Section 5 Warrant Exceptions PDF

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Detailed class notes and book outlines for Professor Mal...

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Class 6: Warrant Exceptions Chapter 4: pg. 246-307

Warden v. Hayden (pg. 247, SC, 1967) Book Notes:

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Chimel v. California (pg. 256, SC, 1969) Book Notes:

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Riley v. California (pg. 267, SC, 2014) Book Notes:

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NY v. Belton (pg. 279, SC, 1981) Book Notes:

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Arizona v. Gant (pg. 289, SC, 2009) Book Notes:

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Whren v. United States (pg. 225, SC, 1975) Book Notes:

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Intro Notes: Warrant Clause: When are Warrants Required? 1. Exigent circumstances 2. Searches incident to an arrest (SITA)

A. Exigent Circumstances 1. Katz: Searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment, subject only to a few established exceptions. a. This section = about those exceptions 2. Next class = court moving away from “warrant requirement” jurisprudence to an explicit reasonableness balancing approach 3. Prior precedent that gets overruled in Warden because it was too narrowly protecting property rights, not privacy a. Officers may seize items of evidentiary value b. Officers may seize instrumentalities, fruits, or contraband 4. Modern view set in Warden = more privacy protection focused a. Thus, if officers ≠ violate ∆’s privacy and see evidence of a

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crime, they = seize it b. In warden, privacy rights weren’t violated, so seizure was constitutional

Class Notes: 1.

Warden v. Hayden (pg. 247, SC, 1967) 1. Rule a. The Fourth Amendment permits officers in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon to enter a home, into which the suspect had fled, and search the home without a warrant.

2. Facts a. Police received a call that an armed robbery had just occurred. The caller gave a description of the suspect and informed the police that the robber had just entered a private residence. When the police arrived at the home, they knocked at the door, and Bennie Hayden’s (defendant’s) wife answered. She let the police in to search the house. The police found Hayden upstairs and arrested him. During the course of their search, the police also found a gun and ammunition. They also found clothing in a washing machine that was consistent with the description given of the robber. All of this evidence was introduced at trial, and Hayden was convicted. Unable to secure relief from state courts, Hayden petitioned the federal district court for habeas corpus, which was denied. b. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the search was lawful, but that the clothing should not have been admitted because it had “evidential value only” and could not be validly seized. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

3. Issue a. (1) Does the Fourth Amendment permit officers in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon to enter a home, into which the suspect had fled, and search the home without a warrant?

4. Answer a. Yes

5. Brennan Holding a. (1) Yes. The Fourth Amendment permits officers in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon to enter a home, into which the suspect had fled, and search the home without a

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warrant. b. Under the exigent-circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, officers may conduct a warrantless search if delaying the search would be inappropriate under the circumstances. c. For example, officers may enter a house and conduct a warrantless search if speed is necessary to avoid grave danger to the officers or others. d. Here, there is no doubt that the entry into the home and the search for weapons were lawful in light of the exigencies of the situation. The police acted reasonably when they entered the home and searched it for suspects and weapons, because they were acting to protect their lives and the lives of others.

Book Notes: 1. Basically, police followed robber in hot pursuit, and searched home for evidence lawfully under the exigent circumstances exception. Follows a reasonableness standard where they can do it without a warrant if it would otherwise risk officer safety or destruction of evidence. 2. Warden v. Wayden recognized: a. (1) officers’ hot pursuit of a fleeing felon as being within the exigentcircumstances exception. 3. exigency—an urgent need or demand a. Exigenct circumstances: An emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect, or destruction of evidence. 4. Warrantless entry of the home part 2 a. Welsh v. WI—when crime that there’s probable cause to arrest for is minor, exigent circumstances cannot be found to allow for warrantless entry into a home i. SC entering home to arrest questionably drunk driver after call b. Stanton v. Sims— pulled a slim shady ^; said that Welsh is usually* true, however, when hot pursuit is found, then the seriousness of the offense does not need to be considered before the entry of a home 5. Warrantless entry of the home part 3: the “community caretaking” emergency doctrine a. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart— cops responded to call about a party, upon arrival, saw adults restraining a kid who then broke loose and punched an adult, drawing blood, they entered and yelled police twice i. ∆s contended 4A violation of:

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1. (1) knock and announce rule, but this was not the case because the officer did announce twice, which was the best he could do under the circumstances 2. (2) warrantless entry, but this was also not found to be true because injured adult might have needed help, and officers ≠ have to wait until violence to get worse a. Differentiated Welsh— said that evidence preservation ≠ enough to create an exigent circumstance, but here, ongoing violence was ii. Rule: one exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such an injury. 1. Officers can enter home to render emergency assistance to an injured occupat or to protect from imminent injury 2. 4A follows “reasonableness” touchstone 6. Exigency warrant exception in a special (and frequent) fact pattern: blood tests of a suspected drunk driver a. Schmerber v. CA— court said to consider circumstances; if warrant application would interfere with duties, ≠ need warrant for blood test b. Welsh v. WI— drunk driving w/out hot pursuit ≠ warrant exigent circ. for home entry and BAC test w/out a warrant c. MO v. McNeeley— if he has time, officer needs a warrant for blood BAC test d. Mitchell v. WI—controlling major case; when a driver is unconscious and therefore cannot be given a less intrusive breath test, a blood BAC test is allowed to be ordered without a warrant i. This case ≠ involve an accident or injury to anyone, just unconsious drunk driver; BAC test was justified on the grounds of exigency ii. Court held that in rare cases, ∆ could still attempt to show that officer did not prove that pursuing a warrant application would have interfered with duties (like Schmerber and McNeeley) iii. Thomas concurrence: thought that alcohol metabolization should create an

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automatic warrant exception bc destruction of evidence iv. Sotomayor dissent: they had time to get a warrant, therefore, they should have. 7. What if the police create the exigency? a. Kentucky v. King—replaced old “police-created exigency rule”; court held that the exigency exception to the warrant requirement applies unless the police “create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the fourth amendment” i. Here, police ≠ violate 4A because they knocked and announced, and evidence destruction was exigent ii. Noted ∆ could have strong case if police created an exigent circumstance by entering/threatening to enter when warrantless entry ≠ allowed by 4A iii. The case involved officers smelling pot while investigating an apartment complex lawfully, knocking and announcing, and then breaking down door because they heard evidence destruction and finding drugs 8. Commonwealth v. Davido— police got call about domestic beating, arrived 3 minutes later and knocked and announcer, heard unanswered telephone ringing so entered without a warrant; unconstitutional? a. Court held that this was constitutional because it was an exigent circumstance b. Makes sense, because someone was in imminent danger 9. US v. Caraballo—V told police that she was afraid of C and that C had guns, then V was murdered; officers were afraid that C was danger to others then so asked Spring to track C’s phone; was a search warrant required to do this? 10. State v. Campbell—officer drove to C’s house for noise complaint; got there and smelled weed, knew he ≠ have authority to enter so he covered peep hole/hid from window and knocked, C opened door holding handgun, saw officer, then closed door a. Officer now saw C as a threat and shoved open door and entered b. 4A violation? c. Seems like a police-created exigent circumstance. i. This violated KY v. King 11. Davido, Caraballo, and Campbell all were held to be constitutional under the exigency exception.

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B. Searches Incident to a Lawful Arrest (SILA)

Three Categories of SILA 1. General principles a. Chimel v. CA—SILA allowed for area in control of person under 4A under (1) officer safety rationale and (2) evidence destruction rationale i.

Searching the whole house went too far

b. Riley v. CA—can’t search cellphone absent exigent circumstances (2 private) i.

Breath test ≠ need warrant, blood tests do

2. Arrests of automobile occupants a. NY v. Belton—car passenger compartment = w/in arrestee’s immediate control b. AZ v. Gant—if prong’s ≠ apply because person subdued, ≠ do SILA i.

If evidence of crime* ≠ at risk, ≠ do SILA

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Limitation: reigned in broad reach of Belton. Restored 2 prongs of Chimel. Expansion: Car search, when incident to arrest, can be justified by desire to locate evidence of the crime of an arrest (here, suspended license, so no justification/reason to search car for evidence)

3. Pretextual stops and arrests, particularly in automobiles a. Whren v. US—pretextual stop ≠ a 4A issue; they’re allowed if pc exists *Belton and Chimel are both still good law. You might just have to use both rules. If individual is arrested separate from car search, via SILA, police are permitted to search the grabbing distance of the person. Chimel gave police the ability to do that regardless of the crime involved. With regard to vehicles, the court will look at the type of arrest and the location of the individual. If the individual has been removed from the vehicle and restrained/unable to reach into the passenger compartment, the police may not be able to search. Depending on the crime of the arrest though, the police may be able to search the vehicle. (Chimel, Belton, and Gant are SILA cases, not automobile cases really.)

General Principles:

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Chimel v. California (pg. 256, SC, 1969) 1. Rule a. Incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search of the area in possession and control of the person under arrest is permissible under the Fourth Amendment. i. Searching entire house went too far 2. Facts a. Pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, the police went to Chimel’s (defendant) home to arrest him for the burglary of a coin shop. Chimel’s wife let the police inside and when Chimel returned home they arrested him. Without a search warrant and without permission, the police then conducted a complete search of Chimel’s home. The police instructed Chimel’s wife to remove items from drawers and eventually the police found and seized a number of coins, medals and tokens. Over Chimel’s objection, these items were introduced at trial. The appellate courts affirmed the decision holding that the search of Chimel’s home was valid as a search incident to a lawful arrest. 3. Issue a. Is a warrantless search of an entire home permissible when the search is incident to a lawful arrest that takes place in the home? 4. Answer a. NO 5. Holding a.

A warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest can only cover the area in possession or control of the person being arrested. When an arrest occurs, it is reasonable for the police to search the person being arrested to insure he is not armed and to ensure no evidence is destroyed. This rule is easily extended to include a search of the area that the person under arrest may access. However, a search of the area outside of the suspect’s immediate control cannot be similarly justified and is therefore not reasonable. The warrantless search of private homes was what the Fourth Amendment requirements of warrants and probable cause were intended to prevent. Furthermore, allowing warrantless searches of an entire home would encourage the police to make all arrests in suspects’ homes since they could then legally undertake a search even where probable cause is lacking. Because the coins introduced at trial were not found in an area under Chimel’s

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immediate control, the search and seizure was unconstitutional and the conviction is overturned. 6. While Dissent a. There is no need to overrule earlier precedent and hold that searches of entire homes incident to arrest are per-se unreasonable. Rather, an arrest creates exigent circumstances allowing for a warrantless search when there is probable cause to believe that delay would result in the destruction of evidence. In this case, if the police had not immediately searched the home for the coins, Chimel’s wife would have likely removed the coins from the home in the time it took the police to secure a search warrant. Therefore, the search was reasonable. ∆ Chimel loses every time until SC, then he wins.

Book Notes: 1. About when police show up with an arrest warrant, but without a search warrant, and search anyways a. Search incident to arrest— allows officers to search a suspect’s person or the surrounding area during a lawful arrest; allowed because it prevents person from reaching for weapon or destroying evidence b. Searching entire house goes too far! i. They can’t search outside their reach; his bedroom upstairs was too far 2. White dissent: should be reasonable when probable cause exists that evidence = in home 3. This case clarified the permissible scope of a scope incident to arrest. (scope of immediate control as seen below)

4. Problem: a. Officers have probable cause to arrest Donald for murder; they wait at his house

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for him to get home for 1.5 hours, after he gets home they wait 15 minutes and arrest him in doorway, then take him inside handcuffed and place him near open closet; search closet and find murder gun in shoe i. Should evidence be admitted despite no warrants for arrest/search? ii. They probably should have gotten a warrant because they had time. So no, evidence should not be admitted. However, this would likely be upheld because it’s not even really SILA anymore it’s just the officers accidentally finding the gun. 5. United States v. Robinson—officer had probable cause to believe that Robinson was driving w/out permit so he pulled him over and arrested him for the offense; searched him about found cigarette box in shirt w/heroin a. ∆ argued that here, the 2 justifications for a search-incident-to-lawfularrest warrant exception (officer safety and prevention of evidence destruction) ≠ apply since crime was auto-related and evidence ≠ be destroyed b. SC held that nevertheless, police’s decision to search is ad hoc (they can exercise under reasonableness) c. Rule: the right to conduct a warrantless search is automatic: if the custodial arrest is based on probable cause, then no more is needed. i. Not just an exception to the warrant requirement, but it’s reasonable. 6. Arrest inventories: another warrant “exception” a. Reconsider Robinson above b. When arrestees are brought to station, they undergo booking and a second “arrest inventory” search to (1) eliminate risk of theft while in jail (2) reduce risk of false claims of theft by arrestee and (3) ensure that contraband/weapons that were initially missed are not smuggled into the jail. c. Therefore, it’s likely that even if officer in Robinson did not conduct the search and find the heroin, it would have likely been found in second arrest inventory search anyways

Riley v. California (pg. 267, SC, 2014) 1. Rule

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a. Under the Fourth Amendment, the government may not conduct a warrantless search of the contents of a cell phone seized incident to an arrest absent exigent circumstances.

2. Facts a. Police searched David Riley (defendant) incident to an arrest and seized his smartphone from his pocket. The police searched the smartphone and used items found on it as evidence at Riley’s trial on shooting charges brought by the State of California (plaintiff). Riley was convicted. On appeal, the state court of appeal determined that the warrantless search was a valid search incident to arrest. In a consolidated case, Brima Wurie (defendant) had his flip-phone seized from his person incident to an arrest for drug sales. Police used items seized from the flipphone to secure a search warrant for Wurie’s residence. The district court admitted evidence found in the residence at trial, but on appeal, the federal court of appeals held that the evidence was the fruit of an illegal search of the flip-phone. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on both cases.

3. Issue a. Under the Fourth Amendment, may the government conduct a warrantless search of the contents of a cell phone seized incident to an arrest absent exigent circumstances?

4. Answer a. NO

5. Roberts Holding a. Police officers generally must secure a warrant before conducting a search of the contents of a cell phone seized incident to an arrest. The search of a person incident to an arrest is a valid exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This exception is permitted for the safety of the arresting officer and to prevent destruction of evidence. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). There is no safety risk posed to an officer by a cell phone beyond a preliminary search to make sure the phone does not house a blade or other small weapon. Searching the contents of a cell phone is distinguishable from the approved warrantless search of a cigarette pack. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). To the extent that a search of the contents of a cell phone might indirectly affect officer safety by alerting of

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potential danger, the separate exigent-circumstances warrant exception may apply. Once officers have secured a cell phone, there is little risk of destruction of evidence stored on the phone. The government concerns of destruction of evidence via remote wiping or data encryption goes beyond the concern in Chimel that a defendant can destroy that which is within reach. An additional justification for searches incident to arrest is the diminished privacy rights of a defendant once an arrest occurs. Although the search of a cigarette pack incident to arrest is acceptable, a complete search of a defendant’s house or cell phone is not. The search of the data on a cell phone is a major invasion of privacy due to the quality and quantity of personal information stored on cell phones. Here, the government argues that, pursuant to Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), a warrantless search of a cell phone is justified when the cell phone is reasonably believed to contain evidence of the crime of arrest. Gant applied to searches of vehicles, however, and the search of a cell phone cannot possibly be limited in any reasonable fashion. The government may not conduct a warrantless search of cell phone incident to arrest; rather, the government must secure a warrant or demonstrate exigent circumstances. Accordingly, the judgment of the state court of appeal is reversed, and the judgm...