access to the records. Except when it is clear that the purpose of the inspection is unlawful, it is not the duty of the registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, purposes, and objects of the person seeking to inspect the records. It is not their 2

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RULING: No. In cases involving infringement of trademark brought before this Court it has been consistently held that there is infringement of trademark when the use of the mark involved would be likely to cause confusion or mistake in the mind of

prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before the public gaze. 7. FRUIT OF THE LOOM V. CA I FRUIT FOR EVE

In cases involving infringement of trademark brought before this Court it has been consistently held that there is infringement of trademark when the use of the mark involved would be likely to cause confusion or mistake in the mind of the public or to deceive purchasers as to the origin or source of the commodity

the public or to deceive purchasers as to the origin or source of the commodity

FACTS: Petitioner is the registrant of a trademark, FRUIT OF THE LOOM, in the Philippines Patent Office and was issued two Certificates of Registration. The classes of merchandise covered by Registration Certificate No. 6227 are, among others, men's, women's and children's underwear, which includes women's panties and which fall under class 40 in the Philippine Patent Office's classification of goods. Registration Certificate No. 6680 covers knitted, netted and textile fabrics.

Standing by itself, FRUIT OF THE LOOM is wholly different from FRUIT FOR EVE. WE do not agree with petitioner that the dominant feature of both trademarks is the word FRUIT for even in the printing of the trademark in both hang tags, the word FRUIT is not at all made dominant over the other words. As to the design and coloring scheme of the hang tags, We believe that while there are similarities in the two marks like the red apple at the center of each mark, We also find differences or dissimilarities which are glaring and striking to the eye such as: 1. The shape of petitioner's hang tag is round with a base that looks like a paper rolled a few inches in both ends; while that of private respondent is plain rectangle without any base. 2. The designs differ. Petitioner's trademark is written in almost semi-circle while that of private respondent is written in straight line in bigger letters than petitioner's. Private respondent's tag has only an apple in its center but that of petitioner has also clusters of grapes that surround the apple in the center. 3. The colors of the hang tag are also very distinct from each other. Petitioner's hang tag is fight brown while that of respondent is pink with a white colored center piece. The apples which are the only similarities in the hang tag are differently colored. Petitioner's apple is colored dark red, while that of private respondent is light red.

Private respondent, a domestic corporation, is the registrant of a trademark FRUIT FOR EVE in the Philippine Patent Office and was issued a Certificate of Registration No. 10160, on January 10, 1963 covering garments similar to petitioner's products like women's panties and pajamas. In 1965 petitioner filed before the lower court, a complaint for infringement of trademark and unfair competition against the herein private respondent. Petitioner principally alleged in the complaint that private respondent's trademark FRUIT FOR EVE is confusingly similar to its trademark FRUIT OF THE LOOM used also on women's panties and other textile products. Furthermore, it was also alleged therein that the color get-up and general appearance of private respondent's hang tag consisting of a big red apple is a colorable imitation to the hang tag of petitioner. Private respondent stated that the trademark FRUIT FOR EVE is being used on ladies' panties and pajamas only whereas petitioner's trademark is used even on men's underwear and pajamas.

The ordinary purchaser must be thought of as having, and credited with, at least a modicum of intelligence to be able to see the obvious differences between the two trademarks in question.

At the pre-trial on May 5, 1965, the following admissions were made: (1) That the trademark FRUIT OF THE LOOM has been registered with the Bureau of Patents and it does not bear the notice 'Reg. Phil. Patent Off.', and (2) That the trademark FRUIT FOR EVE has been registered with the Bureau of Patents and it bears the notice "Reg. Phil. Patent Off." and (3) That at the time of its registration, plaintiff filed no opposition thereto.

8. DEL MONTE V. CA I SUNSHINE SAUCE

ISSUE: W/N the word FRUIT, being a generic word, is capable of exclusive appropriation by petitioner W/N there is no confusing similarity in sound and appearance between the two trademarks in question. 3

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In making the comparison to determine similarity, the question is NOT whether the two articles are distinguishable by their label when set side by side but whether the general confusion made by the article upon the eye of the casual purchaser who is unsuspicious and off his guard, is such as to likely result in his confounding it with the original. The court therefore should be guided by its first impression because the imitator will always try to create enough differences to confuse the Court but enough similarity to confuse the public.

name in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or advertising of any goods, business or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers or others as to the source or origin of such goods or services or identity of such business...

FACTS: Petitioner Del Monte Corporation is a foreign company organized under the laws of the United States and not engaged in business in the Philippines. Both the Philippines and the United States are signatories to the Convention of Paris of September 27, 1965, which grants to the nationals of the parties rights and advantages which their own nationals enjoy for the repression of acts of infringement and unfair competition.

Sec. 29 of the same law states as follows: Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith by which he shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or services for those of the one having established such goodwill...

Petitioner Philippine Packing Corporation (Philpack) is a domestic corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines. Del Monte granted Philpack the right to manufacture, distribute and sell in the Philippines various agricultural products, including catsup, under the Del Monte trademark and logo. Del Monte authorized Philpack to register with the Philippine Patent Office the Del Monte catsup bottle configuration, for which it was granted Certificate of Trademark Registration No. SR-913 by the Philippine Patent Office under the Supplemental Register. Del Monte also obtained two registration certificates for its trademark "DEL MONTE" and its logo.

To arrive at a proper resolution of this case, it is important to bear in mind the following distinctions between infringement of trademark and unfair competition. (1) Infringement of trademark is the unauthorized use of a trademark, whereas unfair competition is the passing off of one's goods as those of another. (2) In infringement of trademark fraudulent intent is unnecessary whereas in unfair competition fraudulent intent is essential. (3) In infringement of trademark the prior registration of the trademark is a prerequisite to the action, whereas in unfair competition registration is not necessary.

Respondent Sunshine Sauce Manufacturing Industries was issued a Certificate of Registration by the Bureau of Domestic Trade to engage in the manufacture, packing, distribution and sale of various kinds of sauce, identified by the logo Sunshine Fruit Catsup. The product itself was contained in various kinds of bottles, including the Del Monte bottle, whi...