Seminar 2- Bird F. B. (2014 ). Moral Muteness. In PDF

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The article for seminar 2 is about moral muteness....

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moral muteness Frederick Bird

What is moral muteness? People are morally mute if they fail forthrightly to voice moral concern regarding issues about which they possess moral convictions. Hypocrites act deceptively, claiming moral convictions that they do not in fact hold. People who are morally mute are deceptive as well, but in a quite different way, because they fail to disclose and communicate overtly moral convictions that they in fact hold. Moral muteness assumes at least four different forms. First, many people in business are morally mute because they fail to speak out about activities they judge to be harmful or wrong. They witness discrimination against minorities, they know colleagues are padding expense accounts, they observe managers misusing executive perks, or they see the cavalier disregard for the legitimate complaints of particular customers – and they say nothing. They learn that agents retained by their firms in developing countries are offering bribes to government officials – but they remain quiet. They hear stories that a purchasing agent is paying a certain long-time supplier much higher prices for goods that could be obtained much more inexpensively from alternative sources – and they do nothing in response. As happened for a large number of people working in the thrift industry in the 1980s, they witness their colleagues making a large number of questionable loan decisions – and they remain silent (Mayer, 1990). In all these examples, business people are morally mute because they have failed to speak up about practices which they privately consider as either blatantly harmful, decidedly wrong, or at least potentially so. Second, people are morally mute as well by not representing their own moral views as forthrightly as they might. They mute their moral concerns by remaining silent about moral ideals they would like to put into place. They might hope, for example, that their organizations would create more opportunities for minorities, adopt more environmentally sustainable practices, or provide more skill training opportunities, but they say nothing directly. They mute

their moral concerns as well by not bargaining hard for positions about which they hold moral convictions. In order to avoid overt conflicts, they too easily or too quickly compromise. Third, one of the most prevalent expressions of moral muteness is exhibited in the way supervisors or colleagues provide muted feedback and appraisals on the work of others. One manager commented: “I inherited a manager who had sloppy dress, bad teeth, and poor personal hygiene; previous managers couldn’t bring themselves to give him feedback.” Another confessed: “Our managers are chicken to confront in the performance appraisal interview. All our employees have satisfactory or better ratings, and everybody has potential. It’s just not true” (Bird, 1996, p. 45, 48). Like assigning inflated grades in school, the failure to provide forthright and honest feedback leaves others without clear understanding of their shortfalls and available opportunities for learning. Fourth, we are morally mute as well when we disguise genuine moral concerns as if they were simply matters of economic calculation or organizational politics. This tendency to mask ethical issues predominantly in other terms as matters of finance, strategy, or pragmatics is widespread. Our concerns for just treatment, honest communications, and socially responsible practices are rephrased as matters of competitive advantage or self-interest. We can appropriately argue that people experience something like moral amnesia when they use decidedly non-moral terms to raise what on closer examination are clearly ethical concerns. One of the best-known examples of this kind of moral amnesia is the essay by Milton Friedman entitled “The social responsibility of business is to increase its profit” Friedman (1971). The title and a quick read of this essay make it seem that Friedman is arguing that the ethical responsibility of businesses does not extend beyond profit making so long as this is done legally. On closer examination, the essay is filled with moral arguments about the responsibilities of executives to employees and customers as well as shareholders, the importance of operating without deception and in keeping with standards of fair competition, and the responsibility of using organizational resources effectively without waste. The failure overtly to acknowledge these ethical concerns

Wiley Encyclopedia of Management, edited by Professor Sir Cary L Cooper. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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makes it much more difficult to encourage and invite open discussions of everyday moral issues that business organizations face. In many cases, moral muteness is a matter of degree. Few business people totally mute their moral concerns. In many cases, what business people do is to whisper their moral concerns or state them indirectly. They raise objections with a few colleagues about what they regard as their firms’ misleading advertising, unfair promotion policies, or loosely interpreted adherence to air quality standards. They hesitantly and in passing note their concern with the way their firms use agents to skirt legal requirements. They bury their criticism of the way their firms manage security problems, sourcing, or consumer complaints within larger reports, where they can be easily overlooked. In an often-cited case that involved the manufacturing of a braking system for US Air Force planes, several engineers quietly cautioned the superiors in their company that the four-disk brake under construction would not provide sufficient braking strength and, therefore, constituted a safety hazard. Inspite of these warnings, their superiors decided to proceed with initial flight tests, in part in order to keep to their agreedupon manufacturing schedule. In the company’s test flights, the new brakes did not allow the planes to come to a stop within the expected distance. The engineers who raised the safety concerns altered the report to allow the planes to coast longer distances. They submitted the report but did not sign their names to it. They knew the brakes as constructed constituted a safety hazard. They had quietly voiced their concern. Even though they believed firmly that weakness of the brakes would become publicly evident as soon as they were utilized by the Air Force, they made no further efforts to communicate their concerns. Yet it was clearly in their firm’s interest to learn of this braking problem. Later, at much greater expense, the firm had to redesign and rebuild the brakes they were working on because their malfunctioning became clear as soon as the Air Force tested them (Vandiver, 1972). Why do business people so often muffle their expression of moral concern? Why do they so frequently respond inattentively to moral concerns expressed by others? What are the

primary underlying causes of moral muteness and deafness? Several individual factors seem especially important. To begin with, many people mute their moral convictions either because they believe they cannot make a difference and/or because they believe that moral considerations call for heroic actions they feel ill-prepared to follow. For example, if they learn that their firm is probably making payoffs to secure contracts, they are likely to assume their alternatives are either to speak out publicly and put their jobs at risk or to remain silent and keep their positions. They view their alternatives almost exclusively in relation to exit or loyalty. When they conclude that they cannot act morally unless they act like saints, what they frequently suffer from is a lack of moral imagination that would lead them to explore varied ways they might voice their concern without having to put themselves at extraordinary risk (Hirschman, 1970). For example, in a case like the one just cited, they might voice concern by raising questions, by proposing to experiment with alternative strategies to develop business contacts, by voicing concern anonymously either within or beyond the organization, and/or by seeking assistance from colleagues or relevant community groups. Moral resignation in many cases follows from excessively inflated notions of what moral convictions require from us, combined with an inability to think creatively about quite different possible ways of responding. Moral imagination, in contrast, invites us to consider varied alternatives, to begin in small ways where we can, and to seek out allies (Nielsen 1987, 1989). Additionally, as individuals, we often fail to speak out about moral concerns because we fear being implicated. We fear that we will be adversely affected because now others will begin to expose ways we may at times have cut corners. We fear that as we speak out, we will be dragged along by unfolding events, which will in turn take increasing amounts of our time and energy. Finally, we fear reprisals from those whose misconduct is being exposed. All these fears call for realistic assessments. Still, often by effectively preparing our cases, by remaining clear about the issues at stake, by using our imagination, and by seeking the support of colleagues, we can protect ourselves both from

moral muteness 3 being further implicated and from becoming over-committed. Nonetheless, the extent to which individuals feel free to voice their moral concerns is often greatly affected by the milieu and structures of organizations of which they are a part. In several decisive ways, business organizations promote and reinforce moral silence and its corollary, moral deafness. For example, many organizations effectively discourage or block overt expressions of dissent, questioning, and criticizing. They do so in the first place by not establishing accessible means for employees, managers, and other stakeholders to raise concerns, air complaints, and make inquiries. Few firms have established effective due process or employee voicing systems that might allow and encourage constituents of organizations regularly to express their moral concerns (Ewing, 1989; Saunders and Leck, 1993). Moreover, many firms that establish some kind of mechanism for employees to speak out about moral issues tend to invite primarily the most accusatory expressions. They establish anonymous hotlines or especially welcome statements providing evidence of violations of organizational standards. These mechanisms do not invite two-way discussions. Rather than risk possibly irretrievably damaging someone else’s reputation or career, and rather than risk reprisals for actions that seem only a little out of line, many business people have chosen to remain silent. Accusatory forms for raising moral concerns do not invite discussions, inquiries, or tentative explorations. Other firms further stifle open communication by penalizing people when their concern about some particular violations turn out to be unfounded. In the process, they suppress efforts to question and seek clarification about moral issues. Certain top-down patterns of organizational direction and accountability also foster moral muteness. Directions and policies are expected to begin at the top and subordinates are then checked for their compliance. The difficulty with this pattern is not that it is hierarchical. Most patterns of authority are, after all, hierarchical. Rather, problems arise because the communications between superiors and subordinates are not two-way, reciprocating, and interactive. Subordinates are given little room to set agendas, initiate concerns, or bargain about

priorities (Westley, 1990). Because subordinates work within parameters set by superiors, they are unlikely to raise moral issues not overtly contained within these limits (Ackerman, 1975). In an ironic way, certain forms of self-serving moral talk seem to give rise to moral muteness and moral deafness. Minimally, they seem to discourage give-and-take conversations about moral issues. Occasionally, business people use moral talk to call attention to their high ideals, to point to praiseworthy performance for which they or their firms claim credit, and to expose the blatant moral abuses of others. These are indeed legitimate uses of moral discourse so long as they do not become too prevalent and they are balanced with uses of moral discourse for selfcriticism and learning, for problem solving, for mobilizing support, and the like (Bird, Westley, and Waters, 1990; Waters, 1980). The problem with praising, blaming, and idealizing is that, when they become the dominant expression of moral concern, they make it seem as if ethics is almost entirely concerned with the acts of saints and sinners (Waters, 1980). As a result, the everyday uses of moral discourse – to think about and address problems, to share common values, to exercise judgment, and to set forth and undertake responsibilities – are ignored or marginalized. Instead, ethics is associated in a very limited way with exceptionally good or deplorably bad conduct. Correspondingly, the excessive use of moral talk to praise, idealize, and blame tends to discourage rather than invite moral discussion and deliberation. Furthermore, people often praise, blame, or idealize to reinforce their own positions. As a result, many others do not voice their genuine moral concerns, in part because talking overtly about moral issues often seems to be associated with the morally questionable practices of cutting off debate, diverting attention from other genuine moral concerns, and singing one’s own praises. See also advertising, ethics of ; due process; moral imagination; stakeholder theory Bibliography Ackerman, R. (1975) The Social Challenge to Business, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

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Bird, F. (1996) The Muted Conscience: Moral Silence and the Practice of Ethics in Business, Quorum Books, Westport, CT. Bird, F. (2001) Good governance: a philosophical discussion of the responsibilities and practices of organizational governors. Canadian Journal of Administrative Studies, 18 (4), 298–312. Bird, F., Westley, F. and Waters, J.A. (1990) The uses of moral talk: why do managers talk ethics? Journal of Business Ethics, 8, 75–89. Ewing, D.W. (1989) Justice on the Job: Resolving Grievances in the Non-Union Workplace, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA. Friedman, M. (1971) The social responsibility of business is to increase its profit. New York Times Magazine, September, 13, 32–33. Hirschman, A. (1970) Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Mayer, M. (1990) The Greatest Bank Robbery Ever: The Collapse of the Savings and Loan Industry, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York.

Nielsen, R. (1987) What can managers do about unethical management? Journal of Business Ethics, 6, 309–320. Nielsen, R. (1989) Changing unethical behavior. Academy of Management Executive, 3 (2), 123–130. Saunders, D. and Leck, J.D. (1993) Formal upward communication procedures: organizational and employee perspectives. Canadian Journal of Administrative Studies, 10 (3), 255–268. Vandiver, K. (1972) Why should my conscience bother me?, in In the Name of Prof it (eds R. Heilbroner et al.), Doubleday, Garden City, NY. Waters, J.A. (1980) Of saints, sinners, and socially responsible executives. Business and Society, winter, 66–73. Westley, F. (1990) The microdynamics of inclusion: middle managers and strategy. Strategic Management Journal, 11, 337–352....