\'The Spirit of Geneva\' PDF

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Lecture 9 – ‘The Spirit of Geneva’: A Thaw Before the Storms Geneva Summit and Wider Cold War Developments o Eisenhower was a fortunate president as, just as he becomes chief executive/ president, Stalin dies –> so there’s a fundamental change in Soviet leadership o Death of Stalin = power struggle with collective new Soviet leadership: 1953-55 (lots of leaders such as Khrushchev, Kremlin, etc. are wanting to take power in Russia –> one this they all have in common, however, is that they each want to maintain ‘peaceful coexistence’ with the US and the west o Eisenhower tells them that if they want better relations with the US, then they could put pressure on the Chinese to end the Korean War, which Kremlin does –> 2-year delayed US response to take up the Soviet proposition of ‘peaceful co-existence’, why?: - Kremlin power struggle: the US don’t know who will prevail in the Soviet power struggle and therefore what policies they are going to want to pursue with the US (not until 1955 until Khrushchev emerges as this ruling role/Soviet leader) - US are also faced with problem of the decision of whether to bring the West Germans into NATO, there’s an argument and struggle between the Americans and Soviets –> it takes until 1955 to do this - McCarthyism –> Eisenhower is also acutely aware that there is ongoing red-baiting in the US, therefore Eisenhower believes its best to get McCarthy out of the way before he deals with the Soviets for fear of being accused of being soft on Communism and create division within the Republican party (McCarthy is censured by 1954) - Wider Cold War developments –> the French are losing in Indochina, being defeated in a big battle in 1954 –> they came to a temporary agreement in the Geneva Conference in 1954, which resulted in the splitting up of Vietnam into the North and the South, bring the first Indochina/French War to an end o USSR, Warsaw Pact = long-term division, Germany –> fait accompli o May 1955 is turning point o Austrian State Treaty, May 1955 –> Austria becomes neutral in the Cold War, the Red Army withdraws from Austria, going back on gains they made during WW2 (very interesting changes) – see Robert Davis, ‘NATO, Western Europe and the Eisenhower Administration,’ in Chester Pach (ed.), A Companion to Dwight D. Eisenhower Geneva Summit: New Cold War environment – o Positives = which can be seen as good as, by 1955, each power has thermo-nuclear weapons (hydrogen bombs) so there is a need for

caution in the way they pursue their relationship –> see Gunter Bischof and Saki Dockrill (eds.), Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit o Negatives = Duality of Russian policy: - (this bullet point isn’t that negative) Khrushchev is different to Stalin in that he is more of a Nationalist Communist rather than straight communist, he is different in the sense that he is willing to support nationalist/communist movements in the Third World in a way that Stalin didn’t - ‘Spirit of Geneva’/’peaceful coexistence’ –> reduce tensions + thermonukes – ie. ‘H’ bomb = need for increased caution - But Khrushchev supports revolutionary nationalism in the Third World; decolonisation of Africa during this time is rapid and has significant influence on Cold War developments and US policy –> decolonisation can therefore be looked at as very political during this time US relations with western allies: o Continuity from Truman’s period – America has close relations with its major allies in Europe and in the Far East (in particular Japan) as well o But fractions –> Suez Crisis, the British and French work with Israel to gain control of the Suze Canal and – duplicity –> they don’t tell the US what they are doing which creates some tensions o However, overall during this period, relations between the US and its western allies remain relatively virtuous o See David Watry, Diplomacy at the Brink: Eisenhower, Churchill, and Eden in the Cold War (2014); David Tal (ed.), The 1956 War

‘New Look’ defence policy – NSC 162/2, October 1953 These are the key strands of the ‘New Look’ defence policy: 1. Previous defence policy (NSC 68) was an extremely expensive defence policy –> defence spending quadrupled between 1950-53 which is substantial –> new NSC 162/2 = better defence at less cost - $5.2 billion cut on defence budget (see Iwan Morgan chapter on economic management, plus David Snead’s analysis of Ike’s National Security policies – both in Chester Pach (ed.), A Companion to Dwight D. Eisenhower) 2. Most controversial strand –> Massive retaliation = ie. what the US will do is threaten massive retaliation (essentially nuclear weapons) against a communist adversary who seeks to engage in any kind of adventurism (sometimes referred to as brinkmanship) –> tends to be over-stated in some of the literature, it is not tried as many times as some would argue (threatened 3 times during Eisenhower’s tenure – one was supposedly during Korean War against the North Koreans, although some say that North Koreans didn’t even receive the warning – never actually tried against the Soviet Union) – H.W.

Brands, Cold Warriors; Norman Graebner, The National Security 3. Pactomania –> extension of US alliances with places around the communist periphery, some of these include: - NATO Pact - Baghdad Pact - SEATO - Look at these pacts in detail at 22:00 minutes 4. In order to enforce these pacts, US needs local ground forces supply by US air and sea power 5. Increased emphasis on negotiations – motives: a) Impact of thermonuclear weapons b) Ike –> diplomatic victories, eg. ‘Open Skies’ (Eisenhower is making the suggestion to the Soviet Union that both sides open their skies to mutual Ariel inspection, this favours the US as they already have open skies, so when the Soviets reject this it, it paints them in a dim light – America is gaining propaganda victory’s, such as this one) 6. ‘Hidden hand’ – eg. psychological warfare, covert action - The worry is that during this period, you’ve got rapid decolonisation, so there is the potential for local communists to exploit conditions in countries like Iran, for example, therefore the US needs to make the impression that these countries are against communism and are picking western democracy instead, making the impression that the US has the upper hand in this new kind of Cold War New Look v. NSC 68 – what’s the same and what different between them: o Continuity – i. Containment still central (despite ‘rollback’ rhetoric) ii. Monolithic communism iii. Zero-sum-game – perceptions crucial o Change – i. Rejects ‘point of maximum danger’ ii. NSC 68, symmetrical strategy v. New Look, asymmetrical strategy – aim: retain initiative at sustainable cost o In order to get a better idea of these two points of continuity and change, and symmetry and asymmetry, watch from around 32:0037:45 mins

Eisenhower-Dulles –> neutralism/nonalignment Eisenhower has been criticised by historians for failing to distinguish been Third World non-alignment and communism, see Robert McMahon, “Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism,” Political Science Quarterly 101 (1986): 453-473 –> key point: Ike-JFD (Eisenhower-John Foster Dulles) perception – stressed fluidity of nonalignment/neutralism

With regards to neutralism in the developed world, Eisenhower and Foster Dulles (US Secretary of State under Eisenhower) see that as a positive thing, they look at various developments of this: Eastern European neutralism – positive: o They say that if you look at the Yugoslav schism from the Soviet Union in 1948 (the Yugoslavs are Communists, but different Communists to the Soviets and they do not want to be satellites and part of the Soviet bloc as they have their own interests to pursue) – > Dulles regarded that as a positive development as it was accomplished peacefully – created a contagion for independence throughout the eastern bloc = so it as leading the way to a potential for break-up of “the Soviet empire without war” (JFD, June 1952) o 1955 Austrian State Treaty in 1955 was another positive move as it fuelled aspirations for freedom behind the Iron Curtain, see “An Historic Week,” DSB (30 May 1955): 871-876 –> possibility of triggering ‘rollback by peaceful means’ 3rd World nonalignment – negative: o In the 3rd World nonalignment was viewed as negative because what they think is that Marxist-Leninism is attractive to developing 3rd World countries because it is the case that the Soviet Union developed very quickly to a modern state –> this could be seen as attractive to countries in Asia, Africa, South America, etc. want to do the same thing o Core Soviet assumption that 3rd World neutralism has an inherently anti-western bias because of the legacy of imperialism = waystation for communism-proper o Core US assumptions that 3rd World nonalignment had a leftward trend o Core US objectives are to prevent political vacuums; stymie (deadlock) efforts by indigenous Marxists to subvert 3rd world nations and provide opening wedge for direct Soviet penetration Allen Dulles (John Foster Dulles’ brother) – Director of Central Intelligence, 1953-61 = Strong trend towards regular and sometimes audacious deployment of clandestine strategies/tactics during Eisenhower’s tenure – > undermines arguments of revisionists such as Robert Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War, who commend Eisenhower for his restraint –> best book for role of Allen Dulles, see Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy

New Cold War battlegrounds and emphasis on the ‘hidden hand’ o Rollback: ongoing covert offensive in Eastern Europe until 1956 – limits –> - The CIA supported all of these riots as part of their covert operations - Berlin riots 1953 (look at 54:40 mins for a book)

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Hungarian Uprising 1956 (fuelled by RFE propaganda – see Scott Lucas, Freedom’s War) o Spy-war: - The Berlin Tunnel (Operation Gold), mid-1955–mid-56 – the US manages to tunnel under East Germany and break into a communications hub from which the Soviets are able to make contact with East Europe generally, form which the CIA could tap into – however the Soviets actually knew about it because of a British spy, see Murphy Kondrashev, and Bailey, Battleground Berlin - U-2 spy flights from 1956 + US Air Force initiatives, eg. Operation Homerun (this was one of the most audacious spy operations that took place by the US during this time – big propaganda move from the US as it’s all about opening fly zones between the US and Soviets when the US’ are already open, spoken about above) o Definitely watch this section to see more about the German and Hungarian uprisings and covert operations by the US from about 54:00-59:00 mins 3rd World operations – her are some of the best documented ventures: o Egypt, 1952-58: - American intervention into Egypt was one of the most important of the covert operations - The CIA remove the Egyptian leader, King Farouk in 1952 in a covert operation - The US then put in place 3 people they think will do their bidding – one of the people is Nasser - President Nasser does not do any of the bidding the US had hoped for, and instead, seeks to pursue Egyptian interests –> he takes control of the Suez Canal, causing the Suez Crisis (1956) where the British and American are on different sides; - So overall, they put into power someone they thought they could control, but couldn’t, but are proactive in Egypt throughout most of the 1950s, seeking to enhance Eisenhower’s political agenda there o Iran, 1953: - Good books at 1:04:15 - In Iran, there is a dispute between Britain (the key power in Iran during the late-1940s, early 1950s), the Iranian oil company now known as BP has 80% control over Iranian oil, and the Nationalist Iranian leader wants to wants to seize control of Iran’s assets, so he is in dispute with the British - The British mount various operations to try and remove him, all unsuccessful –> he then shuts down the British embassy - So, the Americans move in and mount a covert operation in 1953, in partner with the British to remove him from power and replace him with the Shar who will do America’s bidding

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This paves the way for some really bad relations between the two countries – part of the reason why the revolutionary Iranian guard overran the American embassy in the late-70s/early-80s (the revolutionaries held the embassy for 440 days) o Guatemala, 1954: - Books on this at 1:07:30 mins - The Guatemalan leader was seeking to gain control over Guatemala’s assets, he is a Leftist, but not a Communist - He is subject to a propaganda campaign made about him by the US and a covert operation that follows off the back of it – the Americans were laying down the grounds that the Guatemalan leader was a Communist (even though he wasn’t) so that they could perform the covert operation that removes him from power and puts in place a man whose a puppet for America o Tibet, 1955–early-70s: - Operation ST CIRCUS – one of the most successful of the CIA covert operations during the Cold War - US provide support to Tibetans who are seeking to combat that fact that China has taken Tibet into territorial China and the Tibetans are seeking to secure independence from that - Eventually the Chinese build a road that allow them to supply their forces in Tibet far more easily than in the early stages of the operation (as it’s a very ongoing affair – nearly 20 years) o Indonesia, 1958: - Look at 1:13:10 mins for books - The CIA also seeks to remove the Indonesian leader in 1958 because he’s pursuing an agenda which is leaning towards communism - They launch a huge operation with lots of resources and supplies - However, it wasn’t secure anymore so the best tactic would be to cancel it, however, Eisenhower presses ahead with the operation and is essentially defeated by Sukarno (the Indonesian leader) who, in return about saying very little about the US defeat, gets a good deal of aid from the Americans, so he was quite clever

o Congo, 1960: - The CIA remove Patrice Lumumba from power as there is a concern that there is a potential wedge for the Soviets to step into –> The big thing about the Congo is that it has large deposits of Uranium, so if the leader is too independently-minded, there is always the possibility of the Soviets making gain in that respect - So, the US intervene alongside Belgian, French and British intelligence to remove him from power o Dominican Republic, 1960-61: - The CIA did not only remove Leftist leaders from power, if there is a very far-right, repressive leader, and he’s created fertile ground for a Leftist rebellion, this is not acceptable for Eisenhower either, and this is what takes place in the Dominican Republic as well

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So, Eisenhower removes Rafael Trujillo from power as well...