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Olivia Yazzolino PS126 4/15/19 Axelrod Chapter 4: The Live and Let Live System in Trench Warfare in WWI In his research on cooperation in international security, Axelrod discusses a phenomena referred to as the “live-and-let-live” systems. This is the opposite of the kill or be killed philosophy and it emerged commonly during trench warfare exchanges in World War One. When troops were lined up facing one another just a few hundred yards away, they surprisingly often spontaneously cooperated. One reason Axelrod provides for the men not wanting to shoot one another is that they usually ate their meals at the time, so both sides would stop fighting to eat. Further, when the weather was bad, the men often simply chose not to open fire on one another. Over the years spent fighting, the soldiers on either side also became familiar with one another. They did not feel the hate and fear of enemies often instilled in brutal warfare because they spent so many nights camped out in the same position as the enemy. Both sides did not want to be the one to shoot first for fear that the other side would retaliate more violently. However, the live and let live system did not always last after smaller raids on the trenches began taking place. Once raids took place, the feeling of mutual understanding and empathy for the enemy gave way to revenge. Axelrod describes the cycle as “self-reinforcing” so that enemies can come to sympathize with the others position, but will adopt aggression as soon as they feel their trust has been betrayed by the other side. Aexelrod also writes that rituals helped develop the live and let live system, describing the patterns of shooting enemies would engage in to actually signal peace and avoid a confrontation. Axelrod uses the case study of trench warfare to suggest that cooperation is possible even among enemies, and requires a situational understanding of retaliation rather than a necessary allyship or common goals. This chapter explores important questions about security and proposes that perhaps we are more secure when bi-polar powers possess equal capabilities to destroy the other. Because the soldiers fighting on both sides of WWI understood they were each suffering equally, neither wanted to make the suffering worse. Further, finding basic common ground like mealtime and weather proved that they weren’t so different from one another. Axelrod explains that the long terms benefits from cooperating (not being killed) outweigh the short term benefits of defecting and shooting, which would lead to a shoutout that could be deadly for both sides. This live-andlet live system is a sort of Prisoner’s Dilemma in which both sides benefit from not defecting. Axelrod uses this example of cooperation to support his argument that a tit-for-tat strategy allows opponents a way out. It reduces tension between sides and facilitates a natural change from a kill-or-be-killed scenario to one where no one gets killed, it is simply equal....