PSCI151 Notes - Professor Avery Goldstein Spring 2018 PDF

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Professor Avery Goldstein Spring 2018...

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PSCI151 Notes Anarchy)  Not synonym for chaos  Refers to idea that no authority standing above member states in international system, no supreme order, cannot reliably enforce decisions handed down  Domestically, there is a strict hierarchy to follow. When nations break down, they can resemble international politics by having groups fight each other. Blocks form and reestablish new hierarchy. E.g. Syria.  It would appear that UN exist with international law, but expectation is that can’t be sure that rules can be enforced like in domestic policy.  Self help imperative- states must be prepared to look out for themselves to protect own interests.  Even if treaty is signed, concerns remain as chance of being deceived remains. Example- Adolf Hitler signing agreement with other countries, non aggression pact with Soviet Union. Possibility of future changes such as shifts in interests, policies, domestic political changes. Even close allies can become adversaries- USSR and China in 1960s. Security Dilemma)  When states take actions to build up own security, such as building up military, it appears as sign of aggression to other nations even without bad intentions. Cycle of armed escalation.  In anarchy state, each state is uncertain about meaning of capabilities deployed and intentions of others.  We can take actions to build up security that induces actions in others that reduce our security.  We can also refrain from building up military by leaving myself more exposed and vulnerable.  When country is so friendly and close then dilemma is non existent. Other nation is such a threat that any build up is clearly going to be used against you, e.g. Saddam Hussain and North Korea. Military Power and National Security)  Means to an end- military power for national security. Larger

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military may not always be better for country. Arms racing, or other states may join and turn against you. Soviet Russia built up military capabilities in second half of cold war, and US responded by building up and increasing relationships with nations across world like China. Russia surrounded by hostile nations aligned with US and had less secure position. Trigger others into starting preventative war, happens when others cannot afford arms racing. Opportunity costs associated with military build up hurts sectors in civilian economy, undermine political order within country. Soviet Russia lost support from people and even army, could not build high tech weapons on par with US because diverted too much money to building military capabilities. Factual-what weapons should be acquired? Opinion- how much security is needed, how much should be invested in military?

Morality, International Organization and Law)  Anarchy compromises moral actors’ ability to follow rules and principles. Because no way of punishing unethical behavior, behaving morally means exposed to actions of those who do not abide by those ideas. E.g. President Carter with moral foreign policy.  States may be forced to cooperate with distasteful allies to achieve common goal. E.g. Allied alliance with Josef Stalin’s dictatorship regime due to necessity of combatting Nazi Germany. Churchill strongly critical of Stalin in 1930s made comment “If Hitler invaded Hell, I would make at least a favorable reference to the devil in the House of Commons.”  United States partnered with South Korean right wing ruler, Apartheid South Africa, Mao’s communist China.  In choosing allies, morals and ethics are often cast aside.  Strategic bombing campaigns can be ethical way  UN is effective or useful when their resolutions coincide with interests of member states, specifically great powers. E.g. North Korean invade South Korea, UN resolution backed up by military force lead by US and allies.  International Organizations matter less than choices made by top world powers.  States tend to obey international law but attend to self interest.  General rule- pacta sunt servanda (promises must be kept), but

rebus sic stantibus (things thus standing). So if treaties to become inapplicable because of fundamental change of circumstances.  Most treaties have escape clauses that allow individual nations to withdraw from treaty if they deem circumstances change.  Therefore, international law is not as significant as individual state decisions. Smoke- National Security & Nuclear Dilemma)  Nuclear weapons created for WWII not Cold War  First use brought WWII to decisive end with Hiroshima and Nagasaki  Cold War caused proliferation of nuclear arms, changed in attitude from being bringer of peace post WWII to nuclear doom world wide  Ended in 1980s with Mikhail Gorbachev freeing Eastern European states and taking steps to decrease nuclear weapons.  In Middle Ages war did not occur on large scale for sustained period in the West, only exceptions like Crusade.  European states began to form and large scale war occurred e.g. 30 year war over Protestant vs. Catholic  Recoil against ideological based warfare, higher cause than material gain. Led to age of reason, flourishing in logic and philosophy.  Armies became smaller, more professional and nations devoted more time to developing sciences and the arts, colonial pursuits.  Modern age reduction in war due to: professional armies more valuable, capitalism and industrialization brought wealth to all, more material targets for war, nobility ran governments cross border, imperialism meant expansion opportunities overseas.  Napoleonic Wars saw politicians seek to avoid future conflict by distributing power evenly, mechanisms like cooling off periods and forums for negotiation established.  Late 19th century war becomes more technological focused with establishment of 2nd Reich by Prussians with superior technology.  Old practices like parade ground drills and individual heroism may not be as relevant anymore, highly educated officer making complex decisions may be more valuable.  Turn of 20th century arms race focused on quantity rather than superior quality of technology, and tensions between two blocs rose steadily

 Both World Wars resulted power imbalance with unified Germany, and punishments after WWI did not permanently weaken Germany  Distinction between civilians and combatants started to blur in WWI with “homefront” term first used.  World War I dispelled idea of small scale, brief war prevalent in late 19th century  In our era, colonial ties dissolved but more complex ties/alliances politically and economically between developed and developing nations  Technological improvements mean that forces have to be on stand by as no time to react and build up  Constant insecurity due to speed of warfare  War has also become impersonal, lack of romantic portrayal of war like heroes from WWI Red Baron  Technological development driven by war with establishment of R&D system- Boeing 707 first civilian airliner came from B47 bomber, radar developed at start of WWII etc. Goldstein Chapter 1- Deterrence and 21st Century Security)  Nuclear deterrence will remain effective when international system is anarchic, nations value self interest more than supranational interests, no effective counter to nuclear weapons is developed.  Emergence of new international system where serious military threat is unclear and use of force to resolve international disputes judged irrelevant, state’s interests based on economic rather than military terms.  Secondary powers like Britain, China and France’s behavior in Cold War more useful to study for today’s age due to them being constrained in military spending, Soviet Union & US are atypical examples. Goldstein Chapter 2- Theoretical Foundation)  China, Britain and France defined national interest during Cold War as preserving status quo against threats to territorial and political integrity.  Anarchic international system and lack of superordinate system to coordinate disputes is described by neorealist theory.  This system leads to states depending when to employ force to protect interests, burden left to leaders

 Neorealist, balance of power theory suggests that bipolar, anarchic system meant three nations had to rely on one of super powers for security, yet self reliance is preferred under anarchy  Three nations ended up choosing deterrence as being strategy  WWII changed anarchic system, before was multipolar and after until end of Cold War was bipolar  US and Soviet Union set apart by ability to influence  External alliances could not have decisive influence on balance of powers between US and Soviet Union  Collective goods theory of alliances- both collective and national benefits from military spending, cannot exclude allies from sharing in those benefits so smaller states can free ride  Since superpower had enough incentive to provide security, it is rational for partners to not shoulder allocated military burden.  Fear of abandonment by three nations and decrease in political autonomy were flaws in system  Superpower concerned about abandonment of allies ruining their international reputation and image, its principal rival might view it as sign of weakness and challenge it on more important matters.  Superpower will support allies if costs and risks are acceptable, if not then refer to intrinsic value of commitment.  In bipolar world with nuclear weapons, unlike times of WWI with chained alliances, superpower more likely to abandon allies if chances of armed conflict with rival is high.  A way to mitigate risk of abandonment would be to establish itself as loyal ally/follower of superpower and increase reputational costs, exploits idea of zero sum game in international politics for superpowers  Another way is to emphasize the severity of the threat that superpower adversary poses.  Political deference to superpower is unattractive to leaders where nationalism is important in a regime’s legitimacy  To maintain status quo, indirect method would be dissuasion using deterrence or defense using nuclear or conventional methods, direct method would be preservation using defense, with nuclear and conventional methods.  To change status quo, indirect method would be persuasion using compellence and offense, with nuclear and conventional methods. Direct method would be alteration with offense, both

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nuclear and conventional. When dissuasion is goal, states attempt to discourage others from challenging status quo by threatening to use force through deterrence and defense. Dissuasion by deterrence threatens retaliations so scary that adversary does not initiate challenge regardless of ability While nuclear methods are most common, no reason why biochemical and conventional weapons cannot do same job Does not necessary have to be threats of inflicting damage on enemy homeland- fighting to last man to increase costs, protracted resistance movement etc. Dissuasion by defense discourages the adversary from challenging the status quo by threatening him with unsurmountable obstacles to achieve military objectives Incentive to mix both defense and deterrence in together, although if costs of mounting defense is too high then deterrence will be emphasized Even well devised defense strategies can fail due to miscalculation of costs of action, adversary not being rational. Forces deployed in defense can easily defend vital interests in direct attack, forces deployed for deterrence cannot easily revert if dissuasion fails. Persuasion through compellence forces adversary to accept changes in status quo by threatening punishments if not followed Persuasion through offense threatens to create desired change regardless of adversary’s intentions/ability to resist. China, Britain and France embraced dissuasion via deterrence using nuclear means, although it was more expensive than relying on allies, it gave measure of self reliance. Trying to create obstacles of defense against nuclear weapons was impossible for all, and even conventional defense against superpower would have had too high of an opportunity cost e.g. US costs of protecting Western European allies was about 5 times second tier power’s annual military budget Geographic (highly concentrated population and assets) and aging population (smaller standing army) meant Britain and France would have hard time constructing defense Conventional deterrence methods by weaker powers means guerilla war even after military campaign failure, and converting political support into military power e.g. France and US

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in Indochina/Vietnam, Soviets in Afghanistan This conventional method is sometimes ineffective with powers ignoring threats, politically unattractive to trade space for time, abandon assets in urban areas make national war more costly, as living standards rise hard to organize citizens into people militia due to comforts of life not suited to military Nuclear technology changed strategic thinking- no longer how to use forces to win war but to avoid scenario where each party inflicts unacceptable damage to each other High consequences of nuclear attack and ease of inflicting large amount of damage very quickly further erodes trust in alliance- self reliance idea In a confrontation between weak and strong state, not rational for weak state to launch retaliation strike against aggressor as it brings total destruction not just defeat Argument that deterrence relies on credible threat of retaliation, hence should be smaller, graduated attacks that can be controlled Weapons require extreme control and sophistical command system Britain, France and China used nuclear deterrence by threatening to have an irrational situation where things go out of control Aggressor could be wary of accidental nuclear launch against it when command/decision making erode after attack, or nuclear launch under misinformation of complete attack Nuclear weapons may be expensive but it takes more conventional weapons to equalize its effects, also conventional weapons are high maintenance due to shifts in technology, needs according to adversary etc. Nuclear weapons more flexible and not subject to restrictions like geography, easy to redeploy against other enemies

Uses of Force)  Even when use of force is indirect, they still employ some force to reinforce credibility of threat  4 conditions necessary for successful coercion  Knowledge- know what adversary values, know adversary’s capabilities, know what their fears are  Communication- adversary has to receive and understand what they have to do to avoid carrying out the threat, as well as threat itself

 Overlapping interests between adversary and you, must convince adversary that both of you would benefit if threat was not carried out e.g. if Saddam Hussein believed that regardless whatever he did, Americans would carry out attack, then no effect  Ability of adversary to comply- adversary must be able to carry out demands, and cost of complying must not seem too great such as political ramifications  2 conditions that facilitate coercion  Great disparity in actors’ capabilities- e.g. Japan’s article 9 in Constitution written by Americans to never wage war and have official army, eastern European satellite states controlled by Soviets  Ease of carrying out threats  Strategic significance of Nuclear Weapons- speed and certainty, role of military battles, relation between great power warfare and civilian population  Dissuasion by deterrence example- Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait, operation Desert Shield, President Bush threatens Hussein with punishment if his military doesn’t stop. US later moves troops into region  Monroe Doctrine- stop western hemisphere from being infiltrated by European powers, dissuasion by defense as allows US to better defend homeland  Intrinsic value vs. reputation value tradeoff  Ukraine- no intrinsic value but has reputation value, whether adversary take US seriously and allies can count on American resolve  Mutual Deterrence- stable deterrent balance, with neither side feel like they have to attack first with no incentive to attack first  Adversary has to feel like he deters you and you deter him, in some instances, you may have to relent on building strength to build confidence in adversary  Don’t deploy capability to launch decapitating strike on adversary  Don’t have ability to disarm adversary’s weapon systems  Emphasize that weapons are mainly counter value- can be used to punish adversary’s population, assets etc.  Don’t employ defenses that would neutralize adversary’s retaliation strike  Active defenses are things one can employ to fend off adversary’s weapons e.g. antiaircraft weapons, missile systems

 Passive defenses are ways that neutralize adversary’s weapons effects, bomb shelters  Compellence vs. Deterrence- similarity is that they are both strategies based on threat of punishment, compellence strategy is harder than deterrence as it has to change status quo  Challenges in making compellence work- hard to initiate threat and suitable action, hard to clarify demands, concern over appearance as “pushover” e.g. North Korea gives up nuclear weapons next step regime change, how to facilitate compliance with demands  Counterforce vs. Countervalue distinction important  To make threat credible, need to demonstrate the ability to carry out threat, also need to demonstrate resolve Thomas Schelling)  Threat of pain tries to alter somebody’s motives, whereas brute force tries to overcome his strengths  Adversary needs to know what would happen if he doesn’t comply, what we don’t want, how he can comply  Coercion requires finding bargain where adversary is better off doing what we want especially when taking into account punishments, he needs to be confident that we are better off if he complies  E.g. if German killing of French infantrymen at Verdun was simply to get rid of military obstacle then it is brute force, if goal is to enlarge pain felt by family members to get France to accommodate demands then it is coercion  With nuclear weapons, victory is no longer prerequisite for hurting the enemy, can inflict damage without overcoming adversary’s military unlike previous times  Nuclear weapons also reverse sequence of inflicting damage and hoping surrender comes before destruction, no option of sparing loser  Secretary McNamara introduced idea of self restraint and not destroying enemy civilians and cities during Cold War, giving idea that threat of doing so has more value in negotiations and encourages opponent to do same  Korea is an example of limited war in modern times with both sides showing restraint, no attacks on Chinese/Japanese territory, no bombing of ships at sea or even airfields on UN

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side of line Military strategy has become more punitive rather than acquisitive, and military strategy has become the diplomacy of violence. Threat for compellence should be initiated until adversary acts, unlike threat for deterrence Compellence sets things in motion in a way that allows adversary time to carry out desired action, but also sets hard deadline so timing is very important A NATO or American attempt to relieve Budapest in 1956 would have been compellence- hope soviets get out of way and not fight Act of compliance is more obvious as submission under duress than compliance under deterrence as act is simply withheld Need to let adversary understand demands but at same time, not publicize it so that humiliation is felt when adversary complies Ideal compellence action would be non recallable once initiated and automatically stops when action is carried out by opponent- only he can stop it Another type allows initiator to stop action if stress/risk becomes too great Brinkmanship means manipulating the shared risk of war, the danger that somebody may accidentally stumble into war dragging the other with them Skillful diplomacy means forcing oppon...