Torts Chart: General Duty Case Summaries PDF

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The evolution of General Duty, from "no privity, no liability" to general duty to all....

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Case Walter v. Wal-Mart

Evolution of General Duty Winterbottom v. Wright (1842)

Thomas v. Winchester (1852)

Loop v. Litchfield (1870)

Losee v. Clute (1873)

Devlin v. Smith (1882)

Heaven v. Pender (1883)

Facts • Plaintiff prescribed one drug, pharmacist fills Rx for another drug. • Other drug causes severe damages (internal bleeding, etc.)

Rule Respondeat Superior: Wal-Mart is vicariously liable for the negligence of its employee.

• Wheel of a coach collapses • Winterbottom is injured as a result

No privity, no duty/liability. Defendant owed a duty ONLY to the carriage owner, who had a contract with manufacturer. Otherwise, a “parade of horribles” would ensue. Exception to Privity Rule: Liability extends to end user if the product is “inherently dangerous” Inherently dangerous products cause an imminent threat of harm to users. Loop’s usage was unforeseeable to manufacturer. Reaffirms Winterbottom rule of “no privity, no duty” Chain of liability to manufacturer broken once buyer accepts product and inspects product. Expands Thomas to apply to 3rd parties injured by defects of a product that render the product “inherently dangerous” Since serious injury was a “natural and probable” consequence of the product’s use, defendant is liable. Defendant owed a duty because it was “reasonably foreseeable” that careless acts could cause injury to a plaintiff.

• Defendant sells Thomas’s wife a mislabeled poison. • Chain of distribution: Manufacturer Distributor - Pharmacist - Plaintiff • Cast-iron balance wheel for saw breaks, killing Loop. • The balance wheel was used for five years prior to Loop’s usage, without issue. • Steam boiler at paper mill exploded • Seller was aware that buyer would perform inspection of boiler before use • Scaffolding collapses, injuring plaintiff • Scaffolding built for a contractor for his employees to use. • Only contract between scaffolding manufacturer and contractor. • Employee of independent contractor was injured while working on a dock when owner of the dock provided a defective rope that gave way.

DUTY ELEMENT: GENERAL DUTY MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916)

Reasonable Foreseeability Mussivand v. David (1989)

QUALIFIED DUTIES OF CARE Duty to Protect or Rescue Osterlind v. Hill (1928)

Baker v. Fenneman & Brown Prop., LLC (2003)

• Defendant car manufacturer purchases wheel from a reliable source • Did not test wheel before selling the manufactured car to a dealer • Plaintiff is injured when his car’s wheel collapses

Broadly: Manufacturers owe a duty to anyone who they can reasonably foresee injuring by its carelessly made product Narrowly: If a product, when carelessly made, is reasonably certain to put life and limb in peril (and the manufacturer knows that it will be used by a non-purchaser and still fails to inspect it) the manufacturer owes a duty to product users to make their products carefully.

• Affair between Dr. West and Dr. David allows for transfer of STD from David to Dr. Mussivand. • David never alerted West to his STD • Dr. West therefore never alerted Dr. M to the potential of infection

One who knows, or should know, of their STD infection, and engages in sexual conduct with a married person owes the married person’s spouse a duty to take care against infecting them. This is true up until the point that the spouse knows, or should have reason to know, of their own infection.

• Plaintiff’s decedent rents a canoe from defendant while intoxicated • Decedent’s canoe tips over and decedent calls for help until he eventually drowns

When no legal right is infringed, there is no affirmative duty to rescue or protect another from harm (even when the rescue is safe and easy)

• Plaintiff falls twice in a Taco Bell restaurant, with no fault to defendant.

This case involves a nonfeasance (failure to act) versus a misfeasance (action or failure to stop). Affirmative duty to rescue/protect exists when there is a special relationship

• Holding: If a possessor of land knows, or should know, that an invitee on its premises needs assistance, the possessor must take reasonable steps to assist, even if they did not create the need/danger.

between plaintiff and defendant. Special Relationships: • Innkeeper - Guest • Business - Invitee • Common Carrier - Passenger • School - Minor Student • Camp - Camper Not Special Relationships: • Friend - Friend • Social Host - Guest

Premises Liability Leffler v. Sharp (2005)

Pure Economic Loss Aikens v. Debow (2000) MAJORITY VIEW

People Express Airlines v, Consolidated Rail Corp. (1985) MINORITY VIEW

• Leffler is a guest at the hotel, he spent the night drinking and gambling. • Returns to hotel and finds a small window that leads to the roof • Signage near the window says “NOT AN EXIT!” • Leffler proceeds onto roof and falls through, causing injury.

Leffler exceeded his scope as an invitee and became a trespasser once he stepped onto the roof. In doing so, he was no longer owed a duty of care to warn of or protect from dangers.

• Defendant’s negligent driving caused damages to an overpass which deterred customers from patronizing plaintiff’s motel.

There is no duty to avoid causing pure economic loss to someone else, absent a special relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. To have defendant here incur liability, there would be a limitless liability for claims that could be brought. Heightened Foreseeability Test: 1. Defendant is aware that plaintiffs nearby would be evacuated in the event of a toxic spill.

• Defendant carelessly released a toxic gas that caused the evacuation of a nearby airline control building. • This lead to flight delays, cancellations,

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Wyman v. Leavitt (1880)

and loss of $$.

2. Duty of care is based on foreseeability of economic loss to plaintiffs “comprising and identifiable class” of victims.

• Defendant carelessly blasted rocks • Caused plaintiff to fear being blasted by flying objects

The old “no injury rule”: Mental suffering alone, unaccompanied by physical harm, that is caused by simple negligence cannot sustain an action. • Pure emotional harm or fright, even if a setback for the plaintiff, is not cognizable in negligence law as an injury. Robb Zone of Danger Rule: There is a duty to take care against causing distress to another if: (1) Defendant’s carelessness puts the plaintiff at risk of imminent physical harm (ZoD); (2) Plaintiff’s awareness of that risk causes her to fear for her safety; and (3) Plaintiff’s fright produces physical manifestations “that would be elements of damage if bodily injury occurred.” 1. Physical Impact Test: Allows a plaintiff to recover for emotional injuries only if they have suffered a physical impact from defendant’s negligence. 2. Zone of Danger Test: Limits recovery for emotional injury to plaintiffs who either suffered a physical impact or were placed in imminent danger of a physical impact from defendant’s negligence. 3. Relative-Bystander Test: Permits recovery if the defendant could have

Robb v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. (1965)

• Plaintiff just barely escapes death after car becomes stuck in a rut at the railroad junction. • No contemporaneous physical injury was sustained by plaintiff

Consolidated Railroad v. Gottshall (1994)

Gottshall suffered from PTSD; under harsh work conditions, witnessed the death of a close friend and ordered back to work near the body.

Tarasoff v. Regents of UCLA (1976)

BREACH ELEMENT Myers v. Heritage Enterprise (2004)

Martin v. Evans (1998)

Judgment as a Matter of Law (JMOL) Campbell v. Kovich (2006)

• Poddar, a student at UCLA, kills Plaintiff’s decedent. • Two months earlier, Poddar, under the care of the university’s counseling services, tells his therapist that he wants to kill Tarasoff. (Although she was not named, she was easily identifiable) • Therapist had asked campus police to detain Poddar, but he was released shortly after. BREACH IS A QUESTION • Plaintiff’s decedent was injured by defendant nursing home aides in a Hoyer Lift accident • CNAs are not professionals. They are to be held at the ordinary care standard, not the professional negligence standard. • Defendant backs his truck up and hits plaintiff • Defendant was parked in the last space of the lot, went to use restroom, came back and saw no one behind his truck. • D completed a log that took 2 mins, and proceeded to slowly back his truck up using his mirrors, and flashing lights.

• Defendant employs a minor to mow his

reasonably foreseen the emotional injury to the plaintiff. The plaintiff generally would have to witness a horrific accident befall a close relative. A treating therapist who knows, or should know, that their patient poses a serious threat to an identifiable potential victim owes a duty to take reasonable steps to warn the potential victim.

FOR THE JURY! Statutes that impose duties of care typically impose ordinary or reasonable duties of care, unless language indicates otherwise. Nurse’s aides here breached their duty. Jury returns a special verdict for the defendant, holding that defendant was reasonably prudent in backing up his truck. **Just because the trial court may have reached a different conclusion, it cannot order a new trial on the question of breach. Breach is a question of fact, and therefore left only to the jury. The trial court here decides the question

Adams v. Bullock (1919) *Cardozo

Person of Ordinary Prudence: Vaughn v. Menlove (1837)

Appelhans v. McFall (2001)

lawn • In that process, the mower picks up an unidentified object and shoots it from under • The UFO strikes plaintiff in the eye as she was jogging past the property. • Defendant operates a trolley line with an overhead wire system. • Plaintiff was burned by the exposed wires when he was swinging an 8-footlong rope as he crossed the bridge.

• Defendant keeps a stack of hay in a location where it was likely to catch fire • Friend warns D of the risk, but D says he’ll “risk it” • Haystack catches fire and spreads into plaintiff’s property damaging P’s property.

of breach (instead of shifting the question to a jury) because as a matter of law there was no genuine issue regarding the minor’s reasonable care.

Holding the defendant liable in this instance would make them essentially an “insurer.” Use of the overhead wire system was lawful, and to change the infrastructure entirely would be impracticable. Also, the defendant’s wires were situated in such a way that only an “extraordinary measure” could make them dangerous (Unforeseeable). On appeal, Menlove argues that he should be held to a lower standard, given that he himself considers himself to be an “idiot.” The person of ordinary prudence standard is objective and does not take into account any individual person’s mental ability....