Torts Briefs 1-27 - summaries from class PDF

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Intel Corp. v. Hamidi Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 2003 Cal. LEXIS 4812 (Cal. June 30, 2203) Brief Fact Summary. Intel Corp. (Plaintiff) brought suit against Hamidi (Defendant), claiming that by communicating with Plaintiff’s employees on Plaintiff’s email system, Defendant committed the tort of trespass to chattels. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Under California law, the tort of trespass to chattels does not encompass an electronic communication that neither damages the recipient computer system nor impairs its functioning.

Facts. Plaintiff brought an action of trespass to chattels against Defendant. Plaintiff maintains an electronic mail (e-mail) system. On this mail system, messages between employees and those outside the company can be sent and received. Employers can make reasonable non-business use of this system. Defendant, a former employee, sent emails criticizing Plaintiff’s employment practices to numerous current employees on Plaintiff’s e-mail system. Defendant did not breach any computer security barriers. Defendant offered to remove recipients from his mailing list. Defendant’s e-mails caused neither physical damage nor functional disruption to the company’s computers. However, Defendant’s emails caused discussion among employees and managers. Plaintiff claimed that by communicating with its employees on its e-mail system, Defendant committed the tort of trespass to chattels. The trail court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Defendant was enjoined from any further mailings. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed. Issue. May Plaintiff maintain an action for trespass to property if Defendant sends an unauthorized electronic communication over Plaintiff’s electronic mail system, which neither damages the recipient computer system nor impairs its functioning? Held. No. In this case, electronic communication does not constitute an actionable trespass to personal property (the computer system) because it does not interfere with the possessor’s use or possession of, or any other legally protected interest in, the personal property itself. * To be actionable under current California tort law, Defendant’s interference must have caused some injury to the chattel or to Plaintiff’s rights in it. The Restatement makes clear that some actual harm must have occurred in order for a trespass to chattels to be actionable. Plaintiff suggests that the requirement of actual harm does not apply here because it sought only injunctive relief. To obtain injunctive relief, Plaintiff must show that Defendant’s wrongful acts threaten to cause irreparable injury. In this case, the court stated that it would make little legal sense to issue an injunction without a showing of likely irreparable injury in an action for trespass to chattels, in which injury to the personal property or the possessor’s interest in it is an element of the action. Plaintiff argued that its interest in employee productivity is a comparable protected interest in its computer system. The court disagreed. The distraction of reading an unsolicited communication is not within the scope of the tort trespass to chattels.

* California common law should not be extended to cover, as a trespass to chattels, an otherwise harmless e-mail whose contents are objectionable. Writing on behalf of several industry groups appearing as amici curiae, Professor Epstein suggested that a company’s server should be its castle, upon which any unauthorized intrusion, however harmless, is a trespass. However, the court found computers to be personal property, not realty. The court analogized an objectionable email on a computer to an unwelcome message on a telephone or fax. The court refused to adopt Professor Epstein’s view. * The court declines to address the First Amendment claims that would arise if Plaintiff had stated a claim for common law trespass. The court analogized Defendant’s e-mails to Plaintiff’s employees to that of a protester holding a sign or shouting through a bullhorn outside corporate headquarters. Dissent. (J. Brown) Plaintiff’s objection is directed not toward Defendant’s message but toward his use of Plaintiff’s property to display his message. Plaintiff deserves an injunction even if its objections are based entirely on the e-mail’s contents. Plaintiff is entitled to allow its employees Internet access without incurring any simultaneous obligation to allow access to pornographic websites. * (J. Mosk) The majority refused to distinguish the Internet from unauthorized intermeddling on a private Intranet. Defendant is not communicating in the equivalent of an unsolicited “junk” mailing through the U.S. Postal Service. Defendant’s actions, in crossing into Plaintiff’s Intranet, is more like intruding into a private mailroom, commandeering the mail cart, and dropping of unwanted broadsides on 30,000 desks. Concurrence. (J. Kennard) To establish the tort of trespass to chattels, Plaintiff must show that Defendant’s occasional emails to Plaintiff’s employees damaged Plaintiff’s computer system or impaired its functioning in some significant way. Discussion. In this case the court refused to hold that the objectionable e-mail messages distributed to a company’s employees constituted a trespass. An action for trespass to chattels will not lie if there are is no damage to the chattels. Here, the e-mails were only a momentary disturbance to the employees.

Rogers v. Board of Road Com’rs for Kent County CitationRogers v. Board of Road Comm’rs, 319 Mich. 661, 30 N.W.2d 358, 1947 Mich. LEXIS 362 (Mich. 1948) Brief Fact Summary. Pursuant to a license, Defendant placed a snow fence and posts upon Plaintiff’s husband’s property with the understanding that it would be removed at the end of winter. Defendant did not remove the fence at the end of winter, and Plaintiff’s husband was killed by an accident involving the fence’s continued presence on his property. Plaintiff sued for trespass and negligence. Synopsis of Rule of Law. When one consents to the presence of a structure or chattel on his property and that structure or chattel is not removed after the consent is revoked or terminated, he may recover for damages resulting from its continued presence.

Facts. Defendant obtained a license to place a snow fence upon Plaintiff’s husband’s property, but in so doing agreed to remove the fence after the winter months when it was necessary. Defendant failed to remove the fence after winter as agreed. When Plaintiff’s husband was later mowing the area, he was injured by a collision with the fence and ultimately died. Plaintiff sued for trespass and negligence. The Trial Court dismissed the action, finding that there was no basis for finding trespass. The Plaintiff appealed. Issue. Was the Trial Court correct in dismissing the cause of action in trespass? Held. No. The judgment was reversed and remanded. The license and agreement rendering the snow fence’s presence initially lawful did not bar an action for its presence after it should have been removed. Once consent or license to a structure or chattel’s presence upon one’s land is effectively terminated, the presence may revert to a trespass. Discussion. This case demonstrates other possible dimensions of an intrusion upon another’s land. The Court recognizes that the fence was properly on the property in the first instance and was thus not originally a trespass. Had the injury occurred during the winter months, no damages could have been sought in trespass. However, due to the expiration of the license period, the fence’s continued presence ripened into a trespass, and the damages became recoverable.

Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hill

Brief Fact Summary. Defendant’s employee routinely provided repairs to the clock located in Plaintiff’s business. On one occasion when Plaintiff’s wife requested that he repair the clock, Defendant’s employee allegedly offered to fix the clock in exchange for sexual favors and unsuccessfully reached out to grab her. When Plaintiff sued for assault, Defendant denied the allegations and argued the physical evidence showed he could not have reached Plaintiff’s wife. Synopsis of Rule of Law. For assault to occur, there must be an intentional and unlawful offer or attempt to touch another’s person in a harmful or offensive manner such that it creates a wellfounded apprehension of imminent battery. One accused of assault must also appear to have the present ability to commit the battery if not prevented.

Facts. Plaintiff sued Defendant for assault on the grounds that its employee made offensive remarks to his wife and attempted to grab her when she came into its store. Defendant’s employee admitted to having been mildly intoxicated at the time, but denies Plaintiff’s wife’s version of events. The physical evidence also suggested that Defendant’s employee would have been unlikely to be able to touch Plaintiff’s wife as described. The trial court found that whether assault had been committed was a question for the jury, who found for Plaintiff. Issue. Did the trial court err in submitting the question of whether assault had occurred to the jury? Held. No. The Court found the trial judge properly submitted the question to the jury. * When the evidence shows that a party could have made an effort to reach out and touch another in an offensive, unwanted manner and may or may not have had the apparent ability to do so at the time, whether an assault has occurred is a question for a jury. * The Court also found, however, that the employee was acting beyond the scope of his employment if he committed assault and Defendant was thus not liable for his actions. The Court reversed the verdict on this ground. Discussion. Defendant was attempting to avoid liability on the ground that its employee could not have succeeded in touching Plaintiff’s wife, even had he tried. As the Court explains, such an argument is largely irrelevant to the tort of assault. Assault requires only that the victim be put in apprehension of imminent battery. As a corollary to this rule, there may be some circumstances when no reasonable person could possibly apprehend imminent battery. For example, the alleged assailant may have been so far away from the party claiming assault that it would be impossible to reasonably believe battery was imminent. Or the alleged assailant could have been in such an obviously weakened or vulnerable position that such a belief would be impossible. However, when it simply appears that actual battery might have been difficult or unlikely, it is for the jury to decide whether the party claiming assault could have had the requisite apprehension of imminent battery.

Grant v. Stop-N-Go Market of Texas, Inc. CitationGrant v. Stop-N-Go Market of Texas, Inc., 994 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. App. 1999) Brief Fact Summary. Gerald Grant filed a false imprisonment suit against Stop-No-Go Market of Texas, Inc. after a store manager accused Grant of Stealing and refused to let Grant leave the store until the police were called. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A plaintiff can recover on charges of false imprisonment if the plaintiff was detained either by threat or physical restraint. Facts. Calhoun, the manager of a Stop-N-Go store, accused Gerald Grant (Grant) of stealing and told Grant that he could not leave the store until the police were called. Although Calhoun claims that he did not tell Grant to remain in the store, Grant claims that he was afraid to leave, and was brought into police custody soon after the police were called. Grant filed suit on charges of false imprisonment and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Stop-N-Go. Grant appealed. Issue. Whether a plaintiff can recover on charges of false imprisonment when the plaintiff was not physically restrained? Held. Yes. Reversed and remanded.

Nagata v. Quest Diagnostics Inc. United States District Court for the District of Hawai’i 303 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (2004)

Facts On January 19, 1999, Nagata (plaintiff) took a urine test as requested by his employer, Garden Isle Telecommunications. Quest Diagnostics Inc. (defendant) tested the urine sample and found that it was inconsistent with human urine. Garden Isle fired Nagata as a result of the test. Thereafter, Nagata suffered from depression and substance abuse, and contemplated suicide. On January 10, 2001, Quest informed Garden Isle that it had used incorrect testing procedures between January 4, 1999, and February 2, 1999. Quest discovered the mistake in February 1999. The improper procedures could have resulted in erroneous results to Nagata’s test. On January 25, 2001, Garden Isle notified Nagata of Quest’s error and offered Nagata his job back. Nagata brought suit against Quest for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the company’s intentional withholding of the testing error from Garden Isle and Nagata for almost two years. Quest filed a motion for summary judgment.

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