Speech Act Theory: From Austin to Searle PDF

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Agustinian Journal 2018, 19(1): 35-46 Speech Act Theory: From Austin to Searle Napoleon M. Mabaquiao, Jr. De La Salle University, Manila Abstract The speech act theory is one of the rigorous attempts to systematically explain the workings of language. It is not only widely influential in the philoso...

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Agustinian Journal 2018, 19(1): 35-46

Speech Act Theory: From Austin to Searle Napoleon M. Mabaquiao, Jr. De La Salle University, Manila Abstract The speech act theory is one of the rigorous attempts to systematically explain the workings of language. It is not only widely influential in the philosophy of language, but in the areas of linguistics and communication as well. This essay traces the development of this theory from J. L. Austin’s first formulation of the theory to John Searle’s further systematization and grounding of it. The essay first situates the theory in the general approaches to the philosophy of language. After which, it explicates the main features of the theory as initially articulated by Austin and further improved by Searle. Among the innovations introduced by Searle, the essay highlights the following: the distinction between the utterance and propositional acts, the distinction between the effects of illocutionary acts and those of perlocutionary acts, a consistent set of criteria for classifying speech acts, and the grounding of speech acts in terms of rules and facts.

Introduction The speech act theory is a theory in the philosophy of language which rigorously attempts to systematically explain the workings of language. Its wide influence has transcended the confines of the discipline of philosophy as it is currently one of the standard theories that are being studied seriously in the areas of linguistics and communication. In this essay, I trace the evolution of the theory from J. L. Austin’s initial investigations and analyses to John Searle’s significant contributions to its further systematization. J. L. Austin and John Searle, accordingly, were the two main pioneers of the theory. Austin initiated the work and laid its foundations, while John Searle, Austin’s most illustrious student, further systematized it and solidified its foundations. I shall divide the essay into four parts. As a background to the motivations of the theory, I shall, in the first part, situate the theory in the general approaches towards philosophizing about

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language. In the second part, I shall examine Austin’s division of utterances into the constative and performative kinds, and demonstration of the fundamentality of the latter. I shall discuss in this part Searle’s own analysis of the component acts of speech acts and of the effects of such acts. In the third part, I shall look into the basic kinds of speech acts with a view to showing how Searle improved Austin’s original mode of classifying speech acts by introducing a consistent set of criteria for such classification. In the fourth part, I shall examine Searle’s ontological grounding of speech acts in terms of rules and facts. Specifically, I shall look into the kind of rules and facts which, for Searle, makes speech acts possible. Philosophizing About Language: An Overview Philosophizing about language has two purposes. The first is to investigate how linguistic expressions of various kinds acquire their meanings. The second is to use the results of the said investigation to resolve philosophical issues. The first purpose is what defines the area of philosophy of language; the second, on the other hand, refers to a philosophical method associated with analytic philosophy called linguistic philosophy. Philosophy of language is an area in the discipline of philosophy, while linguistic philosophy is a philosophical method for resolving philosophical issues. While these two philosophies are different in that one is an area while the other is a method, in the history of analytic philosophy, most philosophers of language are also linguistic philosophers. This is not surprising for these two philosophies are closely related. One, the theories of meaning in the philosophy of language serve as the analytical tools of linguistic philosophy. Another, the assumption of linguistic philosophy is that most, if not all, philosophical issues are at bottom linguistic confusions, which arise out of the failure to understand how language works. There are two general approaches to the philosophy of language: the so-called ideallanguage and ordinary-language approaches or philosophies (see Mabaquiao 2013). The ideallanguage philosophy focuses on the descriptive or representative function of language. It investigates the meanings of words in so far as they relate to objects or facts in the world. These linguistic expressions are said to be truth-bearing, for they represent states of affairs either correctly or incorrectly. Thus language is here being investigated in the context of advancing knowledge about the world, such as how language is used in the sciences and allegedly in

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metaphysics. The linguistic expressions being analyzed center on the propositions (or statements) and their constituents such as proper names, definite descriptions, and predicate expressions. On the other hand, ordinary-language philosophy does not focus on one particular function of language. It investigates language in its variety of functions as found in the everyday, ordinary contexts of using language (or language-games, as Wittgenstein put it). The focus of the investigation is not the relation between language and world (the central concern of ideal-language philosophy) but between language and its users. Thus language is here being investigated mainly in the context of satisfying the intentions of the language-users. The linguistic expressions being analyzed include a wide variety in which propositions (and their constituents) constitute just one kind. Depending on which approach it adopts, linguistic philosophy analyzes philosophical issues in a certain way. Generally, linguistic philosophers of the ideal-language persuasion would point out that philosophical issues arise when the descriptive function of language is confused with its other functions, or, better, when the other functions of language, due to grammar, are mistaken to be descriptive. In the language of Russell and Frege, this is the confusion between ordinary grammar and logical grammar, which is brought about by the ambiguity and vagueness of ordinary language (It is said that this is mainly due to the fact that various words can be used to refer to one object, and that a single word can be used to refer to many objects.) Consequently, the way to detect and avoid linguistic confusions is through the use of a logically perfect language (which, in the hands of these philosophers trained in mathematics, refers to the language of symbolic logic). On the other hand, linguistic philosophers of the ordinary-language persuasion would generally point out that philosophical issues are results of using language outside of their ordinary contexts. This point is exemplified when philosophers are looking for the essences of things, which they believe can be known through the process of abstraction (the method by which an object or concept is stripped of its contingent or non-necessary features). As Wittgenstein famously put it, such philosophical issues arise “when language goes on holiday” (Philosophical Investigations 1953, sec. 38) Representative theories of meaning under the ideal-language philosophy include Locke’s ideational theory, Mill’s object theory, Frege’s sense-reference theory, Russell’s theory of definite descriptions, Wittgenstein’s picture theory, and the verificationist theory of the logical positivists. On the other hand, representative theories of meanings under the ordinary-language philosophy

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include Moore’s views of common-sense, Wittgenstein’s use theory, Austin and Searle’s speech act theory, and Grice’s theory of implicatures. Needless to say, there are other equally important and influential theories of meaning falling under these two approaches (such as the theories of meaning advanced by Chomsky, Kripke, Carnap, and Quine, among others). The speech act theory is classified under the ordinary-language philosophy, for one, it aims to accommodate a wide variety of linguistic functions, if not to cover all these functions. Another, as Austin would claim and demonstrate, propositions or truth-bearing expressions do not occupy a fundamental status in the overall operations of language, for their truth conditions are subsumed under the more general conditions of success (or conditions of satisfaction, in the language of Searle) of speech acts. Still another, the mental states of the language-users, which include their intentions, is a crucial consideration in the successful performance of speech acts. This point emphasizes the ordinarylanguage approach in which the language-world relation is determined by the language-languageuser relation (this is clearly demonstrated in Searle’s notion of direction of fit). Austin on Two General Kinds of Utterances This theory started with Austin’s preliminary distinction between two kinds of utterances, what he called “constative utterances” (“constatives,” for short) and “performative utterances” (“performatives,” for short), and his inquiry on whether this distinction could be consistently maintained. Constatives refer to linguistic expressions that are either true or false, and are often used to describe facts or states of affairs in the world. They correspond to what are normally referred to as “statements” or “propositions.” Austin’s deviation from the standard name for this kind of linguistic expressions was a way of avoiding the philosophical controversies surrounding the nature of this kind of linguistic expressions. These controversies include the distinction between genuine and pseudo propositions (attributed to the logical positivists), and between referring expressions in form only and referring expressions in both form and content (made by Russell in his theory of definite descriptions). On the other hand, performatives refer to linguistic expressions that are used to perform certain actions. They are the kind of expressions wherein we perform certain actions while saying them. In this regard, to utter a performative means to perform an action. For instance, in saying “I advise you to seek permission from your parents,” I am, in effect, performing the act of advising. Or in saying “I order you to read your book,” I am, in effect, performing the act of ordering or

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making an order. The point shall be further clarified if we compare the foregoing examples of performatives with the following statement: “I am washing the dishes.” By simply uttering this statement, I have not performed the act of washing the dishes. I may have done the act of reporting an event, but I have not performed the act indicated in the statement, that I am washing the dishes, simply by uttering the said statement. The conditions of success (or “conditions of satisfaction,” as Searle preferred to put it) for constatives are indicated by the values of truth and falsity. If a constative successfully represents what it intends to represent (that is, the state of affairs that it asserts to be in the world is really in the world), we say that the constative is true; if otherwise, we say that it is false. If, for example, we say that “It is raining” and it is actually raining, then our statement or constative is true. If, on the other hand, it is not raining, then our statement is false. But what about performatives, what are the values indicating their conditions of success? Austin, upon examining the English language during his time, found no expressions serving this purpose. For this reason, he proposed the expressions “happy” and “unhappy” to indicate, respectively, success and failure of performatives. Accordingly, if a performative is successful, that is, the action it intends to perform is successfully done, the performative is happy; if otherwise, it is unhappy. For instance, suppose I say “I promise to attend the graduation ceremony” and I am not really sincere in saying it, that is, I do not really put myself under the obligation to attend the ceremony. In this case, I have not really performed the act of making a promise, as indicated in my utterance. As such, my performative, being a failure, is unhappy. If, on the other hand, I say to someone “Please keep quiet” for I sincerely want the person to keep quiet and this person does stop talking loudly, then I am successful in performing the act I intend to perform (to request the person to keep quiet). In this case, my performative, being a success, is happy. In the philosophy of language, so much has been done to analyze the conditions for the truth and falsity of constatives or statements. The three standard theories of truth (coherence, correspondence, and pragmatic theories of truth) are part of such efforts. The case of the performatives seems to have been neglected. And thus, Austin did his analyses of performatives to fill in the gap. One important finding or discovery of Austin were the conditions under which performatives could be said to be happy or unhappy, successful or unsuccessful. Austin identified three of such conditions, which he explained in the mode of making a performative unhappy.

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The first condition is the appropriateness of the persons involved in the performative (that is, the speaker and the hearer in the conversation) and the circumstance in which the performative is uttered. If such persons and circumstance are inappropriate, the performative is unhappy. In particular, the performative, in this case, is null and void. For instance, if the person administering a Christian wedding ceremony is not a person authorized to administer this ceremony, say he is not a priest, a pastor, or a court judge, then his performative “I now pronounce you husband and wife,” addressed to a couple in the ceremony, will be null and void. But let us say that this person is authorized to administer the wedding ceremony but the persons he is marrying are not eligible to be married (say they are under-aged or one or each of them is already married to another person), then the same performative will also be null and void. Still, suppose that the person who utters the same performative (“I now pronounce you husband and wife”) and the persons to whom it is uttered are all appropriate for the ceremony, but then the circumstance in which the utterance of the performative is made is inappropriate, in that it is not really a wedding ceremony but just, say, a casual gathering, then the performative is also null and void. The second is the insincerity of the person uttering a performative. In this case, the failure of the performative takes the form of abuse of the performative. For instance, in saying “I promise to attend your birthday party” to someone when I do not really intend to do so, my use of the performative of making promises is an abuse of that performative. Needless to say, my performative here is unhappy. And the third is the failure to perform future actions entailed by performatives. In this case, the failure of a performative takes the form of a breach of commitment. This happens when the speaker, after issuing the performative, acts contrary to what is entailed by the performative. When, for instance, the host of a party tells a guest “You are welcome,” the host commits himself/herself to treating the guest kindly throughout the party. And so, if this host later on in the party treats the guest unkindly, the host’s performative is a failure. And it is because there is a breach of commitment—he/she fails to perform the action he/she commits himself/herself to doing when he/she utters the performative. After identifying and explicating the conditions of success or failure of performatives, Austin realized that the conditions of success of constatives could actually be explained in terms of the conditions of success of performatives. Austin realized that the conditions for the unhappiness of performatives could explain the various ways constatives could be said to be false,

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or when these utterance, as Austin put it, “fail to get by.” In short, Austin wanted to show that the falsity of constatives is just a feature of the unhappiness of performatives. To do this, Austin considered the following statements: 1. All John’s children are bald. 2. The cat is on the mat. 3. All the guests are French. First, the statement “All John’s children are bald” presupposes that John has children. This means that it is only appropriate to say that John’s children are bald if John has children. Thus, if John happens not to have any children, the utterance of the statement “All John’s children are bald” fails to get by. According to Austin, this is the same as the case when performatives are issued under inappropriate conditions, which make them null and void. Second, the statement “The cat is on the mat” implies that the person who utters it believes in what is being asserted in the statement—that the cat is on the mat. Thus, if someone utters it but does not believe what the statement asserts, then it is like uttering the performative “I promise....” without the intention of keeping it. In this sense, the statement “The cat is on the mat,” just like the performative “I promise...,” is abused. Third, in believing a statement one is committed to believing in what this statement entails. Now the statement “All the guests are French” entails that it is not true that some guests are not French. Thus, when someone utters, “All guests are French,” but later on says, “Some guests are not French,” then this person has committed a breach of commitment. And this is no different from the case when the host tells the guest “You are welcome” but later on treats this guest rudely. Austin eventually arrived at the conclusion that a clear distinction could not be made between constatives and performatives as constatives proved to be just a kind of performatives. For the describing, stating, or asserting, which what constatives do are themselves acts performed in saying something. Given this, Austin then embarked on the task of analyzing the logical structure of performatives. Two of the significant realizations of Austin in doing so were the following. First, performatives can be explicit or implicit. An explicit performative is one where it is clear from the utterance of the performatives, like in the case of the performatives “I promise…,” and “I advise you…” what actions are being performed. On the other hand, an implicit performative is one where it is not clear from the utterance what kind of action is being performed.

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In this case, it is the context that determines what kind of action is being performed. For instance, my utterance of “I will be there” may mean that I am making a promise, expressing an intention of being there, or simply making a prediction of some future event. It is the context of my utterance that indicates what action I am performing. Second, the actions performed in uttering performatives can be broken down into three kinds. The general act of uttering a performative, in other words, consist of three component acts. The first is called the locutionary act, which refers to the mere utterance of the performatives. The locutionary act is further broken down into three acts: the phatic act, referring to the act of producing mere noises or sounds; the phonetic act, referring to the act of producing sounds that are recognizable as words from a certain vocabulary and grammar; and the rhetic act, referring to the act of using words to convey meanings (using words with sense and reference). The second component act of the performative act is called the illocutionary act, which refers to the act that is being done in uttering a performative. For instance, in uttering a performative, a speaker may perform the illocutionary acts of making a promise, requesting, etc. And the third is called the perlocutionary act, which refers to the act of the speaker in eliciting a certain response from the hearer, or in making an effect on the hearer. For instance, the speaker, through his/her performative, may want the hearer to be convinced, persuaded, delighted, etc. Consequently, these three component acts of the performative act are related in the following ways. A perlocutionary act presupposes an illocutionary act (...