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An Overview on Hong Kong’s Politics and Government 1Ming SINGIn Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, edited byFarazmand, Ali (Ed.), Springer (expected, 2018).1 The author is very grateful to the research assistance of Ms. Xing ZHANG.1. Hong Kong’s Outstanding ...

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An Overview on Hong Kong’s Politics and Government1

Ming SING In Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, edited by Farazmand, Ali (Ed.), Springer (expected, 2018).

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The author is very grateful to the research assistance of Ms. Xing ZHANG.

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1. Hong Kong’s Outstanding Economic Development Legitimated its Non-democratic System before Handover to Mainland China Hong Kong was a former British colony between 1841 and 1997. Soon after the World War II, given Hong Kong’s port, a skilled international trade sector, and extensive shipping links, Hong Kong has accomplished a rapid post-war recovery through entrepot trade and services, and acted as a doorway to China. As one of the four renowned Asian tigers, Hong Kong has enjoyed the most spectacular economic development in a single generation via its export-led growth strategy. Between 1960 and 1982, Hong Kong’s enjoyed an amazing average annual economic growth rate of 7%, which placed it the fifth highest one globally. Between 1980 and 1992, its GDP could still grow at an enviable rate of 6.7% annually (Sing, 2009, 2012). Of no less importance, since 1970, Hong Kong has changed its gear, broadening its economic base by its more diversified consumer manufacturing and gradual development into the top three financial center in the world. In 2016, the International Monetary Fund statistics revealed that Hong Kong was ranked 12 in the world in terms of per capita GDP, with US$58,095 in purchasing power parity (Table 1). Besides, Hong Kong has also stood out as a society with an extraordinary degree of global connections. Predicated on the 2012 Globalization Index, which encompasses 60 largest societies by GDP in total, Hong Kong was ranked the top and the most globalized society in the world. The spectacular level of human development of Hong Kong, based on the latest statistics, is shown in Table 1.

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Table 1

Various objective indices of human development Indicator

Hong Kong

Ranking from the top

a

0.91

12

Life Expectancy at Birth (Year) 2016 b

82.90

7

Adult Literacy Rate (% Ages 15 and Older) 2014 c

95.70

NA

GDP per Capita (PPP US$) 2016 d

58,095

12

Overall Globalization Index 2012 e

7.81

1

Human Development Index (HDI) Value 2014

Source: a Human Development Data (1980-2015) http://hdr.undp.org/en/data, b The CIA World Factbook (2016) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/2102rank.html#hk, c Social Indicators of Hong Kong (1986-2014) http://www.socialindicators.org.hk/en/indicators/education/7.7, d International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook (2016) http://statisticstimes.com/economy/countries-by-projected-gdp-capita.php, e

The EY Globalization Index (2012) http://www.ey.com/gl/en/issues/driving-growth/globalization--looking-beyond-the-obvious---2012-index Hong Kong’s stunning socioeconomic development and globalization have been accompanied by a low level of corruption. The Transparency International, a worldwide agency assessing the perceived levels of corruption around the world, reveals that only 16 out of 175 societies globally are considered as less corrupt as Hong Kong in 2014, putting Hong Kong as the one of the least sullied societies in Asia (Table 2). In short, the spectacular socio-economic development and overall level of good governance has legitimated the non-democratic regime of Hong Kong especially before the reversion of its sovereignty from Britain to Mainland China in 1997 (Sing, 2010).

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Table 2

Corruption perception index (CPI) 2014 Country

Score

Ranking of 175 societies

Hong Kong

74

17

South Korea

55

43

Taiwan

61

35

Singapore

84

7

Japan

76

15

China

36

100

Note: 100 = “highly clean”, 0 = “highly corrupt” Source: Transparency International (TI) 2014 corruption perceptions index (CPI) http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results That said, the legitimacy or the mass support for Hong Kong’s non-democratic system has visibly faltered, in view of Beijing’s increasingly glaring erosion of Hong Kong’s freedoms, judicial autonomy and its widely reported reneging on its promise of allowing Hong Kong to fully democratize especially since 2003.

2.

Chinese Government Has Repeatedly Blocked Hong Kong’s Democratization

Between 1984 and 1997, the British Government has progressively and vigorously pushed for democratic reforms for Hong Kong. During the period, Beijing repeatedly stalled those democratic reforms with implicit and explicit threats, opinion mobilization and formation of alliances. Immediately after Chinese Government has become the sovereign power over Hong Kong in mid1997, Beijing reversed some crucial democratic reforms initiated by London and cemented a nondemocratic hybrid regime by dampening popular participation in the electoral process and changing the electoral system to discourage the ascendancy of the pro-democratic forces. Beijing’s maneuvers have debilitated Hong Kong’s civil liberties and democracy as measured by the Freedom House (Figure 1). The Chinese Government has enthusiastically rolled back Hong Kong’s partial democracy in order to preclude Hong Kong becoming a subversive base against the one-party rule in China (Sing,

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2006). At least, Beijing viewed the potential demonstration effect of a fully democratic Hong Kong for the rest of Mainland China with trepidation. Against this backdrop, Beijing, through its anointed Chief Executive of Hong Kong, attempted blatantly to impose a draconian anti-subversion law in Hong Kong in 2003. This measure unintendedly deepened the mutual distrust and tension between Beijing and Hong Kong people.

Figure 1

Ratings of Hong Kong’s democracy from 1992 to 2016

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 2015-2016

2014-2015

2013-2014

2012-2013

2011-2012

2010-2011

2009-2010

2008-2009

2007-2008

2006-2007

2005-2006

2004-2005

2003-2004

2002-2003

2001-2002

2000-2001

1999-2000

1998-1999

1997-1998

1996-1997

1995-1996

1994-1995

1993-1994

1992-1993

Competitive, partically illiberal

1991-1992

Total Score

Rating of Hong Kong's Democracy Status from 1992- 2016 (Indicated by Total Sum of Scores of Civil Liberties & Political Rights)

Semicompetitive, partialy pluralist

Year

Source: Freedom House (1992-2016) Freedom in the World, Hong Kong https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/hong-kong The draconian national security law eventually sparked off half a million Hongkongers to join a mass demonstration for better governance and greater democracy, the largest protest since the handover of Hong Kong to China. The protest attested to a widespread public rejection of Beijing’s ratcheting up of political suppression of Hong Kong and a strong support for greater democracy, in order to safeguard Hongkongers’ freedoms, socio-economic development and good governance (Sing, 2005). Indeed, public opinion surveys towards universal suffrage have shown a fairly consistent mass demand for real democracy. Public aspirations for democracy, have been greeted by deliberate and repeated procrastination of

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democratization from Beijing since the handover of Hong Kong (Sing & Tang, 2012). Since China has become Hong Kong’s new master, there was a regression to more authoritarian rule in Hong Kong by dampening popular participation in the electoral process and amending the electoral system to deter the participation of pro-democratic forces in elections. Specifically, the Chinese government reduced the size of the functional constituencies from over two million to around 200,000 for the elections of the nine new legislative seats reserved for various professionals. It also installed the proportional representation system for selecting the twenty directly elected seats and made it difficult for prodemocratic forces to be represented in the legislature (Sing, 2009, 298). With pervasive perception of dwindled freedoms and worsening governance in Hong Kong, amid Beijing’s repeated reneging of constitutional promises to implement democracy, Hong Kong’s followers of democracy have progressively switched to more aggressive tactics to push for democratization. The escalation in confrontations has coincided with the coming to power of XiJinping, a die-hard antagonist to democracy of China. Xi has strengthened Beijing’s determination to scupper not only Hong Kong’s democratization but also to its freedoms and judicial autonomy. In June, 2014, Beijing publicized the White Paper on “One Country Two Systems”. The Chinese Communist Party asserted, in contravention of Hong Kong’s constitution endorsed by Beijing, that Beijing is entitled to interfering with every internal affair of Hong Kong and controlling the nomination of candidates running for Hong Kong’s Chief Executive. What was more, in 2014, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress (NPCSC) had suggested Hong Kong should hold a direct popular vote for its chief executive for the first time in 2017, but an effectively pro-Beijing committee would control nominations for the contest. Confronted with Beijing’s violation of promise of implementing full democracy in Hong Kong, an occupy movement called Umbrella Movement broke out in 2014 to compel Beijing to concede. The striking Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong has stunned the world and riveted the global attention. It was notable by its long duration, epic scale of participation, and a drastic turn in movement tactics from the past in this global city. The 79-days long civil disobedience movement participated by 1.2 million Hong Kong citizens, i.e., nearly 20% of the city’s population aged between 15 and 65, signposted the scale of this civil disobedience activity was the largest in Hong Kong’s history. The

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movement was also salient by its foremost break from the past, when restrained strategies were supplanted by far more provocative acts in the struggle for democracy. The movement has been greeted by many in the world, as many Hong Kong people had the braveries to defy up-front the Chinese government for democracy. That said, the campaign has hit a stone wall, with Beijing yielding no concession in democratization. What is worse, Beijing and the Beijing-anointed leader of Hong Kong have continued to tighten the screw on Hong Kong’s freedoms since late 2014.

3. Threats to Freedoms & Judicial Autonomy in Hong Kong Escalated To obviate another Hong Kong-wide occupy movement, Beijing and its puppet government in Hong Kong have blatantly launched offensives in Hong Kong since the Umbrella Movement to curb Hong Kong’s press freedom, academic freedom, freedom of expression and judicial autonomy. 3.1 Rising Threats to Hong Kong's Press Freedom Though Hong Kong’s constitution upholds freedom of press freedom, the Hong Kong and Chinese government have stepped up their control over Hong Kong’s media (Freedom House 2016). According to the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA)’s 2016 annual report, the erosion in press freedom has been mirrored by the sagging Press Freedom Index. “The 2015 index dropped 0.7 points to 38.2 for journalists and 1.4 points to 47.4 for the general public” (Hong Kong Journalists Association 2016), indicative of a deterioration in press freedom for a second consecutive year. Besides, 85 percent of journalists, based on a HKJA’s research, held that press freedom worsened over the previous year. Likewise, in April 2016, an international NGO concerned with press freedom, i.e., the Reporters Without Borders, detailed Hong Kong’s conspicuous fall in press freedom from 18th to 70th between 2002 and 2015. The calculation was based on 43 criteria, including every kind of violation directly affecting journalists (such as murders, imprisonment, physical attacks and threats) and news media (such as censorship, confiscation of issues, searches and harassment). The dire warnings from the HKJA and Reporters Without Borders were echoed in January 2016 by the International Federation of Journalists. When the Federation released its annual China Press Freedom Report, it underscored that the “press freedom in China, Hong Kong and Macau deteriorated further

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in 2015, as the Communist Party of China used every means at its disposal to control the media.” The report also forewarned that “As Hong Kong goes to elections ... the party is also using its considerable wealth to consolidate its influence in the region” (UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office 12 October, 2016). To explain the decline in Hong Kong’s press freedom, the worsening self-censorship amid the suppression from the political establishment, and the increasing ownership of Hong Kong’s media from Mainland’s capital, have been obviously important causes. As argued by the HKJA in 2015, journalists in Hong Kong were confronted with both external and internal pressures. Journalists were besieged with the “internal pressure in the form of escalating self-censorship in order to comply with establishment viewpoints ” (UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office 11 February, 2016). Most journalists regarded self-censorship as very common, particular regarding stories criticizing the Beijing Government, so as to avoid currying trouble from Beijing (Africa Leader 24 March, 2016; Reporters Without Borders 10 October, 2014). One case in point has been that in April, 2016, a dominant middle-class newspaper of Ming Pao sacked its Executive Chief Editor, shortly after his insistence of releasing an in-depth report detailing the secretive investments and deposits of Mainland’s leaders in offshore banks. “Many were skeptical about Ming Pao’s public explanation that the decision to sack the senior executive was simply ‘cost saving’” (UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office 12 October, 2016). HKJA also highlighted that “71 percent of journalists believed the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government contributed to the suppression of press freedom” (UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office 11 February, 2016). HKJA condemned the HKSAR Government’s increasing practice of making major announcements through blogs and other “one-way” form of communication rather than holding press conferences. The HKJA called on the government to raise transparency by enacting freedom of information and archive laws, only to be ignored by the government. Indeed, 89 percent of journalists agreed in a survey in 2014 that a law on freedom of information should be enacted. Journalists surveyed in early 2016 thought they faced obvious and increasing difficulties in obtaining information vis-à-vis a year before (Hong Kong Journalists Association 2016). Concerns were also raised by some commentators that the pro-Beijing chief

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executive has restricted information on government officials' visits to Beijing, and refused to hold press conferences, or only invited camera operators and photographers in order to avoid question-andanswer sessions (Reporters Without Borders 10 October, 2014). Physical attacks on journalists can be tantamount to trampling on press freedom, especially if they happen mostly on liberal media. Despite the decline in the number of physical attacks on journalists between July 2015 and June 2016, they have been worsening in the last few years (Hong Kong Journalists Association 2016). To illustrate, during the 2014 Umbrella Movement protests, more than 30 journalists were assaulted. Attackers on journalists were mostly released or only had a minor punishment subsequently. In January 2015, the harshest critic on the government and the most liberal media company - the Next Media – had its headquarters and its founder’s home targeted in firebomb attacks soon perhaps for their support of Hong Kong’s prodemocracy movement (Freedom House 2016; Hong Kong Journalists Association 2016). Meanwhile, “the attitude of Hong Kong police toward media and journalists has been hardening in recent years” (Reporters Without Borders 10 October, 2014). Arrests of journalists and police misconduct towards journalists during demonstrations have become more frequent. Since the ascendancy to power of Xi Jinping in March 2013, there has been a visible trend towards escalating media control in Mainland. Arguably, the decline in Hong Kong’s press freedom has mirrored the tightening ideological and organizational control from Beijing. As underlined in the HKJA’s 2013 annual report, China has endeavored to regain the Hong Kong media since the crackdown of Tiananmen Square movement in 1989. The policy aims at ensuring the territory’s media would become the Chinese government’s mouthpieces. Beijing’s policy has achieved a success as the Chinese government or mainland corporations now have direct control or stakes in 8 out of 26, i.e., 31% of mainstream media outlets in Hong Kong. “These are Ta Kung Pao, Wen Wei Po, Hong Kong Commercial Daily, China Daily’s Hong Kong edition, Sing Pao Daily News, Phoenix Satellite Television, TVB and most recently the South China Morning Post, which came under the control of Chinese internet entrepreneur Jack Ma and his Alibaba group in April 2016” (Hong Kong Journalists Association 2016).

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3.2 Escalating Threats to Academic freedom Academic freedom has also taken a hit during recent years. University professors in Hong Kong have been generally able to write and lecture freely, and political debates on campuses were lively. In the aftermath of the Umbrella Movement, however, concerns began to surface that political pressure was being applied to Hong Kong’s universities, in particular over appointments and general policy. In January 2015, Chen Zuo’er, former Deputy Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council (HKMAO), said at a forum in Beijing that it was “clear there are problems with the education in Hong Kong along with its development” and that “the ‘national interest’ must be considered when Hong Kong considered its education policy” (UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office 21 July, 2015). A string of incidents in last two years have raised concerns that Beijing is putting greater pressure on Hong Kong’s academic circle. In April 2015, the City University of Hong Kong abruptly closed its creative writing program, whose students had published a number of works supportive of the Umbrella Movement. In September 2015, “the governing Council of the University of Hong Kong rejected a nominee for the post of pro-vice-chancellor, Johannes Chan, who had been unanimously approved by the search committee. The majority of the council members were neither students nor university employees - six were appointed directly by the Hong Kong’s Chief Executive. Chan’s supporters said that his background as a human rights lawyer and prodemocracy scholar made him unpalatable to Beijing” (Freedom House 2016). In December 2015, despite a series of protests, Chief Executive Leung appointed a pro-Beijing scholar, Arthur Li, as the chairman of the governing council of the University of Hong Kong (Freedom House 2016). Moreover, a liberal and famous academic, Joseph Cheng Yu-shek, a professor of political science at the City University of Hong Kong, also alleged that the pressures on and job insecurity of young academics have incentivized them to be “politically correct” (Denyer, 2015). He found the presence of polit...